PHILOSOPHIES OF PEACE AND WAR:

A BOOK OF READINGS

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INTRODUCTION: PHILOSOPHY, PEACE AND WAR

War, when it comes, is starkly real. Blood and steel, fire and catastrophic explosions are the stuff of wars. A wars is an event, or series of events, in which people are killed and many proud fruits of civilized society are destroyed in a struggle for dominance. **Peace** too is real, though much less dramatic. Positively speaking, it is the whole complex of human endeavors in a society where individuals and groups serve themselves and each other in pursuit of their different interests. Whether they are just or unjust, both war and peace constitute different states of distinct physical and social reality in the world.

Philosophies, on the other hand, are mere systems of ideas. Ideas and concepts, arguments and theories, are the stuff of philosophy. Professional philosophers are a small group who trade in philosophies and philosophical talk. The question may well be asked whether anything can be gained by considering what philosophers have said about war and peace. Has philosophy any relevance to war? Actual decisions on war and peace are, and must be, made by the practical, realistic leaders of men.

But men fight - or refuse to fight - on the basis of ideas and beliefs. They wage wars, or seek to avoid them, by calculations and appeals to national or group self-interest, or on suspicions of their enemies' intentions, or under the banner of ideals. Whatever their real motives may be, the concepts of right and wrong, justice and injustice, are invoked on all sides to justify or rationalize whatever path has been taken. Conflicts and oppositions of ideas underly the conflicts of blood and steel.

Philosophy deals with conflicts and oppositions of ideas and with attempts to reconcile them.

Many who like to describe themselves as realistic or practical have argued that philosophical ideas, political ideals, and articles of religious or cultural faith (ideologies) are never the real determinants of social conflicts; at best they are mere rationalizations - bags of tricks from which one can pull forth high-sounding principles to present as disinterested reasons for doing what serves one's own interest. At worst, they are devices to hoodwink the gullible and the ignorant into submission; they have nothing to do with either the real causes of war or the necessary conditions of peace. This position deserves careful examination, but whether true or not, it is itself a point of view, a philosophical position concerning war and peace. Its acceptance has an impact on decisions concerning war and peace. It must be studied along with other views. And the others - including the "ideological" views - are still worthy of study; if only that we may, in our ignorance, be less likely to be hoodwinked and better able to define clearly our basic aims and interests. There is not just one, but many, philosophies of war and peace.

Philosophy tends to be eclipsed in times of war. Warring nations do not welcome the questioning mind or the philosophical search for universal principles. Unity of thought and partisan resolve are the order of the day. Research is limited to practical questions relevant to

military objectives. But though philosophical inquiry is de-emphasized in wartime, ideas used to justify and conduct wars, are developed and inculcated in times of peace. It is well to investigate the philosophical roots of various rationales for war or peace in periods of calm and leisure, before minds and wills become slaves to survival.

II

Philosophy, as an academic or intellectual discipline, is a fairly well defined field of study. It is customarily divided into three major subdivisions: metaphysics, theory of knowledge and theory of value.

The first of these, historically quite central, is metaphysics. The basic question of metaphysics is: what is the ultimate nature and structure of Reality? The theologies featuring a God-centered universe found in Judaic, Islamic and Christian religions are all metaphysical theories, purporting to give the one true answer to the metaphysical question. No less metaphysical, though more constrained by observable facts, are non-religious materialistic, or physicalistic, world-views, ranging from the scientistic realism of many American and European scientists to the Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism expounded in communist nations. These too constitute metaphysical claims about the ultimate nature and structure of reality. The Absolute Idealism of Hegel, the various "common sense" dualisms ranging from Aristotle's hierarchical theory of man and nature to the natural rights theories embedded in Locke's Dualism are basic metaphysical positions.

Often metaphysical presuppositions or theories are invoked or appealed to in arguments relating to war and peace. One purpose of this book is to explore such connections where they can be found.

The second major subdivision of philosophy is value theory, which includes ethics and aesthetics. In ethical theory the basic questions have to do with concepts of right and wrong, good and bad, justice and injustice, and in aesthetics the problems have do with beauty and what is intrinsically of worth. Often theories of ethics or morals are tied to metaphysical theories; e.g., when religious doctrines of right and wrong are claimed to be determined by God, or, in other metaphysical systems, where ethical principles are said to come from Nature, or History, or Reason. On the other hand some metaphysical systems leave no place for objective ethics, viewing concepts of right and wrong, justice and injustice, as merely psychological or sociological phenomena caused by material conditions. But theories of value can also be examined quite independently of metaphysics; they may neither derive from not imply any particular metaphysic. Further, opposing theories of value are often both compatible with the same metaphysic - God can be a god of war, or a god of peace; Nature may be characterized as beneficent malevolent or neutral.

Aesthetic and moral values, and philosophical theories supporting them - obviously exercise a fundamental influence on decisions relating to war and peace. The question is whether certain theories of values or ethics favor war, or peace, and if so which ones, and in what ways?

The third major subdivision of philosophy is theory of knowledge, or epistemology. This is concerned with the difference between knowledge and mere belief, and tries to specify sound procedures for making inferences and arriving at true or well-founded beliefs. Most people have few ideas on this subject - they tend to believe or accept what they are told or what they want to believe for some reason. However, different assumptions, or theories, about knowledge (or lack of any clear theory) can strongly influence decision-making with respect to war and peace. Holy wars have been based on popular convictions that God's will can be and is revealed to certain persons through revelation; revolutionary wars have been based on appeals to "common sense", or truths "self-evident to natural reason"; and "wars of liberation" have been justified as grounded in "scientific" knowledge of the dialectic of history. In wartime individual conscience and the individual's independent judgment is often overcome by strong claims of authoritative knoledge. Thus the methods or habits of belief-formation which prevail among the leaders and citizens of a society can have an enormous effect on responses of that society to issues of war and peace. In seeking to distinguish better from worse methods of belief-formation in theory of knowledge, philosophy encourages critical thinking and an inquiring mind. There are, among philosophers and non-philosophers, different ideas and theories about knowledge, as in metaphysics or value theory, but there is perhaps no area in which critcal reasoning is more important than where issues of war and peace are involved.

Thus philosophical ideas - metaphysical, moral or aesthetic, epistemological - enter into and affect attitudes and beliefs about war and peace in very subtle and complex ways. They are found, not only in the writings of philosophers, but in religious sources, speeches of generals and statesmen, laws and constitutions, historical accounts, and even novels and poetry. But the philosophical ideas, good or bad, which are implicit in the speeches and documents of religious leaders and statesmen exert tremendous influence on popular beliefs and attitudes regarding war and peace. To get a complete picture of how philosophical ideas influence decisions on war or peace, such writings and speeches should be studied and analysed to uncover the implicit philosophical presuppositions involved. For this reason, slightly more than half of the selections in this book are from political or religious sources.

Philosophy is essentially a rational discipline. While religion, art and politics can appeal directly to feelings and beliefs, philosophers try to discover and lay out the reasons, or rational grounds, which reasonable people might offer to support to these values or beliefs logically. They strive to gain an impartial understanding of the rational arguments on all sides of a wuestion, before introducing their own values and beliefs to make their own decisions. They seek to be more explicit, more consistent, and more universal in outlook than the typical non-philosopher. Thus our intention in including the important work from many political and religious sources with many opposing positions, is to discover and lay out their metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, and epistemological presuppositions, and examine how these may enter into decisions regarding war and peace.

Although the author of this book must confess, in honesty, to a personal belief that wars ought to be greatly restrained or eliminated, these readings are not designed to lead the reader to any foregone conclusion. Rather, as suggested above, the objective is to produce understanding of opposing systems of thought and to show logical inter-relationships between philosophical ideas and decision-making processes involving war and peace. Hopefully, this will enable the reader to formulate his own views more clearly, and be better able to understand his opponents. Better understanding of opponents should help us to avoid those wars - of which there are many - caused by misunderstanding one's opponents. But such understanding can not in itself eliminate all wars. That would require certain conditions, including the prevalence of appropriate attitudes and values, which philosophy can rationalize (as well as their opposites) but which philosophy can not, by itself, make prevail.

III

The lessons to be learned from these readings are of two sorts.

The first sort is drawn from the chronological order of their appearance. By study of this sequence we find 1) progressive changes in thought which exhibit a clear dialectical development, or evolution, of ideas concerning peace, war, and international justice. This is duly noted in several evolutionary philosophies of the history of war and peace (notably in Kant, Hegel and Marx) though they differ in their interpretations. But we also find 2) attitudes and ideas regarding war and peace which seem to persist and recur constantly in history.

The second sort of lesson spells out ways in which philosophical pre-suppositions enter into decisions about war and peace. Details of these relationships can only be developed in connection with specific readings. But in general we shall find that very different metaphysical world-views are capable of sharing very similar attitudes and values judgments about war and peace, and that most metaphysical world-views can accommodate very diverse attitudes and value-judgments concerning war or peace. Since value judgments are the determining factors in decisions affecting war or peace, perhaps the greatest lesson of these readings, then, is the necessity, if human civilization is to survive and progress, of developing rational and universally acceptable methods of arriving at value judgments where there are conflicting group interests, independently of differences in metaphysical beliefs; a task which belongs jointly to ethics and epistemology. Further general comments on these sorts of lessons will be deferred until the Epilogue at the end of the book. Then the reader will be in a better position to pull the different readings together.

The historical lesson from the chonological record may, however, anticipated with some profit before we begin. Viewing the readings which follow as a whole - as a partial record of the history of philosophical ideas about war and peace - one is struck by several points.

First of all, it is remarkable to find that so many contemporary ideas and attitudes appear so ancient. 1) The idea of a Holy War, i.e., a war commanded or sanctioned by God, found in the chronicles of Moses 3,500 years ago, still lives both in the minds and faiths of influential orthodox Jews in Israel, and as the idea of Jihad, from the Koran 1,300 years ago, lives in the minds of fundamentalist muslims in Iran, motivating and justifying both groups in war. 2) The nationalistic spirit of pride and expansionism exhibited by the Athenian generals in the Peloponnesion Wars, recurs in the rulers of Germany, Italy and Japan in World War II, in the expansionism of the Argentinian generals of 1984, and in continuing implicit claims of a right to dominate smaller nations by both the United States and the Soviet Union. 3) The honour and respect accorded to soldiers and the military in all countries has changed little since Plato. 4) The persistent belief in an objective distinction between just and unjust wars (though in application it is always one's own side that is just and the other side which is unjust) is as old as the Jews and the Greeks, and as current as the morning newspaper. Though changes in technology and material progress have been greatly altered the concepts of both war and peace in the last 2,500 years, these attitudes and ideas regarding martial projects seem remarkably constant.

On the other hand, there seems to have been a three-pronged evolution of changing ideas regarding war and peace.

1) One of these prongs is the result of technological development of weaponry throughout history, which has progressed with the advance of scientific knowledge. This has led to constant revisions and changes in ideas about military strategy and tactics. The contemporary phase of this evolution, involving rapid developments in nuclear weapons, electronics, laser and space warfare, is forcing radical revisions in the very concept of war and victory, is affecting both the quality and the structure of peace, and raises the horrendous spectre of the annihilation of humankind.

2) Much less apparent to the modern eye, is the long but steady development in the concepts of what constitutes a just war, and in growing acceptance of these concepts. Ancient conquerers saw no moral problem in the practice of killing all of the male enemy and enslaving the enemy's women and children, until the Greeks began to debate whether justice was the same as the interest of the stronger. The distinction between just and unjust wars continued to develop from Cicero to Augustine to Thomas Aquinas, eventually reaching a high point in the work of Grotius, the "father of International Law" in 1625. Grotius stressed a distinction between <u>just causes</u> for going to war, and the <u>just conduct</u> of military operations during a war. Concepts of just and unjust grounds for going to war have since been incorporated in the charters of the League of Nations and the United Nations; concepts of self-determination, democracy and the legitimization of war only on the grounds of self-defense now exert a powerful force on world opinion. The old-style imperialistic adventures of Germany in Europe, Italy in North

Africa and the Japanese in China and Asia were beaten back in World War II, and while powerful nations still occasionally violate the newer concepts, world opinion often makes them retract. On the other side of the just war concept, the concept of <u>just conduct</u> within a war, more marked changes have occurred. Building on Grotius' principles a long line of international treaties and conventions - such as the Geneva Conventions - have established as principles of international law humane treatment of prisoners, provision for care of sick and wounded enemies, preservation of enemies' property rights occupied territories, immunity of non-combatants from military attack or enslavement, outlawing of chemical or bacteriological warfare, and many other principles which stand in marked contrast to the crude and bestial military practices of earlier ages. Though these principles of just war are still violated, it can not be denied that there has been progressive change in what is deemed acceptable in the military conduct of convential war.

3) Finally, it is clear also that ideas of world government have developed and gained increasing acceptance in the last three centuries. From the ancient concept of a Pax Romana - a group of countries under unified Roman rule - emerged the rather tenuous concept of a Holy Roman Empire united under Christianity - with a concept of world government to secure peace outlined in Dante's De Monarchia around 1311. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries plans for systems of government to provide "perpetual peace" sprang forth from pens of many thinkers. Around the middle of the next century, the nineteenth, nations began to get together in "international peace conferences", and within the last hundred years the web of international agreements in all sorts of areas has proliferated beyond description. The establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations gave a visible structure and semblance of actual world government. Though in practice we are far from bringing the many diverse and quarreling nationalistic factions under one rule, the progress towards that goal - once a mere philosophical idea - has been remarkable in the last one hundred and twenty-five years. The horrendous prospect of nuclear war has the dual effect of raising the balance of terror to unprecedented heights while nations remain autonomous, and forcing mankind to consider constraints on nationalistic sovereignty to avoid mutual annihilation.

Thus, though recent centuries have seen much more thought given to peace and international justice, with a proliferation of international organizations set up to avoid conflicts and the beginnings of world government, the future of mankind still seems to hang in the balance. Attitudes and philosophies emphasizing peaceful reconciliation and non-violent resolutions of conflict are up against more prevalent mind-sets which favor strong national self defense and military leverage of national interests. Meanwhile all parties struggle desperately to cope with the inexorable, everchanging technological developments which, guided by wrong philosophical presuppositions or principles, or by simple lack of knowledge, could lead to the end of mankind.

MOSES and ISAIAH

The following passages from the Old Testament are a good point of departure for two reasons. First, from a historical point of view, they convey what is probably the most detailed record available of practices and concepts and practices of war and peace that far back in history. Secondly, because these passages are included in the sacred writings of three living major religions, the ideas and values they express continue to exert an influence on popular and official beliefs, attitudes and decisions regarding war and peace. Though they antedated the rise of philosophy, they are rich in philosophical assumptions and conclusions - metaphysical, moral, and epistemological.

1. MOSES (1500?, 1200? B.C.)

The five books known to the Jews as The Torah, or The Law of Moses, are included among the sacred writings of Christian, Jewish and Islamic religions. By tradition, Moses is cited as the author of all five books, but modern scholars usually attribute them to later groups of writers. To Jews the Torah is the foundation of their religion; to Christians these boks are the first five books of their Holy Bible; and to Moslems the central figures of these books - Adam, Noah, Abraham and Moses - along with Jesus are counted the five principal early prophets who preceded Muhammad, who is them the final, incorrigible source of God's messages to mankind.

The basic theme of the Torah, and indeed throughout the Old Testament, is the struggle of a people, chosen by God to provide an example of righteousness to all the world, to 1) live up to the moral standards God commands, and 2) to make of themselves, despite their enemies, the great nation God promised they could become if they lived up to their part of the covenant.

In outline the central story is as follows. After two millenia of being provoked by human wickedness, God tells the faithful Abraham (c.1921 B.C.?) to move to Canaan, promising that his descendants there will become a great nation and blessing to mankind. Abraham, obeys and his son Isaac, and grandson Jacob live there for 200 years, until Jacob and his eleven other sons join Joseph in Egypt. Jacob is renamed Israel, and descendants of his twelve sons Israelites. The Israelites live in captivity in Egypt for 430 years until Moses leads them back, after 40 years in the wilderness, to the promised land of Canaan. Moses dies before the conquest is complete; but it follows a few years after his death.

The selections which follow, taken from the most widely read English translation (1611), include 1) God's promise to Abraham, 2) the Law of Retaliation and the Ten Commandments (concepts of justice, and personal morality purportedly revealed by God to Moses), 3) an account of the holy war against the Midianites, commanded by God so as to re-take the promised land of Canaan, with graphic detail on treatment of the enemy, division of booty, etc., as well as specific descriptions of the boundaries and division of the Promised Land, and finally 4) the laws of warfare, claimed to be given by God to Moses at that time.

As a historical account, the practices described and accepted -

indeed, divinely commanded - for treating the enemy, taking booty, etc., in war, stand in shocking, bestial contrast to the more civilized international law of today. But the evidence is that these practices were common to all war-parties at that stage of history, whether or not divinely sanctioned as Moses claimed.

The metaphysical world-view asserted and presupposed throughout these writings is that in addition to the natural world of men and animals, rivers and plains, there is a super-natural God who created this world and all living creatures in it. The moral and ethical theory conveyed is that God 1) demands unquestioning recognition of his existence and authority, 2) commands obedience to his principles and laws of conduct, and by his commands determines the difference between right and wrong, 3) has chosen a specific tribal entity to exemplify, defend, and carry out his commands, and 4) visits disobedience to these commands with displeasure, wrath and punishment. Finally and crucially, a theory of knowledge is presupposed: namely, that selected persons can have true, authoritative knowledge - by direct revelation from God - of what God's commands and laws are.

From the point of view of philosophy all of these assumptions and ideas should be examined, with an eye to discover and lay out reasons and arguments which support them, or support their logical opposites. Philosophers have discussed arguments for and against propositions that God exists, for and against immortality, etc., from the beginning. But what has often been more crucial in questions regarding war and peace is not so much whether there is a God, but whether, if there is a God, there are any good reasons to believe that certain persons <u>know</u> what God's will is. For, in the history of war, and arguments for peace, the contending parties have often differed not on whether there was a God or not, but on whether God was on their side. And on each side there was an implicit claim that they, or their leaders, had authoritative knowledge of what was right or wrong, directly from God. This dogmatism, or unquestioning acceptance, of claims about God's will has created many an unreconcilable conflict and often led to war.

Though history has changed, philosophical ideas above, perpetuated by religions, continue to influence beliefs and attitudes about war and peace in various ways. The concept of a Holy War, God-commanded, later gave credence to the Christian Crusades; and to many Jewish and Christian Fundamentalists, the belief that these passages are authoritatively known to have come God, makes present-day Israel's claims for territory in the Promised Land both just and right, while also supporting the Muslim's concept of Jihad (very much alive in Iran today). The Law of Retaliation - i.e., the concept of rudimentary justice expressed by "an eye for an eye" - guides the decisions of not a few governments in responding to enemy action. More broadly, the Biblical examples of divinely sanctioned wars and war practices preserves the belief, for many of the faithful, that wars can be good and just despite their carnage, if in accordance with God's will.

2. ISAIAH (c. 750 B.C.)

Just as concepts of war, and what is acceptable in war have changed, concepts of peace have changed too. There are, to be sure, passages from the book of Isaiah, which have become part of the litany of peace movements. But reading the book of Isaiah as a whole, and knowing its historical context, it becomes clear that its concept of peace, though clearly a precursor, is quite different from our modern concept.

There is little in the Old Testament about peace in the sense of a stable and just relationships between the diverse nationalities and cultures of the world. As history of one small people struggling against its own waywardness from God's commands, and in a continuing battle to survive against the onslaughts of predators from Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Media, Greece and Rome, the Old Testament is full of wars and prophecies of wars. The internal peace of individuals, freed from slavery, poverty or war, and associated with the security and comfort of a firm religious faith is often referred to, and Isaiah extended this to a larger social context. But still, among the anxieties and warring tyrannies of those times our modern concept of international peace was incapable of even being conceived.

Isaiah lived around 750 B.C.. Israel had seen its greatest days as a nation under Kings Saul, David and Solomon (from 1095 to 9:75 B.C.), and had then split into two battling kingdoms, the Southern Kingdom, (Judah) which included Jerusalem, and the Norther Kingdom (Israel, or Ephraim). Isaiah was a prophet and adviser to the kings of Judah. As a religious leader he strenuously deplored the lack of faith in God and God's purposes, the iniquities of the rich and powerful, and the general sinfulness and wrongdoing in Judah and Ephraim. He prophesied the fall of Judah and Israel before their enemies as God's punishment for the nation's unfaithfulness, as well as the ultimate devastation and defeat of those enemies (the Assyrians and Babylonians) for not recognizing God. But he also predicted eventual redemption for a reunited Israel under a descendant of David (which Christians, but not Jews, have said was Jesus) and with him peace and the end of wars. Thus what is really predicted is the eventual victory of Israel and the submission of all nations to the God of Israel - not quite an international peace among nations of all different religions, social systems and cultures.

Nevertheless, we include these "peace passages" because they present the concept of a just and moral society, governed by "the spirit of wisdom and understanding" in which warring factions are somehow reconciled so that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more".

GENESIS 12

12 Now the LORD said to Abram, "Go from your country and your kindred and your father's house to the land that I will show you. 2 And I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name great, so that you will be a blessing. 3 I will bless those who bless you, and him who curses you I will curse; and by you all the families of the earth shall bless themselves."[q]

4 So Abram went, as the LORD had told him; and Lot went with him. Abram was seventy-five years old when he departed from Haran. 5 And Abram took Sar'ai his wife, and Lot his brother's son, and all their possessions which they had gathered, and the persons that they had gotten in Haran; and they set forth to go to the land of Canaan. When they had come to the land of Canaan, 6 Abram passed through the land to the place at Shechem, to the oak[r] of Moreh. At that time the Canaanites were in the land. 7 Then the LORD appeared to Abram, and said, "To your descendants I will give this land." So he built there an altar to the LORD, who had appeared to him.

LEVITICUS 25

[a]3 And the LORD said to Moses, [4] "Bring out of the camp him who cursed; and let all who heard him lay their hands upon his head, and let all the congregation stone him. 15 And say to the people of Israel, Whoever curses his God shall bear his sin. 16 He who blasphemes the name of the LORD shall be put to death; all the congregation shall stone him; the sojourner as well as the native, when he blasphemes the Name, shall be put to death. 17 He who kills a man shall be put to death. 18 He who kills a beast shall make it good, life for life. 19 When a man causes a disfigurement in his neighbor, as he has done it shall be done to him, 20 fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; as he has disfigured a man, he shall be disfigured. 21 He who kills a beast shall make it good; and he who kills a man shall be put to death. 22 You shall have one law for the sojourner and for the native; for I am the LORD your God." 23 So Moses spoke to the people of Israel; and they brought him who had cursed out of the camp, and stoned him with stones. Thus the people of Israel did as the LORD commanded Moses.

EXODUS, 19

3 And [t]Mō'-sĕs went up unto God, and the LORD [u]called unto him out of the mountain, saying, Thus shalt thou say to the house of Jā'-cŏb, and tell the children of Ĭs'-rā-ĕl;

4 [v]Ye have seen what I did unto the Ē-gўp'-tĭăns, and *how* [w]I bare you on eagles' wings, and brought you unto myself.

5 Now [x]therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then [y]ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for [z]all the earth *is* mine:

6 And ye shall be unto me a [a]kingdom of priests, and an [b]holy nation. These *are* the words which thou shalt speak unto the children of Ĭs'-rā-ĕl.

EXODUS, 20.

AND God spake [p]all these words, saying,

2 [q]I *am* the LORD thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Ē'-gўpt, [r]out of the house of [s]bondage.

3 [t]Thou shalt have no other gods before me.

4 [u]Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness *of any thing* that *is* in heaven above, or that *is* in the earth beneath, or that *is* in the water under the earth:

5 [v]Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God *am* [w]a jealous God, [x]visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth *generation* of them that hate me;

6 And [y]shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.

7 [z]Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain; for the LORD [a]will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.

8 [b]Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.

9 [c]Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work:

10 But the [d]seventh day *is* the sabbath of the LORD thy God: *in it* thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, [e]nor thy stranger that *is* within thy gates:

11 For [f]*in* six days the LORD made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them *is*, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the LORD blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it.

12 ¶ [g]Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee.

13 [h]Thou shalt not kill.

14 [i]Thou shalt not commit adultery.

15 [j]Thou shalt not steal.

16 [k]Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.

17 [l]Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, [m]thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that *is* thy neighbour's.

THE HOLY WAR FOR THE PROMISED LAND

NUMBERS 31

31 The LORD said to Moses, [2] "Avenge the people of Israel on the Mid'ianites; afterward you shall be gathered to your people." 3 And Moses said to the people, "Arm men from among you for the war, that they may go against Mid'ian, to execute the LORD's vengeance on Mid'ian. 4 You shall send a thousand from each of the tribes of Israel to the war." 5 So there were provided, out of the thousands of Israel, a thousand from each tribe, twelve thousand armed for war. 6 And Moses sent them to the war, a thousand from each tribe, together with Phin'ehas the son of Elea'zar the priest, with the vessels of the sanctuary and the trumpets for the alarm in his hand. 7 They warred against Mid'ian, as the LORD commanded Moses, and slew every male. 8 They slew the kings of Mid'ian with the rest of their slain, Evi, Rekem, Zur, Hur, and Reba, the five kings of Mid'ian; and they also slew Balaam the son of Be'or with the sword. 9 And the people of Israel took captive the women of Mid'ian and their little ones; and they took as booty all their cattle, their flocks, and all their goods. 10 All their cities in the places where they dwelt, and all their encampments, they burned with fire, 11 and took all the spoil and all the booty, both of man and of beast. 12 Then they brought the captives and the booty and the spoil to Moses, and to Elea'zar the priest, and

NUMBERS 31

13 Moses, and Elea'zar the priest, and all the leaders of the congregation, went forth to meet them outside the camp. 14 And Moses was angry with the officers of the army, the commanders of thousands and the commanders of hundreds, who had come from service in the war. 15 Moses said to them, "Have you let all the women live? 16 Behold, these caused the people of Israel, by the counsel of Balaam, to act treacherously against the LORD in the matter of Pe'or, and so the plague came among the congregation of the LORD. 17 Now therefore, kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman who has known man by lying with him. 18 But all the young girls who have not known man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves. 19 Encamp outside the camp seven days; whoever of you has killed any person, and whoever has touched any slain, purify yourselves and your captives on the third day and on the seventh day. 20 You shall purify every garment, every article of skin, all work of goats' hair, and every article of wood."

21 And Elea'zar the priest said to the men of war who had gone to battle: "This is the statute of the law which the LORD has commanded Moses: 22 only the gold, the silver, the bronze, the iron, the tin, and the lead, 23 everything that can stand the fire, you shall pass through the fire, and it shall be clean. Nevertheless it shall also be purified with the water of impurity; and whatever cannot stand the fire, you shall pass through the water. 24 You must wash your clothes on the seventh day, and you shall be clean; and afterward you shall come into the camp."

25 The LORD said to Moses, 26 "Take the count of the booty that was taken, both of man and of beast, you and Elea'zar the priest and the heads of the fathers' houses of the congregation; 27 and divide the booty into two parts, between the warriors who went out to battle and all the congregation. 28 And levy for the LORD a tribute from the men of war who went out to battle, one out of five hundred, of the persons and of the oxen and of the asses and of the flocks; 29 take it from their half, and give it to Elea'zar the priest as an offering to the LORD. 30 And from the people of Israel's half you shall take one drawn out of every fifty, of the persons, of the oxen, of the asses, and of the flocks, of all the cattle, and give them to the Levites who have charge of the tabernacle of the LORD." 31 And Moses and Elea'zar the priest did as the LORD commanded Moses.

32 Now the booty remaining of the spoil that the men of war took was: six hundred and seventy-five thousand sheep, 33 seventy-two thousand cattle, 34 sixty-one thousand asses, 35 and thirty-two thousand persons in all, women who had not known man by lying with him. 36 And the half, the portion of those who had gone out to war, was in number three hundred and thirty-seven thousand five hundred sheep, 37 and the LORD's tribute of sheep was six hundred and seventy-five. 38 The cattle were thirty-six thousand, of which the LORD's tribute was seventy-two. 39 The asses were thirty thousand five hundred, of which the LORD's tribute was sixty-one. 40 The persons were sixteen thousand, of which the LORD's tribute was thirty-two persons. 41 And Moses gave the tribute, which was the offering for the LORD, to Elea'zar the priest, as the LORD commanded Moses.

42 From the people of Israel's half, which Moses separated from that of the men who had gone to war– 43 now the congregation's half was three hundred and thirty-seven thousand five hundred sheep, 44 thirty-six thousand cattle, 45 and thirty thousand five hundred asses, 46 and sixteen thousand persons– 47 from the people of Israel's half Moses took one of every fifty, both of persons and of beasts, and gave them to the Levites who had charge of the tabernacle of the LORD; as the LORD commanded Moses.

48 Then the officers who were over the thousands of the army, the captains of thousands and the captains of hundreds, came near to Moses, 49 and said to Moses, "Your servants have counted the men of war who are under our command, and there is not a man missing from us. 50 And we have brought the LORD's offering, what each man found, articles of gold, armlets and bracelets, signet rings, earrings, and beads, to make atonement for ourselves before the LORD." 51 And Moses and Elea'zar the priest received from them the gold, all wrought articles. 52 And all the gold of the offering that they offered to the LORD, from the commanders of thousands and the commanders of hundreds, was sixteen thousand seven hundred and fifty shekels. 53 (The men of war had taken booty, every man for himself.) 54 And Moses and Elea'zar the priest received the gold from the commanders of thousands and of hundreds, and brought it into the tent of meeting, as a memorial for the people of Israel before the LORD.

NUMBERS 33

50 And the LORD said to Moses in the plains of Moab by the Jordan at Jericho, 51 "Say to the people of Israel, When you pass over the Jordan into the land of Canaan, 52 then you shall drive out all the inhabitants of the land from before you, and destroy all their figured stones, and destroy all their molten images, and demolish all their high places; 53 and you shall take possession of the land and settle in it, for I have given the land to you to possess it. 54 You shall inherit the land by lot according to your families; to a large tribe you shall give a large inheritance, and to a small tribe you shall give a small inheritance; wherever the lot falls to any man, that shall be his; according to the tribes of your fathers you shall inherit. 55 But if you do not drive out the inhabitants of the land from before you, then those of them whom you let remain shall be as pricks in your eyes and thorns in your sides, and they shall trouble you in the land where you dwell. 56 And I will do to you as I thought to do to them."

NUMBERS 34


34 The LORD said to Moses, 2 "Command the people of Israel, and say to them, When you enter the land of Canaan (this is the land that shall fall to you for an inheritance, the land of Canaan in its full extent), 3 your south side shall be from the wilderness of Zin along the side of Edom, and your southern boundary shall be from the end of the Salt Sea on the east; 4 and your boundary shall turn south of the ascent of Akrab'bim, and cross to Zin, and its end shall be south of Ka'desh-bar'nea; then it shall go on to Ha'zar-ad'dar, and pass along to Azmon; 5 and the boundary shall turn from Azmon to the Brook of Egypt, and its termination shall be at the sea.

6 "For the western boundary, you shall have the Great Sea and its[a] coast; this shall be your western boundary.

7 "This shall be your northern boundary: from the Great Sea you shall mark out your line to Mount Hor; 8 from Mount Hor you shall mark it out to the entrance of Hamath, and the end of the boundary shall be at Zedad; 9 then the boundary shall extend to Ziphron, and its end shall be at Ha'zar-e'nan; this shall be your northern boundary.

10 "You shall mark out your eastern boundary from Ha'zar-e'nan to Shepham; 11 and the boundary shall go down from Shepham to Riblah on the east side of A'in; and the boundary shall go down, and reach to the shoulder of the sea of Chin'nereth on the east; 12 and the boundary shall go down to the Jordan, and its end shall be at the Salt Sea. This shall be your land with its boundaries all round."

13 Moses commanded the people of Israel, saying, "This is the land which you shall inherit by lot, which the LORD has commanded to give to the nine tribes and to the half-tribe; 14 for the tribe of the sons of Reuben by fathers' houses and the tribe of the sons of Gad by their fathers' houses have received their inheritance, and also the half-tribe of Manas'seh; 15 the two tribes and the half-tribe have received their inheritance beyond the Jordan at Jericho eastward, toward the sunrise."



RULES OF WARFARE

DEUTERONOMY 20

20 "When you go forth to war against your enemies, and see horses and chariots and an army larger than your own, you shall not be afraid of them; for the LORD your God is with you, who brought you up out of the land of Egypt. 2 And when you draw near to the battle, the priest shall come forward and speak to the people, 3 and shall say to them, 'Hear, O Israel, you draw near this day to battle against your enemies: let not your heart faint; do not fear, or tremble, or be in dread of them; 4 for the LORD your God is he that goes with you, to fight for you against your enemies, to give you the victory.' 5 Then the officers shall speak to the people, saying, 'What man is there that has built a new house and has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his house, lest he die in the battle and another man dedicate it. 6 And what man is there that has planted a vineyard and has not enjoyed its fruit? Let him go back to his house, lest he die in the battle and another man enjoy its fruit. 7 And what man is there that has betrothed a wife and has not taken her? Let him go back to his house, lest he die in the battle and another man take her.' 8 And the officers shall speak further to the people, and say, 'What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted? Let him go back to his house, lest the heart of his fellows melt as his heart.' 9 And when the officers have made an end of speaking to the people, then commanders shall be appointed at the head of the people.

10 "When you draw near to a city to fight against it, offer terms of peace to it. 11 And if its answer to you is peace

THUCYDIDES (471?-400? B.C.) THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (431-404 B.C.)

Thucydides has been described as the "first and greatest of all critical historians". His History of the Peloponnesian War is notable for its attention to facts, its avoidance of moral judgment, and its inclusion of speeches and debates giving reasons for and against various martial projects. The latter makes his history philosophically interesting.

Not much is known about Thucydides the man. He states in the beginning of his History that he lived through the Peloponnesian War (from 431 B.C. to 404 B.C.), and that he was a mature man when it began. From this it has been inferred that he was born in 471 B.C. (if maturity begins at forty) or at 455 B.C. (if twenty-five is sufficient).

The Peloponnesian War was a war between Athens and its allies, and the Peloponnesian League which was headed by Sparta. Fifty years earlier Athens had united the various independent Greek city-states to repel the invading Persians. The Persian fleet was defeated by the Athenian navy at Salamis in 480 B.C. and the following year a united Greek force defeated the Persian army at Platea. As the strongest naval force in Greece Athens organized a league of city-states, the Delian League, for mutual protection. The period that followed, from 461 to 431 B.C. became known as the Golden Age of Athens, or the Age of Pericles. Under the leadership of Pericles, Athens produced its greatest sculpture, architecture and drama in this period. A popular leader, Pericles introduced the beginnings of democracy, and generated a great spirit of pride and patriotism among Athenian citizens. In the flush of success and his pride in the cultural superiority of Athens, he also sought to enlarge Athenian influence and power by conquest. This threatened Sparta, which had the strongest army in Greece. Pericles had to made a peace with Sparta in 445 B.C. which lasted fifteen years. It was supposed to have lasted thirty years, but in the meantime Athens had used the Treasury of the Delian League to strengthen its navy and build many structures, including the Parthenon, for the glorification of Athens. The Peloponnesian League headed by Sparta, not reassured by Athens' persistent moves towards empire, and declared war in 431 B.C.. Pericles died in 429 B.C. and in the end Sparta won the war. When Athens fell in 404 B.C., Sparta became the leader of the Greek city-states.

The following selection includes two debates recorded by Thucydides. The first, between Cleon and Diodotus, concerns the treatment of prisoners of war - whether to put the whole adult male population of a former enemy to death. In the second, known as the Melian Conference, the Athenians argue that merely because of their own superior forces, the Melians (of the island of Melos) should submit to Athens like the other islanders - the Melians argue against this on grounds of right and justice. In these arguments, though there are passing references to Greek gods, there are no suggestions of holy wars or of morality derived from supernatural sources. The concept of justice is based on a natural sense of fairness, and the opposing arguments are straightforward assertions of self or national interest. The policies of exterminating or enslaving conquered populations is still in force, but it too is challenged without appeal to supernatural metaphysics or divine supernatural sanctions. Similar arguments are given today by hawks and doves, have and have-not nations, "realist", and "peaceniks". [The translation of Thucydides is by Richard Crawley, 1876]

and it opens to you, then all the people who are found in it shall do forced labor for you and shall serve you. 12 But if it makes no peace with you, but makes war against you, then you shall besiege it; 13 and when the LORD your God gives it into your hand you shall put all its males to the sword, 14 but the women and the little ones, the cattle, and everything else in the city, all its spoil, you shall take as booty for yourselves; and you shall enjoy the spoil of your enemies, which the LORD your God has given you. 15 Thus you shall do to all the cities which are very far from you, which are not cities of the nations here. 16 But in the cities of these peoples that the LORD your God gives you for an inheritance, you shall save alive nothing that breathes, 17 but you shall utterly destroy them, the Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Per'izzites, the Hivites and the Jeb'usites, as the LORD your God has commanded; 18 that they may not teach you to do according to all their abominable practices which they have done in the service of their gods, and so to sin against the LORD your God.

19 "When you besiege a city for a long time, making war against it in order to take it, you shall not destroy its trees by wielding an axe against them; for you may eat of them, but you shall not cut them down. Are the trees in the field men that they should be besieged by you? 20 Only the trees which you know are not trees for food you may destroy and cut down that you may build siegeworks against the city that makes war with you, until it falls.

DEUTERONOMY 21

10 "When you go forth to war against your enemies, and the LORD your God gives them into your hands, and you take them captive, 11 and see among the captives a beautiful woman, and you have desire for her and would take her for yourself as wife, 12 then you shall bring her home to your house, and she shall shave her head and pare her nails. 13 And she shall put off her captive's garb, and shall remain in your house and bewail her father and her mother a full month; after that you may go in to her, and be her husband, and she shall be your wife. 14 Then, if you have no delight in her, you shall let her go where she will; but you shall not sell her for money, you shall not treat her as a slave, since you have humiliated her.

ISAIAH'S PROPHESY OF A PEACEABLE KINGDOM

ISAIAH, 2.

THE word that Ī-śâ'-ăh the son of Ā'-mŏz saw concerning Jû'-dăh and Jĕ-rû'-să-lĕm.

2 And [a]it shall come to pass [b]in the last days, [c]*that* the mountain of the LORD'S house shall be [d]established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; [e]and all nations shall flow unto it.

3 And many people shall go and say, [f]Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the LORD, to the house of the God of Jā'-cŏb; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths: [g]for out of Zī'-ŏn shall go forth the law, and the word of the LORD from Jĕ-rû'-să-lĕm.

4 And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and [h]they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into [i]pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, [j]neither shall they learn war any more.

ISAIAH, 9.

6 [k]For unto us a child is born, unto us a [l]son is given: and [m]the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called [n]Wonderful, Counsellor, [o]The mighty God, The everlasting Father, [p]The Prince of Peace.

7 Of the increase of *his* government and peace [q]*there shall be* no end, upon the throne of Dā'-vĭd, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even for ever. The [r]zeal of the LORD of hosts will perform this.

ISAIAH, 11.

2 [s]And the spirit of the LORD shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the LORD;

3 And shall make him of [t]quick understanding in the fear of the LORD: and he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his ears:

4 But [u]with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and [v]reprove with equity for the meek of the earth: and he shall [w]smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked.

5 And righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins.

6 [x]The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them.

7 And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young ones shall lie down together: and the Hon shall eat straw like the ox.

8 And the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the [y]cockatrice' den.

9 [z]They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain: for [a]the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the LORD, as the waters cover the sea.

10 ¶ [b]And in that day [c]there shall be a root of Jĕs'-sĕ, which shall stand for an ensign of the people; to it shall the [d]Gĕn'-tīles seek: and his rest shall be [e]glorious.

11 And it shall come to pass in that day, *that* the Lord shall set his hand again the second time to recover the remnant of his people, which shall be left, [f]from Ăs-sўr'-ĭ-ă, and from Ē'-gўpt, and from Păth'-rŏs, and from Cûsh, and from Ē'-lăm, and from Shī'-när, and from Hā'-măth, and from the islands of the sea.

12 And he shall set up an ensign for the nations, and shall assemble the outcasts of Ĭs'-rā-ĕl, and gather together [g]the dispersed of Jû'-dăh from the four [h]corners of the earth.

13 [i]The envy also of Ē'-phră-ĭm shall depart, and the adversaries of Jû'-dăh shall be cut off: Ē'-phră-ĭm shall not envy Jû'-dăh, and Jû'-dăh shall not vex Ē'-phră-ĭm.

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The selections which follow present two of the debates recorded by Thucydides. The first, between Cleon and Diodotus, concerned the treatment of prisoners of war - whether to put the whole adult male population of the former enemy to death. The second, known as the Melian Conference, shows the Athenians arguing by blatant insistence on their own superior forces, that the Melians (inhabitants of the island of Melos) should submit to Athens like the other islanders - while the Melians argue against this on grounds of right and justice. In these arguments, though there are passing references to the Greek gods and their favors, there are no suggestions of holy wars or of morality derived from supernatural sources. The concepts of justice are appeals to a natural sense of fairness, and the opposing arguments are straightforward assertions of self or national interest. The policies of exterminating or enslaving conquered populations is still in force, but it is submitted to rational challenges without appeal to supernatural metaphysics or divine supernatural sanctions. Echoes of these arguments are easily recognized today in the hawks and doves, the have and the have-not nations, the "realist", "hardline", nationalists and "peaceniks" of our present world.

The translation of Thucydides is that of Richard Crawley, 1876.

Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salæthus, the Athenians at once put the latter to death, although he offered, among other things, to procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Platæa, which was still under siege; and after deliberating as to what they should do with the former, in the fury of the moment determined to put to death not only the prisoners at Athens, but the whole adult male population of Mitylene, and to make slaves of the women and children. It was remarked that Mitylene had revolted without being, like the rest, subjected to the empire; and what above all swelled the wrath of the Athenians was the fact of the Peloponnesian fleet having ventured over to Ionia to her support, a fact which was held to argue a long-meditated rebellion. They accordingly sent a galley to communicate the decree to Paches, commanding him to lose no time in despatching the Mitylenians. The morrow brought repentance with it and reflexion on the horrid cruelty of a decree, which condemned a whole city to the fate merited only by the guilty. This was no sooner perceived by the Mitylenian ambassadors at Athens and their Athenian supporters, than they moved the authorities to put the question again to the vote; which they the more easily consented to do, as they themselves plainly saw that most of the citizens wished some one to give them an opportunity for reconsidering the matter. An assembly was therefore at once called, and after much expression of opinion upon both sides, Cleon, son of Cleænetus, the same who had carried the former motion of putting the Mitylenians to death, the most violent man at Athens, and at that time by far the most powerful with the commons, came forward again and spoke as follows:—

'I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable of empire, and never more so than by your present change of mind in the matter of Mitylene. Fears or plots being unknown to you in your daily relations with each other, you feel just the same with regard to your allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into which you may be led by listening to their appeals, or by giving way to your own compassion, are full of danger to yourselves, and bring you no thanks for your weakness from your allies; entirely forgetting that your empire is a despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators, whose obedience is insured not by your suicidal concessions, but by the superiority given you by your own strength and not their loyalty. The most alarming feature in the case is the constant change of measures with which we appear to be threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the fact that bad laws which are never changed are better for a city than good ones that have no authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than quick-witted insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage public affairs better than their more gifted fellows. The latter are always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule every proposition brought forward, thinking that they cannot show their wit in more important matters, and by such behaviour too often ruin their country; while those who mistrust their own cleverness are content to be less learned than the laws, and less able to pick holes in the speech of a good speaker; and being fair judges rather than rival athletes, generally conduct affairs successfully. These we ought to imitate, instead of being led on by cleverness and intellectual rivalry to advise your people against our real opinions.

'For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those who have proposed to reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are thus causing a delay which is all in favour of the guilty, by making the sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of his anger blunted; although where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong, it best equals it and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will be the man who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show that the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us, and our misfortunes injurious to the allies. Such a man must plainly either have such confidence in his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that what has been once for all decided is still undetermined, or be bribed to try to delude us by elaborate sophisms. In such contests the state gives the rewards to others, and takes the dangers for herself. The persons to blame are you who are so foolish as to institute these contests; who go to see an oration as you would to see a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge of the practicability of a project by the wit of its advocates, and trust for the truth as to past events not to the fact which you saw more than to the clever strictures which you heard; the easy victims of new-fangled arguments, unwilling to follow received conclusions; slaves to every new paradox, despisers of the commonplace; the first wish of every man being that he could speak himself, the next to rival those who can speak by seeming to be quite up with their ideas by applauding every hit almost before it is made, and by being as quick in catching an argument as you are slow in foreseeing its consequences; asking, if I may so say, for something different from the conditions under which we live, and yet comprehending inadequately those very conditions; very slaves to the pleasure of the ear, and more like the audience of a rhetorician than the council of a city.

'In order to keep you from this, I proceed to show that no one state has ever injured you as much as Mitylene. I can make allowance for those who revolt because they cannot bear our empire, or who have been forced to do so by the enemy. But for those who possessed an island with fortifications; who could fear our enemies only by sea, and there had their own force of galleys to protect them; who were independent and held in the highest honour by you—to act as these have done, this is not revolt—revolt implies oppression; it is deliberate and wanton aggression; an attempt to ruin us by siding with our bitterest enemies; a worse offence than a war undertaken on their own account in the acquisition of power. The fate of those of their neighbours who had already rebelled and had been subdued, was no lesson to them; their own prosperity could not dissuade them from affronting danger; but blinded, confident in the future, and full of hopes beyond their power, though not beyond their ambition, they declared war and made their decision to prefer might to right, their attack being determined not by provocation but by the moment which seemed propitious. The truth is that great good fortune coming suddenly and unexpectedly tends to make a people insolent: in most cases it is safer for mankind to have success by reason than out of reason; and it is easier for them, one may say, to stave off adversity than to preserve prosperity. Our mistake has been to distinguish the Mitylenians as we have done: had they been long ago treated like the rest, they never would have so far forgotten themselves, human nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration, as it is awed by firmness. Let them now therefore be punished as their crime requires, and do not, while you condemn the aristocracy, absolve the people. This is certain, that all attacked you without distinction, although they might have come over to us, and been now again in possession of their city. But no, they thought it safer to throw in their lot with the aristocracy and so joined their rebellion! Consider therefore! if you subject to the same punishment the ally who is forced to rebel by the enemy, and him who does so by his own free choice, which of them, think you, is there that will not rebel upon the slightest pretext; when the reward of success is freedom, and the penalty of failure nothing so very terrible? We meanwhile shall have to risk our money and our lives against one

state after another; and if successful, shall receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the revenue upon which our strength depends; while if unsuccessful, we shall have an enemy the more upon our hands, and shall spend the time that might be employed in combating our existing foes in warring with our own allies.

'No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money purchase, of the mercy due to human infirmity must be held out to the Mitylenians. Their offence was not involuntary, but of malice and deliberate; and mercy is only for unwilling offenders. I therefore now as before persist against your reversing your first decision, or giving way to the three failings most fatal to empire—pity, sentiment, and indulgence. Compassion is due to those who can reciprocate the feeling, not to those who will never pity us in return, but are our natural and necessary foes: the orators who charm us with sentiment may find other less important arenas for their talents, in the place of one where the city pays a heavy penalty for a momentary pleasure, themselves receiving fine acknowledgments for their fine phrases; while indulgence should be shown towards those who will be our friends in future, instead of towards men who will remain just what they were, and as much our enemies as before. To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is just towards the Mitylenians, and at the same time expedient; while by a different decision you will not oblige them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right in rebelling, you must be wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong, you determine to rule, you must carry out your principle and punish the Mitylenians as your interest requires; or else you must give up your empire and cultivate honesty without danger. Make up your minds, therefore, to give them like for like; and do not let the victims who escaped the plot be more insensible than the conspirators who hatched it; but reflect what they would have done if victorious over you, especially as they were the aggressors. It is they who wrong their neighbour without a cause, that pursue their victim to the death, on account of the danger which they foresee in letting their enemy survive; since the object of a wanton wrong is more dangerous, if he escape, than an enemy who has not this to complain of. Do not, therefore, be traitors to yourselves, but recall as nearly as possible the moment of suffering and the supreme importance which you then attached to their reduction; and now pay them back in their turn, without yielding to present weakness or forgetting the peril that once hung over you. Punish them as they deserve, and teach your other allies by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion is death. Let them once understand this and you will not have so often to neglect your enemies while you are fighting with your own confederates.'

Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus, son of Eucrates, who had also in the previous assembly spoken most strongly against putting the Mitylenians to death, came forward and spoke as follows:—

'I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind. As for the argument that speech ought not to be the exponent of action, the man who uses it must be either senseless or interested: senseless if he believes it possible to treat of the uncertain future through any other medium; interested if wishing to carry a disgraceful measure and doubting his ability to speak well in a bad cause, he thinks to frighten opponents and hearers by well-aimed calumny. What is still more intolerable is to accuse a speaker of making a display in order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed, an unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for honesty, if not for wisdom; while the charge of dishonesty makes him suspected, if successful, and thought, if defeated, not only a fool but a rogue. The city is no gainer by such a system, since fear deprives it of its advisers; although in truth, if our speakers are to make such assertions, it would be better for the country if they could not speak at all, as we should then make fewer blunders. The good citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly in argument; and a wise city without over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless not deprive them of their due, and far from punishing an unlucky counsellor will not even regard him as disgraced. In this way successful orators would be least tempted to sacrifice their convictions to popularity, in the hope of still higher honours, and unsuccessful speakers to resort to the same popular arts in order to win over the multitude.

'This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is suspected of giving advice, however good, from corrupt motives, we feel such a grudge against him for the gain which after all we are not certain he will receive, that we deprive the city of its certain benefit. Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the advocate of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than the best counsellor is to lie in order to be believed. The city and the city only, owing to these refinements, can never be served openly and without disguise; he who does serve it openly being always suspected of serving himself in some secret way in return. Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a little further than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. For if those who gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you would judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which the whim of the moment may have led you, upon the single person of your adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error.

'However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is not their guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so guilty, I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be expedient; nor though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I recommend it, unless it be clearly for the good of the country. I consider that we are deliberating for the future more than for the present; and where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent effects that will follow from making rebellion capital, I who consider the interests of the future quite as much as he, as positively maintain the contrary. And I require you not to reject my useful considerations for his specious ones: his speech may have the attraction of seeming the more just in your present temper against Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the Mitylenians useful to Athens.

'Now of course communities have enacted the penalty of death for many offences far lighter than this: still hope leads

men to venture, and no one ever yet put himself in peril without the inward conviction that he would succeed in his design. Again, was there ever city rebelling that did not believe that it possessed either in itself or in its alliances resources adequate to the enterprise? All, states and individuals, are alike prone to err, and there is no law that will prevent them; or why should men have exhausted the list of punishments in search of enactments to protect them from evil-doers? It is probable that in early times the penalties for the greatest offences were less severe, and that, as these were disregarded, the penalty of death has been by degrees in most cases arrived at, which is itself disregarded in like manner. Either then some means of terror more terrible than this must be discovered, or it must be owned that this restraint is useless; and that as long as poverty gives men the courage of necessity, or plenty fills them with the ambition which belongs to insolence and pride, and the other conditions of life remain each under the thraldom of some fatal and master passion, so long will the impulse never be wanting to drive men into danger. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the other following, the one conceiving the attempt, the other suggesting the facility of succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and, although invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that are seen. Fortune, too, powerfully helps the delusion, and by the unexpected aid that she sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with inferior means; and this is especially the case with communities, because the stakes played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting together, each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity. In fine, it is impossible to prevent, and only great simplicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it has once set its mind upon, by force of law or by any other deterrent force whatsoever.

'We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy through a belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or exclude rebels from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of their error. Consider a moment! At present, if a city that has already revolted perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to terms while it is still able to refund expenses, and pay tribute afterwards. In the other case, what city think you would not prepare better than is now done, and hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it is all one whether it surrender late or soon? And how can it be otherwise than hurtful to us to be put to the expense of a siege, because surrender is out of the question; and if we take the city, to receive a ruined town from which we can no longer draw the revenue which forms our real strength against the enemy? We must not, therefore, sit as strict judges of the offenders to our own prejudice, but rather see how by moderate chastisements we may be enabled to benefit in future by the revenue-producing powers of our dependencies; and we must make up our minds to look for our protection not to legal terrors but to careful administration. At present we do exactly the opposite. When a free community, held in subjection by force, rises, as is only natural, and asserts its independence, it is no sooner reduced than we fancy ourselves obliged to punish it severely; although the right course with freemen is not to chastise them rigorously when they do rise, but rigorously to watch them before they rise, and to prevent their ever entertaining the idea, and, the insurrection suppressed, to make as few responsible for it as possible.

'Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people is your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or, if forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so that in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your side. But if you butcher the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do with the revolt, and who, as soon as they got arms, of their own motion surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of killing your benefactors; and next you will play directly into the hands of the higher classes, who when they induce their cities to rise, will immediately have the people on their side, through your having announced in advance the same punishment for those who are guilty and for those who are not. On the contrary, even if they were guilty, you ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid alienating the only class still friendly to us. In short, I consider it far more useful for the preservation of our empire voluntarily to put up with injustice, than to put to death, however justly, those whom it is our interest to keep alive. As for Cleon's idea that in punishment the claims of justice and expediency can both be satisfied, facts do not confirm the possibility of such a combination.

'Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of which motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon the plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try calmly those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to leave the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and most terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as good policy against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of brute force.'

Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed were the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the Athenians, notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a division, in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the motion of Diodotus carried the day. Another galley was at once sent off in haste, for fear that the first might reach Lesbos in the interval, and the city be found destroyed; the first ship having about a day and a night's start. Wine and barley-cakes were provided for the vessel by the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made if they arrived in time; which caused the men to use such diligence upon the voyage that they took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded with oil and wine as they rowed, and only slept by turns while the others were at the oar. Luckily they met with no contrary wind, and the first ship making no haste upon so horrid an errand, while the second pressed on in the manner described, the first arrived so little before them, that Paches had only just had time to read the decree, and to prepare to execute the sentence, when the second put into port and prevented the massacre. The danger of Mitylene had indeed been great.

The other party whom Paches had sent off as the prime movers in the rebellion, were upon Cleon's motion put to death by the Athenians, the number being rather more than a thousand.



THE next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized the suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the number of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry, three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus, the generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament, before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them state the object of their mission to the magistrates and the few; upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as follows:

Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people, in order that we may not be able to speak straight on without interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know that this is the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if you who sit there were to pursue a method more cautious still? Make no set speech yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and settle that before going any farther. And first tell us if this proposition of ours suits you.

The Melian commissioners answered:

Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.

Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future, or for anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon the facts that you see before you, we will give over; otherwise we will go on.

Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the question in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you propose.

Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in powers, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest—that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon.

Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both.

Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?

Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.

Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.

Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power.

Melians. Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put those who have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?

Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea.

Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try

to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at our case and conclude from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?

Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger.

Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried, before submitting to your yoke.

Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you are.

Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect.

Athenians. Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to their destruction.

Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians, who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not so utterly irrational.

Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests or their country's laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon.

Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in Hellas and helping their enemies.

Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger; and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible.

Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood ensures our fidelity.

Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to, is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an island?

Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for your own country and your own confederacy.

Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians never once yet withdrew

from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck by the fact, that after saying you would consult for the safety of your country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole succeed best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin.

The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had maintained in the discussion, and answered: "Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both."

Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from the conference said: "Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely deceived."

The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing no signs of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the Melians, dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently the Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place.

About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius and lost eighty men cut off in an ambush by the Phliasians and Argive exiles. Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the Lacedaemonians that the latter although they still refrained from breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet proclaimed that any of their people that chose might plunder the Athenians. The Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the Athenians for private quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet. Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the Athenian lines over against the market, and killed some of the men, and brought in corn and all else that they could find useful to them, and so returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians took measures to keep better guard in future.

Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to invade the Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the sacrifices for crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped them. About the same time the Melians again took another part of the Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. Reinforcements afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the command of Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; and some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves.

PLATO (427-347 B.C.)

Although Athens never regained the political and military supremacy it lost with its defeat by Sparta in 404 B.C., its cultural and intellectual influence persisted and in fact the next seventy-five years included the advent of the greatest philosophers of the ancient world. Socrates (470-399 B.C.), who had been honoured for his military service in the Peloponnesian Wars and had had some of its leaders (Alcibiades, Critias) as pupils, was also the teacher of an admiring young Plato from about 409 B.C. until Socrates' death in 399. Plato himself came from the aristocracy, and is said to have seen service in the war against Sparta, probably in the cavalry. Socrates' method of teaching was by a question-and-answer dialogue; he never wrote any treatises and never had a formal school. Plato, however, wrote some twenty-six dialogues, most of which purported to be records of Socrates' dialogues with his pupils or friends. The first selections below are from Books II and V of the best known of these dialogues, The Republic. Plato also founded a school, the Academy, around 367 B.C., and one of his pupils for many years was Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the third great philosopher of antiquity.

In the selections which follow, from Plato, we first see Plato's account of the origin of the state including an explanation of how the development and expansion of the state gives rise to wars, or to the need for defense against military attack. This ammounts to one of the earliest theories of the economic causes of war. Believing strongly in the need for a military establishment in the state, he discusses the art of war, the need for proper training of the "guardians" of the state, and later on, in Book V of the Republic, the honours which should be given to good soldiers as well as some rules for the treatment of enemies. The latter show some marked withdrawals from the cruder, earlier rules which permitted the killing of enemy males, enslavement of women and children, and despoiling of property. Still, his modifications seem to apply primarily to other Hellenes - not to "barbarians".

In the final selection from Plato's The Laws, "the Athenian Stranger" (usually thought to be Plato himself) engages in a discussion with Cleinas, a citizen from Crete. Cleinas describes how the institutions of his state are all designed "with a view to war". Plato draws out this view and its rationale and then expounds an alternative view of the state (compatible with the earlier one in The Republic) in which the aim of all laws would be the reverse of war, namely to organize and reconcile the diverse interests and abilities of citizens so as to create a harmonius, just and peaceful community. This does not deny the need for a military establishment, but very clearly makes the latter subordinate to other, higher, non-military ends.

Both Socrates and Plato were deeply concerned with questions about ethics and its relationship to knowledge. The central question in The Republic is, What is justice?. Plato's answer is considerably more subtle than the simple law of retaliation; it has to do, in both the just man and the just state, with having the better parts of man's nature (reason) and the better men in the state (the wisest) governing and organizing the lower parts and less wise men into a harmonious whole in which every element did what it was best suited to do. Though Plato saw a place in the ideal state for military personnel, and viewed the military virtues of courage, spiritedness and attention to honor and power, as having a very important place in the structure of a state, he saw the ideas of justice, governed by reason and wisdom, as higher still and made them the concepts to which all others whould be subordinate. The concept of a universal, non-partisan idea of justice discoverable by reason stands in contrast to both the theological and partisan revelations of Moses, the self-interested empire-seeking of the Athenian imperialists, and the simple concept of justice in the law of retaliation.

Republic II

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

The State arises out of the wants of men.

A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

There can be no other.

Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

True, he said.

And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Very true.

Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.

Of course, he replied.

Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence.

The four or five greater needs of life, and the four or five kinds of citizens who correspond to them.

Certainly.

The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.

True.

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right.

The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.

Clearly.

The division of labour.

And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into a common stock?—the individual husbandman, for example, producing for four, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three-fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

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Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing everything.

Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.

Very true.

And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one?

When he has only one.

Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?

No doubt.

For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the business his first object.

He must.

And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things.

Undoubtedly.

The first citizens are:—1. a husbandman,

Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools—and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.

True.

Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in our little State, which is already beginning to grow?

2. a builder, 3. a weaver, 4. a shoemaker. To these must be added:—5. a carpenter, 6. a smith, etc., 7. merchants, 8. retailers.

True.

Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and hides,—still our State will not be very large.

That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all these.

Then, again, there is the situation of the city—to find a place where nothing need be imported is well-nigh impossible.

Impossible.

Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city?

There must.

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But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require who would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.

That is certain.

And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.

Very true.

Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?

They will.

Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?

Yes.

Then we shall want merchants?

We shall.

And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be needed, and in considerable numbers?

Yes, in considerable numbers.

Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State.

Clearly they will buy and sell.

Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.

Certainly.

Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,—is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place?

The origin of retail trade.

Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to buy.

This want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not 'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Yes, he said.

And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour.

True.

Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Yes.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?

I think so.

Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the State did they spring up?

372 Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found anywhere else.

I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better think the matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry.

Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. And they will take care that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or war.

A picture of primitive life.

But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.

True, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish—salt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?

But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.

Why, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.

Yes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to see a State at fever heat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.

A luxurious State must be [373] called into existence

True, he said.

Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one

and in this many new callings will be required.

large class have to do with forms and colours; another will be the votaries of music—poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Certainly.

And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

Much greater.

And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?

Quite true.

The territory of our State must be enlarged; and hence will arise war between us and our neighbours.

Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?

Most certainly, he replied.

Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

Undoubtedly.

And our State must once more enlarge; and this
374 time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.

Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?

War is an art, and as no art can be pursued with success unless a man's whole attention is devoted to it, a soldier cannot be allowed to exercise any calling but his own.

No, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practise many arts with success.

Very true, he said.

But is not war an art?

Certainly.

And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?

Quite true.

And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder—in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? No tools will make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?

The warrior's art requires a long apprenticeship and many natural gifts.

Yes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.

And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and skill, and art, and application will be needed by him?

No doubt, he replied.

Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?

Certainly.

Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?

It will.

And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and do our best.

What is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?

True.

The guardian must unite the opposite qualities of gentleness and spirit.

He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.

I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.

Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.—My friend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.

And where do you find them?

Such a combination may be observed in the dog.

Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.

Yes, I know.

Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Certainly not.

And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

They are the same, he replied.

And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

That we may safely affirm.

Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Undoubtedly.

Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated?

Republic V SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do you think?

By all means, I should say.

The coward is to be degraded into a lower rank.

And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they like with him.

Certainly.

But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?

I approve.

The hero to receive honour from his comrades and favour from his beloved,

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?

To that too, I agree.

But you will hardly agree to my next proposal.

What is your proposal?

That he should kiss and be kissed by them.

Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valour.

Capital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Agreed.

and to have precedence, and a larger share of meats and drinks;

Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths should be honoured; for he tells how Ajax[1], after he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing.

Most true, he said.

Then in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honour the brave according to the measure of their valour, whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions which we were mentioning; also with

'seats of precedence, and meats and full cups[2];'

and in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them.

That, he replied, is excellent.

Yes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race?

also to be worshipped after death.

To be sure.

Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead

'They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil, the guardians of speech-gifted men'?[3]

Yes; and we accept his authority.

We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must do as he bids?

By all means.

And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchres as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are deemed pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honours.

That is very right, he said.

Behaviour to enemies.

Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?

In what respect do you mean?

First of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?

To spare them is infinitely better.

No Hellene shall be made a slave.

Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.

Certainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one another.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder.

Very true.

Those who fall in battle are not to be despoiled.

And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him,—is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?

Very like a dog, he said.

Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?

Yes, he replied, we most certainly must.

The arms of Hellenes are not to be offered at temples;

Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?

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Very true.

Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?

May I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?

Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual produce and no more. Shall I tell you why?

Pray do.

nor Hellenic territory devastated.

Why, you see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' and 'war,' and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external and foreign: and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the second, war.

That is a very proper distinction, he replied.

And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the barbarians?

Very good, he said.

Hellenic warfare is only a kind of discord not intended to be lasting.

And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; and such enmity is to be called discord.

I agree.

Consider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true lover of his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever.

Yes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.

And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?

It ought to be, he replied.

Then will not the citizens be good and civilized?

Yes, very civilized.

The lover of his own city will also be a lover of Hellas.

And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land, and share in the common temples?

Most certainly.

And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?

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Certainly not.

Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?

Certainly.

They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?

Just so.

Hellenes should deal mildly with Hellenes; and with barbarians as Hellenes now deal with one another.

And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, not even suppose that the whole population of a city—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and raze their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.

Then let us enact this law also for our guardians: —that they are neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.

Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our previous enactments, are very good.

LAWS

BOOK I

Persons of the Dialogue

An ATHENIAN STRANGER CLEINIAS, a Cretan
MEGILLUS, a Lacedaemonian

Athenian Stranger. TELL me, strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be the author of your laws?

Cleinias. A God, stranger; in very truth a God: among us Cretans he is said to have been Zeus, but in Lacedaemon, whence our friend here comes, I believe they would say that Apollo is their lawgiver: would they not, Megillus?

Megillus. Certainly.

Ath. And do you, Cleinias, believe, as Homer tells, that every ninth year Minos went to converse with his Olympian sire, and was inspired by him to make laws for your cities?

Cle. Yes, that is our tradition; and there was Rhadamanthus, a brother of his, with whose name you are familiar; he is reputed to have been the justest of men, and we Cretans are of opinion that he earned this reputation from his righteous administration of justice when he was alive.

Ath. Yes, and a noble reputation it was, worthy of a son of Zeus. As you and Megillus have been trained in these institutions, I dare say that you will not be unwilling to partake in a discussion of your government and laws; on our way we can pass the time pleasantly in talking about them, for I am told that the distance from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus is considerable; and doubtless there are shady places under the lofty trees, which will protect us from this scorching sun. Being no longer young, we may often stop to rest beneath them, and get over the whole journey without difficulty, beguiling the time by conversation.

Cle. Yes, stranger, and if we proceed onward we shall come to groves of cypresses, which are of rare height and beauty, and there are green meadows, in which we may repose and converse.

Ath. Very good.

Cle. Very good, indeed; and still better when we see them; let us move on cheerily.

Ath. I am willing.—And first, I want to know why the law has ordained that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and wear arms.

Cle. I think, stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily intelligible to anyone. Look at the character of our country: Crete is not like Thessaly, a large plain; and for this reason they have horsemen in Thessaly, and we have runners—the inequality of the ground in our country is more adapted to locomotion on foot; but then, if you have runners you must have light arms,—no one can carry a heavy weight when running, and bows and arrows are convenient because they are light. Now all these regulations have been made with a view to war, and the legislator appears to me to have looked to this in

all his arrangements:—the common meals, if I am not mistaken, were instituted by him for a similar reason, because he saw that while they are in the field the citizens are by the nature of the case compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual protection. He seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not understanding that all men are always at war with one another; and if in war there ought to be common meals and certain persons regularly appointed under others to protect an army, they should be continued in peace. For what men in general term peace would be said by him to be only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting. And if you look closely, you will find that this was the intention of the Cretan legislator; all institutions, private as well as public, were arranged by him with a view to war; and in this spirit he meant us to preserve them. He was under the impression that no possessions or institutions are of any value to him who is defeated in battle; for all the good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.

Ath. You appear to me, stranger, to have been thoroughly trained in the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will you tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government which you would lay down? You seem to imagine that a well-governed state ought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states in war: am I right in supposing this to be your meaning?

Cle. Certainly; and our Lacedaemonian friend, if I am not mistaken, will agree with me.

Meg. Why, my good friend, how could any Lacedaemonian say anything else?

Ath. And is what you say applicable only to states, or also to villages?

Cle. To both alike.

Ath. The case is the same?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And in the village will there be the same war of family against family, and of individual against individual?

Cle. The same.

Ath. And should each man conceive himself to be his own enemy:—what shall we say?

Cle. O Athenian stranger,—inhabitant of Attica I will not call you, for you seem to deserve rather to be named after the goddess herself, because you go back to first principles,—you have thrown a light upon the argument, and will now be better able to understand what I was just saying,—that all men are publicly one another's enemies, and each man privately his own.

(*Ath.* My good sir, what do you mean?)—

Cle. . . . Moreover, there is a victory and defeat,—the first and best of victories, the lowest and worst of defeats,—which each man gains or sustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this shows that there is a war against ourselves going on within every one of us.

Ath. Let us now reverse the order of the argument: Seeing that every individual is either his own superior or his own inferior, may we say that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the state?

Cle. You mean that each of them gives an example either of superiority or of inferiority to self?

Ath. Yes.

Cle. You are quite right in asking the question, for there certainly is such a conflict, and above all in states; and the state in which the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised, where such a victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case.

Ath. Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is a question which requires more discussion, and therefore may be left for the present. But now I quite understand your meaning when you say that citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities may unjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome and enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated, its own superior and therefore good.

Cle. Your remark, stranger, is a paradox, and yet we cannot possibly deny it.

Ath. Here is another case for consideration;—in a family there may be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very possibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a minority.

Cle. Very possibly.

Ath. And you and I ought not to pursue the verbal question whether this family and household are rightly said to show inferiority to self when the baser element prevails, and superiority when it is conquered; for we are not now considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of speaking, but we are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws.

Cle. What you say, stranger, is most true.

Meg. Quite excellent, in my opinion, as far as we have gone.

Ath. Again; might not there be a judge over these brethren, of whom we were speaking?

Cle. Certainly

Ath. Now, which would be the better judge,—one who destroyed the bad and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? Or third, I suppose, in the scale of excellence might be placed a judge, who, finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy anyone, but reconciled them to one another for ever after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends.

Cle. The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator.

Ath. And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the reverse of war.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man have in view external war, or that kind of intestine war called civil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring in his own state; and when occurring, everyone would wish to be quit of as soon as possible?

Cle. He would have the latter chiefly in view

Ath. And would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties, and by the victory of the other, or that peace and friendship should be re-established, and that, being reconciled, they should give their attention to foreign enemies?

Cle. Everyone would desire the latter in the case of his own state.

Ath. And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And would not everyone always make laws for the sake of the best?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and good will, are best. Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge. And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.

Cle. I suppose that there is truth, stranger, in that remark of yours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and object of our own institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonian.

Ath. I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning them, seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest. Please follow me and the argument closely:—And first I will put forward Tyrtaeus, an Athenian by birth, but also a Spartan citizen, who of all men was most eager about war: Well, he says,

'I sing not, I care not, about any man,

even if he were the richest of men, and possessed almost every good (and then he gives a whole list of them), if he be not at all times a brave warrior.' I imagine that you, too, must have heard his poems; our Lacedaemonian friend has probably heard more than enough of them.

Meg. Very true.

Cle. And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete.

Ath. Come now and let us all join in asking this question of Tyrtaeus: O most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent

praise which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good, and I and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus do, as I believe, entirely agree with you. But we should like to be quite sure that we are speaking of the same men; tell us, then, do you agree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of war; or what would you say? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly, that war is of two kinds,—one which is universally called civil war, and is, as we were just now saying, of all wars the worst; the other, as we should all admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a different race, is a far milder form of warfare.

Cle. Certainly, far milder.

Ath. Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this high-flown strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to which kind of war are you referring? I suppose that you must mean foreign war, if I am to judge from expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate those

'Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and strike at their enemies.'

And we shall naturally go on to say to him,—You, Tyrtaeus, as it seems, praise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war; and he must admit this.

Cle. Evidently.

Ath. They are good; but we say that there are still better men whose virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles. And we too have a poet whom we summon as a witness, Theognis, citizen of Megara in Sicily:—

'Cyrnus,' he says, 'he who is faithful in a civil broil is worth his weight in gold and silver.'

And such a one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a more difficult kind of war, much in the same degree as justice and temperance and wisdom, when united with courage, are better than courage only; for a man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife without having all virtue. But in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary soldier will take his stand and be ready to die at his post, and yet they are generally and almost without exception insolent, unjust, violent men, and the most senseless of human beings. You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove: I maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is worthy of consideration, will always and above all things in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue; which, according to Theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect justice. Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was praised by the poet at the right time, yet in place and dignity may be said to be only fourth-rate.[1]

Cle. Stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a rank which is far beneath him.

Ath. Nay, I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon and Crete mainly with a view to war.

Cle. What ought we to say then?

[1] i.e., it ranks after justice, temperance, and wisdom.

Ath. What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence;[1]—that the legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and this the lowest part, of virtue, but all virtue, and that he wished to devise classes of laws answering to the kinds of virtue; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws make the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws whenever a want is felt, and one man has a class of laws about allotments and heiresses, another about assaults; others about ten thousand other such matters. But we maintain that the right way of examining into laws is to proceed as we have now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition; for you were quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you went wrong when you added that all his legislation had a view only to a part, and the least part of virtue, and this called forth my subsequent remarks. Will you allow me then to explain how I should have liked to have heard you expound the matter?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. You ought to have said, stranger,—The Cretan laws are with reason famous among the Hellenes; for they fulfil the object of laws, which is to make those who use them happy; and they confer every sort of good. Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine; and the state which attains the greater, at the same time acquires the less, or, not having the greater, has neither. Of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god [Plutus], but one who is keen of sight, if only he has wisdom for his companion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage. All these naturally take precedence of the other goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader, mind. Some of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage which they make one with another, and then to the procreation and education of children, both male and female; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give them punishments and rewards; and in reference to all their intercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions; he should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves. Also with regard to anger and terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the opposite of these; in all these states he should determine and teach what is the good and evil of the condition of each. In the next place, the legislator has to be careful how

the citizens make their money and in what way they spend it, and to have an eye to their mutual contracts and dissolutions of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary: he should see how they order all this, and consider where justice as well as injustice is found or is wanting in their several dealings with one another; and honour those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey, until every aspect of civil life has been reviewed, and the time has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead. And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these things,—some who walk by intelligence, others by true opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice, and not with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which I was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. And I want to know the nature of all these things, and how they are arranged in the laws of Zeus, as they are termed, and in those of the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus gave; and how the order of them is discovered to his eyes, who has experience in laws gained either by study or habit, although they are far from being self-evident to the rest of mankind like ourselves.

ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.)

Aristotle was born in Stagira, the son of Nicomachus, the court physician to the king of Macedon, in 384 B.C.. He was sent to Athens to study in Plato's Academy around 367 B.C., and he remained there until Plato died in 347 B.C.. Around345 B.C. he moved to Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, where he apparently did much of the research which was presented in his biological treatises. In 342 B.C. he began a three year stint in which he supervised the education of the future Alexander the Great, then thirteen years old, at the court of Alexander's father, Phillip II of Macedon. From 335 to 323 B.C. he ran a school known as the Lyceum just outside of Athens, and he died in 322 B.C.

Aristotle's scientific and philosophical writings covered most of the major sub-divisions of human knowledge, and they did so in such a novel, systematic and thorough way that they have been enormously influential in the development of western civilization. His treatment of logic and language, his original investigations in biology, his concept of the heavens, his metaphysics, theories of ethics, political science and poetry, have dominated those disciplines throughout much of history, and some of his views continue to exercise a lively influence even today.

Aristotle's world-view was matter-of-fact and naturalistic. He assumed that the ultimately real entities in the universe were the physical objects, living organisms, and capacities for thought and feeling recognized by common sense as real entities occurring in time in the various regions of space. He believed that the earth was the center of the universe and the stars,sun, moon and planets revolved around the earth. What was unique in his world-view was the conception that every thing in nature acts for some end; in other words, he used as an explanatory principle for the causal processes in nature the idea that each individual member of each plant or animal species has within itself an "entelechy", or "final cause" - i.e., an unconscious but real and natural impetus or driving force which strives to become just the kind of being that an individual of that species is. This was his way of explaining how it is that acorns grow into oak trees, pine cones into a pine tree, chicken's eggs yield chickens instead of ducks, and human fetuses become adult humans rather than pigs or horses. He also believed of course in physical or mechancial causes. But it was this teleological view, that nature is shot through with purposes, which provided a remarkable integrating concept for his view of the world. Aristotle even held that gravity is explained by the natural tendency of solid matter to seek to get to the center of the universe, while the fact that heat rises and that the stars and sun and moon are in the heavens is due to an innate impetus of fire and heat to rise. Modern science, of course, rejects teleology, and tends to recognize only physical causation in natural science; and of course Aristotle's astronomy was supplanted with the Copernican Revolution.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the way in which Aristotle's ethics and political philosophy fitted into his teleological world-view. The <u>good</u> for any kind of being was to become the kind of thing it was intended to be. A good knife is a knife which cuts well; a good violinist is one who plays the violin well. A good <u>man</u> is a person who realizes what, by man's nature, he is naturally striving to become. Since the unique characteristic of man was that he was an animal with reason, and since his development was aimed at developing himself as a rational animal, the good for man was to live a life"of reason or in accordance with reason". In man, reason must rule over the appetites and passions,insuring that they are satisfied or exercised only in the right ways at the right time. And, following Plato, he held that the highest goods for man were intellectual goods - wisdom and knowledge, on which justice and the good society must depend. He held that man is by nature a political animal; by nature he forms and becomes a parts of groups - the family, the village, the city-state. The best form of government is one ruled by the best men, whether in a democracy, oligarchy or monarchy. Unlike Plato,Aristotle was empirical in approach; he studied some 150 constitutions of governments and instead of seeking one absolute idea of Justice, he analyzed and compared a variety of different senses in which the word 'justice' is used.

The following selections from <u>Politics</u>, or revolutions, were translated by Benjamin Jowett.

BOOK V

1 The design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly completed.[1] Next in order follow the causes of revolution in states, how many, and of what nature they are; what modes of destruction apply to particular states, and out of what, and into what they mostly change; also what are the modes of preservation in states generally, or in a particular state, and by what means each state may be best preserved: these questions remain to be considered.

In the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgement of justice and proportionate equality, although mankind fail in attaining them, as indeed I have already explained.[2] Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal, that is, in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things; while the oligarchs, under the idea that they are unequal, claim too much, which is one form of inequality. All these forms of government have a kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution. Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel (for they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal),[3] but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so.[4] There is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank; for they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy and virtuous ancestors.[5] Here then, so to speak, are opened the very springs and fountains of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments; the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change from an existing form into some other, for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into democracy, or from either of them into constitutional government or aristocracy, and conversely; the other not affecting the constitution, when, without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get the administration into their own hands.[6] Further, there is a question of degree; an oligarchy, for example, may become more or less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical; and in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or less strictly maintained. . . . Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion —for instance, a perpetual monarchy among equals; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion

Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and proportional; by the first I mean sameness or equality in number or size; by the second, equality of ratios. For example, the excess of three over two is numerically equal to the excess of two over one; whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the same part of four that one is of two, namely, the half. As I was saying before,[9] men agree that justice in the abstract is proportion, but they differ in that some think that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are unequal in any respect they should be unequal in all. Hence there are two principal forms of government, democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers are more common. In what city shall we find a hundred persons of good birth and of virtue? whereas the rich everywhere abound. That a state should be ordered, simply and wholly, according to either kind of equality, is not a good thing; the proof is the fact that such forms of government never last. They are originally based on a mistake, and, as they begin badly, cannot fail to end badly. The inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed; numerical in some cases, and proportionate in others.

Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy.[10] For in oligarchies [11] there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people; but in democracies [12] there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs. No dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves. And we may further remark that a government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government.

2 In considering how dissensions and political revolutions arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them which affect constitutions generally. They may be said to be three in number; and we have now to give an outline of each. We want to know (1) what is the feeling? (2) what are the motives of those who make them? (3) whence arise political disturbances and quarrels? The universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has been already mentioned; [13] viz. the desire of equality, when men think that they are

equal to others who have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when are the desire of gain and honour, or the fear of dishonour and loss; the authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonour from themselves or their friends. The causes and reasons of revolutions, whereby men are themselves affected in the way described, and about the things which I have mentioned, viewed in one way may be regarded as seven, and in another as more than seven. Two of them have been already noticed; [14] but they act in a different manner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and honour—not, as in the case which I have just supposed, in order to obtain them for themselves, but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state; causes of another sort are election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity of elements.

3 What share insolence and avarice have in creating revolutions, and how they work, is plain enough. When the magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public. It is evident, again, what an influence honour exerts and how it is a cause of revolution. Men who are themselves dishonoured and who see others obtaining honours rise in rebellion; the honour or dishonour when undeserved is unjust; and just when awarded according to merit. Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when one or more persons have a power which is too much for the state and the power of the government; this is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family oligarchy. And therefore, in some places, as at Athens and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism.[15] But how much better to provide from the first that there should be no such pre-eminent individuals instead of letting them come into existence and then finding a remedy.

CH. 4

Revolutions also break out when opposite parties, e. g. the rich and the people, are equally balanced, and there is little or no middle class; for, if either party were manifestly superior, the other would not risk an attack upon them. And, for this reason, those who are eminent in virtue usually do not stir up insurrections, always a minority. Such are the beginnings and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable.

Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud. Force may be applied either at the time of making the revolution or afterwards. Fraud, again, is of two kinds; for (1) sometimes the citizens are deceived into acquiescing in a change of government, and afterwards they are held in subjection against their will. This was what happened in the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the people by telling them that the king would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians, and, having cheated the people, still endeavoured to retain the government. (2) In other cases the people are persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained. The revolutions which effect constitutions generally spring from the above-mentioned causes.[21]

5 And now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what follows from the principles already laid down.

Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine (for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward in public stir up the people against them. The truth of this remark is proved by a variety of examples.

Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants were originally demagogues.[25] They are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is that they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. Whereas in our day, when the art of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents them from usurping power; at any rate instances to the contrary are few and slight.

6 There are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies: (1) First, when the oligarchs oppress the people, for then anybody is good enough to be their champion, especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant.

(2) Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the demagogue. Now, the oligarchical demagogue is of two sorts: either (*a*) he practises upon the oligarchs themselves

or (*b*) the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the people.

from Politics, Book VII,Ch 2

Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act for the best and live happily. But even those who agree in thinking that the life of virtue is the most eligible raise a question, whether the life of business and politics is or is not more eligible than one which is wholly independent of external goods, I mean than a contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a philosopher. For these two lives—the life of the philosopher and the life of the statesman—appear to have been preferred by those who have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other ages. Which is the better is a question of no small moment; for the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his life according to the best end. There are some who think that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over them, even though not unjust, is a great impediment to a man's individual well-being. Others take an opposite view; they maintain that the true life of man is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits of being practised, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as by private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion that arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with happiness; indeed, [1] in some states the entire aim of the laws [1] is to give men despotic power over their neighbours. And, therefore, although in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in a chaotic state, still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the maintenance of power: thus in Lacedaemon and Crete the system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed with a view to war [2]. And in all nations which are able to gratify their ambition military power is held in esteem, for example among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and Celts. In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate the warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where we are told that men obtain the honour of wearing as many armlets as they have served campaigns. There was once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was handed round at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, the number of enemies whom a man has slain is indicated by the number of spits which are fixed in the earth round his tomb; and there are numerous practices among other nations of a like kind, some of them established by law and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the statesman should be always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will or not. How can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right. The other arts and sciences offer no parallel; a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet many appear to think that a despotic government is a true political form, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are not ashamed of practising towards others; they demand justice for themselves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing about it. Such behaviour is irrational; unless the one party is born to command, and the other born to serve, in which case men have a right to command, not indeed all their fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects; just as we ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food or sacrifice, but only the animals which are intended for food or sacrifice, that is to say, such wild animals as are eatable. And surely there may be a city happy in isolation, which we will assume to be well-governed (for it is quite possible that a city thus isolated might be well-administered and have good laws); but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest of enemies—all that sort of thing must be excluded. Hence we see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed honourable, are not the supreme end of all things, but only means.

ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.) Politics

from Politics, Book VII, Ch 14

Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of which has reason in itself, and the other, not having reason in itself, is able to obey reason[1]. And we call a man good because he has the virtues of these two parts. In which of them the end is more likely to be found is a matter of doubt to those who adopt our division; for in the world both of nature and of art the inferior always exists for the sake of the better or superior, and the better or superior is that which has reason. The reason too, in our ordinary way of speaking, is divided into two parts, for there is a practical and a speculative reason[2], and there must be a corresponding division of actions; the actions of the naturally better principle are to be preferred by those who have it in their power to attain to both or to all, for that is always to every one the most eligible which is the highest attainable by him. The whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and leisure[3], war and peace, and all actions into those which are necessary and useful, and those which are honourable. And the preference given to one or the other class of actions must necessarily be like the preference given to one or other part of the soul and its actions over the other; there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honourable. All these points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws; he should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and above all the better and the end; he should also remember the diversities of human lives and actions. For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and useful, but what is honourable is better. In such principles children and persons of every age which requires education should be trained. Whereas even the Hellenes of the present day, who are reputed to be best governed, and the legislators who gave them their constitutions, do not appear to have framed their governments with a regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to all the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those which promised to be more useful and profitable. Many modern writers have taken a similar view: they commend the Lacedaemonian constitution, and praise the legislator for making conquest and war his sole aim[1], a doctrine which may be refuted by argument and has long ago been refuted by facts. For most men desire empire in the hope of accumulating the goods of fortune; and on this ground Thibron and all those who have written about the Lacedaemonian constitution have praised their legislator, because the Lacedaemonians, by a training in hardships, gained great power. But surely they are not a happy people now that their empire has passed away, nor was their legislator right. How ridiculous is the result, if, while they are continuing in the observances of his laws and no one interferes with them they have lost the better part of life. These writers further err about the sort of government which the legislator should approve, for the government of freemen is noble, and implies more virtue than despotic government[1]. Neither is a city to be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised because he trains his citizens to conquer and obtain dominion over their neighbours, for there is great evil in this. On a similar principle any citizen who could, would obviously try to obtain the power in his own state—the crime which the Lacedaemonians accused king Pausanias of attempting[2], although he had so great honour already. No such principle and no law having this object is either statesmanlike or useful or right. For the same things are best both for individuals and for states, and these are the things which the legislator ought to implant in the minds of his citizens. Neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to be slaves. Facts, as well as arguments, prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For most of these military states are safe only while they are at war[3], but fall when they have acquired their empire; like unused iron they lose their edge in time of peace. And for this the legislator is to blame, he never having taught them how to lead the life of peace.

Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best man and of the best state must also be the same; it is therefore evident that there ought to exist in both of them the virtues of leisure; for peace, as has been often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of toil. But leisure and cultivation may be promoted, not only by those virtues which are practised in leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to business[1]. For many necessaries of life have to be supplied before we can have leisure. Therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and able to endure: for truly, as the proverb says, 'There is no leisure for slaves,' and those who cannot face danger like men are the slaves of any invader. Courage and endurance are required for business and intellectual virtue for leisure, temperance and justice for both, more especially in times of peace and leisure, for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure which comes with peace tends to make them insolent. Those, then, who seem to be the best off and to be in the possession of every good, have special need of justice and temperance—for example, those (if such there be, as the poets say) who dwell in the Islands of the Blest; they above all will need philosophy and temperance and justice, and all the more the more leisure they have, living in the midst of abundance. There is no difficulty in seeing why the state that would be happy and good ought to have these virtues. If it be disgraceful in men not to be able to use the goods of life, it is peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use them in time of peace—to show excellent qualities in action and war, and when they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves.

CICERO (106-43 B.C.)

Marcus Tullius Cicero was born in Arpino, Italy in 106 B.C..As a young man he studied under an Epicurean philosopher, Phaedrus, a stoic philosopher, Diodotus, and an Academic philosopher, Philo of Larissa, who perpetuated the tradition of Plato; thus he was well-versed in three of the four major schools of philosophy. Following his studies in Greece and Rome, he took up law and earned a strong reputation as a lawyer by the age of twenty-seven. He was also known in his youth as the finest poet in Rome, though history did not sustain this assessment. He got involved in politics and was elected consul in 63 B.C. at the age of forty-two and his year in office was notable for the dramatic and effective manner in which he exposed and aborted the conspiracy headed by Cataline to ovethrow the Republic by a coup. Cicero is remembered chiefly as Rome's greatest orator. He employed his oratorical skills in staunch defense of republican principles through the civil struggles which ended in the destruction of the Roman Republic. He disliked Caesar's dictatorship and was glad to see it terminated, though he did not participate in the plot to assassinate Caesar; he delivered in 44-43 the fourteen brilliant orations, the "philippics", against Mark Anthony after Caesar's death, but failed to stop an alliance between Anthony, Octavian (later the emperor Augustus) and Lepidus) which gained control, and ordered Cicero's capture and death,which took place in 43 B.C..

Cicero's serious philosophical writings were composed in the last ten years of his life. De Republica (The Republic) and De Legibus (The Laws) were efforts to relate Roman history to the political theories from Greece, particularly Plato, but also Aristotle. He favored a republican form of government with a mixed constitution, rather than either democracy, or oligarchy or monarchy alone. His concept of natural law, and nature as a source of reason and laws of justice and virtue, obviously was strongly influenced by the Stoics' concept of order and constancy in nature , though it is modified by considerations drawn from Plato and Aristotle. Cicero is not viewed customarily as an original philosopher so much as transmitter of Greek philosophy into the culture and language of Rome. In this task, however, he provided Rome and Europe with much of their philosophical vocabulary.

In terms of the concepts of war and peace, the selections which follow suggest two contributions which later writers would draw upon and develop. One is the strong emphasis upon concepts and laws of justice and right drawn from the nature of man as a natural being, and which in an important sense emphasize the commonality of all men, rooted in an objective natural law, which can provide the basis for laws which are above, and independent of, the particular laws of this or that nation or state. The other is the concept of a "just" war, as distinct from an unjust war, of which much more will be said in the selections which follow.

M is Cicero. *A* is Atticus. *Q* is Quintus.

. . . IV. *M.*[2] My opinions? Well then, I believe that there have been most eminent men in our state whose customary function it was to interpret the law to the people and answer questions in regard to it, but that these men, though they have made great claims, have spent their time on unimportant details. What subject indeed is so vast as the law of the state? But what is so trivial as the task of those who give legal advice? It is, however, necessary for the people. But, while I do not consider that those who have applied themselves to this profession have lacked a conception of universal law, yet they have carried their studies of this civil law, as it is called, only far enough to accomplish their purpose of being useful to the people. Now all this amounts to little so far as learning is concerned, though for practical purposes it is indispensable. What subject is it, then, that you are asking me to expound? To what task are you urging me? Do you want me to write a treatise on the law of eaves and house-walls? Or to compose formulas for contracts and court procedure? These subjects have been carefully treated by many writers, and are of a humbler character, I believe, than what is expected of me.

V. *A.*[1] Yet if you ask what I expect of you, I consider it a logical thing that, since you have already written a treatise on the constitution of the ideal state, you should also write one on its laws. For I note that this was done by your beloved Plato, whom you admire, revere above all others, and love above all others.

. . . *M.* But in our present investigation we intend to cover the whole range of universal justice and law in such a way that our own civil law, as it is called, will be confined to a small and narrow corner. For we must explain the nature of justice, and this must be sought for in the nature of man; we must also consider the laws by which states ought to be governed; then we must deal with the enactments and decrees of nations which are already formulated and put in writing; and among these the civil law, as it is called, of the Roman people will not fail to find a place.

VI. *Q.*[2] You probe deep, and see, as you should, the very fountain-head, to find what we are after, brother. And those who teach the civil law in any other way are teaching not so much the path of justice as of litigation.

M. There you are mistaken, Quintus, for it is rather ignorance of the law than knowledge of it that leads to litigation. But that will come later; now let us investigate the origins of justice.

Well, then, the most learned men have determined to begin with law, and it would seem that they are right, if, according to their definition, law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is law. And so they believe that law is intelligence, whose natural function it is to command right conduct and forbid wrongdoing. They think that this quality has derived its name in Greek from the idea of granting to every man his own, and in our language I believe it has been named from the idea of choosing.[1] For as they have attributed the idea of fairness to the word law, so we have given it that of selection, though both ideas properly belong to law. Now if this is correct, as I think it to be in general, then the origin of justice is to be found in law, for law is a natural force; it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man, the standard by which justice and injustice are measured. But since our whole discussion has to do with the reasoning of the populace, it will sometimes be necessary to speak in the popular manner, and give the

[1] *Laws*, Bk. I, chs. 4–11 (in part); Bk. III, ch. 1; *Republic*, Bk. III, ch. 22.

name of law to that which in written form decrees whatever it wishes, either by command or prohibition. For such is the crowd's definition of law. But in determining what justice is, let us begin with that supreme law which had its origin ages before any written law existed or any state had been established.

Q. Indeed that will be preferable and more suitable to the character of the conversation we have begun.

M. Well, then, shall we seek the origin of justice itself at its fountain-head? For when that is discovered we shall undoubtedly have a standard by which the things we are seeking may be tested.

Q. I think that is certainly what we must do.

A. Put me down also as agreeing with your brother's opinion.

M. Since, then, we must retain and preserve that constitution of the state which Scipio proved to be the best in the six books devoted to the subject, and all our laws must be fitted to that type of state, and since we must also inculcate good morals, and not prescribe everything in writing, I shall seek the root of justice in Nature, under whose guidance our whole discussion must be conducted.

. . . VII. *M.* I will not make the argument long. Your admission leads us to this: that animal which we call man, endowed with foresight and quick intelligence, complex, keen, possessing memory, full of reason and prudence, has been given a certain distinguished status by the supreme God who created him; for he is the only one among so many different kinds and varieties of living beings who has a share in reason and thought, while all the rest are deprived of it. But what is more divine, I will not say in man only, but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason, when it is full grown and perfected, is rightly called wisdom. Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists both in man and God, the first common possession of man and God is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is law, we must believe that men have law also in common with the gods. Further, those who share law must also share justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth. If indeed they obey the same authorities and powers, this is true in a far greater degree; but as a matter of fact they do obey this celestial system, the divine mind, and the God of transcendent power. Hence we must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth of which both gods and men are members.

And just as in states distinctions in legal status are made on account of the blood relationships of families, according to a system which I shall take up in its proper place so in the universe the same thing holds true, but on a scale much vaster and more splendid, so that men are grouped with Gods on the basis of blood relationship and descent.

VIII. For when the nature of man is examined, the theory is usually advanced (and in all probability it is correct) that through constant changes and revolutions in the heavens, a time came which was suitable for sowing the seed of the human race. And when this seed was scattered and sown over the earth, it was granted the divine gift of the soul. For while the other elements of which man consists were derived from what is mortal, and are therefore fragile and perishable, the soul was generated in us by God. Hence we are justified in saying that there is a blood relationship between ourselves and the celestial beings; or we may call it a common ancestry or origin. Therefore among all the varieties of living

beings, there is no creature except man which has any knowledge of God, and among men themselves there is no race either so highly civilized or so savage as not to know that it must believe in a god, even if it does not know in what sort of god it ought to believe. Thus it is clear that man recognizes God because, in a way, he remembers and recognizes the source from which he sprang.

Moreover, virtue exists in man and God alike, but in no other creature besides; virtue, however, is nothing else than Nature perfected and developed to its highest point; therefore there is a likeness between man and God. As this is true, what relationship could be closer or clearer than this one? For this reason, Nature has lavishly yielded such a wealth of things adapted to man's convenience and use that what she produces seems intended as a gift to us, and not brought forth by chance; and this is true, not only of what the fertile earth bountifully bestows in the form of grain and fruit, but also of the animals; for it is clear that some of them have been created to be man's slaves, some to supply him with their products, and others to serve as his food. Moreover innumerable arts have been discovered through the teachings of Nature; for it is by a skilful imitation of her that reason has acquired the necessities of life.

IX. Nature has likewise not only equipped man himself with nimbleness of thought, but has also given him the senses, to be, as it were, his attendants and messengers; she has laid bare the obscure and none too [obvious] meanings of a great many things, to serve as the foundations of knowledge, as we may call them; and she has granted us a bodily form which is convenient and well suited to the human mind. For while she has bent the other creatures down toward their food, she has made man alone erect, and has challenged him to look up toward heaven, as being, so to speak, akin to him, and his first home. In addition, she has so formed his features as to portray therein the character that lies hidden deep within him; for not only do the eyes declare with exceeding clearness the innermost feelings of our hearts, but also the countenance, as we Romans call it, which can be found in no living thing save man, reveals the character. (The Greeks are familiar with the meaning which this word "countenance" conveys, though they have no name for it.) I will pass over the special faculties and aptitudes of the other parts of the body, such as the varying tones of the voice and the power of speech, which is the most effective promoter of human intercourse; for all these things are not in keeping with our present discussion or the time at our disposal; and besides, this topic has been adequately treated, as it seems to me, by Scipio in the books which you have read.[1] But, whereas God has begotten and equipped man, desiring him to be the chief of all created things, it should now be evident, without going into all the details, that Nature, alone and unaided, goes a step farther; for, with no guide to point the way, she starts with those things whose character she has learned through the rudimentary beginnings of intelligence, and, alone and unaided, strengthens and perfects the faculty of reason.

X. *A.* Ye immortal gods, how far back you go to find the origins of justice! And you discourse so eloquently that I not only have no desire to hasten on to the consideration of the civil law, concerning which I was expecting you to speak, but I should have no objection to your spending even the entire day on your present topic; for the matters which you have taken up, no doubt, merely as preparatory to another subject, are of greater import than the subject itself to which they form an introduction.

M. The points which are now being briefly touched upon are certainly important; but out of all the material of the philosophers' discussions, surely there comes nothing more valuable than the full realization that we are born for justice, and that right is based, not upon men's opinions, but upon Nature. This fact will immediately be plain if you once get a clear conception of man's fellowship and union with his fellow-men. For no single thing is so like another, so exactly its counterpart, as all of us are to one another. Nay, if bad habits and false beliefs did not twist the weaker minds and turn them in whatever direction they are inclined, no one would be so like his own self as all men would be like all others. And so, however we may define man, a single definition will apply to all. This is a sufficient proof that there is no difference in kind between man and man; for if there were, one definition could not be applicable to all men; and indeed reason, which alone raises us above the level of the beasts and enables us to draw inferences, to prove and disprove, to discuss and solve problems, and to come to conclusions, is certainly common to us all, and, though varying in what it learns, at least in the capacity to learn it is invariable. For the same things are invariably perceived by the senses, and those things which stimulate the senses, stimulate them in the same way in all men; and those rudimentary beginnings of intelligence to which I have referred, which are imprinted on our minds, are imprinted on all minds alike; and speech, the mind's interpreter, though differing in the choice of words, agrees in the sentiments expressed. In fact, there is no human being of any race who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain to virtue.

XI. The similarity of the human race is clearly marked in its evil tendencies as well as in its goodness. For pleasure also attracts all men; and even though it is an enticement to vice, yet it has some likeness to what is naturally good. For it delights us by its lightness and agreeableness; and for this reason, by an error of thought, it is embraced as something wholesome. It is through a similar misconception that we shun death as though it were a dissolution of nature, and cling to life because it keeps us in the sphere in which we were born; and that we look upon pain as one of the greatest of evils, not only because of its cruelty, but also because it seems to lead to the destruction of nature. In the same way, on account of the similarity between moral worth and renown, those who are publicly honored are considered happy, while those who do not attain fame are thought miserable. Troubles, joys, desires, and fears haunt the minds of all men without distinction, and even if different men have different beliefs, that does not prove, for example, that it is not the same quality of superstition that besets those races which worship dogs and cats as gods, as that which torments other races. But what nation does not love courtesy, kindliness, gratitude, and remembrance of favors bestowed? What people does not hate and despise the haughty, the wicked, the cruel, and the ungrateful? Inasmuch as these considerations prove to us that the whole human race is bound together in unity, it follows, finally, that knowledge of the principles of right living is what makes men better.

I.[1] *M.* I will follow again, then, as I did before, the example of that divine personage, whom I praise oftener, perhaps, than I should, such is the admiration I feel for him.

A. Of course you mean Plato.

M. None other, Atticus.

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1 From **The Laws**, Book III

A. Surely you can never praise him too highly or too often; for even those friends of ours who object to the praise of anyone outside their own company allow me to be as fond of him as I like.

M. And they are certainly right in that. For what could be more appropriate to the good taste of a man like yourself, who in both his life and his language has achieved, in my opinion, that most difficult combination of dignity and refinement?

A. I am very glad indeed that I interrupted you, since you have given me so fine a proof of your good opinion. But go on as you have begun.

M. First, then, let us commend the law itself with words of praise which are both merited and appropriate to its character.

A. By all means, just as you did in the case of the law of religion.

M. You understand, then, that the function of a magistrate is to govern, and to give commands which are just and beneficial and in conformity with the law. For as the laws govern the magistrate, so the magistrate governs the people, and it can truly be said that the magistrate is a speaking law, and the law a silent magistrate. Nothing, moreover, is so completely in accordance with the principles of justice and the demands of Nature (and when I use these expressions, I wish it understood that I mean law) as is government, without which existence is impossible for a household, a city, a nation, the human race, physical nature, and the universe itself. For the universe obeys God; seas and lands obey the universe, and human life is subject to the decrees of supreme law.

XXII.[1] LAELIUS: There is in fact a true law—namely, right reason—which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible. Neither the senate[2] nor the people can absolve us from our obligation to obey this law, and it requires no Sextus Aelius[3] to expound and interpret it. It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another at Athens, nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one law, eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely God, who is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor. The man who will not obey it will abandon his better self, and, in denying the true nature of a man, will thereby suffer the severest of penalties, though he has escaped all the other consequences which men call punishment.

1 From The Republic, Book III

No war can be undertaken by a just and wise state, unless for faith or self-defence. This self-defence of the state is enough to ensure its perpetuity, and this perpetuity is what all patriots desire. Those afflictions which even the hardiest spirits smart under—poverty, exile, prison, and torment—private individuals seek to escape from by an instantaneous death. But for states, the greatest calamity of all is that of death, which to individuals appears a refuge. A state should be so constituted as to live for ever. For a commonwealth, there is no natural dissolution, as there is for a man, to whom death not only becomes necessary, but often desirable. And when a state once decays and falls, it is so utterly revolutionized, that if we may compare great things with small, it resembles the final wreck of the universe.

All wars, undertaken without a proper motive, are unjust. And no war can be reputed just, unless it be duly announced and proclaimed, and if it be not preceded by a rational demand for restitution.

Our Roman commonwealth, by defending its allies, has got possession of the world.

(Fragment from Book IV, On The Commonwealth)

According to the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus was born during the lifetime of Herod the Great, the Roman Ruler of Judea who ordered all the infants in Bethlehem to be killed. From other sources it is clear the Herod died in the year of Rome, 750. The present calendar, dating the years A.D. and B.C. from Jesus' birth, was not adopted until centuries after Jesus died. A monk, Dionysius Exiguus, erroneously calculated Jesus' birth as having taken place in the year of Rome, 754. This year was then taken as the year 1 A.D., though clearly Jesus was born before the year of Rome 750, i.e., in what we now call 5 B.C.. Such at least is what most scholars say, including the Oxford edition of the King James Version of the Bible.

From a theological point of view, and by way of understanding the historical impact of Jesus' ideas and principles, it is necessary to review the central doctrines of the Christian religion. The central traditional core has lain in the doctrine the Jesus was literally the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary, that God had created this earth that man might prepare himself for life hereafter, and that by faith in Christ and living in accordance with his teachings men might attain eternal life in Heaven. Jesus' life on earth, his miraculous birth, the miracles he performed and his crucifixion, resurrection and ascension to heaven, are cited as proof both of these doctrines and of God's love for man and forgiveness of man's sins. It is this central core, not simply the appeal of Jesus' ethical principles, which has been the basis of belief and personal commitment of the vast majority of hundreds of millions of people who have embraced Christianity since its inception. On the other hand, those who embraced Christianity in this basically theological mode, could not avoid exposure to and influence by the ethical principles and mode of human conduct which Jesus taught and practiced. From the point of view of our topic, philosophies of war and peace, it is these ethical precepts which are of interest, not the theological doctrines.

Jesus was Jew, born in Judea at a time when it was subject to the imperial powers of Rome. Indeed his land, and the Jewish people, had been subject to Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian or Roman rule - except for an interlude of 80 years under the Maccabees - for almost six centuries. The periods of Jewish nationhood which followed Moses and the Exodus, the Kingdoms of Solomon and David, of Judah and Israel, were - save for the heroic revolt of the Maccabees - a thing of the past. It was in this context of a subject people, longing for a new messiah who would restore the Jewish people to nationhood, that Jesus taught the message of centering one's life on love of God and of fellow men. Despite its strong roots in the tradition of Moses, the Ten Commandments, the moral compact between men and God, the holy wars for the promised land, Jesus message was new and unique. Plato and Socrates had urged the cultivation of virtue and knowledge above the pursuit ofwealth, power or honor; but they did not advocate a love of all men let alone one's enemies. And certainly the ethos of the Roman Empire, and of the other past imperial powers, as well as that of the eras of David and Solomon, were not of this kind. Even the Stoic philosophy which also arose within the context of political subjection, urged only that one not desire what was not within own's power to get, that one bear up under the stress of life, and give due respect to the laws of nature; it certainly did not oppose military life, or teach love of all men. The ethical concepts of universal love and equality, and non-resistance were new

The concepts set forth in the Sermon on the Mount were taken very seriously and literally by early Christians. In the first three centuries Christians considered military service incompatible with their faith; for the most part they refused it. Tertullian (160-230 A.D.) wrote, "How shall a Christian wage war, nay, how shall he even be a soldier in peacetime, without the Sword, which the Lord has taken away? ...although even a centurion believed, the Lord afterwards in disarming Peter ungirded every soldier." And Origen (185-254 A.D.) wrote, "We no longer take up the sword against any nation, nor do we learn war any more, having become children of peace for the sake of Jesus who is our leader." But after 313, when Constantine I published the edict of toleration for Christianity, and as Christiantity became the official religion of more and more temporaral states, pacifism gave way to the "just war" concept in Christian thought, as selections from Augustine (354-430) and Aquinas (1225-1274) show (cf. especially pp 62-64). The moderating influence of the Sermon on the Mount remains even in the "just war" theory, and worked its way into precepts of International Law, as selection from Grotius will demonstrate.

MATTHEW 5

5 Seeing the crowds, he went up on the mountain, and when he sat down his disciples came to him. 2 And he opened his mouth and taught them, saying:

3 "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

4 "Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted.

5 "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.

6 "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied.

7 "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.

8 "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.

9 "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God.

10 "Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

11 "Blessed are you when men revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely on my account. 12 Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven, for so men persecuted the prophets who were before you.

13 "You are the salt of the earth; but if salt has lost its taste, how shall its saltness be restored? It is no longer good for anything except to be thrown out and trodden under foot by men.

14 "You are the light of the world. A city set on a hill cannot be hid. 15 Nor do men light a lamp and put it under a bushel, but on a stand, and it gives light to all in the house. 16 Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven.

17 "Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to abolish them but to fulfil them. 18 For truly, I say to you, till heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the law until all is accomplished. 19 Whoever then relaxes one of the least of these commandments and teaches men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; but he who does them and teaches them shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven. 20 For I tell you, unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven.

21 "You have heard that it was said to the men of old, 'You shall not kill; and whoever kills shall be liable to judgment.' 22 But I say to you that every one who is angry with his brother[i] shall be liable to judgment; whoever insults[j] his brother shall be liable to the council, and whoever says, 'You fool!' shall be liable to the hell[k] of fire. 23 So if you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has something against you, 24 leave your gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled to your brother, and then come and offer your gift. 25 Make friends quickly with your accuser, while you are going with him to court, lest your accuser hand you over to the judge, and the judge to the guard, and you be put in prison; 26 truly, I say to you, you will never get out till you have paid the last penny.

27 "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall not commit adultery.' 28 But I say to you that every one who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart. 29 If your right eye causes you to sin, pluck it out and throw it away; it is better that you lose one of your members than that your whole body be thrown into hell.[k] 30 And if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away; it is better that you lose one of your members than that your whole body go into hell.[k]

31 "It was also said, 'Whoever divorces his wife, let him give her a certificate of divorce.' 32 But I say to you that every one who divorces his wife, except on the ground of unchastity, makes her an adulteress; and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery.

33 "Again you have heard that it was said to the men of old, 'You shall not swear falsely, but shall perform to the Lord what you have sworn.' 34 But I say to you, Do not swear at all, either by heaven, for it is the throne of God, 35 or by the earth, for it is his footstool, or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. 36 And do not swear by your head, for you cannot make one hair white or black. 37 Let what you say be simply 'Yes' or 'No'; anything more than this comes from evil.[l]

38 "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' 39 But I say to you, Do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; 40 and if any one would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as well; 41 and if any one forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. 42 Give to him who begs from you, and do not refuse him who would borrow from you.

43 "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' 44 But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, 45 so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust. 46 For if you love those who love you, what reward have you? Do not even the tax collectors do the same? 47 And if you salute only your brethren, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same? 48 You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.

6 "Beware of practicing your piety before men in order to be seen by them; for then you will have no reward from your Father who is in heaven.

2 "Thus, when you give alms, sound no trumpet before you, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may be praised by men. Truly, I say to you, they have their reward. 3 But when you give alms, do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing, 4 so that your alms may be in secret; and your Father who sees in secret will reward you.

5 "And when you pray, you must not be like the hypocrites; for they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, that they may be seen by men. Truly, I say to you, they have their reward. 6 But when you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to your Father who is in secret; and your Father who sees in secret will reward you.

7 "And in praying do not heap up empty phrases as the Gentiles do; for they think that they will be heard for their many words. 8 Do not be like them, for your Father knows what you need before you ask him. 9 Pray then like this:

Our Father who art in heaven,
Hallowed be thy name.
10 Thy kingdom come.
Thy will be done,
On earth as it is in heaven.
11 Give us this day our daily bread;[m]
12 And forgive us our debts,
As we also have forgiven our debtors;
13 And lead us not into temptation,
But deliver us from evil.[n]

14 For if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father also will
forgive you; 15 but if you do not forgive men their trespasses, neither will
your Father forgive your trespasses.

16 "And when you fast, do not look
dismal, like the hypocrites, for they
disfigure their faces that their fasting
may be seen by men. Truly, I say to
you, they have their reward. 17 But
when you fast, anoint your head and
wash your face, 18 that your fasting
may not be seen by men but by your
Father who is in secret; and your
Father who sees in secret will reward
you.

19 "Do not lay up for yourselves
treasures on earth, where moth and
rust[o] consume and where thieves
break in and steal, 20 but lay up for
yourselves treasures in heaven, where
neither moth nor rust[o] consumes and
where thieves do not break in and
steal. 21 For where your treasure is,
there will your heart be also.

22 "The eye is the lamp of the body.
So, if your eye is sound, your whole
body will be full of light; 23 but if your
eye is not sound, your whole body will
be full of darkness. If then the light in
you is darkness, how great is the darkness!

24 "No one can serve two masters;
for either he will hate the one and
love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other.
You cannot serve God and mammon.

25 "Therefore I tell you, do not be
anxious about your life, what you shall
eat or what you shall drink, nor about
your body, what you shall put on. Is
not life more than food, and the body
more than clothing? 26 Look at the
birds of the air: they neither sow nor
reap nor gather into barns, and yet your
heavenly Father feeds them. Are you
not of more value than they? 27 And
which of you by being anxious can add
one cubit to his span of life?[p] 28 And
why are you anxious about clothing?
Consider the lilies of the field, how they
grow; they neither toil nor spin; 29 yet I
tell you, even Solomon in all his glory
was not arrayed like one of these.
30 But if God so clothes the grass of
the field, which today is alive and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, will
he not much more clothe you, O men
of little faith? 31 Therefore do not be
anxious, saying, 'What shall we eat?'
or 'What shall we drink?' or 'What
shall we wear?' 32 For the Gentiles seek
all these things; and your heavenly
Father knows that you need them all.
33 But seek first his kingdom and his
righteousness, and all these things
shall be yours as well.

34 "Therefore do not be anxious
about tomorrow, for tomorrow will be
anxious for itself. Let the day's own
trouble be sufficient for the day.

7 "Judge not, that you be not judged.
2 For with the judgment you pronounce you will be judged, and the
measure you give will be the measure
you get. 3 Why do you see the speck
that is in your brother's eye, but do not
notice the log that is in your own eye?
4 Or how can you say to your brother,
'Let me take the speck out of your eye,'
when there is the log in your own eye?
5 You hypocrite, first take the log out
of your own eye, and then you will
see clearly to take the speck out of
your brother's eye.

6 "Do not give dogs what is holy;
and do not throw your pearls before
swine, lest they trample them under
foot and turn to attack you.

7 "Ask, and it will be given you;
seek, and you will find; knock, and it
will be opened to you. 8 For every one
who asks receives, and he who seeks
finds, and to him who knocks it will
be opened. 9 Or what man of you, if his
son asks him for bread, will give him
a stone? 10 Or if he asks for a fish,
will give him a serpent? 11 If you then,
who are evil, know how to give good
gifts to your children, how much
more will your Father who is in heaven
give good things to those who ask him!
12 So whatever you wish that men
would do to you, do so to them; for
this is the law and the prophets.

13 "Enter by the narrow gate; for
the gate is wide and the way is easy,[q]
that leads to destruction, and those who
enter by it are many. 14 For the gate is
narrow and the way is hard, that leads
to life, and those who find it are few.

15 "Beware of false prophets, who
come to you in sheep's clothing but inwardly are ravenous wolves. 16 You
will know them by their fruits. Are
grapes gathered from thorns, or figs
from thistles? 17 So, every sound tree
bears good fruit, but the bad tree
bears evil fruit. 18 A sound tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor can a bad tree
bear good fruit. 19 Every tree that does
not bear good fruit is cut down and
thrown into the fire. 20 Thus you will
know them by their fruits.

21 "Not every one who says to me,
'Lord, Lord,' shall enter the kingdom
of heaven, but he who does the will of
my Father who is in heaven. 22 On that
day many will say to me, 'Lord, Lord,
did we not prophesy in your name, and
cast out demons in your name, and do
many mighty works in your name?'
23 And then will I declare to them, 'I
never knew you; depart from me, you
evildoers.'

24 "Every one then who hears these
words of mine and does them will be
like a wise man who built his house
upon the rock; 25 and the rain fell, and
the floods came, and the winds blew
and beat upon that house, but it did not
fall, because it had been founded on
the rock. 26 And every one who hears
these words of mine and does not do
them will be like a foolish man who
built his house upon the sand; 27 and
the rain fell, and the floods came, and
the winds blew and beat against that
house, and it fell; and great was the fall
of it."

28 And when Jesus finished these
sayings, the crowds were astonished at
his teaching, 29 for he taught them as
one who had authority, and not as
their scribes.

AUGUSTINE (354-430)

Aurelius Augustinus, or Saint Augustine, was born in Tagaste, North Africa in 354. His parents were poor and his father was a pagan who lived a somewhat loose life. His mother, St. Monica, however, was a devout Christian who had a strong influence on Augustine's life. At the University of Carthage he gave up the religion his mother had taught him and developed skills in rhetoric while living a rather fast life and fathering an illegitimate son. He was later converted to Manichaeism, a heretical sect originating in Persia and combining elements of Christianity with Zorastrianism, Buddhism, and Platonism. In 376 Augustine went to Rome where he became a successful teacher of rhetoric. In 384, at the urging of the Manichaeans, he went to Milan. There he was exposed to the eloquence and fervor of the Bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose, and engaged in a profound study of Plato. After a critical period of doubt and mental turmoil, he re-converted to Christianity, and forthwith returned to Tagaste to enter upon a monastic life with some friends. In 391 he was chosen to be a priest at Hippo. He remained at Hippo the rest of his life, becoming Bishop of Hippo around 395 and dying there thirty-five years later, in 430. The best known of Augustine's writings are his Confessions, and autobiographical explication and apology (to God) for his spiritual journey from youth through his conversion to Christianity, and the City of God, written between 413 and 426, from which the following selections are taken.

Augustine is credited by Aquinas with the initial clarification of the concept of just war, and indeed in the passages below we find him distinguishing a just war ("justified only by the injustice of the agressor") from unjust wars and commenting that a good ruler will bewail the need even of just wars. But we will not stress this contribution of Augustine here since it is developed with copious references and quotations from Augustine in the selections from Aquinas. Rather, we shall focus on Augustine's concept of peace, his pessimistic view of war and peace in the actual "earthly" society, and his contrasting vision of eternal or heavenly peace in the life hereafter.

Some background is helpful. By Augustine's time the Roman Empire had accepted Christianity. In 313 A.D. the Emperor Constantine I had issued the Edict of Milan which, after two centuries of persecutions, recognized Christiantity and allowed its worship. Constantine himself was baptized a Christian on his deathbed and his successors proclaimed Christiantity to be the offical religion of the Roman Empire. This triumph of Christianity, however, was, according to the historian Gibbon, the cause of the fall of the Roman Empire; the stoic, realistic character of the Roman citizen and soldier gave way to the mysticism and concern for otherworldly salvation of the Christians. This latter position is nowhere more clearly set forth than in Augustine's City of God which was written as the Empire's decline entered its final phase. Twenty-six years after Augustine left Rome from Milan, the German Visigoth, Alaric, stormed and sacked that city; nineteen years later, as Augustine lay dying, the Vandals had his city of Hippo under seige. The City of God was written in this sad period, and reflects Augustine's contrast between the misery and destruction of noble things which he saw about him, and the tranquillity of "heavenly" peace for which he yearned.

Augustine exercised an enormous influence on Christian thought and is considered by both Protestant and Catholic clergy as the founder of Christian theology. He held that God is the absolutely perfect, all-good, all-powerful and all-knowing ground and source of all being, and that love and devotion to God is the ultimate proper aim of man. God does not create evil; evil is only the imperfection, the finitude of man, and occurs because of man's love of the lesser, finite material things of this world rather than God. War is an inevitable concomitant of man's imperfect nature, and though some wars are more just than others, we must forego hopes of a genuine peace on earth. Augustine's concept of peace as an ordered harmony which yields a conflict-free tranquillity of mind and is only acheivable in heaven, contrasts with the more practical ideal of peace as a political organization of men and nations of the world which will provide reasonable and humane ways to resolve the various natural and human conflicts of interest which arise.

THE CITY OF GOD: BOOK XV

Chapter 4

As for the city of this world, it is neither to last forever nor even to be a city, once the final doom of pain is upon it. Nevertheless, while history lasts, it has a finality of its own; it reaches such happiness by sharing a common good as is possible when there are no goods but the things of time to afford it happiness. This is not the kind of good that can give those who are content with it any freedom from fear. In fact, the city of man, for the most part, is a city of contention with opinions divided by foreign wars and domestic quarrels and by the demands for victories which either end in death or are merely momentary respites from further war. The reason is that whatever part of the city of the world raises the standard of war, it seeks to be lord of the world, when, in fact, it is enthralled in its own wickedness. Even when it conquers, its victory can be mortally poisoned by pride, and if, instead of taking pride in the success already achieved, it takes account of the nature and normal vicissitudes of life and is afraid of future failure, then the victory is merely momentary. The fact is that the power to reach domination by war is not the same as the power to remain in perpetual control.

Nevertheless, it is wrong to deny that the aims of human civilization are good, for this is the highest end that mankind of itself can achieve.[1] For, however lowly the goods of earth, the aim, such as it is, is peace. The purpose even of war is peace. For, where victory is not followed by resistance there is a peace that was impossible so long as rivals were competing, hungrily and unhappily, for something material too little to suffice for both. This kind of peace is a product of the work of war, and its price is a so-called glorious victory; when victory goes to the side that had a juster cause it is surely a matter for human rejoicing, and the peace is one to be welcomed.

The things of earth are not merely good; they are undoubtedly gifts from God. But, of course, if those who get such goods in the city of men are reckless about the better goods of the City of God, in which there is to be the ultimate victory of an eternal, supreme, and untroubled peace, if men so love the goods of earth as to believe that these are the only goods or if they love them more than the goods they know to be better, then the consequence is inevitable: misery and more misery.

THE CITY OF GOD: BOOK XVIII

Chapter 2

The city of man, for all the width of its expansion throughout the world and for all the depth of its differences in this place and that, is a single community. The simple truth is that the bond of a common nature makes all human beings one. Nevertheless, each individual in this community is driven by his passions to pursue his private purposes. Unfortunately, the objects of these purposes are such that no one person (let alone, the world community) can ever be wholly satisfied. The reason for this is that nothing but Absolute Being can satisfy human nature.[1] The result is that the city of man remains in a chronic condition of civil war. Hence, there is always the oppression of those who fail by those who succeed. The vanquished succumb to the victorious, preferring sheer survival and any kind of peaceful settlement to their own continued hegemony—even to liberty itself. In nearly all peoples the voice of nature itself has counseled that, when you have had the bad luck to be beaten, it is better to bow before the conqueror than to risk wholesale annihilation—so much so, in fact, that those who have chosen death rather than slavery have aroused constant admiration in those who do not understand. At any rate, God, in whose mighty providence lie both defeat and victory, has seen to it that wars brought supremacy to some people and subjugation to others.

THE CITY OF GOD: BOOK XIX

Chapter 7

After the city comes the world community. This is the third stage in the hierarchy of human associations. First, we have the home; then the city; finally, the globe. And, of course, as with the perils of the ocean, the bigger the community, the fuller it is of misfortunes.

The first misfortune is the lack of communication resulting from language differences. Take two men who meet and find that some common need calls on them to remain together rather than to part company. Neither knows the language of the other. As far as intercommunication goes, these two, both men, are worse off than two dumb animals, even of different kinds. For all its identity in both, their human nature is of no social help, so long as the language barrier makes it impossible for them to tell each other what they are thinking about. That is why a man is more at home with his dog than with a foreigner.

It will be answered that the Roman Empire, in the interests of peaceful collaboration, imposes on nations it has conquered the yoke of both law and language, and thus has an adequate, or even an overflowing, abundance of interpreters. True enough. But at what cost! There is one war after another, havoc everywhere, tremendous slaughterings of men.

All this for peace. Yet, when the wars are waged, there are new calamities brewing. To begin with, there never has been, nor, is there today, any absence of hostile foreign powers to provoke war. What is worse, the very development of the empire accruing from their incorporation has begotten still worse wars within. I refer to the civil wars and social uprisings that involve even more wretched anxieties for human beings, either shaken by their actual impact, or living in fear of their renewal. Massacres, frequent and sweeping, hardships too dire to endure are but a part of the ravages of war. I am utterly unable to describe them as they are, and as they ought to be described; and even if I should try to begin, where could I end?

I know the objection that a good ruler will wage wars only if they are just. But, surely, if he will only remember that he is a man, he will begin by bewailing the necessity he is under of waging even just wars. A good man would be under compulsion to wage no wars at all, if there were not such things as just wars. A just war, moreover, is justified only by the injustice of an aggressor; and that injustice ought to be a source

of grief to any good man, because it is human injustice. It would be deplorable in itself, apart from being a source of conflict.

Any man who will consider sorrowfully evils so great, such horrors and such savagery, will admit his human misery. And if there is any man who can endure such calamities, or even contemplate them without feeling grief, his condition is all the more wretched for that. For it is only the loss of all humane feeling that could make him call such a life 'the happy life.'

Chapter 10

. . . . . .

On earth we are happy, after a fashion, when we enjoy the peace, little as it is, which a good life brings; but such happiness compared with the beatitude which is our end in eternity is, in point of fact, misery. When we mortal men, living amid the realities of earth, enjoy the utmost peace which life can give us, then it is the part of virtue, if we are living rightly, to make a right use of the goods we are enjoying. When, on the other hand, we do not enjoy this temporal peace, then it is the function of virtue to make a right use of the misfortunes which we are suffering. By genuine Christian virtue we mean here that we refer not only all good things which are being rightly used, and all the right use we are making of blessings and misfortunes, but our very virtue itself to that End in which there will be a peace so good that no peace could be better, a peace so great that a greater would be impossible.

Chapter 11

Thus, we may say of peace what we have said of eternal life—that it is our highest good; more particularly because the holy Psalmist was addressing the City of God (the nature of which I am trying, with so much difficulty, to make clear) when he said: 'Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem; praise thy God, O Sion. Because he hath strengthened the bolts of thy gates, he hath blessed thy children within thee. He hath placed peace in thy borders.'[1] For, when the bolts of that city's gates will have been strengthened, none will enter in and none will issue forth. Hence, its borders [*fines*] must be taken to mean that peace which I am trying to show is our final good. Note, too, that Jerusalem, the mystical name which symbolizes this City, means, as I have already mentioned, 'the vision of peace.'

However, the word 'peace' is so often applied to conditions here on earth, where life is not eternal, that it is better, I think, to speak of 'eternal life' rather than of 'peace' as the end or supreme good of the City of God. It is in this sense that St. Paul says: 'But now being made free from sin, and become servants of God, you have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting.'[2]

It would be simplest for all concerned if we spoke of 'peace in eternal life,' or of 'eternal' or of 'eternal life in peace,' as the end or supreme good of this City. The trouble with the expression 'eternal life' is that those unfamiliar with the Scriptures might take this phrase to apply also to the eternal loss of the wicked, either because, as philosophers, they accept the immortality of the soul, or even because, as Christians, they know by faith that the punishment of the wicked has no end and, therefore, that they could not be punished forever unless their life were eternal.

The trouble with 'peace' is that, even on the level of earthly and temporal values, nothing that we can talk about, long for, or finally get, is so desirable, so welcome, so good as peace. At any rate, I feel sure that if I linger a little longer on this topic of peace I shall tire very few of my readers. After all, peace is the end of this City which is the theme of this work; besides, peace is so universally loved that its very name falls sweetly on the ear.

Chapter 12

Any man who has examined history and human nature will agree with me that there is no such thing as a human heart that does not crave for joy and peace. One has only to think of men who are bent on war. What they want is to win, that is to say, their battles are but bridges to glory and to peace. The whole point of victory is to bring opponents to their knees —this done, peace ensues. Peace, then, is the purpose of waging war; and this is true even of men who have a passion for the exercise of military prowess as rulers and commanders.

What, then, men want in war is that it should end in peace. Even while waging a war every man wants peace, whereas no one wants war while he is making peace. And even when men are plotting to disturb the peace, it is merely to fashion a new peace nearer to the heart's desire; it is not because they dislike peace as such. It is not that they love peace less, but that they love their kind of peace more. And even when a secession is successful, its purpose is not achieved unless some sort of peace remains among those who plotted and planned the rebellion. Take even a band of highwaymen. The more violence and impunity they want in disturbing the peace of other men, the more they demand peace among themselves. Take even the case of a robber so powerful that he dispenses with partnership, plans alone, and single-handed robs and kills his victims. Even he maintains some kind of peace, however shadowy, with those he cannot kill and whom he wants to keep in the dark with respect to his crimes. Certainly in his own home he wants to be at peace with his wife and children and any other members of his household. Of course, he is delighted when his every nod is obeyed; if it is not obeyed, he rages, and scolds, and demands peace in his own home and, if need be, gets it by sheer brutality. He knows that the price of peace in domestic society is to have everyone subject in the home to some head—in this instance, to himself.

Suppose, now, a man of this type were offered the allegiance of a larger society, say of a city or of a nation, with the pledge that he would be obeyed as he looks to be obeyed under his own roof. In this case, he would no longer hide himself away in a darksome robber's den; he would show himself off as a high and mighty king—the same man, however, with all of his old greed and criminality. Thus it is that all men want peace in their own society, and all want it in their own way. When they go to war what they want is to make, if they can, their enemies their own, and then to impose on them the victor's will and call it peace.

Now let us imagine a man like the one that poetry and

mythology tell us about, a being so wild and anti-social that it was better to call him half-human than fully a man. He was called Cacus, which is Greek for 'bad.' His kingdom was the solitude of a dreadful cave and it was his extraordinary wickedness that gave him his name. He had no wife to exchange soft words with him; no tiny children to play with; no bigger ones to keep in order; no friend whose company he could enjoy, not even his father, Vulcan—than whom he was at least this much luckier that he had never begotten a monster like himself! There was no one to whom he would give anything, but whenever and from whomsoever he could he would take whatever he wanted and whenever he wanted it.

Nevertheless, all alone as he was in a cave that was always 'warm with the blood of some recent victim,'[1] his sole longing was for peace in which no force would do him harm and no fear disturb his rest. Even with his own body he wanted to be at peace, and he was at ease only when peace was there. Even when he was bidding his members to obey him and was seizing, killing, and devouring his victims, his purpose was peace—the speediest possible peace with his mortal nature, driven by its needs to rebellion, and with his hunger, in sedition, clamoring for the breakup of the union of body and soul. Brutal and wild as he was and brutal and wild as were his ways, what he wanted was to have his life and limbs in peace. So much so that, had he been as willing to be at peace with his neighbors as he was active in procuring peace within himself and in his cave, no one would have called him wicked, nor a monster, nor even sub-human; or, at least, despite the shape of his body and the smoke and fire that issued from his mouth and kept all neighbors at a distance, people would have said that what looked like injustice, greed, and savagery were merely means to self-preservation. The truth is, of course, that there never existed any such being or, at least, none just like the foil the poets' fancy invented to glorify Hercules at the expense of Cacus. As is the case with most poetic inventions, we need not believe that any such creature, human or sub-human, ever lived.

I turn now to real wild beasts (from which category the animal part of the so-called half-beast,[2] Cacus, was borrowed). They, too, keep their own particular genus in a kind of peace. Their males and females meet and mate, foster and feed their young, even though many of them by nature are more solitary than gregarious, like lions, foxes, eagles, and owls —as contrasted with deer, pigeons, starlings, and bees. Even a tigress purrs over her cubs and curbs all her fierceness when she fondles them. Even a falcon which seems so lonely when hovering above its prey mates and builds a nest, helps to hatch the eggs and feed the young, and makes every effort to maintain with the mother falcon a peaceful domestic society.

It is even more so with man. By the very laws of his nature, he seems, so to speak, forced into fellowship and, as far as in him lies, into peace with every man. At any rate, even when wicked men go to war they want peace for their own society and would like, if possible, to make all men members of that society, so that everyone and everything might be at the service of one head. Of course, the only means such a conqueror knows is to have all men so fear or love him that they will accept the peace which he imposes. For, so does pride perversely copy God.[3] Sinful man hates the equality of all men under God and, as though he were God, loves to impose his sovereignty on his fellow men. He hates the peace of God which is just and prefers his own peace which is unjust. However, he is powerless not to love peace of some sort. For, no man's sin is so unnatural as to wipe out all traces whatsoever of human nature. Anyone, then, who is rational enough to prefer right to wrong and order to disorder can see that the kind of peace that is based on injustice, as compared with that which is based on justice, does not deserve the name of peace.

Of course, even disorder, in whole or in part, must come to some kind of terms either with the situation in which it finds itself or with the elements out of which it takes its being —otherwise it would have no being at all.

Take a man hanging upside down. Certainly his members are in disorder and the posture of the body as a whole is unnatural. The parts which nature demands should be above and below have become topsy-turvy. Such a position disturbs the peace of the body and is therefore painful. Nevertheless, the soul remains at peace with the body and continues to work for its welfare. Otherwise, the man would not live to feel the agony. And even if the soul is driven from the body by excess of pain, nevertheless, so long as the limbs hold together, some kind of peace among these parts remains. Otherwise, there would be no corpse to go on dangling there. Further, the fact that by gravity the corpse, made out of earth, tends to fall to the ground and pulls at the noose that holds it up proves that there is some order in which it seeks peace, and that its weight is, as it were, crying out for a place where it can rest. Lifeless and insensible though the body now is, it does not renounce that appropriate peace in the order of nature which it either has or seeks to have.

So, too, when a corpse is treated to embalming, to prevent dissolution and decay, there is a kind of peace which holds the parts together while the whole is committed to the earth, its proper resting place, and, therefore, a place with which the body is at peace. If, on the other hand, embalming is omitted and nature is allowed to take its course, the corpse remains a battleground of warring exhalations (that attack our senses with the stench we smell) only until such time as they finally fall in with the elements of this world and, slowly, bit by bit, become indistinguishable in a common peace.

Even afterward, however, the law and ordering of the Creator who is supreme in the whole cosmos and the regulator of its peace are still in control. Even when tiny bacteria spring from the corpse of a larger animal, it is by the same law of the Creator that all these minute bodies serve in peace the organic wholes of which they are parts. Even when the flesh of dead animals is eaten by other animals, there is no change in the universal laws which are meant for the common good of every kind of life, the common good that is effected by bringing like into peace with like. It makes no difference what disintegrating forces are at work, or what new combinations are made, or even what changes or transformations are effected.

Chapter 13

The peace, then, of the body lies in the ordered equilibrium of all its parts; the peace of the irrational soul, in the balance

adjustment of its appetites; the peace of the reasoning soul, in the harmonious correspondence of conduct and conviction; the peace of body and soul taken together, in the well-ordered life and health of the living whole. Peace between a mortal man and his Maker consists in ordered obedience, guided by faith, under God's eternal law; peace between man and man consists in regulated fellowship. The peace of a home lies in the ordered harmony of authority and obedience between the members of a family living together. The peace of the political community is an ordered harmony of authority and obedience between citizens. The peace of the heavenly City lies in a perfectly ordered and harmonious communion of those who find their joy in God and in one another in God. Peace, in its final sense, is the calm that comes of order.[1] Order is an arrangement of like and unlike things whereby each of them is disposed in its proper place.

This being so, those who are unhappy, in so far as they are unhappy, are not in peace, since they lack the calm of that Order which is beyond every storm; nevertheless, even in their misery they cannot escape from order, since their very misery is related to responsibility and to justice. They do not share with the blessed in their tranquility, but this very separation is the result of the law of order. Moreover, even the miserable can be momentarily free from anxiety and can reach some measure of adjustment to their surroundings and, hence, some tranquility of order and, therefore, some slender peace. However, the reason why they remain unhappy is that, although they *may* be momentarily free from worry and from pain, they are not in a condition where they *must* be free both from worry and pain.[2] Their condition of misery is worse when such peace as they have is not in harmony with that law which governs the order of nature. Their peace can also be disturbed by pain and in proportion to their pain; yet, some peace will remain, so long as the pain is not too acute and their organism as a whole does not disintegrate.

Notice that there can be life without pain, but no pain without some kind of life. In the same way, there can be peace without any kind of war, but no war that does not suppose some kind of peace. This does not mean that war as war involves peace; but war, in so far as those who wage it or have it waged upon them are beings with organic natures, involves peace—for the simple reason that to be organic means to be ordered and, therefore, to be, in some sense, at peace.

Similarly, there can be a nature without any defect and, even, a nature in which there can be no kind of evil whatever, but there can be no nature completely devoid of good.[3] Even the nature of the Devil, in so far as it is a nature, is not evil; it was perversity—not being true to itself—that made it bad.[4] The Devil did not 'stand in the truth'[5] and, therefore, did not escape the judgment of truth. He did not stand fast in the tranquility of order—nor did he, for all that, elude the power of the Ordainer. The goodness which God gave to his nature does not withdraw him from the justice of God by which that nature is subject to punishment. Yet, even in that punishment, God does not hound the good which He created, but only the evil which the Devil committed. So it is that God does not take back the whole of His original gift. He takes a part and leaves a part; He leaves a nature that can regret what God has taken back. Indeed, the very pain inflicted is evidence of both the good that is lost and the good that is left. For, if there were no good left, there would be no one to lament the good that has been lost.

. . . . .

God, the wise Creator and just Ordainer of all natures, has made the mortal race of man the loveliest of all lovely things on earth. He has given to men good gifts suited to their existence here below. Among these is temporal peace, according to the poor limits of mortal life, in health, security, and human fellowship; and other gifts, too, needed to preserve this peace or regain it, once lost—for instance, the blessings that lie all around us, so perfectly adapted to our senses: daylight, speech, air to breathe, water to drink, everything that goes to feed, clothe, cure, and beautify the body. These good gifts are granted, however, with the perfectly just understanding that whoever uses the goods which are meant for the mortal peace of mortal men, as these goods should be used, will receive more abundant and better goods—nothing less than immortal peace and all that goes with it, namely, the glory and honor of enjoying God and one's neighbor in God everlastingly; but that whoever misuses his gifts on earth will both lose what he has and never receive the better gifts of heaven.

Chapter 14

In the earthly city, then, temporal goods are to be used with a view to the enjoyment of earthly peace, whereas, in the heavenly City, they are used with a view to the enjoyment of eternal peace. Hence, if we were merely unthinking brutes, we would pursue nothing beyond the orderly interrelationship of our bodily part and the appeasing of our appetites, nothing, that is, beyond the comfort of the flesh and plenty of pleasures, so that the peace of body might contribute to peace of the soul. For, if order in the body be lacking, the peace of an irrational soul is checked, since it cannot attain the satisfaction of its appetites. Both of these forms of peace meanwhile subserve that other form of peace which the body and soul enjoy between them, the peace of life and health in good order.

For, just as brutes show that they love the peace or comfort of their bodies by shunning pain, and the peace of their souls by pursuing pleasure to satisfy their appetites, so, too, by running from death, they make clear enough how much they love the peace which keeps body and soul together.

Because, however, man has a rational soul, he makes everything he shares with brutes subserve the peace of his rational soul, so that he first measures things with his mind before he acts, in order to achieve that harmonious correspondence of conduct and conviction which I called the peace of the rational soul. His purpose in desiring not to be vexed with pain, nor disturbed with desire, nor disintegrated by death is that he may learn something profitable and so order his habits and way of life. However, if the infirmity of his human mind is not to bring him in his pursuit of knowledge to some deadly error, he needs divine authority to give secure guidance, and divine help so that he may be unhampered in following the guidance given.

And because, so long as man lives in his mortal body and is a pilgrim far from the Lord, he walks, not by vision, but by faith. Consequently, he refers all peace of body or soul, or their combination, to that higher peace which unites a mortal man with the immortal God and which I defined as 'ordered obedience guided by faith, under God's eternal law.'

THE KORAN (651-2) - ON JIHAD, OR HOLY WAR

The Koran is the sacred book of Islam - the religion, found mainly in Asia and Africa, of almost a quarter of the present world population. According to believers, The Koran is literally the word of God, communicated in more than one hundred revelations through his chief messenger and prophet Muhammed (570?-632). The canonical text was put together by Arabian editors in 651-2. It was drawn from the records of Muhammed's secretary, Zaid Ibn Thabit; all other records were destroyed, so the text has no challengers.

The metaphysical claims of Islam are closely related to those of Judaism and Christianty: 1) there is just one all-powerful God, Allah, who created the universe and knows and foresees every detail of each occurrence in our lives; 2) that Allah communicates to humans by revelations to a few selected individuals - among whom are included Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus, but whose final, chief prophet was Muhammed; 3) that there will be a Judgment Day when Allah will judge all souls, and true believers will be rewarded with an eternal life in heaven. There is more emphasis on an afterlife than in Judaism, and Jesus is accepted only as a prophet, not as Son of God.

The moral code in The Koran is closer to that of the Torah than to that of the Greeks or the Sermon on the Mount. The eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth concept of justice is reaffirmed, and stealing, adultery, idolatry, and incest along with drinking, and gambling, are proscribed. Instead of the Aristotelian ideal of happiness as a life governed by reason, Islam inculcates the concept of life guided by submission to, adoration and worship of, Allah, "the Lord of all being, the All-merciful, and All-compassionate, the Master of the Day of Doom", to be expressed in prayer five times a day, and in obedience to a large body of regulations based on The Koran and subsequent "Traditions". There is no hint of pacifism, or turning the other cheek, when deliberately wronged. God is merciful, compassionate, loving, and orders forgiveness when circumstances warrant; but he is sternly just and sanctions punishment of wrongdoers to the full extent of the injury. All believers are equal before Allah - rich and poor, weak and powerful, black, white and yellow; there is mandatory almsgiving to the poor, and a remarkable absence of racial or social discrimination, although men are said to excel over women and be in charge of them.

Jihad, the Islamic concept of a holy war in which the martyrs who die are assured of heaven, combines the duty of worship and submission to Allah with the concept of retributive justice. In general, a Jihad, or Holy War, is ordered for defense against unbelievers who attack or obstruct the beliefs and practices of Islam. The goal of such a war is either the conversion of the unbelievers or their payment of a poll-tax. Islam has been characterized in the West as "a religion of the sword, spread by the sword and upheld by the sword". And indeed the astonishing spread of Islam in its first century - it secured an empire by 732 which extended from Spain to China, including Syria, Persia, Egypt and North Africa, and was bigger than the Roman Empire - was achieved by a series of military conquests. Yet the characterization is somewhat misleading. The conquest began in self-defense, and though it became mixed with religious zeal and territorial ambition, its successes were due in large part to the fact that Islam gained the allegiance of subjects, was moderate in demands and tolerated other religions - particularly Jews and Christians who believed in one God and shared a common literature. The Koran says to resist persecution, but not to attack first, to keep one's word to the enemy, desist when they desist, and give them protection if they ask it so they may hear Allah's word. But at other places The Koran speaks in more violent tones, which may account for the fanaticism of some contemporary proclaimers of Jihad.

Islam early divided into the mystical,intense Shiite sect centered in Persia (Iran), and the more numerous, orthodox Sunni branch. In the eleventh century, al-Ghazali, a great Islamic philosopher, denounced the study of the sciences and philosophy as opposed to mystical religion, and thereafter, the the great contributions of Arabic scholars to science and philosophy ended.

THE KORAN

Selections from the Koran (Translated, by George Sale, 1880) on Jihad.

Ch. I Entitled the Preface. Revealed at Mecca.

Praise be to God, the Lord of all creatures: the most merciful, the king of the day of judgment. Thee do we worship, and of thee do we beg assistance. Direct us in the right way, in the way of those to whom thou hast been gracious; not of those against whom thou art incensed.

Ch. II Entitled, the Cow: Revealed partly at Mecca, and partly at Medina.

1 A.L.M. There is no doubt in this book; it is a direction to the pious, who believe in the mysteries of faith, who observe the appointed times of prayer, and distribute alms out of what we have bestowed on them; and who believe in the revelation, which hath been sent down unto thee, and that which hath been sent down unto the prophets before thee, and have firm assurance in the life to come: these are directed by their Lord, and they shall prosper. As for the unbelievers, it will be equal to them whether thou admonish them or do not admonish them; they will not believe. God hath sealed up their hearts and their hearing; a dimness covereth their sight, and they shall suffer a grievous punishment. There are some who say, 'We believe in God and the last day,' but are not really believers; they seek to deceive God and those who do believe, but they deceive themselves only and are not sensible thereof.

184 The month of Ramadan shall ye fast, in which the Koran was sent down from heaven, a direction unto men, and declarations of direction, and the distinction between good and evil...[At night] eat and drink until ye can plainly distinguish a white thread from a black thread by the daybreak; then keep the fast until night, ...but be constantly present in the places of worship.

190 ...fear God that ye may be happy. And fight for the religion of God against those who fight against you, but transgress not by attacking them first, for God loveth not the transgressors. And kill them wherever ye find them, and turn them out of that whereof they have dispossessed you; for a temptation to idolatry is more grievous than slaughter; yet fight not against them in the holy temple, until they attack you therein; but if they attack you slay them there. This shall be the reward of the infidels. But if they desist, God is gracious and merciful. Fight therefore against them until there be no temptation to idolatry, and the religion be God's: but if they desist, then let there be no hostility, except against the ungodly. A sacred month for a sacred month, and the holy limits of Mecca, if they attack you therein, do ye also attack them therein in retaliation; and whoever transgresseth against you by so doing, do ye transgress against him in like manner as he hath transgressed against you, and fear God, and know that God is with those who fear him.

216 Whatsoever good ye do, God knoweth it. War is enjoined you against the infidels; but this is hateful unto you: yet perchance ye hate a thing which is better for you, and perchance ye love a thing which is worse for you: but God knoweth and ye know not. They will ask thee concerning the sacred month, whether they may war therein: Answer, To war therein is grievous; but to obstruct the way of God and infidelity towards him, and to keep men from the holy temple, and to drive out his people from thence, is more grievous in the sight of God, and the temptation to idolatry is more greivous than to kill in sacred months. They will not cease to war against you , until they turn you from your religion, if they be able: but whoever among you shall turn back from his religion, and die an infidel, their works shall be vain in this world, and the next; they shall be companions of hell fire, they shall remain therein for ever. But they who believe and who fly for the sake of religion , and fight in God's cause, they shall hope for the mercy of God; for God is gracious and merciful.

Ch. 8 Entitled The Spoils: Revealed at Medina

They who believe not expend their wealth to obstruct the way of God: they shall expend it, but afterwards it shall become a matter of sighing and regret unto them, and at length they shall be overcome: and the unbelievers shall be gathered together unto hell: that God may distinguish the wicked from the good, and may throw the wicked one upon the other, and may gather them all in a heap, and cast them into hell. These are they who shall perish. Say unto the unbelievers, that if they desist from opposing thee, what is already past shall be forgiven them; but if they return to attack thee, the exemplary punishment of the former opposers of the prophets is already past, and the like shall be inflicted on them. Therefore fight against them until there be no opposition in favor of idolatry, and the religion be wholly God's [39].

And think not that the unbelievers have escaped God's vengeance, for they shall not weaken the power of God. Therefore prepare against them what force ye are able, and troops of horse, whereby ye may strike a terror into the enemy of God, and your enemy, and into other infidels besides them, whom ye know not, but God knoweth them. And whatsoever ye shall expend in the defence of the religion of God, it shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly. And if they incline unto peace, do thou also incline thereto; and put thy confidence in God, for it is he who heareth and knoweth [61, the "Peace Verse"]. But if they seek to deceive thee, verily, God will be they support.

Ch. 9 Entitled The Declaration of Immunity; Revealed at Medina.

And when the months wherein ye are not allowed to attack them shall be past, kill the idolaters wheresoever ye shall find them, and take them prisoners, and beseige them, and lay wait for them in every convenient place [5]. But if they repent, and observe the appointed times of prayer, and pay the legal alms, dismiss them freely for God is gracious and merciful. And if any of the idolaters demad protection of thee, grant him protection, that he may hear the word of God; and afterwards let him reach the place of his security. This thou shalt do, because they are people which know not the excellency of the religion thou preachest.

O true believers, verily the idolaters are unclean; let them not therefore come near unto the holy temple after this year. And if ye fear want, by the cutting off of trade and communication with them, God will enrich you of his abundance, if he pleaseth: for God is knowing and wise. Fight against them who believe not in God nor in the last day and forbid not that which God and his [29] apostle have forbidden and profess not the true religion of those unto whom the scriptures have been delivered, until they pay tribute by right of subjection, and they be reduced low. The Jews say, Ezra is the son of God and the Christians say, Christ is the son of God. This is the saying of their mouths: they imitate the sayings of those who were unbelievers in former times. May God resist them. How they are infatuated! They take their priests and their monks for their lords, besides God, and the Christ the son of Mary; although they are commanded to worship one God only; there is no God but he; far be that from him which they associate with him!

In those who are weak, or are afflicted with sickness, or those who find not wherewith to contribute to the war, it shall not be a crime if they stay at home; provided they behave themselves faithfully towards God and his apostle. [91]

The believers are not obliged to go forth to war all together: if a part of every band of them go not forth, it is that they may diligently instruct themselves in their religion: and may admonish their people, when they return unto them, that they may take heed to themselves. [112].

Verily God hath purchased of the true believers their souls and their substance, promising themthe enjoyment of paradise; on condition that they fight for the cause of God: whether they slay or be slain, the promise is assuredly due by the law, and the gospel, and the Koran.[c 104]

POPE URBAN II (1042-1099) - THE FIRST CRUSADE

The Crusades were a series of wars, by Christian leaders in Europe from 1095 to 1291, to regain the Holy Land from the muslims. Geographically, the Holy Land was not large: the territory at issue was about one fourth the size of France. Despite a potent mixture of political and economic mctivations, the recurring announced purpose of the Crusades was a religious one. As proclaimed in Pope Urban II's speech at Clermont in 1095, initiating the First Crusade, this was a holy war - a war willed by God and done to achieve God's purposes. St. Bernard of Clairvaux, who called for a second crusade in 1146, wrote to the Knights Templar, in words reminiscent of the Koran, "The Christian who slays the unbliever in the Holy War, is sure of a reward; more sure if he himself is slain. The Christian glories in the death of the pagan, because Christ is thereby glorified."

History suggests that the causes of war often do not coincide with the reasons leaders give for embarking upon them. In the case of the Crusades there are indeed other factors which help to explain the enthusiastic response: the prospects of riches and new domains for the nobles, the trade interests of merchants in Italian cities, and the excitement, freedom and adventure of fighting for a noble cause. But the immediate proximate cause, referred to by Urban II, was the defeat of the Byzantine Emperor by the Seljuq Turks in 1071, and the reports of their atrocities against Christians in Jerusalem. The Holy Lands had been under comparatively moderate muslim control, with a few exceptions, from the 7th century on. Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem had not been cut off, pilgrims had been allowed free access to the many Christian churches and holy places in Jerusalem, and the Holy Sepulcher, though despoiled by the mad caliph, Hakim, in 1010, had been lavishly rebuilt with muslim help. But when the Byzantine Empire, which had been christian under the Orthodox Eastern Church, fell into the hands of the aggressive moslim Seljuq Turks, the Pope had both religious and political reasons for initiating his Crusade. Add to these a desire to restore the spiritual focus of the papacy (which had achieved an absolute low point of corruption in the preceding centuries) and to re-unify the Christian Church under Rome after the break between the Orthodox Eastern Church and Rome in 1054, and we see in Urban II a powerful merging of religious and political motivation. It is pointless to speculate over which was the ultimate determinant; but it would be quite false to claim that his strong religious grounds for a Holy War were not decisive causal factors.

Pope Urban II was a Frenchman, named Odo of Lagery, who became a monk at Cluny and later was made cardinal and bishop of Ostia by his Pope. The latter, Gregory VII, was an Italian named Hildebrand, recognized as one of the greatest of all popes. He instituted a program of reform against the corruption and laxity of the Church which had prevailed in the two preceding centuries. The source of the problem had been control of church offices by secular powers, with buying and selling of the papacy, degeneracy in the popes and clergy, bribery, nepotism, and murders as a result. Gregory VII condemned clerical concubinage or marriage, and simony (buying and selling of church offices) against the strong opposition of the married clergy and the royal houses of Europe who considered church offices their property. He excommunicated the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Henry IV, in 1076 for his recalcitrance, and, noting the Seljuq Truks' advances in the east, Gregory also called unsuccessfuly for a holy war against them. He did not succeed in his efforts, but his reforms and ideas were carried out by Urban II and his successors. When Urban II became Pope in 1088, Henry IV had installed an "anti-pope", Clement III, in Rome, so that Urban II could not be seated in Rome until 1093, when the antipope was expelled. Among the significant results of Urban II's popular call for a Crusade, was a unification and strengthening of support for the Church reforms which had been started by Gregory VII, as well as for his concept of a holy war.

The First Crusade was the only one, out of nine, with a claim to significant success. Following the first part of the speech, given below, which Urban II

addressed to a large council gathered at Clermont in 1095, the assemblage raised a great cry of excitement: "Dieu li volt!" ("God wills it!"). Urban continued, urging that this be their battle cry, and telling them to set forth, wearing the cross on brow or breast (from which the name "crusades" came). Some nobles immediately fell on their knees before the Pope, consecrating themselves and their property to the service of God. In the following months, as the Pope went on to other cities to preach his message, thousands of commonalty - serfs, debtors, merchants, prisoners - as well as monks, hermits, priests and knights, released from various commitments by authority of the Pope, did likewise. In Rome he was greeted with enthusiastic acclaim and in due time the First Crusade got under way. Despite false starts under hordes led by Peter the Hermit, Walter the Penniless, and others, Jerusalem was finally captured in 1099 by the knights Godfrey and Tancred, and some 70,000 Moslems and Jews, including women and children were massacred. The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was established, and Godfrey of Bouillon was chosen as ruler under the title, Defender of the Sepulcher. The religious orders of the Hospitalers and the Knights Templar were established, and with them the medieval ideal of chivalry reached its highest development. Chivalric ethics mixed Christian and military concepts of morality. The chief virtues were piety, honor, valor, courtesy, chastity and loyalty. The knight's loyalty was due to God, his feudal lord and his sworn love. In practice chivalric conduct was subject to corruption, barbarism or, eventually ritualization, but the concept remained as romantic, if dubious, merger of Christian and military virtues.

The Second Crusade was a dismal failure, and later crusades were chiefly expeditions to assist those already in the Holy Land. They ended in 1291 when the last Christian stronghold fell, coming under the control of the muslims once again.

The translation of Pope Urban II's speech which follows is from a modern French version, and was done by David Jaymes.

URBAN II - ADDRESS TO THE COUNCIL AT CLERMONT - 1095

These words and exhortations are addressed to Frenchmen as well as to those living beyond the mountains, to all those in whom God's work shines and who are set off from other peoples either because of where they live or because of the homage paid to the faith and the Church. For we want to inform you of the great sadness which brings us to these parts in order to respond to your needs and the needs of the faithful.

Indeed, from within Jerusalem and from Constantinople we have heard this: that some some Persians have invaded Christian lands, devastating them by force, pillage, and by setting fires, taking some residents captive, and killing others. Those responsible are from the kingdom of Persia which, we know, is an accursed nation completely turned away from God. They have either destroyed the places of worship of desecrated them by practicing their own form of worship: after defiling our altars they turn them over; they circumcise Christians and spread their blood either on altars or over baptismal fonts. Those they wish to kill they do so by piercing the umbilical in order to get the intestine and tie it to a stake. Then they whip them, forcing them to run around the stake until the entrails are completely out of the cavity and they finally die. Others, tied to a post, are shot full of arrows, and still others stick out their necks only to have them severed with one swift blow. And what can I say about the way in which our women have been sullied? Here I am better better off saying very little.

Thus they have dismembered the Greek empire and conquered a territory that would take two months to traverse. Whose duty is it to punish them and take back what is stolen if it isn't yours? The Lord has set you above other nations by your arms, a courageous soul, an agile body, and the ability to strike down those who resist you. May you be moved by these words, may you be incited to action by the deeds of your ancestors, by the courage and greatness of Charlemagne and his son King Louis, and by the examples of your other kings who broke the domination of the Turks and extended the reign of the Holy Church in their lands. Be touched above all by the thought of Christ's Holy Sepulcher possessed by a vile and base people, of the Holy Lands profaned by their filth and impurity.

Valiant horsemen, noble issue of invincible fathers, do not falter! Return to the boldness of your ancestors! If you are held back by the love of wife, children, and family, remember what the Lord said: 'He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me....And every one who has left houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother or children or lands, for my name's sake, will receive a hundredfold, and inherit eternal life.'

Do not allow yourselves to be kept here by any concern for your lands or family. The lands you occupy, bordered on one side by the sea and on the other by mountains, are too small for the population: they do not produce abundantly and they scarcely provide what food you need. This is why you envy one another so much, fight with one another, and kill one another. Remove the hatred from your hearts: may your quarrels be silenced and your wars ended, and all animosity assuaged.

Set out on the road of the Holy Sepulcher! Take back the land from the infidels, and establish again your power! God has created an Israel in which, as the Scriptures say, 'milk and honey flow.' Jerusalem is the center of a land more fertile than any other and a veritable paradise: the Redeemer singled it out by His arrival there, honored it by His presence, consecrated it by His Passion, saved it by His death, and distinguished it by His tomb. This royal city, placed in the middle of the world but now in the hands of enemies, is reduced to servitude by peoples wholly ignorant of God. She cries out to you for deliverance, and implores you to come to her aid. She looks to you for help because, as we have already said, God has accorded you the signal gift of arms. Take to the road as expiation for your sins, and know that glory awaits you in heaven.

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(Those present cry 'GOD WILLS IT! GOD WILLS IT!')

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Dear brothers, we have seen in you today what God meant when he said when two or three come together in my name, I will be in their midst. If the Lord God had not been present in your souls, you would not have pronounced the same words. Although the words issued forth from many different mouths, they had one source: God Himself said them through you; it was He who spoke. May the same words become your war cry: when you attack the enemy, may God's army cry out, 'God wills it! God wills it!'

The old, the weak and those having no experience with weapons should not undertake this trip. Women who are without husband, brother, or guardian should likewise not go for they would be more a burden than a help. May the rich help the poor and support those who are able to wage war. Priests and religious persons, regardless of their order, must receive the permission of their bishop, and no lay person should depart without the blessing of his pastor.

Whoever leaves on this holy pilgrimage must commit himself to God and be willing to sacrifice himself as a living host. He will wear the sign of the cross on his forehead or breast and on his back: through this double act he will accomplish the words of the Lord who said, 'He who does not take his cross and follow me is not worthy of me.'

AQUINAS (1225-1274)

Thomas Aquinas was born in Aquino, a small town between Naples and Rome, around 1225. He entered the University of Naples at age 14, and joined the Dominican order in 1244. He studied under Albert the Great, also a Dominican, at Paris and Cologne beginning around 1248. He was a University Professor at the University of Paris from 1257-59 and in 1268-72, and at the University of Naples from 1272-72,and he taught and wrote at various Dominican monasteries in between his terms of teaching. He died at about the age of 49 in 1274. During his lifetime he produced an enormous ammount of writing, including the twenty-two volumes of Summa Theologiae from which the following selections are taken, and some eleven commentaries on Aristotle's writings.

Generally considered the greatest philosopher of the middle ages, Aquinas' major achievement, simply put, was to effect an exhaustive and coherent synthesis of Aristotle's philosophy of nature with the central tenets of Christian Theology and ethics. Aristotle had been in a state of relative neglect in Western Christendom; neo-Platonism and mysticism had exercised a greater influence on Christian scholarship from before Augustine on. Although some of Aristotle's work was known, (e.g., his logic) his philosophy of nature, of ethics, politics and metaphysics were only translated into Latin, usually from Arabian texts disclosed during the crusades, in the years from around 1210 to 1250. Albert the Great, Aquinas' teacher, embarked on the project of synthesizing Aristotle's thought with Christian theology; Aquinas took up the task and carried it to completion. Although his great synthesis was later subjected to devastating criticism with the advance of modern science, there is a sense in which the development of science and technology in Western Europe and American is deeply in his debt. For Aquinas saved Western scholars from the fate which Al Ghazzali visited upon scientific and philosophical inquiry in the Arabian world, by establishing a modus vivendi for science and religion, rather than rejecting the study of nature as opposed to the worship of God.

Broadly speaking, Aquinas accepted Aristotle's account of nature and the natural world, and placed it within the context of super-natural realm in which God existed, created the world for a purpose, thus providing an ultimate other-worldly purpose of men's lives, and a set of moral or religious standards of personal and social life which went beyond the natural virtues and secular aims of society set forth by Aristotle.

To Aristotle's view of the natural world, as earth-centered and populated with a hierarchy of natural kinds of things(from the elements earth,air, fire and water, through the vegetable kingdom, the various levels of the animal kingdom up to man) and each natural kind acting from its inner entelechy or essence to realize its end, - to this view of the natural world Aquinas added the super-natural world of Christiantity peopled by God and other purely spiritual beings. The teleology of nature, as well as efficient causation, became means to the fulfillment of God's over-all plan of creating the earth that man might prepare himself for eternal life. The Aristotelian sources of knowledge - the senses, and reason - were supplemented by a third, divine revelation. Reason remained man's highest natural faculty, but was superseded by revelation, in the absence of which faith in revealed truth took priority over reason. The Aristotelian moral virtues and intellectual virtues were supplemented by the even higher Christian virtues of faith, hope and love (or charity). Thus was established a compatibility between common sense, science as it was then known and religion.

Thomas's teaching were at first a subject of much controversy, But he was canonized as Saint Thomas in 1323, and established by papal encyclical as the official philosopher of the Roman Catholic Church in 1879 (though the Church is currently much more eclectic philosophically).

In the passages which follow Thomas takes up in turn "Peace","War" and "killing in self-defense". Typically he a) presents a question, b)gives 3 or more objections to the asnwer he will give, c) presents his answer with reasons for it, and d) answers the objections. The selection on self-defense is significant for the principle of "double effect", of which we will hear more later, which is found in his answer.

QUESTION XXIX.

OF PEACE.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider peace, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether peace is the same as concord? (2) Whether all things desire peace? (3) Whether peace is an effect of charity? (4) Whether peace is a virtue?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PEACE IS THE SAME AS CONCORD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix. 13): *Peace among men is well ordered concord.* Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.

Obj. 2. Further, Concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace consists in suchlike union, for Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* xi.) that *peace unites all, and makes them of one mind.* Therefore peace is the same as concord.

Obj. 3. Further, Things whose opposites are identical are themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. xiv. 33): *God is not the God of dissension but of peace.* Therefore peace is the same as concord.

On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But *there is no peace to the wicked* (Isa. xlviii. 22). Therefore peace is not the same as concord.

I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.

For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal. v. 17: *The flesh lusteth against the spirit.* Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for

him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even in one man.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both of them. For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that *peace is tranquillity of order*, which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.

Reply Obj. 2. If one man consent to the same thing together with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in agreement.

Reply Obj. 3. A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.

Second Article.

whether all things desire peace?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* xi.), peace *unites consent*. But there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.

Obj. 2. Further, The appetite does not tend to opposite things at the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do not desire peace.

Obj. 3. Further, Good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matth. x. 34): *I came not to send peace*. Therefore all things do not desire peace.

Obj. 4. Further, That which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command (Mark ix. 49): *Have peace among you*. Therefore all things do not desire peace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix. 12, 14) that *all things desire peace:* and Dionysius says the same (*Div. Nom.* xi.).

I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are

removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine defines (*De Civ. Dei* xix. 13) *the tranquillity of order*.

Reply Obj. 1. Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that *peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness*, where *consent* denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and *connaturalness*, the union of natural appetites.

Reply Obj. 2. Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore.

Reply Obj. 3. Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is written (Wis. xiv. 22): *Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace.*

Reply Obj. 4. Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Ps. cxlvii. 3: *Who hath placed peace in thy borders.* The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb that peace.

Third Article.

WHETHER PEACE IS THE PROPER EFFECT OF CHARITY?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.

Obj. 2. Further, If a certain thing is caused by charity,

its contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one another (Acts xv.). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of charity.

Obj. 3. Further, The same thing is not the proper effect of different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isa. xxxii. 17: *And the work of justice shall be peace.* Therefore it is not the effect of charity.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. cxviii. 165): ***Much peace have they that love Thy Law.***

I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (A. 1). The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity:—the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him; so that all his desires tend to one object:—the second, in so far as we love our neighbour as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbour's will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people *make choice of the same things* (*Ethic.* ix. 4), and Tully says (*De Amicitia*) that friends *like and dislike the same things* (Sallust, *Catilin.*).

Reply Obj. 1. Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 6) friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly suchlike dissension about very slight matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.

Reply Obj. 3. Peace is the *work of justice* indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is *a unitive force* as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.): and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.

Fourth Article.

whether peace is a virtue?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are precepts about keeping peace, for example: *Have peace among you* (Mark ix. 49). Therefore peace is a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, We do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is meritorious to keep peace, according to Matth. v. 9: *Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.* Therefore peace is a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. v. 20). Therefore peace is a virtue.

On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xix. 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXVIII., A. 4), when a number of acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other, they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire produces all such actions by its one power of calefaction.

Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and of our neighbour, as shown above (A. 3), there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in reference to joy (Q. XXVIII., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1. We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXIX., AA. 1, 3). It is also numbered among the fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.

This suffices for the *Reply* to the *Second Objection.*

Reply Obj. 3. Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.

QUESTION XL.

OF WAR.

(In Four Articles.)

WE must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether some kind of war is lawful? (2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight? (3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes? (4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS ALWAYS SINFUL TO WAGE WAR?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Matth. xxvi. 52: *All that take the sword shall perish with the sword.* Therefore all wars are unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for is written (Matth. v. 39): *But I say to you not to resist evil;* and (Rom. xii. 19): *Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath.* Therefore war is always sinful.

Obj. 3. Further, Nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.

Obj. 4. Further, The exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion: *If the Christian Religion forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to no man; . . . and be content with your pay.'† If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering.*

I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in war-time. And as the care of the common weal is committed

to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. xiii. 4): *He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil;* so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Ps. lxxxi. 4): *Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner;* and for this reason Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxii. 75): *The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.*

Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (*QQ. in Hept.*, qu. x., *super Jos.*): *A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly.*

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom.*): *True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandisement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.* For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxii. 74): *The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and suchlike things, all these are rightly condemned in war.*

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* xxii. 70): *To take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority.* On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to *take the sword*, but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

Reply Obj. 2. Suchlike precepts, as Augustine observes (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte* i. 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-defence. Never-

theless it is necessary sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (*Ep. ad Marcellin.* cxxxviii.): *Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an internal enemy.*

Reply Obj. 3. Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord *came not to send upon earth* (Matth. x. 34). Hence Augustine says (*Ep. ad Bonif.* clxxxix.): *We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace.*

Reply Obj. 4. Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no such danger, and hence they were called *exercises of arms* or *bloodless wars*, as Jerome states in an epistle.

Second Article.

whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. For, as stated above (A. 1), wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory says (*Hom. in Ev.* xiv.): *The wolf comes upon the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, and flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice.* Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.

Obj. 2. Further, Pope Leo IV. writes (xxiii., qu. 8, can. *Igitur*): *As untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly ; for which reason we commanded our people to gather together, and ordered them to go down to the sea-shore.* Therefore it is lawful for bishops to fight.

Obj. 3. Further, Apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according to Rom. i. 32: *They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them.* Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce others to fight: for it is written (xxiii., qu. 8, can. *Hortatu*) that Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and

entreaty of Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.

Obj. 4. Further, Whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii., qu. 8, can. *Omni timore*) that if *a man die for the true faith, or to save his country, or in defence of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward.* Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.

On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing bishops and clerics (Matth. xxvi. 52): *Put up again thy sword into the scabbard* (Vulg.,—*its place*). Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.

I answer that, Several things are requisite for the good of a human society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (*Polit.* i. 1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce.

Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Tim. ii. 4: *No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business.* The second reason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. xi. 26: *As often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He come.* Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.

Reply Obj. 1. Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. x. 4): *The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God.* Such are

salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication.

Reply Obj. 2. Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the Old Testament (Jos. vi. 4) the priests were commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 4, *ad* 2) every power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is unbecoming their personality.

Reply Obj. 4. Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO LAY AMBUSHES IN WAR?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war. For it is written (Deut. xvi. 20): *Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just.* But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just war.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (*Contra Mend.* xv.). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy, as Augustine states (*Ep. ad Bonifac.* clxxxix.), it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Matth. vii. 12): *Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them:* and we ought to observe this in all our dealings with our neighbour. Now our enemy is our neighbour. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*QQ. in Heptateuch.*, qu. x., *super Jos.*): *Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes:* and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Jos. viii. 2).

I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain *rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies*, as Ambrose states (*De Offic.* i.).

Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Matth. vii. 6: *Give not that which is holy, to dogs.* Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated in the Book on *Strategy* by Frontinus. Suchlike concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war.

Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him.

This suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections.*

Fourth Article.

Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God. Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Exod. xx. 8: for *sabbath* is interpreted *rest.* But wars are full of unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.

Obj. 2. Further, Certain persons are reproached (Isa. lviii. 3) because on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it unlawful to fight on holy days.

Obj. 3. Further, No ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed. Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of avoiding temporal harm.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Machab. ii. 41): The Jews rightly determined . . . saying: *Whosoever shall come up against us to fight on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him.*

I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (Jo. vii. 23): *Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?* Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, provided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from fighting.

However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the *Replies* to the *Objections*.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO KILL A MAN IN SELF-DEFENCE?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in self-defence. For Augustine says to Publicola (*Ep.* xlvii.): *I do not agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be a soldier, or exercise a public office, so that one does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be in keeping with one's person.* Now he who kills a man in self-defence, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, He says (*De Lib. Arb.* i. 5): *How are they free from sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's life for the sake of these contemptible things?* Now among contemptible things he reckons *those which men may forfeit unwillingly*, as appears from the context (*ibid.*): and the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his own body.

Obj. 3. Further, Pope Nicolas says in the Decretals: *Concerning the clerics about whom you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defence, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever.* Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defence.

Obj. 4. Further, Murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defence in order to save his own life.

Obj. 5. Further, If the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Matth. vii. 17. Now self-defence itself seems to be unlawful, according to Rom. xii. 19: *Not defending* (Douay,—*revenging*) *yourselves, my dearly beloved.* Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xxii. 2): *If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood.* Now it is much more lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder

if he kill another in defence of his own life.

I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (Q. XLIII., A. 3: I.-II., Q. LXXII., A. 1). Accordingly the act of self-defence may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in *being,* as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defence, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defence will be lawful, because according to the jurists, *it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defence.* Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defence in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above (A. 3), it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defence, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defence, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.

Reply Obj. 1. The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage quoted in the *Second Objection* is to be understood in the same sense. Hence he says pointedly, *for the sake of these things,* whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the *Reply* to the *Second Objection.*

Reply Obj. 3. Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defence, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself.

Reply Obj. 4. The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man's life.

Reply Obj. 5. The defence forbidden in this passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: *Not defending yourselves,—that is, not striking your enemy back.*

Dante Alighieri was born in Florence in 1265 of a family of decayed nobility. He moved in patrician circles, was a member of the Florentine cavalry when it routed the anti-papist Ghibellines in 1289, and subsequently served as councilman and in other offices in Florence. However he sided with the losing side in a schism within the Guelph, or anti-imperial, party which governed Florence,and was dispossessed and exiled in 1302. In exile he worked for several princes but in particular supported Holy Roman Emperor Henry VII, as the potential unifier of all Italy. He wrote the book De Monarchia while in exile, around 1311, and died in 1321.

Dante is known primarily as the poet who wrote The Divine Comedy, which was also composed while he was in exile. Largely on the basis of this work he has been viewed as the first learned layman of the middle ages, and the outstanding figure in Italian letters. This magnificent work, over 14,000 lines long, is divided into three parts, telling of the poet's journey through Hell, Purgatory and Heaven. Highly imaginative and poetic,it is also a rational synthesis of the medieval world-view, quite compatible with that of Thomas Aquinas and rich with allusions to classical literature. The poet travels down through the nine circles of Hell, then up Mount Purgatory, and on up through nine heavens with his beloved Beatrice.The different circles of Hell, the stages through Purgatory and the various Heavens (associated with spheres of the Sun Moon and Planets) represent a hierarchy of vices and virtues ranging from the basest to the beautific vision of God.

Although Dante was immediately interested in a unification of the warring Italian states, De Monarchia is a plea for a much broader peace based upon the rule of a single temporal monarch over the entire human race. In it he addresses three questions. To the first, whether or not a government over all men by one prince is necessary to the welfare of the world, he gives an affirmative asnwer based on his argument as to the purpose of civil government. To the second, whether the Roman Empire was justified, he also gives an affirmative answer, arguing that by several tests, its victory was evidence of God's will. The third question is whether the authority of of the temporal ruler comes directly from God or only through the spiritual vicar, or pope; to this he answers that it must come directly from God. De Monarchia is of interest as one of the first pleas for a universal, secular world government based on a vision of international peace as a goal of mankind.

The historical background, and Dante's role in it, are not irrelevant. After the fall of the Roman Empire around 400, the popes gained significant temporal power through acquisition of various territories, known as the Papal States. In 800 Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the West in Rome, and thus began a tradition which held the Holy Roman Empire to be successor to the Roman Empire. Though the term 'Holy Roman Empire' did not come into usage until later, the political entity was dated from the coronation of Otto I in 962 until 1806. In any case, though in theory the Holy Roman Emperors were the temporal rulers of Christendom while the Popes were the spiritual vicars, there developed a continuing rivalry over their temporal jurisdictions. In various cities of Italy, this took the form in the 1200s and 1300s of a rivalry between the Guelph party which sided with the popes and the Ghibellines which sided with the Emperors,who were generally German Kings. Florence, and Dante, were aligned with the Guelphs - hence Dante's role in routing the Ghibellines. Dante was expelled, however, by the portion of the Guelphs (the "Black Guelphs") who took the hard line against the imperial party; Dante had joined the "White Guelphs" who inclined towards certain Ghibelline opinions, e.g., the independence of the Temporal Monarch from the Papacy which Dante advocates in De Monarchia.

The translation of De Monarchia is that E.J.Church, 1879.

DE MONARCHIA.

BOOK I.

I.—It very greatly concerns all men on whom a higher nature has impressed* the love of truth, that, as they have been enriched by the labour of those before them, so they also should labour for those that are to come after them, to the end that posterity may receive from them an addition to its wealth. For he is far astray from his duty—let him not doubt it—who, having been trained in the lessons of public business, cares not himself to contribute aught to the public good. He is no "tree planted by the water-side, that bringeth forth his fruit in due season." He is rather the devouring whirlpool, ever engulfing, but restoring nothing. Pondering, therefore, often on these things, lest some day I should have to answer the charge of the talent buried in the earth, I desire not only to show the budding promise, but also to bear fruit for the general good, and to set forth truths by others unattempted. For what fruit can he be said to bear who should go about to demonstrate again some theorem of Euclid? or when Aristotle has shown us what happiness is, should show it to us once more? or when Cicero has been the apologist of old age, should a second time undertake its defence? Such squandering of labour would only engender weariness and not profit.

But seeing that among other truths, ill-understood yet profitable, the knowledge touching temporal monarchy is at once most profitable and most obscure, and that because it has no immediate reference to worldly gain it is left unexplored by all, therefore it is my purpose to draw it forth from its hiding-places, as well that I may spend my toil for the benefit of the world, as that I may be the first to win the prize of so great an achievement to my own glory. The work indeed is difficult, and I am attempting what is beyond my strength; but I trust not in my own powers, but in the light of that Bountiful Giver, "Who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not."

II.—First, therefore, we must see what is it that is called Temporal Monarchy, in its idea, so to speak, and according to its purpose. Temporal Monarchy, then, or, as men call it, the Empire, is the government of one prince above all men in time, or in these things and over those things which are measured by time. Three great questions are asked concerning it. First, there is the doubt and the question, is it necessary for the welfare of the world? Secondly, did the Roman people take to itself by right the office of Monarchy? And thirdly, does the authority of Monarchy come from God directly, or only from some other minister or vicar of God?

Now, since every truth, which is not itself a first principle, becomes manifest from the truth of some first principle, it is therefore necessary in every inquiry to have a knowledge of the first principle involved, to which by analysis we may go back for the certainty of all the propositions which are afterwards accepted. And since this treatise is an inquiry, we must begin by examining the first principle on the strength of which deductions are to rest. It must be understood then that there are certain things which, since they are not subject to our power, are matters of speculation, but not of action: such are Mathematics and Physics, and things divine. But there are some things which, since they are subject to our power, are matters of action as well as of speculation, and in them we do not act for the sake of speculation, but contrariwise: for in such things action is the end. Now, since the matter which we have in hand has to do with states, nay, with the very origin and principle of good forms of government, and since all that concerns states is subject to our power, it is manifest that our subject is not in the first place speculation, but action. And again, since in matters of action the end sought is the first principle and cause of all (for that it is which first moves the agent to act), it follows that all our method concerning the means which are set to gain the end must be taken from the end. For there will be one way of cutting wood to build a house, and another to build a ship. That therefore, if it exists, which is the ultimate end for the universal civil order of mankind, will be the first principle from which all the truth of our future deductions will be sufficiently manifest. But it is folly to think that there is an end for this and for that particular civil order, and yet not one end for all.

III.—Now, therefore, we must see what is the end of the whole civil order of men; and when we have found this, then, as the Philosopher* says in his book to Nicomachus,† the half of our labour will have been accomplished. And to render the question clearer, we must observe that as there is a certain end for which nature makes the thumb, and another, different from this, for which she makes the whole hand, and again another for which she makes the arm, and another different from all for which she makes the whole man; so there is one end for which she orders the individual man, and another for which she orders the family, and another end for the city, and another for the kingdom, and finally an ultimate one for which the Everlasting God, by His art which is nature, brings into being the whole human race. And this is what we seek as a first principle to guide our whole inquiry.

Let it then be understood that God and nature make nothing to be idle. Whatever comes into being, exists for some operation or working. For no created essence is an ultimate end in the creator's purpose, so far as he is a creator, but rather the proper operation of that essence. Therefore it follows that the operation does not exist for the sake of the essence, but the essence for the sake of the operation.

There is therefore a certain proper operation of the whole body of human kind, for which this whole body of men in all its multitudes is ordered and constituted, but to which no one man, nor single family, nor single neighbourhood, nor single city, nor particular kingdom can attain. What this is will be manifest, if we can find what is the final and characteristic capacity of humanity as a whole. I say then that no quality which is shared by different species of things is the distinguishing capacity of any one of them. For were it so, since this capacity is that which makes each species what it is, it would follow that one essence would be specifically distributed to many species, which is impossible. Therefore the ultimate quality of men is not existence, taken simply; for the elements share therein. Nor is it existence under certain conditions;* for we find this in minerals too. Nor is it existence with life; for plants too have life. Nor is it percipient existence; for brutes share in this power. It is to be percipient with the possibility of understanding, for this quality falls to the lot of none but man, either above or below him. For though there are other beings which with him have understanding, yet this understanding is not, as man's, capable of development. For such beings are only certain intellectual natures, and not anything besides, and their being is nothing other than to understand; which is without interruption, otherwise they would not be eternal. It is plain, therefore, that the distinguishing quality of humanity is the faculty or the power of understanding.

And because this faculty cannot be realised in act in its entirety at one time by a single man, nor by any of the individual societies which we have marked, therefore there must be multitude in the human race, in order to realise it: just as it is necessary that there should be a multitude of things which can be brought into being, so that the capacity of the primal matter for being acted on may be ever open to what acts on it. For if this were not so, we could speak of a capacity apart from its substance, which is impossible. And with this opinion Averroes, in his comment on [Aristotle's] treatise on the Soul, agrees. For the capacity for understanding, of which I speak, is concerned not only with universal forms or species, but also, by a kind of extension, with particular ones. Therefore it is commonly said that the speculative understanding becomes practical by extension; and then its end is to do and to make. This I say in reference to things which may be *done*, which are regulated by political wisdom, and in reference to things which may be *made*, which are regulated by art; all which things wait as handmaidens on the speculative intellect, as on that best good, for which the Primal Goodness created the human race. Hence the saying of the Politics that those who are strong in understanding are the natural rulers of others.

IV.—It has thus been sufficiently set forth that the proper work of the human race, taken as a

* The common title for Aristotle from the first half of the thirteenth century. *Vide* Jourdain, *Recherches sur les traductions d'Aristote*, p. 212, note.

† Arist. *Ethics*, i. 7.

whole, is to set in action the whole capacity of that understanding which is capable of development: first in the way of speculation, and then, by its extension, in the way of action. And seeing that what is true of a part is true also of the whole, and that it is by rest and quiet that the individual man becomes perfect in wisdom and prudence; so the human race, by living in the calm and tranquillity of peace, applies itself most freely and easily to its proper work; a work which, according to the saying; "Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels," is almost divine. Whence it is manifest that of all things that are ordered to secure blessings to men, peace is the best. And hence the word which sounded to the shepherds from above was not riches, nor pleasure, nor honour, nor length of life, nor health, nor strength, nor beauty; but peace. For the heavenly host said: "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth, peace to men of goodwill." Therefore also, "Peace be with you," was the salutation of the Saviour of mankind. For it behoved Him, who was the greatest of saviours, to utter in His greeting the greatest of saving blessings. And this custom His disciples too chose to preserve; and Paul also did the same in his greetings, as may appear manifest to all.

Now that we have declared these matters, it is plain what is the better, nay the best, way in which mankind may attain to do its proper work. And consequently we have seen the readiest means by which to arrive at the point, for which all our works are ordered, as their ultimate end; namely, the universal peace, which is to be assumed as the first principle for our deductions. As we said, this assumption was necessary, for it is as a sign-post to us, that into it we may resolve all that has to be proved, as into a most manifest truth.

V.—As therefore we have already said, there are three doubts, and these doubts suggest three questions, concerning Temporal Monarchy, which in more common speech is called the Empire; and our purpose is, as we explained, to inquire concerning these questions in their given order, and starting from the first principle which we have just laid down. The first question, then, is whether Temporal Monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world; and that it is necessary can, I think, be shown by the strongest and most manifest arguments; for nothing, either of reason or of authority, opposes me. Let us first take the authority of the Philosopher in his Politics.* There, on his venerable authority, it is said that where a number of things are arranged to attain an end, it behoves one of them to regulate or govern the others, and the others to submit. And it is not only the authority of his illustrious name which makes this worthy of belief, but also reason, instancing particulars.

If we take the case of a single man, we shall see the same rule manifested in him: all his powers are ordered to gain happiness; but his understanding is what regulates and governs all the others; and otherwise he would never attain to happiness. Again, take a single household: its end is to fit the members thereof to live well; but there must be one to regulate and rule it, who is called the father of the family, or, it may be, one who holds his office. As the Philosopher says: "Every house is ruled by the oldest."† And, as Homer says, it is his duty to make rules and laws for the rest. Hence the proverbial curse: "Mayst thou have an equal at home." Take a single village: its end is suitable assistance as regards persons and goods, but one in it must be the ruler of the rest, either set over them by another, or with their consent, the head man amongst them. If it be not so, not only do its inhabitants fail of this mutual assistance, but the whole neighbourhood is sometimes wholly ruined by the ambition of many, who each of them wish to rule. If, again, we take a single city: its end is to secure a good and sufficient life to the citizens; but one man must be ruler in imperfect as well as in good forms of the state. If it is otherwise, not only is the end of civil life lost, but the city too ceases to be what it was. Lastly, if we take any one kingdom, of which the end is the same as that of a city, only with greater security for its tranquillity, there must be one king to rule and govern. For if this is not so, not only do his subjects miss their end, but the kingdom itself falls to destruction, according to that word of the infallible truth: "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be brought to desolation." If then this holds good in these cases, and in each individual

* Arist. *Polit.* i. 5.

† *Ibid.* i. 2, 6, quoting Hom. *Od.* ix. 114.—(W.)

thing which is ordered to one certain end, what we have laid down is true.

Now it is plain that the whole human race is ordered to gain some end, as has been before shown. There must, therefore, be one to guide and govern, and the proper title for this office is Monarch or Emperor. And so it is plain that Monarchy or the Empire is necessary for the welfare of the world.

VII.—Further, the whole human race is a whole with reference to certain parts, and, with reference to another whole, it is a part. For it is a whole with reference to particular kingdoms and nations, as we have shown; and it is a part with reference to the whole universe, as is manifest without argument. Therefore, as the lower portions of the whole system of humanity are well adapted to that whole, so that whole is said to be well adapted to the whole which is above it. It is only under the rule of one prince that the parts of humanity are well adapted to their whole, as may easily be collected from what we have said; therefore it is only by being under one Princedom, or the rule of a single Prince, that humanity as a whole is well adapted to the Universe, or its Prince, who is the One God. And it therefore follows that Monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world.

X.—Wherever there is controversy, there ought to be judgment, otherwise there would be imperfection without its proper remedy, which is impossible; for God and Nature, in things necessary, do not fail in their provisions. But it is manifest that there may be controversy between any two princes, where the one is not subject to the other, either from the fault of themselves, or even of their subjects Therefore between them there should be means of judgment. And since, when one is not subject to the other, he cannot be judged by the other (for there is no rule of equals over equals), there must be a third prince of wider jurisdiction, within the circle of whose laws both may come. Either he will or he will not be a Monarch. If he is, we have what we sought; if not, then this one again will have an equal, who is not subject to his jurisdiction, and then again we have need of a third. And so we must either go on to infinity, which is impossible, or we must come to that judge who is first and highest; by whose judgment all controversies shall be either directly or indirectly decided; and he will be Monarch or Emperor. Monarchy is therefore necessary to the world, and this the Philosopher saw when he said: "The world is not intended to be disposed in evil order; 'in a multitude of rulers there is evil, therefore let there be one prince.'"

XI.—Further, the world is ordered best when justice is most paramount therein: whence Virgil, wishing to celebrate that age, which in his own time seemed to be arising, sang in his *Bucolics:* "Now doth the Virgin return, and the kingdom of Saturn." For Justice was named "the Virgin," and also Astræa. The kingdom of Saturn was the good time, which they also called the Golden Age. But Justice is paramount only in a Monarchy, and therefore a Monarchy, that is, the Empire, is needed if the world is to be ordered for the best. For better proof of this assumption it must be recognised that Justice, considered in itself, and in its proper nature, is a certain rightness or rule of conduct, which rejects on either side all that deviates from it.

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Now Justice, as a state of mind, has a force which opposes it in the will; for where the will of a man is not pure from all desire, then, though there be Justice, yet there is not Justice in all its ideal brightness; for there is in that man, however little, yet in some degree, an opposing force; and therefore they, who would work on the feelings of a judge, are rightly repelled. But, in practice, Justice finds an opposing force in what men are able to do. For, seeing that it is a virtue regulating our conduct towards other men, how shall any act according to Justice if he has not the power of rendering to all their due? Therefore it is plain that the operation of Justice will be wide in proportion to the power of the just man.

From this let us argue: Justice is strongest in the world when it is in one who is most willing and most powerful; only the Monarch is this; therefore, only when Justice is in the Monarch is it strongest in the world. This pro-syllogism goes on through the second figure, with an involved negative, and is like this: All B is A; only C is A; therefore only C is B: or all B is A; nothing but C is A; therefore nothing but C is B.

Our previous explanation makes the first proposition apparent: the second is proved thus, first in regard to will, and secondly in regard to power. First it must be observed that the strongest opponent of Justice is Appetite, as Aristotle intimates in the fifth book to Nicomachus. Remove Appetite altogether, and there remains nothing adverse to Justice; and therefore it is the opinion of the Philosopher that nothing should be left to the judge, if it can be decided by law; and this ought to be done for fear of Appetite, which easily perverts men's minds. Where, then, there is nothing to be wished for, there can be no Appetite, for the passions cannot exist if their objects are destroyed. But the Monarch has nothing to desire, for his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean; and this is not the case with other princes, whose kingdoms are bounded by those of their neighbours; as, for instance, the kingdom of Castile is bounded by the kingdom of Aragon. From which it follows that the Monarch is able to be the purest embodiment of Justice among men.

XV.—I say also that Being, and Unity, and the Good come in order after the fifth mode of priority. For Being comes by nature before Unity, and Unity before Good. Where Being is most, there Unity is greatest; and where Unity is greatest, there Good is also greatest; and in proportion as anything is far from Being in its highest form, is it far from Unity, and therefore from Good. Therefore in every kind of things, that which is most one is best, as the Philosopher holds in the treatise about simple Being. Therefore it appears that to be one is the root of Good, and to be many the root of Evil. Therefore, Pythagoras in his parallel tables placed the one, or Unity, under the line of good, and the many under the line of Evil; as appears from the first book of the *Metaphysics*. Hence we may see that to sin is nothing else than to pass on from the one which we despise and to seek many things, as the Psalmist saw when he said: "By the fruit of their corn and wine and oil, are they multiplied."

Hence it is plain that whatever is good, is good for this reason, that it consists in unity. And because concord is a good thing in so far as it is concord, it is manifest that it consists in a certain unity, as its proper root, the nature of which will appear if we find the real nature of concord. Concord then is the uniform motion of many wills; and hence it appears that a unity of wills, by which is meant their uniform motion, is the root of concord, nay, concord itself. For as we should say that many clods of earth are concordant, because that they all gravitate together towards the centre; and that many flames are concordant because that they all ascend together towards the circumference, if they did this of their own free will, so we say that many men are in concord because that they are all moved together, as regards their willing, to one thing, which one thing is formally in their wills just as there is one quality formally in the clods of earth, that is gravity, and one in the flame of fire, that is lightness. For the force of willing is a certain power; but the quality of good which it apprehends is its form; which form, like as others, being one is multiplied in itself, according to the multiplication of the matters which receive it, as the soul, and numbers, and other forms which belong to what is compound.

To explain our assumption as we proposed, let us argue thus: All concord depends on unity which is in wills; the human race, when it is at its best, is a kind of concord; for as one man at his best is a kind of concord, and as the like is true of the family, the city, and the kingdom; so is it of the whole human race. Therefore the human race at its best depends on the unity which is in will. But this cannot be unless there be one will to be the single mistress and regulating influence of all the rest. For the wills of men, on account of the blandishments of youth, require one to direct them, as Aristotle shows in the tenth book of his *Ethics*. And this cannot be unless there is one prince over all, whose will shall be the mistress and regulating influence of all the others. But if all these conclusions be true, as they are, it is necessary for the highest welfare of the human race that there should be a Monarch in the world; and therefore Monarchy is necessary for the good of the world.

II.—Inquiry concerning the truth of the first doubt has been made as accurately as the nature of the subject permitted; we have now to inquire concerning the second, which is: Whether the Roman people assumed to itself *of right* the dignity of the Empire? And the first thing in this question is to find the truth, to which the reasonings concerning it may be referred as to their proper first principle.

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III.—My answer then to the question is, that it was by right, and not by usurpation, that the Roman people assumed to itself the office of Monarchy, or, as men call it, the Empire, over all mankind. For in the first place it is fitting that the noblest people should be preferred to all others; the Roman people was the noblest; therefore it is fitting that it should be preferred to all others. . . . .

VI.—But in order properly to discover the truth in our inquiry, we must recognise that the judgment of God is sometimes made manifest to men, and sometimes hidden from them.

It may be made manifest in two ways, namely, by reason and by faith.

There are some judgments of God to which the human reason, by its own paths, can arrive; as, that a man should risk death to save his country. For a part should always risk itself to save its whole, and each man is a part of his State, as is clear from the Philosopher in his *Politics*. . . . .

But the judgment of God is a hidden one, when man cannot arrive at the knowledge of it either by the law of nature or by the written law, but only occasionally by a special grace. This grace comes in several ways: sometimes by simple revelation, sometimes by revelation assisted by a certain kind of trial or debate. . . . .

Revelation by means of trial is also of two kinds. It is given either by casting lots, or by combat; for "to strive" (*certare*), is derived from a phrase which means "to make certain" (*certum facere*). It is clear that the judgment of God is sometimes revealed to men by casting lots, as in the substitution of Matthias in the Acts of the Apostles.

Again the judgment of God is revealed to men by combat in two ways: either it is by a trial of strength, as in the duels of champions who are called "*duellioncs*," or it is by the contention of many men, each striving to reach a certain mark first, as happens in the contests of athletes who run for a prize. The first of these methods was prefigured among the Gentiles by the contests between Hercules and Antæus, which Lucan mentions in the fourth book of his *Pharsalia*, and Ovid in the ninth book of his *Metamorphoses*. The second is prefigured by the contest between Atalanta and Hippomenes, described in the tenth book of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.

Moreover, it ought not to pass unnoticed concerning these two kinds of strife, that while in the first each champion may fairly hinder his antagonist, in the second this is not so; for athletes must not hinder one another in their strife, though our poet seems to have thought differently in the fifth *Æneid* where Euryalus so receives the prize. But Cicero has done better in forbidding this practice in the third book of the *De Officiis*, following the opinion of Chrysippus.† He there says: "Chrysippus is right here, as he often is, for he says that he who runs in a race should strive with all his might to win, but in no way should he try to trip up his competitor."

With these distinctions, then, we may assume that there are two ways in which men may learn the judgment of God, as we have on this point stated; first by the contests of athletes, and secondly by the contests of champions. These ways of discovering the judgment of God I will treat of in the chapter following.

IX.—That people then, which conquered when all were striving hard for the Empire of the world, conquered by the will of God. For God cares more to settle a universal strife than a particular one; and even in particular contests the athletes sometimes throw themselves on the judgment of God, according to the common proverb: "To whom God makes the grant, him let Peter also bless." It cannot, then, be

doubted that the victory in the strife for the Empire of the world followed the judgment of God. The Roman people, when all were striving for the Empire of the world, conquered; it will be plain that so it was, if we consider the prize or goal, and those who strove for it. The prize or goal was the supremacy over all men; for it is this that we call the Empire. None reached this but the Roman people. Not only were they the first, they were the only ones to reach the goal, as we shall shortly see.

The first man who panted for the prize was Ninus, King of the Assyrians; but although for more than ninety years (as Orosius tells) he, with his royal consort Semiramis, strove for the Empire of the world and made all Asia subject to himself, nevertheless he never subdued the West. Ovid mentions both him and his queen in the fourth book of the *Metamorphoses*, when he says, in the story of Pyramus:† "Semiramis girdled the round space with brick-built walls;" and, "let them come to Ninus' tomb and hide beneath in its shade."

Secondly, Vesoges, King of Egypt, aspired to this prize; but though he vexed the North and South of Asia, as Orosius relates, yet he never gained for himself one-half of the world; nay, when, as it were, between the judges and the goal, the Scythians drove him back from his rash enterprise.

Then Cyrus, King of the Persians, made the same attempt; but after the destruction of Babylon, and the transference of its Empire to Persia, he did not even reach the regions of the West, but lost his life and his object in one day at the hands of Tamiris, Queen of the Scythians.

But after that these had failed, Xerxes, the son of Darius and king among the Persians, assailed the world with so great a multitude of nations, with so great a power, that he bridged the channel of the sea which separates Asia from Europe, between Sestos and Abydos. And of this wonderful work Lucan makes mention in the second book of his *Pharsalia*: "Such paths across the seas, made by Xerxes in his pride, fame tells of." But finally he was miserably repulsed from his enterprise, and could not attain the goal.

Besides these kings, and after their times, Alexander, King of Macedon, came nearest of all to the prize of monarchy; he sent ambassadors to the Romans to demand their submission, but before the Roman answer came, he fell in Egypt, as Livy tells us, as it were in the middle of the course. Of his burial there, Lucan speaks in the eighth book of his *Pharsalia*, where he is inveighing against Ptolemy, King of Egypt: "Thou last of the Lagæan race, soon to perish in thy degeneracy, and to yield thy kingdom to an incestuous sister; while for thee the Macedonian is kept in the sacred cave. . . ."

"Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!" Who will not marvel at thee here? For when Alexander was trying to hinder his Roman competitor in the race, thou didst suddenly snatch him away from the contest that his rashness might proceed no further.

But that Rome has won the crown of so great a victory is proved on the testimony of many. Our poet in his first *Æneid* says: "Hence, surely, shall one day the Romans come, as the years roll on, to be the leaders of the world, from the blood of Teucer renewed; over the sea and over the land they shall hold full sway." And Lucan, in his first book, writes: "The sword assigns the kingdom; and the fortune of that mighty people that rules o'er sea and land and the whole earth, admitted not two to rule." And Boethius, in his second book,† speaking of the Roman prince says: "With his sceptre he ruled the nations, those whom Phœbus beholds, from his rising afar to where he sinks his beams beneath the waves; those who are benumbed by the frosty Seven Stars of the north, those whom the fierce south wind scorches with his heat, parching the burning sands." And Luke, the Scribe of Christ, bears the same testimony, whose every word is true, where he says: "There went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus that all the world should be taxed;" from which words we must plainly understand that the Romans had jurisdiction over the whole world.

From all this evidence it is manifest that the Roman people prevailed when all were striving to gain the Empire of the world. Therefore it was by

the judgment of God that it prevailed; consequently its Empire was gained by the judgment of God, which is to say, that it was gained by right.

X.—And what is gained as the result of single combat or duel is gained of right. For whenever human judgment fails, either because it is involved in the clouds of ignorance, or because it has not the assistance of a judge, then, lest justice should be left deserted, we must have recourse to Him who loved justice so much that He died to fulfil what it required by shedding His own blood. Therefore the Psalmist wrote: "The righteous Lord loveth righteousness." This result is gained when, by the free consent of the parties, not from hatred but from love of justice, men inquire of the judgment of God by a trial of strength as well of soul as of body. And this trial of strength is called a duel, because in the first instance it was between two combatants, man to man.

But when two nations quarrel they are bound to try in every possible way to arrange the quarrel by means of discussion; it is only when this is hopeless that they may declare war. Cicero and Vegetius agree on this point, the former in his *De Officiis*, the latter in his book on war. In the practice of medicine recourse may only be had to amputation and cauterising when every other means of cure have been tried. So in the same way, it is only when we have sought in vain for all other modes of deciding a quarrel that we may resort to the remedy of a single combat, forced thereto by a necessity of justice.

Two formal rules, then, of the single combat are clear, one which we have just mentioned, the other, which we touched on before, that the combatants or champions must enter the lists by common consent, not animated by private hatred or love, but simply by an eager desire for justice. Therefore Cicero, in touching on this matter, spoke well when he said: "Wars, which are waged for the crown of empire, must be waged without bitterness."

But, if the rules of single combat be kept when men are driven by justice to meet together by common consent, in their zeal for justice (and if they are not, the contest ceases to be a single combat), do not they meet together in the name of God? And if it is so, is not God in the midst of them, for He Himself promises us this in the Gospel? And if God is there, is it not impious to suppose that justice can fail? —that justice which He loved so much, as we have just seen. And if single combat cannot fail to secure justice, is not what is gained in single combat gained as of right?

This truth the Gentiles, too, recognised before the trumpet of the Gospel was sounded, when they sought for a judgment in the fortune of single combat. So Pyrrhus, noble both in the manners and in the blood of Æacidæ, gave a worthy answer when the Roman envoys were sent to him to treat for the ransom of prisoners. "I ask not for gold; ye shall pay me no price, being not war-mongers, but true men of war. Let each decide his fate with steel, and not with gold. Whether it be you or I that our mistress wills to reign, or what chance she may bring to each, let us try by valour. Hear ye also this word: those whose valour the fortune of war has spared, their liberty will I too spare. Take ye them as my gift." So spoke Pyrrhus. By "mistress" he meant Fortune, which we better and more rightly call the Providence of God. Therefore, let the combatants beware that they fight not for money; then it would be no true single combat in which they fought, for they would strive in a court of blood and injustice; and let it not be thought that God would then be present to judge; nay, for it would be that ancient enemy who had been the instigator of the strife. If they wish to be true combatants, and not dealers in blood and injustice, let them keep Pyrrhus before their eyes when they enter the arena, the man who, when he was striving for empire, so scorned gold, as we have said.

But, if men will not receive the truth which we have proved, and object, as they are wont, that all men are not equal in strength, we will refute them with the instance of the victory of David over Goliath; and if the Gentiles seek for aught more, let them repel the objection by the victory of Hercules over Antæus. For it is mere folly to fear that the strength which God makes strong should be weaker than a human champion. It is, therefore, now sufficiently clear that what is acquired by single combat is acquired by right.

XI.—But the Roman people gained their empire by duel between man and man; and this is proved by testimonies that are worthy of all credence

I.—"HE hath shut the lions' mouths and they have not hurt me, forasmuch as before Him justice was found in me."* At the beginning of this work I proposed to examine into three questions, according as the subject-matter would permit me. Concerning the two first questions our inquiry, as I think, has been sufficiently accomplished in the preceding books. It remains to treat of the third question; and, perchance, it may arouse a certain amount of indignation against me, for the truth of it cannot appear without causing shame to certain men.

The present question, then, concerning which we have to inquire, is between two great luminaries, the Roman Pontiff and the Roman Prince: and the question is, does the authority of the Roman Monarch, who, as we have proved in the second book, is the monarch of the world, depend immediately on God, or on some minister or vicar of God; by whom I understand the successor of Peter, who truly has the keys of the kingdom of heaven?

II.—For this, as for the former questions, we must take some principle, on the strength of which we may fashion the arguments of the truth which is to be expounded. For what does it profit to labour, even in speaking truth, unless we start from a principle? For the principle alone is the root of all the propositions which are the means of proof.

Let us, therefore, start from the irrefragable truth that that which is repugnant to the intention of nature, is against the will of God. For if this were not true its contradictory would not be false; namely, that what is repugnant to the intention of nature is not against God's will, and if this be not false neither are the consequences thereof false. For it is impossible in consequences which are necessary, that the consequent should be false, unless the antecedent were false also.

But if a thing is not "*against the will*" it must either be willed or simply "not willed," just as "not to hate" means "to love," or "not to love;" for "not to love" does not mean "to hate," and "not to will" does not mean "to will not," as is self-evident. But if this is not false, neither will this proposition be false; "God wills what He does not will," than which a greater contradiction does not exist.

I prove that what I say is true as follows: It is manifest that God wills the end of nature; otherwise the motions of heaven would be of none effect, and this we may not say. If God willed that the end should be hindered, He would will also that the hindering power should gain its end, otherwise His will would be of none effect. And since the end of the hindering power is the non-existence of what it hinders, it would follow that God wills the non-existence of the end of nature which He is said to will.

For if God did not will that the end should be hindered, in so far as He did not will it, it would follow as a consequence to His not willing it, that He cared nought about the hindering power, neither whether it existed, nor whether it did not. But he who cares not for the hindering power, cares not for the thing which can be hindered, and consequently has no wish for it; and when a man has no wish for a thing he wills it not. Therefore, if the end of nature can be hindered, as it can, it follows of necessity that God wills not the end of nature, and we reach our previous conclusion, that God wills what He does not will. Our principle is therefore most true, seeing that from its contradictions such absurd results follow.

XVI.—Although it has been proved in the preceding chapter that the authority of the Empire has not its cause in the authority of the Supreme Pontiff; for we have shown that this argument led to absurd results; yet it has not been entirely shown that the authority of the Empire depends directly upon God, except as a result from our argument. For it is a consequence that, if the authority comes not from the vicar of God, it must come from God Himself. And therefore, for the complete determination of the question proposed, we have to prove directly that the emperor or monarch of the world stands in an immediate relation to the King of the universe, who is God.

For the better comprehending of this, it must be recognised that man alone, of all created things, holds a position midway between things corruptible and things incorruptible; and therefore* philosophers rightly liken him to a dividing line between two

hemispheres. For man consists of two essential parts, namely, the soul and the body. If he be considered in relation to his body only, he is corruptible; but if he be considered in relation to his soul only, he is incorruptible. And therefore the Philosopher spoke well concerning the incorruptible soul when he said in the second book "of the Soul:" "It is this alone which may be separated, as being eternal, from the corruptible."

If, therefore, man holds this position midway between the corruptible and the incorruptible, since every middle nature partakes of both extremes, man must share something of each nature. And since every nature is ordained to gain some final end, it follows that for man there is a double end. For as he alone of all beings participates both in the corruptible and the incorruptible, so he alone of all beings is ordained to gain two ends, whereby one is his end in so far as he is corruptible, and the other in so far as he is incorruptible.

Two ends, therefore, have been laid down by the ineffable providence of God for man to aim at: the blessedness of this life, which consists in the exercise of his natural powers, and which is prefigured in the earthly Paradise; and next, the blessedness of the life eternal, which consists in the fruition of the sight of God's countenance, and to which man by his own natural powers cannot rise, if he be not aided by the divine light; and this blessedness is understood by the heavenly Paradise.

But to these different kinds of blessedness, as to different conclusions, we must come by different means. For at the first we may arrive by the lessons of philosophy, if only we will follow them, by acting in accordance with the moral and intellectual virtues. But at the second we can only arrive by spiritual lessons, transcending human reason, so that we follow them in accordance with the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity. The truth of the first of these conclusions and of these means is made manifest by human reason, which by the philosophers has been all laid open to us. The other conclusions and means are made manifest by the Holy Spirit, who by the mouth of the Prophets and holy writers, and by Jesus Christ, the co-eternal Son of God, and His disciples, has revealed to us supernatural truth of which we have great need. Nevertheless human passion would cast them all behind its back, if it were not that men, going astray like the beasts that perish,* were restrained in their course by bit and bridle, like horses and mules.

Therefore man had need of two guides for his life, as he had a twofold end in life; whereof one is the Supreme Pontiff, to lead mankind to eternal life, according to the things revealed to us; and the other is the Emperor, to guide mankind to happiness in this world, in accordance with the teaching of philosophy. And since none, or but a few only, and even they with sore difficulty, could arrive at this harbour of happiness, unless the waves and blandishments of human desires were set at rest, and the human race were free to live in peace and quiet, this therefore is the mark at which he who is to care for the world, and whom we call the Roman Prince, must most chiefly aim at: I mean, that in this little plot of earth* belonging to mortal men, life may pass in freedom and with peace. And since the order of this world follows the order of the heavens, as they run their course, it is necessary, to the end that the learning which brings liberty and peace may be duly applied by this guardian of the world in fitting season and place, that this power should be dispensed by Him who is ever present to behold the whole order of the heavens. And this is He who alone has preordained this, that by it in His providence He might bind all things together, each in their own order.

But if this is so, God alone elects, God alone confirms: for there is none higher than God. And hence there is the further conclusion, that neither those who now are, nor any others who may, in whatsoever way, have been called "Electors," ought to have that name; rather they are to be held as declarers and announcers of the providence of God. And, therefore, it is that they to whom is granted the privilege of announcing

God's will sometimes fall into disagreement; because that, all of them or some of them have been blinded by their evil desires, and have not discerned the face of God's appointment.

It is therefore clear that the authority of temporal Monarchy comes down, with no intermediate will, from the fountain of universal authority; and this fountain, one in its unity, flows through many channels out of the abundance of the goodness of God.

And now, methinks, I have reached the goal which I set before me. I have unravelled the truth of the questions which I asked: whether the office of Monarchy was necessary to the welfare of the world; whether it was by right that the Roman people assumed to themselves the office of Monarchy; and, further, that last question, whether the authority of the Monarch springs immediately from God, or from some other. Yet the truth of this latter question must not be received so narrowly as to deny that in certain matters the Roman Prince is subject to the Roman Pontiff. For that happiness, which is subject to mortality, in a sense is ordered with a view to the happiness which shall not taste of death. Let, therefore, Cæsar be reverent to Peter, as the first-born son should be reverent to his father, that he may be illuminated with the light of his father's grace, and so may be stronger to lighten the world over which he has been placed by Him alone, who is the ruler of all things spiritual as well as temporal.

Niccolo Machiavelli, like Dante, was born in Florence; but 204 years later, in 1469. He, too, was a member of an impoverished but distinguished family, served in the Florentine government, and was a man of letters. But their lives and their theories were as different as the mediaeval world view was from the burgeoning new world of the Renaissance and the Reformation.

Machiavelli's best known work is The Prince, which was written in 1513 but only published post-humously in 1532. In this book he treats of the methods and devices by which an "ideal" prince, unhampered by considerations of right and wrong, could most successfully acquire, increase and maintain his political dominion and power. It is often called the first distinctively "modern" work in political theory, because it considers questions of political decision-making only in terms of their instrumentality for achieving political ends; considerations of right and wrong, the public welfare, or conformity to religious strictures, are brought in only so far as they are relevant to the success of the single-minded, amoral, calculating prince. Its conclusions are supported by reference to historical facts or contempory political figures; they are not based on appeals to authorities, philosophies or theologies. Only in the final pages, in an exhortation to free Italy from the barbarians, does Machiavelli seem to appeal to something higher than the Prince's self-interest. As might be expected, his chapters on warfare ignore questions of 'just' or 'unjust' wars, and elaborate on the techniques for success.

Despite the enormous influence of The Prince - which in Count Carlo Sforza's words "made Machiavelli famous and infamous" - there is some reason to doubt that it expresses the true attitudes and positions of Machiavelli himself. This may be clearer on consideration of some historical background. In 1492 when Machiavelli was 23, Lorenzo de Medici, the ruler of Florence, died. Under the merchant-princes, the de Medicis, Florence had become a wealthy center of trade with an incredible blossoming of artistic and intellectual genius which included Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael, and numerous poets and scholars. Lorenzo had been chiefly responsible for maintaining a balance of power between the five important states of Italy: Venice, Milan, Florence, the Church and Naples. With his death the balance was lost and the kings of France and of Spain became involved in Italian disputes, with a resulting loss of Italy's independence. In 1494, the religious reformer and monk, Savonarola led a revolution in Florence which expelled the Medicis and sought to establish a democratic republic. Savonarola, who opposed the vicious and corrupt Pope Alexander VI (who was Rodrigo Borgia, of whom Cesare Borgia and Lucrezia Borgia were the illegitimate offspring) as well as the Medicis, was excommunicated by the Pope and subsequently tried and hanged in 1498. But a form of the Republic continued in Florence and Machiavelli was made the Secretary of this new government; in this capacity Machiavelli organized a new militia and occupied a central position in the government's administration. Unfortunately, in 1512 the de Medicis returned in force, the new militia fled in panic and Machiavelli lost his position. Suspected of conspiracy against the Medici, he was briefly imprisoned and tortured in 1513, and "banished" to a little estate outside Florence where he wrote The Prince and his Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy. He humiliated himself by trying in a variety of different ways to ingratiate himself with the Medici so as to recover his office; though The Prince was not published in his lifetime, it was dedicated obsequiously to one of the Medici, and the apparent model for the "ideal" prince was Cesare Borgia, the rapacious and unprincipled bastard son of Pope Alexander VI who had taken such vindictive action against Savanarola.

In both the Discourses, in which he argues for an uncorrupt republican form of government, and in The Art of War (1520) in which he discusses military virtues and vices, as well as in his ardent desire for a united Italy, Machiavelli displays a sensitivity to moral issues and ideals which contrasts with the cynicism of The Prince. Nevertheless, The Prince remains his greatest work.

The translation of The Art of War is that of Allan Gilbert, 1965.

Chapter X

HOW THE STRENGTH OF ALL STATES SHOULD BE MEASURED

In examining the character of these principalities it is necessary to consider another point, namely, whether the prince has such a position as to be able in case of need to maintain himself alone, or whether he has always need of the protection of others. The better to explain this I would say, that I consider those capable of maintaining themselves alone who can, through abundance of men or money, put together a sufficient army, and hold the field against any one who assails them; and I consider to have need of others, those who cannot take the field against their enemies, but are obliged to take refuge within their walls and stand on the defensive. We have already discussed the former case and will speak of it in future as occasion arises. In the second case there is nothing to be said except to encourage such a prince to provision and fortify his own town, and not to trouble about the surrounding country. And whoever has strongly fortified his town and, as regards the government of his subjects, has proceeded as we have already described and will further relate, will be attacked with great reluctance, for men are always averse to enterprises in which they foresee difficulties, and it can never appear easy to attack one who has his town stoutly defended and is not hated by the people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, have little surrounding country, and obey the emperor when they choose, and they do not fear him or any other potentate that they have about them. They are fortified in such a manner that every one thinks that to reduce them would be tedious and difficult, for they all have the necessary moats and bastions, sufficient artillery, and always keep food, drink, and fuel for one year in the public storehouses. Beyond which, to keep the lower classes satisfied, and without loss to the commonwealth, they have always enough means to give them work for one year in these employments which form the nerve and life of the town, and in the industries by which the lower classes live. Military exercises are still held in high reputation, and many regulations are in force for maintaining them.

A prince, therefore, who possesses a strong city and does not make himself hated, cannot be assaulted; and if he were to be so, the assailant would be obliged to retire shamefully; for so many things change, that it is almost impossible for any one to maintain a siege for a year with his armies idle. And to those who urge that the people, having their possessions outside and seeing them burnt, will not have patience, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince, I reply that a powerful and courageous prince will always overcome those difficulties by now raising the hopes of his subjects that the evils will not last long, now impressing them with fear of the enemy's cruelty, now by dextrously assuring himself of those who appear too bold. Besides which, the enemy would naturally burn and ravage the country on first arriving and at the time when men's minds are still hot and eager to defend themselves, and therefore the

prince has still less to fear, for after some time, when people have cooled down, the damage is done, the evil has been suffered, and there is no remedy, so that they are the more ready to unite with their prince, as it appears that he is under an obligation to them, their houses having been burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence.

It is the nature of men to be as much bound by the benefits that they confer as by those they receive. From which it follows that, everything considered, a prudent prince will not find it difficult to uphold the courage of his subjects both at the commencement and during a state of siege, if he possesses provisions and means to defend himself.

(Chapter XII) ...

We said already how necessary it is for a prince to have his foundations good, otherwise he is certain to be ruined. The chief foundations of all states, whether new, old, or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And as there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws, I will not now discuss the laws, but will speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms by which a prince defends his possessions are either his own, or else mercenaries, or auxiliaries, or mixed. The mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if any one supports his state by the arms of mercenaries, he will never stand firm or sure, as they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, faithless, bold amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they have no fear of God, and keep no faith with men. Ruin is only deferred as long as the assault is postponed; in peace you are despoiled by them, and in war by the enemy. The cause of this is that they have no love or other motive to keep them in the field beyond a trifling wage, which is not enough to make them ready to die for you. They are quite willing to be your soldiers so long as you do not make war, but when war comes, it is either fly or decamp altogether. I ought to have little trouble in proving this, since the ruin of Italy is now caused by nothing else but through her having relied for many years on mercenary arms. These did indeed help certain individuals to power, and appeared courageous when matched against each other, but when the foreigner came they showed their worthlessness. Thus it came about that King Charles of France was allowed to take Italy without the slightest trouble, and those who said that it was owing to our sins, spoke the truth, but it was not the sins they meant but those that I have related. And as it was the sins of princes, they too have suffered the punishment.

Chapter XIII

OF AUXILIARY, MIXED, AND NATIVE TROOPS

WHEN one asks a powerful neighbour to come to aid and defend one with his forces, they are termed auxiliaries and are as useless as mercenaries. This was done in recent times by Julius, who seeing the wretched failure of his mercenary forces, in his Ferrara

enterprise, had recourse to auxiliaries, and arranged with Ferrando, King of Spain, that he should help him with his armies. These forces may be good in themselves, but they are always dangerous for those who borrow them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if they conquer you remain their prisoner. And although ancient history is full of examples of this, I will not depart from the example of Pope Julius II, which is still fresh. Nothing could be less prudent than the course he adopted; for, wishing to take Ferrara, he put himself entirely into the power of a foreigner. But by good fortune there arose a third cause which prevented him reaping the effects of his bad policy; for when his auxiliaries were beaten at Ravenna, the Swiss rose up and drove back the victors, against all expectation of himself or others, so that he was not taken prisoner by the enemy which had fled, nor by his own auxiliaries, having conquered by other arms than theirs. The Florentines, being totally disarmed, hired 10,000 Frenchmen to attack Pisa, by which measure they ran greater risk than at any period of their struggles. The emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, put 10,000 Turks into Greece, who after the war would not go away again, which was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to the infidels.

And one, therefore, who wishes not to conquer, would do well to use these forces, which are much more dangerous than mercenaries, as with them ruin is complete, for they are all united, and owe obedience to others, whereas with mercenaries, when they have conquered, it requires more time and a good opportunity for them to injure you, as they do not form a single body and have been engaged and paid by you, therefore a third party that you have made leader cannot at once acquire enough authority to be able to injure you. In a word, the greatest danger with mercenaries lies in their cowardice and reluctance to fight, but with auxiliaries the danger lies in their courage.

A wise prince, therefore, always avoids these forces and has recourse to his own, and would prefer rather to lose with his own men than conquer with the forces of others, not deeming it a true victory which is gained by foreign arms. I never hesitate to cite the example of Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered Romagna with auxiliary troops, leading forces composed entirely of French soldiers, and with these he took Imola and Forlì; but as they seemed unsafe, he had recourse to mercenaries as a less risky policy, and hired the Orsini and Vitelli. Afterwards finding these uncertain to handle, unfaithful, and dangerous, he suppressed them, and relied upon his own men. And the difference between these forces can be easily seen if one considers the difference between the reputation of the duke when he had only the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he had to rely on himself and his own soldiers. His reputation will be found to have constantly increased, and he was never so highly esteemed as when every one saw that he was the sole master of his forces.

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I conclude then by saying that no prince is secure without his own troops, on the contrary he is entirely dependent on fortune, having no trustworthy means of defence in time of trouble. It

has always been held and proclaimed by wise men 'quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixae.' One's own troops are those composed either of subjects or of citizens or of one's own dependants; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. The way to organise one's own troops is easily learnt if the methods of the four princes mentioned above be studied, and if one considers how Philip, father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and sovereigns have organised theirs. With such examples as these there is no need to labour the point.

Chapter XIV

THE DUTIES OF A PRINCE WITH REGARD TO THE MILITIA

A PRINCE should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other thing for his study, but war and its organisation and discipline, for that is the only art that is necessary to one who commands, and it is of such virtue that it not only maintains those who are born princes, but often enables men of private fortune to attain to that rank. And one sees, on the other hand, that when princes think more of luxury than of arms, they lose their state. The chief cause of the loss of states, is the contempt of this art, and the way to acquire them is to be well versed in the same.

Francesco Sforza, through being well armed, became, from private status, Duke of Milan; his sons, through wishing to avoid the fatigue and hardship of war, from dukes became private persons. For among other evils caused by being disarmed, it renders you contemptible; which is one of those disgraceful things which a prince must guard against, as will be explained later. Because there is no comparison whatever between an armed and a disarmed man; it is not reasonable to suppose that one who is armed will obey willingly one who is unarmed; or that any unarmed man will remain safe among armed servants. For one being disdainful and the other suspicious, it is not possible for them to act well together. And therefore a prince who is ignorant of military matters, besides the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be esteemed by his soldiers, nor have confidence in them.

He ought, therefore, never to let his thoughts stray from the exercise of war; and in peace he ought to practise it more than in war, which he can do in two ways: by action and by study. As to action, he must, besides keeping his men well disciplined and exercised, engage continually in hunting, and thus accustom his body to hardships; and meanwhile learn the nature of the land, how steep the mountains are, how the valleys debouch, where the plains lie, and understand the nature of rivers and swamps. To all this he should devote great attention. This knowledge is useful in two ways. In the first place, one learns to know one's country, and can the better see how to defend it. Then by means of the knowledge and experience gained in one locality, one can easily understand any other that it may be necessary to observe;

for the hills and valleys, plains and rivers of Tuscany, for instance, have a certain resemblance to those of other provinces, so that from a knowledge of the country in one province one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And that prince who is lacking in this skill is wanting in the first essentials of a leader; for it is this which teaches how to find the enemy, take up quarters, lead armies, plan battles and lay siege to towns with advantage.

Philopœmen, prince of the Achaei, among other praises bestowed on him by writers, is lauded because in times of peace he thought of nothing but the methods of warfare, and when he was in the country with his friends, he often stopped and asked them: If the enemy were on that hill and we found ourselves here with our army, which of us would have the advantage? How could we safely approach him maintaining our order? If we wished to retire, what ought we to do? If they retired, how should we follow them? And he put before them as they went along all the contingencies that might happen to an army, heard their opinion, gave his own, fortifying it by argument; so that thanks to these constant reflections there could never happen any incident when actually leading his armies for which he was not prepared.

But as to exercise for the mind, the prince ought to read history and study the actions of eminent men, see how they acted in warfare, examine the causes of their victories and defeats in order to imitate the former and avoid the latter, and above all, do as some men have done in the past, who have imitated some one, who has been much praised and glorified, and have always kept his deeds and actions before them, as they say Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Cæsar Alexander, and Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon, will perceive in the life of Scipio how gloriously he imitated the former, and how, in chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those qualities of Cyrus as described by Xenophon.

A wise prince should follow similar methods and never remain idle in peaceful times, but industriously make good use of them, so that when fortune changes she may find him prepared to resist her blows, and to prevail in adversity.

Chapter XV

OF THE THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

It now remains to be seen what are the methods and rules for a prince as regards his subjects and friends. And as I know that many have written of this, I fear that my writing about it may be deemed presumptuous, differing as I do, especially in this matter, from the opinions of others. But my intention being to write something of use to those who understand, it appears to me more proper to go to the real truth of the matter than to its imagination; and many have imagined republics and principalities which

have never been seen or known to exist in reality; for how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation. A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good. Therefore it is necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain himself, to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge and not use it, according to the necessity of the case.

Leaving on one side, then, those things which concern only an imaginary prince, and speaking of those that are real, I state that all men, and especially princes, who are placed at a greater height, are reputed for certain qualities which bring them either praise or blame. Thus one is considered liberal, another *misero* or miserly (using a Tuscan term, seeing that *avaro* with us still means one who is rapaciously acquisitive and *misero* one who makes grudging use of his own); one a free giver, another rapacious; one cruel, another merciful; one a breaker of his word, another trustworthy; one effeminate and pusillanimous, another fierce and high-spirited; one humane, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one frank, another astute; one hard, another easy; one serious, another frivolous; one religious, another an unbeliever, and so on. I know that every one will admit that it would be highly praiseworthy in a prince to possess all the above-named qualities that are reputed good, but as they cannot all be possessed or observed, human conditions not permitting of it, it is necessary that he should be prudent enough to avoid the scandal of those vices which would lose him the state, and guard himself if possible against those which will not lose it him, but if not able to, he can indulge them with less scruple. And yet he must not mind incurring the scandal of those vices, without which it would be difficult to save the state, for if one considers well, it will be found that some things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and some others which appear vices result in one's greater security and wellbeing.

Chapter XVI

OF LIBERALITY AND NIGGARDLINESS

BEGINNING now with the first qualities above named, I say that it would be well to be considered liberal; nevertheless liberality such as the world understands it will injure you, because if used virtuously and in the proper way, it will not be known, and you will incur the disgrace of the contrary vice. But one who wishes to obtain the reputation of liberality among men, must not omit every kind of sumptuous display, and to such an extent that a prince of this character will consume by such means all his resources, and will be at last compelled, if he wishes to maintain his name for liberality, to impose heavy taxes on his people, become extortionate, and do everything possible to obtain money.

This will make his subjects begin to hate him, and he will be little esteemed being poor, so that having by this liberality injured many and benefited but few, he will feel the first little disturbance and be endangered by every peril. If he recognises this and wishes to change his system, he incurs at once the charge of niggardliness.

A prince, therefore, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality without risk if it be known, must not, if he be prudent, object to be called miserly. In course of time he will be thought more liberal, when it is seen that by his parsimony his revenue is sufficient, that he can defend himself against those who make war on him, and undertake enterprises without burdening his people, so that he is really liberal to all those from whom he does not take, who are infinite in number, and niggardly to all to whom he does not give, who are few. In our times we have seen nothing great done except by those who have been esteemed niggardly; the others have all been ruined. Pope Julius II, although he had made use of a reputation for liberality in order to attain the papacy, did not seek to retain it afterwards, so that he might be able to wage war. The present King of France has carried on so many wars without imposing an extraordinary tax, because his extra expenses were covered by the parsimony he had so long practised. The present King of Spain, if he had been thought liberal, would not have engaged in and been successful in so many enterprises.

For these reasons a prince must care little for the reputation of being a miser, if he wishes to avoid robbing his subjects, if he wishes to be able to defend himself, to avoid becoming poor and contemptible, and not to be forced to become rapacious; this niggardliness is one of those vices which enable him to reign. If it is said that Cæsar attained the empire through liberality, and that many others have reached the highest positions through being liberal or being thought so, I would reply that you are either a prince already or else on the way to become one. In the first case, this liberality is harmful; in the second, it is certainly necessary to be considered liberal. Cæsar was one of those who wished to attain the mastery over Rome, but if after attaining it he had lived and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed that empire. And should any one reply that there have been many princes, who have done great things with their armies, who have been thought extremely liberal, I would answer by saying that the prince may either spend his own wealth and that of his subjects or the wealth of others. In the first case he must be sparing, but for the rest he must not neglect to be very liberal. The liberality is very necessary to a prince who marches with his armies, and lives by plunder, sack and ransom, and is dealing with the wealth of others, for without it he would not be followed by his soldiers. And you may be very generous indeed with what is not the property of yourself or your subjects, as were Cyrus, Cæsar, and Alexander; for spending the wealth of others will not diminish your reputation, but increase it, only spending your own resources will injure you. There is nothing which destroys itself so much as liberality, for by using it you lose the power of using it, and become either poor and despicable, or, to escape poverty, rapacious and hated. And of all things that a prince must guard against, the most im-

portant are being despicable or hated, and liberality will lead you to one or other of these conditions. It is, therefore, wiser to have the name of a miser, which produces disgrace without hatred, than to incur of necessity the name of being rapacious, which produces both disgrace and hatred.

Chapter XVII

OF CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED OR FEARED

PROCEEDING to the other qualities before named, I say that every prince must desire to be considered merciful and not cruel. He must, however, take care not to misuse this mercifulness. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel, but his cruelty had brought order to the Romagna, united it, and reduced it to peace and fealty. If this is considered well, it will be seen that he was really much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid the name of cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. A prince, therefore, must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful; for, with a very few examples, he will be more merciful than those who, from excess of tenderness, allow disorders to arise, from whence spring bloodshed and rapine; for these as a rule injure the whole community, while the executions carried out by the prince injure only individuals. And of all princes, it is impossible for a new prince to escape the reputation of cruelty, new states being always full of dangers. Wherefore Virgil through the mouth of Dido says:

> Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
> Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.

Nevertheless, he must be cautious in believing and acting, and must not be afraid of his own shadow, and must proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence does not render him incautious, and too much diffidence does not render him intolerant.

From this arises the question whether it is better to be loved more than feared, or feared more than loved. The reply is, that one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be wanting. For it may be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, and covetous of gain; as long as you benefit them, they are entirely yours; they offer you their blood, their goods, their life, and their children, as I have before said, when the necessity is remote; but when it approaches, they revolt. And the prince who has relied solely on their words, without making other preparations, is ruined; for the friendship which is gained by purchase and not through grandeur and nobility of spirit is bought but not secured, and at a pinch is not to be expended in your service. And men have less scruple in offending one who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared; for

love is held by a chain of obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose; but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails.

Still, a prince should make himself feared in such a way that if he does not gain love, he at any rate avoids hatred; for fear and the absence of hatred may well go together, and will be always attained by one who abstains from interfering with the property of his citizens and subjects or with their women. And when he is obliged to take the life of any one, let him do so when there is a proper justification and manifest reason for it; but above all he must abstain from taking the property of others, for men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. Then also pretexts for seizing property are never wanting, and one who begins to live by rapine will always find some reason for taking the goods of others, whereas causes for taking life are rarer and more fleeting.

But when the prince is with his army and has a large number of soldiers under his control, then it is extremely necessary that he should not mind being thought cruel; for without this reputation he could not keep an army united or disposed to any duty. Among the noteworthy actions of Hannibal is numbered this, that although he had an enormous army, composed of men of all nations and fighting in foreign countries, there never arose any dissension either among them or against the prince, either in good fortune or in bad. This could not be due to anything but his inhuman cruelty, which together with his infinite other virtues, made him always venerated and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, and without it his other virtues would not have sufficed to produce that effect. Thoughtless writers admire on the one hand his actions, and on the other blame the principal cause of them.

And that it is true that his other virtues would not have sufficed may be seen from the case of Scipio (famous not only in regard to his own times, but all times of which memory remains), whose armies rebelled against him in Spain, which arose from nothing but his excessive kindness, which allowed more licence to the soldiers than was consonant with military discipline. He was reproached with this in the senate by Fabius Maximus, who called him a corrupter of the Roman militia. Locri having been destroyed by one of Scipio's officers was not revenged by him, nor was the insolence of that officer punished, simply by reason of his easy nature; so much so, that some one wishing to excuse him in the senate, said that there were many men who knew rather how not to err, than how to correct the errors of others. This disposition would in time have tarnished the fame and glory of Scipio had he persevered in it under the empire, but living under the rule of the senate this harmful quality was not only concealed but became a glory to him.

I conclude, therefore, with regard to being feared and loved, that men love at their own free will, but fear at the will of the prince, and that a wise prince must rely on what is in his power and not on what is in the power of others, and he must only contrive to avoid incurring hatred, as has been explained.

Chapter XVIII

IN WHAT WAY PRINCES MUST KEEP FAITH

How laudable it is for a prince to keep good faith and live with integrity, and not with astuteness, every one knows. Still the experience of our times shows those princes to have done great things who have had little regard for good faith, and have been able by astuteness to confuse men's brains, and who have ultimately overcome those who have made loyalty their foundation.

You must know, then, that there are two methods of fighting, the one by law, the other by force: the first method is that of men, the second of beasts; but as the first method is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the second. It is therefore necessary for a prince to know well how to use both the beast and the man. This was covertly taught to rulers by ancient writers, who relate how Achilles and many others of those ancient princes were given to Chiron the centaur to be brought up and educated under his discipline. The parable of this semi-animal, semi-human teacher is meant to indicate that a prince must know how to use both natures, and that the one without the other is not durable.

A prince being thus obliged to know well how to act as a beast must imitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognise traps, and a lion to frighten wolves. Those that wish to be only lions do not understand this. Therefore, a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against his interest, and when the reasons which made him bind himself no longer exist. If men were all good, this precept would not be a good one; but as they are bad, and would not observe their faith with you, so you are not bound to keep faith with them. Nor have legitimate grounds ever failed a prince who wished to show colourable excuse for the non-fulfilment of his promise. Of this one could furnish an infinite number of modern examples, and show how many times peace has been broken, and how many promises rendered worthless, by the faithlessness of princes, and those that have been best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But it is necessary to be able to disguise this character well, and to be a great feigner and dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to obey present necessities, that one who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived.

I will only mention one modern instance. Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men, he thought of nothing else, and found the occasion for it; no man was ever more able to give assurances, or affirmed things with stronger oaths, and no man observed them less; however, he always succeeded in his deceptions, as he well knew this aspect of things.

It is not, therefore, necessary for a prince to have all the above-named qualities, but it is very necessary to seem to have them. I would even be bold to say that to possess them and always to observe them is dangerous, but to appear to possess them is useful. Thus it is well to seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, religious, and also to be so; but you must have the mind

so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change to the opposite qualities. And it must be understood that a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion. And, therefore, he must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if constrained.

A prince must take great care that nothing goes out of his mouth which is not full of the above-named five qualities, and, to see and hear him, he should seem to be all mercy, faith, integrity, humanity, and religion. And nothing is more necessary than to seem to have this last quality, for men in general judge more by the eyes than by the hands, for every one can see, but very few have to feel. Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and those few will not dare to oppose themselves to the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of men, and especially of princes, from which there is no appeal, the end justifies the means. Let a prince therefore aim at conquering and maintaining the state, and the means will always be judged honourable and praised by every one, for the vulgar is always taken by appearances and the issue of the event; and the world consists only of the vulgar, and the few who are not vulgar are isolated when the many have a rallying point in the prince. A certain prince of the present time, whom it is well not to name, never does anything but preach peace and good faith, but he is really a great enemy to both, and either of them, had he observed them, would have lost him state or reputation on many occasions.

Chapter XIX

THAT WE MUST AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

But as I have now spoken of the most important of the qualities in question, I will now deal briefly and generally with the rest. The prince must, as already stated, avoid those things which will make him hated or despised; and whenever he succeeds in this, he will have done his part, and will find no danger in other vices. He will chiefly become hated, as I said, by being rapacious, and usurping the property and women of his subjects, which he must abstain from doing, and whenever one does not attack the property or honour of the generality of men, they will live contented; and one will only have to combat the ambition of a few, who can be easily held in check in many ways. He is rendered despicable by being thought changeable, frivolous, effeminate, timid, and irresolute; which a prince must guard against as a rock of danger, and so contrive that his actions show grandeur, spirit, gravity, and fortitude; and as to the government of his subjects, let his sentence be irrevocable, and let him adhere to his decisions so that no one may think of deceiving or cozening him.

The prince who creates such an opinion of himself gets a great reputation, and it is very difficult to conspire against one who has a great reputation, and he will not easily be attacked, so long as it is known that he is capable and reverenced by his subjects. For a prince must have two kinds of fear: one internal as regards his subjects, one external as regards foreign powers. From the latter he can defend himself with good arms and good friends, and he will always have good friends if he has good arms; and internal matters will always remain quiet, if they are not perturbed by conspiracy and there is no disturbance from without; and even if external powers sought to attack him, if he has ruled and lived as I have described, he will always if he stands firm, be able to sustain every shock, as I have shown that Nabis the Spartan did. But with regard to the subjects, if not acted on from outside, it is still to be feared lest they conspire in secret, from which the prince may guard himself well by avoiding hatred and contempt, and keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is necessary to accomplish, as has been related at length. And one of the most potent remedies that a prince has against conspiracies, is that of not being hated by the mass of the people; for whoever conspires always believes that he will satisfy the people by the death of their prince; but if he thought to offend them by doing this, he would fear to engage in such an undertaking, for the difficulties that conspirators have to meet are infinite. Experience shows that there have been very many conspiracies, but few have turned out well, for whoever conspires cannot act alone, and cannot find companions except among those who are discontented; and as soon as you have disclosed your intention to a malcontent, you give him the means of satisfying himself, for by revealing it he can hope to secure everything he wants; to such an extent that seeing a certain gain by doing this, and seeing on the other hand only a doubtful one and full of danger, he must either be a rare friend to you or else a very bitter enemy to the prince if he keeps faith with you. And to express the matter in a few words, I say, that on the side of the conspirator there is nothing but fear, jealousy, suspicion, and dread of punishment which frightens him; and on the side of the prince there is the majesty of government, the laws, the protection of friends and of the state which guard him. When to these things is added the goodwill of the people, it is impossible that any one should have the temerity to conspire. For whereas generally a conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case, having the people for an enemy, he must also fear after his crime is accomplished, and thus he is not able to hope for any refuge.

Numberless instances might be given of this, but I will content myself with one which took place within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale Bentivogli, Prince of Bologna, ancestor of the present Messer Annibale, was killed by the Canneschi, who conspired against him. He left no relations but Messer Giovanni, who was then an infant, but after the murder the people rose up and killed all the Canneschi. This arose from the popular goodwill that the house of Bentivogli enjoyed at that time, which was so great that, as there was nobody left after the death of An-

nibale who could govern the state, the Bolognese hearing that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence, who had till then been thought the son of a blacksmith, came to fetch him and gave him the government of the city, and it was governed by him until Messer Giovanni was old enough to assume the government.

I conclude, therefore, that a prince need trouble little about conspiracies when the people are well disposed, but when they are hostile and hold him in hatred, then he must fear everything and everybody. Well-ordered states and wise princes have studied diligently not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to satisfy the populace and keep it contented, for this is one of the most important matters that a prince has to deal with.

THE DISCOURSES

Chapter XL

DECEIT IN THE CONDUCT OF A WAR IS MERITORIOUS

ALTHOUGH deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and honorable; and a commander who vanquishes an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with one who gains victory by force. This is proved by the judgment of those who have written the lives of great men, and who give much credit to Hannibal and others who were most remarkable in that respect. History gives so many examples of this that I need not cite any of them here. But I will say this, that I do not confound such deceit with perfidy, which breaks pledged faith and treaties; for although states and kingdoms may at times be won by perfidy, yet will it ever bring dishonor with it. But I speak of those feints and stratagems which you employ against an enemy that distrusts you, and in the employment of which properly consists the art of war. Such was that practised by Hannibal when he feigned flight on the lake of Perugia (Thrasimene), for the purpose of hemming in the Consul and the Roman army; and when he attached blazing fagots to the horns of his cattle to enable him to escape from the hands of Fabius Maximus. Such was also the stratagem of Pontius, general of the Samnites, to draw the Romans into the defiles of the Caudine Forks. Having concealed his army behind a mountain, he sent a number of his soldiers disguised as herdsmen with droves of cattle into the plains. These, on being captured and interrogated by the Romans as to the whereabouts of the Samnite army, answered, according to the instructions of Pontius, that it was engaged in the siege of the town of Nocera. The Consuls, believing it, entered the defiles of Caudium, where they were promptly hemmed in by the Samnites. This victory won by stratagem would have been most glorious for Pontius had he followed the advice of his father, who wanted him either to allow the Romans to pass out entirely free, or to kill them all; but not to take any half-way measures, which, as we have said elsewhere, are always pernicious, "and never make a friend nor rid you of an enemy."

THE ART OF WAR

PREFACE BY NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI,

In the past, Lorenzo, many have held and now still hold this opinion: that no two things are more out of harmony with one another or differ more from one another than civilian life and military life. Because of this we often see one who plans to excel in the soldier's calling at once not merely changing his dress, but also in habits, manners, voice and presence departing widely from every civilian custom, because he does not believe that civilian dress can be worn by one who strives to be active and ready for any and every violent deed. Nor can civilian habits and manners be used by one who thinks those habits effeminate and those manners not helpful in his activities; nor does it seem suitable for him to retain normal bearing and speech when with his beard and his curses he intends to make other men afraid. This makes the opinion I have mentioned seem in these times very true. But if we consider ancient ways, we shall not find things that are more closely united, more in conformity, and of which one, necessarily, so much loves the other as do these,[1] because all the arts that are provided for in a state for the sake of the common good of men, all the statutes made in it so that men will live in fear of the laws and of God, would be vain if for them there were not provided defenses, which when well ordered, preserve them, even though they themselves are not well ordered. And so, on the contrary, good customs, without military support, suffer the same sort of injury as do the rooms of a splendid and kingly palace, even though ornamented with gems and gold, when, not being roofed over, they have nothing to protect them from the rain. And if for every other order of men in cities and kingdoms every diligence should be used to keep them faithful, peaceful, and full of the fear of God, in the army it should be redoubled. Because from what man ought his native land to expect greater fidelity than from that one who has to promise to die for her? In whom ought there to be more love of peace than in him who can get nothing but injury from war? In whom ought there to be more fear of God than in a man who every day, being exposed to countless perils, has great need for his aid? This necessity, well considered both by those who give laws to empires and by those who are put in charge of military training, would bring it about that the life of soldiers would be praised by other men and with great zeal followed and imitated. But since military customs are wholly corrupted and have greatly diverged from ancient methods, about them have sprung up injurious opinions, which make everybody hate soldiering and avoid association with those who engage in it.

But judging from what I have seen and read that it is not impossible to bring military practice back to ancient methods and to restore some of the forms of earlier excellence, and wishing not to pass these my times of leisure without doing something, I have determined, for the pleasure of those who love ancient deeds, to write out what I have learned about the art of war.

FABRIZIO. I am very willing that you, Cosimo, and these other young men should here question me, because I believe that your youth makes you more interested in military matters and readier to believe what I shall say. Men of another age, with their hair white and the blood in their bodies turned to ice, are commonly some of them enemies of war, some beyond correction, believing that the times and not bad customs force men to live thus. So ask questions of me, all of you, with assurance and without hesitation; this I wish both because it will give me a little rest and because I shall be glad not to leave in your minds any uncertainty.

[*Professional soldiers cannot be good men*]

I wish to begin with your words, in which you said to me that in war, which is my profession, I have not used any ancient methods. On this I say that because this is a profession by means of which men cannot live virtuously at all times, it cannot be practiced as a profession except by a republic or a kingdom; and neither of these, when they have been well regulated, has ever allowed one of its citizens or subjects to practice it as a profession, nor has any good man ever engaged in it as his special profession. Because he will never be reckoned a good man who carries on an occupation in which, if he is to endeavor at all times to get income from it, he must be rapacious, fraudulent, violent, and must have many qualities which of necessity make him not good; nor can men who practice it as a profession, the big as well as the little, be of any other sort, because this profession does not support them in time of peace. Hence they are obliged either to hope that there will be no peace, or to become so rich in time of war that in peace they can support themselves. And neither one of these two expectations is to be found in a good man, because from the desire to support themselves at all times come the robberies, the deeds of violence, the murderous acts that such soldiers commit as much against their friends as against their enemies; and from not wishing peace come the deceits that the generals practice against those by whom they are employed, in order that a war may last; and if peace does come, it often happens that the generals, being deprived of their stipends and of their living, lawlessly set up their ensigns as soldiers of fortune and without any mercy plunder a region.

[*Mercenary soldiers by example*]

Is it not in your historical records that when there were many soldiers in Italy without pay because the wars were finished, several groups joined together, which were called Companies, and kept exacting money from the cities and plundering the country, and there was no remedy? Have you not read how the Carthaginian soldiers, at the end of the first war they had with the Romans, under Matho and Spendius, two leaders rebelliously chosen by them, waged a more dangerous war against the Carthaginians than the one they had finished with the Romans? In the time of our fathers,

Francesco Sforza, in order to be able to live sumptuously in times of peace, not merely deceived the Milanese by whom he was employed, but took away their liberty and became their prince. Like him have been all the other soldiers of Italy who have practiced warfare as their personal profession, and if they have not, by means of their evil deeds, become dukes of Milan, they merit so much the more to be blamed, because without so much gain, they all, if you examine their lives, have the same faults. Sforza, the father of Francesco, forced Queen Giovanna to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, having suddenly abandoned her and left her unarmed in the midst of her enemies, merely to satisfy his ambition or to exact money from her or to take away her kingdom. Braccio, with the same efforts, tried to occupy the Kingdom of Naples, and if he had not been defeated and killed at Aquila, would have succeeded. Such outrages do not come from anything else than that there have been men who practiced the trade of the soldier as their special profession. Do you not have a proverb reinforcing my reasons that runs: "War makes thieves and peace hangs them?" Because those who do not know how to live by any other occupation and do not find anybody who will support them in soldiering and do not have so much ability that they can join together to carry out an honorable villainy, are forced by necessity to rob on the highway, and justice is forced to wipe them out.

[*The professional general may become a tyrant*]

COSIMO. For me, you have made this profession of the soldier become almost nothing, and I had thought it the most excellent and the most honorable there could be. Hence, if you do not explain it better, I shall not be satisfied, because, if it is as you say, I do not know whence comes the glory of Caesar, of Pompey, of Scipio, of Marcellus, and of so many Roman generals whom fame praises as though they were gods.

FABRIZIO. I have not yet finished discussing all that I have laid out, for there were two things: one, that a good man is not able to carry on this activity as his profession; the second, that a well-ordered republic or kingdom would never permit her subjects and her citizens to make it their profession. About the first I have said all that has occurred to me. It remains for me to speak of the second, in which I shall arrive at an answer to this last question of yours. So I say that Pompey and Caesar and almost all the Roman generals after the last Carthaginian war gained fame as brave men but not as good ones, while those who lived before them gained fame as brave and good. This came about because the latter did not take the waging of war for their profession, and those I first named did practice it as their profession. And while the republic continued without reproach, no great citizen ever presumed, by means of such an activity, to retain power in time of peace, so as to break the laws, plunder the provinces, usurp and tyrannize over his native land and in every way gain wealth for himself. Nor did anybody of low estate dream of violating his oath, forming parties with private citizens, ceasing to fear the Senate, or carrying out any tyrannical injury in order to live

at all times by means of warfare as a profession. But the generals, satisfied with their triumph, eagerly returned to private life; and those who were privates laid down their arms with greater eagerness than they took them up, and each one turned to the occupation by means of which he had supported his life. Nor was there ever anybody who hoped by plunder and by means of this profession to make his living. About this one can make, as to the great citizens, an obvious inference by means of Regulus Attilius, who, when he was general of the Roman armies in Africa and had almost conquered the Carthaginians, asked from the Senate leave to return home to take care of his fields, which were ruined by his laborers. From this it is clearer than sunlight that if he had practiced war as his profession and by means of that had expected to gain profit, he would not, when he had as booty so many provinces, have asked leave to return to take care of his fields, because every day he would have gained more than the value of all of them.

[*A well-governed state has only citizen soldiers*]

But because these good men, who did not practice war as their profession, did not expect to get from it anything except labor, peril, and fame, when they were famous enough, they wished to come home and live by their profession. As to the men of low rank and the mass of soldiers, it is evidently true that each one was in the same condition, for everyone gladly left such a pursuit and, when he was not soldiering, was willing to be a soldier, and when he was soldiering, wanted to be dismissed. This is verified in many ways, and especially because among the chief privileges the Roman people gave to a citizen was that he would not be forced against his will to serve as a soldier. Rome, then, while she was well governed (which was up to the time of the Gracchi) did not have any soldier who took up this pursuit as his profession, and for that reason she had few bad ones, and all of those were severely punished. A well-ordered city will then decree that this practice of warfare shall be used in times of peace for exercise and in times of war for necessity and for glory, and will allow the public alone to practice it as a profession, as did Rome. Any citizen who in such an activity has another purpose is not a good citizen, and any city that conducts itself otherwise is not well governed.

[*Kings should find soldiers among their subjects*]

COSIMO. I am well pleased and satisfied with what you have said up to now and am much gratified with this conclusion you have drawn, and so far as it deals with a republic, I believe it is true, but as to a king, I do not at all know, because I should suppose a king would wish to have around him those who would especially take as their profession this pursuit.

FABRIZIO. So much the more will a well-governed kingdom avoid such professionals, because they alone are the ruin of its king and are altogether servants of tyranny. Do not bring up to me in reply any kingdom of the present. I shall deny that they are well-

governed kingdoms, because the kingdoms that have good laws do not give absolute command to their king except in their armies; in this place alone sudden decision is necessary, so in it there must be one and only one authority. In other things he cannot do anything without consultation, and they are obliged to fear—those who give him advice—that he will have somebody near him who in time of peace will desire war, being unable to get his living without it.

But I wish to carry this matter a little further and not to seek out a kingdom wholly good but one like those that exist today, where likewise the king needs to be afraid of those who for their profession take warfare, because the might of armies, without any doubt, is their infantry. Hence if a king does not manage in such a way that his infantrymen in time of peace are glad to return home and live by their occupations, he will necessarily be ruined, because there is no more dangerous infantry than that composed of men who carry on war as their profession, because you are obliged either to make war always,[2] or to pay them always, or to be subject to the danger that they will deprive you of your kingdom. To make war always is not possible; to pay them always is not possible; so necessarily you run into danger of losing your power.

[*When Rome turned to professional soldiers, she fell*]

My Romans, as I have said, while they were wise and good, never allowed their citizens to take this pursuit as their profession, notwithstanding that they would have been able to support them at all times, because at all times they made war. But to avoid the injury that could be done them by this continual employment, since the times did not vary, they varied the men, and they observed the time in such a way for their legions that always in fifteen years they had renewed them; and thus they made use of men in the flower of their lives, that is, from eighteen to thirty-five years, a time in which the legs, the hands and the eye are in harmony with one another, nor did they wait until their vigor decreased and their malice increased, as later they did in corrupt times. Because Octavian first and then Tiberius, thinking more about their own power than about the public advantage, began to disarm the Roman people in order to command them more easily and to keep those same armies continually on the frontiers of the Empire. And because they still did not judge that they would be enough to hold in check the Roman people and Senate, they set up an army called Praetorian, which remained near the walls of Rome and was like a castle over that city. Because they then freely began to allow men chosen for those armies to practice soldiering as their profession, these men soon became arrogant, so that they were dangerous to the Senate and harmful to the Emperor. The result was that many emperors were killed through the arrogance of the soldiers, who gave the Empire to whom they chose, and took it away; sometimes it happened that at the same time there were many emperors established by various armies. From these things resulted, first, division of the Empire, and finally its ruin.

[*Good soldiers wish to return to peaceful pursuits*]

Hence kings, if they wish to live securely, make up their infantry of men who, when it is time to make war, gladly for love of them go into it, and when peace comes, more gladly return home—which will always happen when a king selects men who know how to live by some other profession than this. So he must see to it that when peace comes his chief men return to rule their peoples, his gentlemen to the management of their property, and the infantry to their individual occupations. Each one of these will gladly make war in order to have peace, and will not seek to disturb the peace in order to have war.

[*Few soldiers find military employment in time of peace*]

COSIMO. Truly this reasoning of yours seems to me well considered. Nevertheless, since it is almost opposite to what I have up to now supposed, my mind is still not purged of every doubt, because I see many lords and gentlemen support themselves in time of peace by means of the pursuits of war, such as those like yourself who receive pay from princes and from republics. I see also almost all the men-at-arms steadily getting their pay. I see that there are many infantrymen in the garrisons of cities and fortresses. Hence it seems to me that there is a place, in time of peace, for everybody.

FABRIZIO. I do not believe you believe that in time of peace everyone has his place, because, supposing that no other reason could be brought forward, the small number of all those who remain in the places mentioned by you would answer you. What fraction of the infantry needed in war are those used in time of peace? Because the fortresses and the cities that are guarded in time of peace, in war are guarded much more; and to them are to be added the soldiers kept in the field, of which there are a large number, all of whom in peace are dismissed. And as to governmental garrisons, a small number, Pope Julius and you have shown to everybody how much to be feared are those not willing to carry on any other occupation than war; such men because of their arrogance you have rejected from your garrisons, and you have put there Switzers, since they were born and brought up under laws and chosen by their free states, with genuine selection. So hereafter you will not say that in peace there is a place for every man. As to the men-at-arms, since all of them in peace continue to get their pay, any solution of their case seems more difficult. Nevertheless, he who carefully considers the whole finds the answer easy, because this way of keeping the men-at-arms is a method that is corrupt and not good. The reason is that they are men who make war their profession, and every day they would cause a thousand disorders in the states where they are, if supported by a body of sufficient size; but since they are few and unable by themselves to make up an army, they are not so often able to cause grave damage. Nevertheless they have done it many times, as I explained to you about Francesco, and Sforza his father, and Braccio da Perugia. So as to this custom of retaining men-at-arms, I do not approve of it, for it is corrupt and can cause serious troubles.

But let us return to our subject. Continuing this matter of training, I say that it is not enough to make good armies for the men to be hardened and made strong, swift, and agile; they must also learn to remain in their ranks, to obey the signals, the musical calls and the voices of the officers, and must be able when standing still, drawing back, going forward, fighting and marching to keep their ranks. Because without this discipline, accurately and carefully planned and practiced, no army was ever good. Without doubt spirited but unorganized men are much weaker than the timid but well-organized, because organization expels men's fear; disorder lessens their spirit.

in an army there must be enough groups and every group must have its banner and its leader. If it has this, it is likely to have many souls and, consequently, much life. The infantrymen, then, should march according to the banner, and the banner should move according to the music.

[*Military music*]

When well handled, this music regulates the army, which by moving in paces that correspond to its beats, easily keeps in rank. Thence it is that the ancients had whistles and fifes and musical instruments perfectly modulated; because, just as one who dances moves in time with music and keeping with it does not err, so an army moving in obedience to music does not get disordered. And therefore they varied the music according as they wished to vary the movement and according as they wished to stir up or to quiet or to make firm the spirits of the men. As the music was of various kinds, they gave it various names. Doric music produced firmness, Phrygian produced impetuosity. Hence they say that when Alexander was at table and someone played Phrygian music, it excited his spirit so much that he laid his hands on his weapons. It would be necessary to find all these modes again, and if that were difficult, we should at least not omit those that teach the soldiers to obey. Each commander can vary them at will, so long as with practice he accustoms the ears of his soldiers to recognize them. But today military music generally yields no other benefit than the making of a noise.

[*Religion*]

Also very powerful in keeping the ancient soldiers well disposed were religion and the oath sworn when they were taken into service, because in all their transgressions they were threatened not alone with the ills they could fear from men but with those they could expect from God. This condition, mingled with other religious customs, many times made every sort of undertaking easy for the ancient generals, and always will make them so, where religion is feared and observed. Sertorius availed himself of this, pretending that he spoke with a deer which, on the part of God, promised him victory. Sulla said that he spoke with an image that he had taken from the temple of Apollo. Many have said that in a dream they have seen God, exhorting them to fight. In the time of our fathers, Charles VII, King of France, in the war that he made against the English, said that he took counsel with a girl sent by God, who was called everywhere the Maid of France; and this was the cause of his victory.

HUGO GROTIUS (1583-1645)

The Dutch jurist, Huigh de Groot - better known by his latinized name as Hugo Grotius - was born in Delft, Holland, April 10 1583. He came from a family of magistrates and scholars, his father having been burgomaster of Delft four times and curator of the University of Leyden. At the age of 15 he became famous as a prodigy of wide learning by virtue of his defense at the University of Leyden of a Latin thesis in philosophy and jurisprudence. By the age of seventeen he was admitted to the bar, and had accompanied the statesman Oldenbarnveldt on a diplomatic mission to Henry IV of France, who called Grotius "the miracle of Holland". He attracted much attention as a lawyer, assisted in a famous case involving the Dutch East India Company in 1604, and at the age of 24 was appointed Attorney-General of Holland. Assuming many other honors and positions of responsibility, Grotius was deeply associated with Oldenbarneveldt and was led to share with Oldenbarneveldt the wrath of Maurice of Nassau in 1619. Maurice of Nassau was the Prince of Orange, and Oldenbarneveldt had helped him to achieve power in the Netherlands as well as securing the independence of the Netherlands from Spain in 1609. But they took different sides on religious questions; Maurice and the nobles sided with the strict Calvinists who believed in pre-destination, Oldenbarnevaeldt sided with the moderate advocates of toleration. Maurice of Nassau won, Oldenbarneveldt was condemned to death and executed, and Grotius was sentenced to imprisonment for life. However, with the help of his wife, Grotius escaped from the castle which was his prison in a chest which had been used for conveying books back and forth. He went to France and there wrote De Jure Belli et Pacis. He was never to serve in the Dutch government again, but served various other governments, including an ambassadorship from Sweden to France in his last ten years, 1635-45.

Known and honored as "the father of International Law", his major work De Jure Belli et Pacis - which is sometimes translated as 'The Rights of War and Peace' and sometimes as 'The Law of War and Peace' - apparently grew out of the legal case he was involved in in 1604. The Dutch East India Company had sent two ships to southeast Asia. The Portugese had a large galleon in the Strait of Malacca which was obstructing the passage of the Dutch ships. The two Dutch ships attacked the galleon successfully, took a very rich booty (though sparing the 700 or so men,women and children aboard). Some religious Anabaptists in the Company had moral scruples about accepting booty gained in this manner. In a long and learned treatise (discovered in the files of the Dutch East India Company in 1868) Grotius apparently drew upon his broad learning in philosophy, history, theology and law to defend the seizure. One chapter of this treatise, Commentary on the Law of the Prize, was published in 1609 as Mare Liberum (The Freedom of the Seas), and was influential in securing a peace with Spain which did not involve any restrictions on Dutch trade in Southeast Asia. His later work, apparently, was an extension of this earlier work, greatly broadened both in detail, and in the scope of his interest which now was focused on the most general and comprehensive principles concerning what is right and justifiable, and what is not, in the conduct of War and of Peace.

To indicate the wide scope and detail of Grotius' three-volume work, we have included a table of contents. A great many principles which are still appealed to in international law are brought together and ordered in Grotius' work. The selections which follow concentrate only on the broad philosophical issues of a) the foundations and nature of international law, as rooted in natural law, b) just and unjust wars, c) what is lawful in the conduct of war, and d) cautions to preserve Peace. The selections are taken from William Whewell's abridged translation of 1853.

DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS

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*'Postliminy'=df. the right of a person who has been banished or captured to assume his former civic privileges upon his return home.

PROLEGOMENA

1 The Civil Law, both that of Rome, and that of each nation in particular, has been treated of, with a view either to illustrate it or to present it in a compendious form, by many. But International Law, that which regards the mutual relations of several Peoples, or Rulers of Peoples, whether it proceed from nature, or be instituted by divine command, or introduced by custom and tacit compact, has been touched on by few, and has been by no one treated as a whole in an orderly manner. And yet that this be done, concerns the human race.

3 And such a work is the more necessary on this account; that there are not wanting persons in our own time, and there have been also in former times persons, who have despised what has been done in this province of jurisprudence, so far as to hold that no such thing existed, except as a mere name. Every one can quote the saying of Euphemius in Thucydides;—that for a king or a city which has an empire to maintain, nothing is unjust which is useful: and to the same effect is the saying, that for those who have supreme power, the equity is where the strength is: and that other, that state affairs cannot be carried on without doing some wrong. To this we must add that the controversies which arise between peoples and kings have commonly war for their arbiter. And that war is far from having anything to do with rights, is not only the opinion of the vulgar, but even learned and prudent men often let fall expressions which favour such an opinion. It is very usual to put *rights* and *arms* in opposition to each other. And accordingly Ennius says:

> They have recourse to arms, and not to rights.

5 But since our discussion of Rights is worthless if there are no Rights, it will serve both to recommend our work, and to protect it from objections, if we refute briefly this very grave error. And that we may not have to deal with a mob of opponents, let us appoint them an advocate to speak for them. And who can we select for this office, fitter than Carneades, who had made such wonderful progress in his suspension of opinion, the supreme aim of his Academical Philosophy, that he could work the machinery of his eloquence for falsehood as easily as for truth. He, then, undertook to argue against justice; and especially the kind of justice of which we here treat; and in doing so, he found no argument stronger than this;—that men had, as utility prompted, established Rights, different as their manners differed; and even in the same society, often changed with the change of times: but Natural Law there is none: for all creatures, men and animals alike, are impelled by nature to seek their own gratification: and thus, either there is no such thing as justice, or if it exist, it is the height of folly, since it does harm to itself in aiming at the good of others.

6 But what the philosopher here says, and what the poet (Horace) follows:—

> By naked nature ne'er was understood
> What's just and right:

must by no means be admitted. For man is an animal indeed, but an animal of an excellent kind, differing much more from all other tribes of animals than they differ from one another; which appears by the evidence of many actions peculiar to the human species. And among these properties which are peculiar to man, is a desire for society; that is, a desire for a life spent in common with fellowmen; and not merely spent somehow, but spent tranquilly, and in a manner corresponding to the character of his intellect. This desire the Stoics called οἰκείωσις, *the domestic instinct*, or *feeling of kindred*. And therefore the assertion, that, by nature, every animal is impelled only to seek its own advantage or good, if stated so generally as to include man, cannot be conceded.

7 And indeed even in other animals, as well as in man, their desire of their own individual good is tempered by a regard, partly for their offspring, partly for others of their own species; which in them, indeed, we perceive to proceed from some extrinsic intelligent principle*; because with regard to other acts not at all more difficult than those [thus directed towards the offspring, and the like,] an equal degree of intelligence does not appear. The same is to be said of infants, in which, previous to all teaching, we see a certain disposition to do good to others, as is sagaciously remarked by Plutarch: as for example, compassion breaks out spontaneously at that age. But inasmuch as a man of full age has the knowledge which enables him to act similarly in similar cases; and along with that, a peculiar and admirable appetite for society; and has also language, an instrument of this desire, given to him alone of all animals; it is reasonable to assume that he has a faculty of knowing and acting according to general principles; and such tendencies as agree with this faculty do not belong to all animals, but are peculiar attributes of human nature.

8 And this tendency to the conservation of society, which we have now expressed in a rude manner, and which tendency is in agreement with the nature of the human intellect, is the source of *Jus*, or Natural Law, properly so called. To this *Jus* belong the rule of abstaining from that which belongs to other persons; and if we have in our possession anything of another's, the restitution of it, or of any gain which we have made from it; the fulfilling of promises, and the reparation of damage done by fault; and the recognition of certain things as meriting punishment among men.

9 From this signification has flowed another larger sense of *Jus:* for, inasmuch as man is superior to other animals, not only in the social impulse of which we have spoken, but in his judgment and power of estimating advantages and disadvantages; and in these, not only present good and ill, but also future good and ill, and what may lead to each; we may understand that it is congruous to human nature to follow, in such matters also, [the estimate of future good and ill, and of the consequences of actions,] a judgment rightly framed; not to be misled by fear or by the temptation of present pleasure, nor to be carried away by blind and thoughtless impulse; and that what is plainly repugnant to such judgment, is also contrary to *Jus*, that is, to Natural Human Law.

11 And what we have said would still have great weight, even if we were to grant, what we cannot grant without wickedness, that there is no God, or that he bestows no regard on human affairs.

12 And here we are brought to another origin of Jus, besides that natural source; namely, the free will of God, to which, as our reason irresistibly tells us, we are bound to submit ourselves. But even that Natural Law of which we have spoken, whether it be that which binds together communities, or that looser kind [which enjoins duties,] although it do proceed from the internal principles of man, may yet be rightly ascribed to God; because it was by His will that such principles came to exist in us. . . .

15 In the next place, since it is conformable to Natural Law to observe compacts, (for some mode of obliging themselves was necessary among men, and no other natural mode could be imagined,)

Civil Rights were derived from this source, mutual compact. For those who had joined any community, or put themselves in subjection to any man or men, those either expressly promised, or from the nature of the case must have been understood to promise tacitly, that they would conform to that which either the majority of the community, or those to whom the power was assigned, should determine.

16 And therefore what Carneades said (as above), and what others also have said, as Horace,

Utility, Mother of just and right.

if we are to speak accurately, is not true. For the Mother of Right, that is, of Natural Law, is Human Nature; for this would lead us to desire mutual society, even if it were not required for the supply of other wants; and the Mother of Civil Laws, is Obligation by mutual compact; and since mutual compact derives its force from Natural Law, Nature may be said to be the Grandmother of Civil Laws. [The genealogy is, Human Nature: Natural Law: Civil Laws.] But Natural Law, [which impels us to society,] is *reinforced* by Utility. For the Author of Nature ordained that we should, as individuals, be weak, and in need of many things to make life comfortable, in order that we might be the more impelled to cling to society. But Utility is the *occasion* of Civil Laws; for the association or subjection by mutual compact, of which we have just spoken (15), was at the first instituted for the sake of some utility. And accordingly, they who prescribe laws for others, in doing this, aim, or ought to aim, at some Utility, to be produced to them for whom they legislate.

17 Further: as the Laws of each Community regard the Utility of that Community, so also between different Communities, all or most, Laws might be established, and it appears that Laws have been established, which enjoined the Utility, not of special communities, but of that great aggregate System of Communities. And this is what is called the Law of Nations, or International Law; when we distinguish it from Natural Law. . . .

25 It is so far from being proper to admit, what some choose to say, that in war all rights cease, that war is never to be undertaken except to assert rights; and when undertaken, is never to be carried on except within the limits of rights and of good faith. Demosthenes well said, that war was the mode of dealing with those who could not be kept in order by judicial proceedings. For judicial proceedings are of force against those who feel themselves to be the weaker party: but against those who make themselves or think themselves equals, war is the proceeding; yet this too, in order to be justifiable, to be carried on in a no less scrupulous manner than judicial proceedings are.

26 Be it so then, that, in the conflict of arms, laws must be silent: but let this be understood of laws civil, judicial, proper to peace; not of those laws which are perpetual and accommodated to all time. For it is excellently said by Dio Prusæensis, that between enemies, written laws, that is, Civil Laws, are not in force; but that unwritten laws are, namely, those which nature dictates, or the consent of nations institutes.

28 I, for the reasons which I have stated, holding it to be most certain that there is among nations a common law of Rights which is of force with regard to war, and in war, saw many and grave causes why I should write a work on that subject. For I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed; recourse being had to arms for slight reasons or no reason; and when arms were once taken up, all reverence for divine and human law was thrown away, just as if men were thenceforth authorized to commit all crimes without restraint.

29 And the sight of these atrocities has led many men, and these, estimable persons, to declare arms forbidden to the Christian, whose rule of life mainly consists in love to all men: and to this party sometimes John Ferus and our countryman Erasmus seem to approximate, men much devoted to peace, both ecclesiastical and civil: but they take this course, as I conceive, with the purpose with which, when things have been twisted one way, we bend them the other, in order to make them straight. But this attempt to drive things too far, is often so far from succeeding, that it does harm; because the excess which it involves is easily detected; and then, detracts from the authority of what is said, even within the limits of truth. We are to provide a remedy for both disorders; both for thinking that nothing is allowable, and that everything is.

32 What course *we* think ought to be followed in the execution of such a task, we shew by act rather than by words, in this present work; in which is contained by far the noblest part of Jurisprudence.

33 For in the First Book, (after a Preface concerning the origin of Rights and Laws,) we have examined the question whether any war be just: next, in order to distinguish between public and private war, we have to explain the nature of sovereignty; what Peoples, what Kings, have it entire; what, partial; who, with a right of alienation; who, otherwise; and afterwards we have to speak of the duty of subjects to superiors.

34 The Second Book, undertaking to expound all the causes from which war may arise, examines what things are common, what are property, what is the right of persons over persons, what obligation arises from ownership, what is the rule of royal succession, what right is obtained by pact or contract, what is the force and interpretation of treaties, of oaths private and public, what is due for damage done, what is the sacredness of ambassadors, the right of burying the dead, and the nature of punishments.

35 The Third Book has for its subject, in the first place, what is lawful in war; and when it has drawn a distinction between that which is done with impunity, or may even, in dealing with foreigners, be defended as consistent with Rights; and that which is really free from fault; it then descends to the kinds of Peace and to Conventions in War.

40 In order to give proofs on questions respecting this Natural Law, I have made use of the testimonies of philosophers, historians, poets, and finally orators. Not that I regard these as judges from whose decision there is no appeal: for they are warped by their party, their argument, their cause: but I quote them as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, proceeding from innumerable different times and places, must be referred to some universal cause; which, in the questions with which we are here concerned, can be no other than a right deduction proceeding from the principles of reason, or some common consent. The former cause of agreement points to the Law of Nature; the latter, to the Law of Nations. . . .

48 The books written by men inspired by God, or approved by them, I often use as authority, with a distinction between the Old and the New Law. . . .

50 I use the New Testament for this purpose; that I may shew, what cannot be shewn in any other way, what is lawful for Christians; which however, contrary to what most writers have done, I have distinguished from the Law of Nature: holding it for certain that in that more holy Law, a greater holiness is enjoined upon us than the Law of Nature of itself requires.

II. 1 We have then to treat of War, and of the Rights of War. We must then ask, What is War? What are Rights?

Cicero says that War is a contest or contention carried on by force. But usage applies the term, not to an action, [a contest,] but to a state or condition: and thus we may say, War is the state of persons contending by force, as such. . . .

3 The common use of the word *War* allows us to include Private War, though, used generally, it often means specifically *public* War.

We do not say that war is a state of *just* contention, because precisely the point to be examined is, Whether there be just war, and What war is just. And therefore we must distinguish the subject, War, from the question which we examine concerning it.

III. 1 By entitling our Treatise, *Of the Rights of War*, we mean, in the first place, to imply the discussion of the questions just stated, Whether any war is just, and What is just in war. For *Rights, Jus*, in this case, means only what is right, that is, just; and that, rather with a negative than a positive sense; so that *that* comes within the substantive *Right*, which is not unjust, or wrong.

IV. *Jus, Right*, has another signification, derived from the former, as when we say *my* Right. In this sense Right is a moral Quality by which a person is competent to have or to do a certain thing justly.

Right in this sense belongs to a person, though sometimes it follows a thing: as one piece of land may have a right of way, or other easement, over another piece of land. In this case the Right still belongs to a person, namely, to the person who possesses the first piece. Such Rights are called *real* Rights in comparison with others which are merely personal.

IX. 1 *Jus* has a third signification, meaning Law in its largest sense, namely, "a Rule of moral acts obliging to what is right."

"*Obliging*" is necessary to this signification: for mere Counsel or Advice is not included in *Jus* or Law; and Permission is not Law, but the absence of Law, except so far as it obliges other persons not to impede.

"Obliging to what is *right*," not to what is just; for *Jus* in this signification does not include strict Justice merely, but the matter of other virtues. Yet what is right is sometimes loosely called *just*.

2 The best distinction of Law in this general sense, is that of Aristotle, into Natural Law, and Voluntary or Legal Law [or Positive Law; δίκαιον φυσικὸν and δίκαιον νομικὸν, *Eth. Nicom.* v. 10,] or Instituted Law, τὸ ἐν τάξει. The Hebrew has a like distinction.

X. 1 Natural Law is the Dictate of Right Reason, indicating that any act, from its agreement or disagreement with the rational [and social*] nature [of man] has in it a moral turpitude or a moral necessity; and consequently that such act is forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature.

2 Acts concerning which there is such a Dictate are obligatory, [morally necessary,] or are unlawful, in themselves, and are therefore understood as necessarily commanded or forbidden by God; and in this character, Natural Law differs, not only from Human Law, but from Positive Divine Law, which does not forbid or command acts which, in themselves and by their own nature, are either obligatory or unlawful; but, by forbidding them makes them unlawful, by commanding them makes them obligatory.

5 Natural Law is so immutable that it cannot be changed by God himself. For though the power of God be immense, there are some things to which it does not extend: because if we speak of those things being done, the words are mere words, and have no meaning, being self-contradictory. Thus God himself cannot make twice two not be four; and in like manner, he cannot make that which is intrinsically bad, not be bad. For as the essence of things, when they exist, and by which they exist, does not depend on anything else, so is it with the properties which follow that essence: and such a property is the baseness of certain actions, when compared with the nature of rational beings. And God himself allows himself to be judged of by this rule.

XII. 1 That there is such a thing as Natural Law, is commonly proved both *a priori* and *a posteriori*; the former the more subtle, the latter, the more popular proof. It is proved *a priori* by shewing the agreement or disagreement of anything with the rational and social nature of man. It is proved *a posteriori* when by certain or very probable accounts we find anything accepted as Natural Law among all nations, or at least the more civilized. For a universal effect requires a universal cause: now such a universal belief can hardly have any cause except the common sense of mankind.

Hesiod, Heraclitus, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Quintilian, agree that the consent of all nations is evidence of the truth. And Porphyry, Andronicus of Rhodes, Plutarch, Aristotle, agree that the more savage nations are of less weight in such an estimate.

XIII. Thus much of Natural Law; next of Positive or Instituted Law. [See Sect. x. 2.] And this is either Human or Divine.

XIV. Of Human [instituted] Law, first, as more widely known.

This is either the Civil Law, [that is, the National Law,] or Law in a narrower, or in a wider sphere.

The Civil Law is that which governs the State, (*Civitas*).

The State, (*Civitas*) is a perfect [that is, independent] collection of free men, associated for the sake of enjoying the advantages of *jus*, and for common utility.

Law in a narrow sphere, and not derived from the State, though subject to it, is various, as paternal precepts, the commands of a master, and the like.

Law in a wider sphere is *Jus Gentium*, the Law of Nations, that Law which has received an obligatory force from the will of all nations, or of many.

I have added "*or of many*," because scarce any Law is found, except Natural Law, (which also is often called *Jus Gentium*,) common to *all* nations.

2 This *Jus Gentium*, Law of Nations, is proved in the same manner as the unwritten Civil Law, by constant usage, and the testimony of those who have made it their study.

XV. 1 What is Divine [instituted] Law is sufficiently apparent from the term itself; namely, that which has its origin from the Divine Will; by which character it is distinguished from Natural Law,

2 This Law is given either to the whole human race, or to one nation. To the human race, the Law has thrice been given by God; at the Creation; immediately after the Deluge, and at the coming of Christ. These three sets of Laws oblige all men, as soon as they acquire a sufficient knowledge of them.

XVI. 1 There is one nation in particular to which God has especially given his Laws, namely, the Hebrew people. See Deut. iv. 7; Psalm cxlvii.

2 It is erroneous to suppose (as some Jews have done) that those of other nations, in order to be saved, must submit to the Jewish law. For the law does not oblige those to whom it is not given;

XVII. 1 Since then the law of Moses cannot impose any direct obligation upon us, let us see if it can be of any other use in questions of the Rights of War, and the like.

2 (1) In the first place, the Jewish Law shews that what is commanded by that law is not contrary to Natural Law. For Natural Law being, as we have said [x. 5] perpetual and immutable, God, who is never unjust, could not command anything against that Law.

4 (3) In the third place: whatever is commanded by the law of Moses, connected with the virtues which Christ requires from his disciples, that, at least, if not more, is due from Christians. The foundation of this remark is this: that the virtues which are required of Christians, as humility, patience, kindness, are required in a greater degree than they were under the Jewish Law: and that with good reason; because the heavenly promises are more and more clearly given in the Gospel. And hence, the Old Law is declared not to have been *perfect*, nor *faultless*: and Christ is called *the end of the Law;*

Chapter II. *Whether War ever be just.*

Having seen what are the fountains of *Jus* or of Law, let us come to the first and more general question, which is this: Whether any war be just; or, Whether it ever be lawful to make war.

I. 1 This question, and others which will follow, are first to be treated with reference to Natural Law. Cicero repeatedly speaks of certain First Principles, and certain other truths, the consequences of these, but of higher value than those. There is, according to him, a First Principle of Self-preservation. An animal, from its birth, is urged to care for and preserve itself, to choose the means of preserving its good condition, to shun destruction, and every thing which leads to its destruction. Thus there is no one who does not prefer to have the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed and distorted. The first business of each is to preserve himself in the state of nature; the next, to retain what is according to nature, and to reject what is contrary to it.

2 After this Principle, there follows a notion of the Agreement of things with Reason, which is superior to the body; and this Agreement, in which what is reasonable (*honestum*) becomes our object, is seen to be of more importance than those things to which alone the first impulse of appetite tended. The first Principle [of self-preservation] commends us to Right Reason; but Right Reason ought to be dearer to us than those things by which we were first led to use it.

This is allowed by all who are of sound mind, without demonstration. Hence in examining what agrees with Natural Law, we must first see what agrees with that first principle of Self-preservation; and afterwards proceed to that which, though subsequent in origin, is of greater dignity; and must not only accept it, if it be offered, but seek it with all care.

4 In the first principle of nature [Self-preservation] there is nothing which is repugnant to war: indeed all things rather favour it: for the end of war, the preservation of life and limb, and the retention or acquisition of things useful to life, agrees entirely with that principle. And if force be requisite for this purpose, still there is in this nothing at variance with nature; for all animals are provided by nature with means for the very purpose of self-defence. So Xenophon, Ovid, Horace, Lucretius. Galen observes that man is an animal born for peace and war, not born with weapons, but with hands by which weapons can be acquired. And we see infants, without teaching, use their hands for weapons. So also Aristotle.

5 Again, Right Reason and the nature of Society, which are next to be considered, do not prohibit all force, but that only which is repugnant to Society; that is, that which is used to attack the Rights of others. For Society has for its object, that every one may have what is his own in safety, by the common help and agreement. Which consideration would still have place, even if property were not introduced: for even then, each one would have a property in his life, limbs, liberty; and these could not be attacked without wrong done to him. And also to use things which lay in common, and to take as much of them as nature should require, would be the right of the person who first took occupation of them; and he who should prevent the exercise of this Right, would do the occupier wrong. And this is much more easily understood now, when property has taken a shape by law or usage: as Cicero says. [See the passage in the text.]

6 Therefore it is not contrary to the nature of Society to take care of the future for one's self, so that the Rights of others be not infringed: and thus, even force, which does not violate the Right of another, is not unjust.

II. 1 Our doctrine, that all war is not contrary to Natural Law, is further proved from the sacred history. Abraham made war upon the four kings who had plundered Sodom, and was thereupon blessed by Melchisedec. This he did without the special mandate of God, as appears by the history: he must therefore have been justified by the Law of Nature: for he was a most holy and wise man, as even heathen authors declare. . . .

2 But further, God prescribed to his people general and perpetual laws concerning the mode of carrying on war (Deut. xx. 10. 15): shewing plainly by this that a war may be just, without a special mandate: for the case of the nations of Canaan is here expressly distinguished from the case of other nations. And inasmuch as nothing is there said as to what are just causes of war, this shews that they are assumed to be known by the light of nature.

III. 1 What we say is proved by the consent of all nations, and especially of wise men. There are the noted passages in Cicero's Oration for Milo, in which he appeals to the testimony of nature for the right of self-defence.

IV. 1 By Natural Law, then, [*Jure naturali* or *Jure gentium*] it is plain that all wars are not condemned.

2 That by the voluntary or instituted Law of nations [see chap. I. § ix. 2] wars are not condemned, we have evidence enough in the histories, laws and customs of all nations.

V. 1 Concerning Instituted Divine Law [Chap. I. § xv. 1] there is more difficulty. Nor is the objection valid, that Natural Law is immutable, and therefore cannot be changed, even by God: for this is true as to what is commanded or forbidden by Natural Law, but not as to what is only permitted. Things of that kind are not properly under Natural Law, but extraneous to it, and may be forbidden or commanded [by Instituted Law].

9 Moreover the law given by Moses gives reasons for capital punishments, which are valid among other nations as well as the Jews: as Lev. xviii. 24, &c., *Defile not yourselves, &c.* Psal. ci. 5, *Whoso privily slandereth his neighbour, him will I cut off.* Prov. xx. 8, *A king that sitteth in the throne of judgment scattereth away all evil with his eyes.* And especially concerning homicide, it is said, Num. xxxv. 33, that *the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein but by the blood of him that shed it.*

Further, it is absurd to suppose that the Hebrew people were indulged with the privilege of protecting public and private interests by capital punishments, and defending themselves by war, and that other kings and nations at that time had no such privilege: and that, this being so, those kings and nations were yet never rebuked by God for the practice of capital punishment and of war, as they were often rebuked for other offences.

10 On the contrary, we must suppose that, as the law of Moses was the expression of the divine Will, the other nations would do well and piously to take example by that law: which it is probable that the Greeks, and especially the Athenians, did: whence arises the so great similarity of the old Attic Law, and the Laws of the Twelve Tribes therefrom derived, with the Laws of the Hebrews.

VI. 1 The arguments adduced against war from the Gospel are more specious: and in examining these, I shall not assume, as many do, that there is in the Gospel nothing, besides the precepts of belief and institution of the sacraments, which is not matter of Natural Law: for that, in the sense in which it is commonly understood, I do not believe.

2 From the fifth chapter of Matthew, many arguments are usually drawn; and in order to estimate the value of these, we must repeat what has been said already; That if the intention of Christ had been to take away all capital punishment, and the right of making war, he would have done this in the most express and special words, in consideration of the magnitude and novelty of the thing: and all the

more on that account, that no Jew could think otherwise than that the laws of Moses which concerned the Jewish State and tribunals were to retain their authority over Jews, as long as the State existed. With this previous remark, let us consider in order the force of the particular passages.

3 (2) The second argument then in favour of the opposite opinion is taken from these words: *Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, that ye resist not the evil man: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.* Hence some infer that no injury is to be resisted or satisfaction for it to be required, either publicly or privately. But this is not what the words say: for Christ is not here addressing magistrates, but those who are assailed: nor does he speak of wrongs of all kinds, but of such as a blow on the cheek; for the subsequent words restrict the generality of the preceding.

5 So in what follows, *Whosoever will impose service as for one mile, go with him two:* our Lord does not speak of a hundred miles, a distance that would carry a man quite away from his business, but of one, and if need be, two; which is a trifling amount of walking. The meaning then is this; That in matters which are not very inconvenient to us, we are not to insist upon our right, but to give up even more than is asked, that our patience and kindness may appear to all.

9 (3) A third argument is usually drawn from that which follows in St Matthew, *Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy; But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you, and persecute you.* There are who think that such love to enemies and assailants is inconsistent both with capital punishments and with war.

But this is easily refuted if we consider this precept of the Hebrew law more nearly. The Hebrews were commanded to love their neighbour, that is, the Hebrew; for so the word *neighbour* is there taken, as we see, Levit. xix. 17, *Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart: thou shalt in anywise rebuke thy neighbour;* compared with verse 18, *Thou shalt not avenge nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.* But notwithstanding this, the magistrate was commanded to put to death the manslayer and other great criminals: notwithstanding this, the eleven tribes justly made war upon the tribe of Benjamin for a heinous crime, Judg. xx.: notwithstanding this, David who fought the battles of the Lord, rightly won by arms from Ishbosheth the kingdom promised to him. [2 Sam. iii. 1.]

10 Let it be granted then that the word *neighbour* is now to be extended more widely so as to include all men: for all nations are now received under one common rule of grace; no people is cut off from God; still there will be the same permission for all nations which there then was for the Israelites, who were then commanded mutual love, as all men now are.

But if you allege that a greater degree of love is enjoined in the Gospel-law, this also may be conceded, provided we make this reserve, that all are not to be loved equally, but, for example, a father more than a stranger: and thus, the good of the innocent is to be preferred to the good of the guilty, public good to private good. Now capital punishments and just wars arise from our love of the innocent. See Prov. xxiv. 11, *If thou forbear to deliver them that are drawn unto death, and those that are ready to be slain, &c.* And thus the precepts of Christ respecting loving and helping all are to be fulfilled in such a way that a greater and juster love do not interfere. There is a noted ancient saying, *It is as great a cruelty to be indulgent to all as to none.*

Book II, Chapter I

CHAPTER I. *Of the Causes of War; and first of Self-defense, and Defense of our Property.*

I. 1 Let us come to the causes of war; I mean justificatory causes; for there are causes which operate on the ground of utility, distinct from those which depend on justice; and these again may be distinguished from occasional causes, or the first collision, as the stag in the war of Turnus and Æneas. These are sometimes confounded.

3 Just cause is requisite for public no less than for private war. Seneca complains that the State forbids homicide on a small scale, but commands it on a large one. It is true that wars undertaken by public authority have peculiar jural effects, as public sentences have; but they are not therefore blameless, except there be a reason for them. If Alexander made war on the Persians without cause, he was rightly called a robber by the Scythians, by Seneca, by Lucan, by the Indians; and treated as an equal by a pirate. Philip his father did the like. Augustine says, *Without justice what is empire, but robbery on a great scale?* So Lactantius.

4 A just cause of War is injury done us, and nothing else. Augustine says, *The Injustice* (that is the injury) *of the adverse party makes a war just.* The formula of the Roman Heralds [in declaring war] was, *I call you to witness that that people is unjust, and does not perform its obligations.*

II. 1 There are evidently as many sources of war as there are of Actions at law; for when the judgments of tribunals cease to be of force, war begins. . . .

2 Most writers state three just causes of war; defense, recovery of property, and punishment of wrong; which three we find mentioned in the proclamation of Camillus against the Gauls: *All that we may lawfully defend, recover, revenge.* [Compare this with Plato and Seneca.] The formula of the Roman Heralds was, *What things were to be given, done, and discharged, they have not given, done, and discharged.* [See Sallust; Augustine.]

III. If the body be menaced by present force with danger of life not otherwise evitable, war is lawful, even to the slaying of the aggressor, as we have before said, in proving some private war to be lawful. And this right of defense arises from the natural right of self-protection, not from the injustice or fault of another who makes the danger. And therefore this right of self-protection is not taken away, even if the aggressor be blameless; if, for instance, he be a soldier acting *bonâ fide;* or if he take me for another than I am, or if he be insane or a sleepwalker, such as we read of; it is sufficient that I am not bound to suffer what he attempts to inflict; just as if a wild beast were to attack me.

V. 1 Present danger is here required, and imminent in a point of time. I confess indeed that if the aggressor be taking up weapons, and in such a way that he manifestly does so with the intent to kill, the deed may be anticipated; for in moral things, as in natural, there is no point without a certain latitude: but they are in great error who allow any fear [however slight] as a right of killing for prevention. It is well said by Cicero that most injuries proceed from fear, he who meditates hurting another, fearing that if he do not do so, he will suffer some evil. So Clearchus in Xenophon, Cato for the Rhodians. [Sec.] Gellius says, a man is not to act like a gladiator, who must kill or be killed. So Cicero, quoted by Quintilian: Euripides, Thucydides, Livy. Quintilian quotes, *Who allowed you such fear?*

2 If any one direct against us violence not present; as if he make a conspiracy, or lay an ambush, or put poison in our way, or assail us with a false accusation, false testimony, or iniquitous judgment; I deny that he may be lawfully slain, if either the danger may be otherwise avoided, or it be not certain that it cannot be otherwise avoided. For delay allows recourse to many remedies and many chances; as we say, between the cup and the lip. Although there are not wanting both Jurists and Divines who extend the indulgence further. But the other opinion, which is the better and safer, is also not without its authorities.

Chapter XXII. *Of unjust Causes of War.*

I. 1 We have said above, when we began to treat of the causes of war, that some are justificatory or justifying, some suasory or impelling. Polybius, who first noted this difference, calls the former *pretexts*, the latter, *causes;* Livy sometimes calls the former *titulus**.

2 Thus in the war of Alexander against Darius, the *pretext* was revenge for the injuries which the Persians had done to the Greeks; the *cause* was the desire of glory, empire, wealth, added to a great hope of the facility of the conquest, proved from the expeditions of Xenophon and Agesilaus. So the *pretext* of the second Punic war was the controversy concerning Saguntum, the *cause* was the indignation of the Carthaginians excited by the terms which the Romans had imposed upon them in their evil times, and their courage exalted by their successes in Spain; as Polybius notes. In the same way Thucydides judges that the true cause of the Peloponnesian war was the strength of the Athenians, increasing and drawing the suspicion of the Lacedæmonians; the pretext, the controversy of the Corcyreans, of the Potideans, and others things: . . .

II. Some there are who rush into war not actuated by either of these kinds of cause, being, as Tacitus says, greedy of danger for its own sake*. These men are of a temper which does not lie within the proper limits of humanity, of a ferine nature. So Seneca, *On Clemency*, says, it is not mere cruelty but a ferine disposition, which delights in human blood and butchery. So Aristotle says that that is a sanguinary character, which makes a man break with his friends for the sake of fighting and shedding blood; and Dio Prusæensis says it is mere madness. So Seneca, Epist. xiv.

III. 1 However, most parties, when they go to war, have impelling causes, either with or without justifying causes. There are some who frankly do not trouble themselves about justificatory causes; to whom we may apply the maxim of the Roman jurists, that he who, when he is asked by what claim he possesses a thing, can assign no other than that he does possess it, is a robber. Aristotle speaks of those who give no care to the question whether it is just to enslave unoffending neighbours.

2 Such a man was Brennus, who said that everything belonged to the stronger: such is Annibal in Silius, whose *sword is the measure of right and justice:* such Attila; and those who say, as in Seneca, *Our thought the fortune not the cause of war;* or as in Lucan, *This day will make the conquered part the guilty;* or as in Tacitus, that *In the highest fortune what is strongest is most just.* Yet as Augustine says, *To make war on unoffending neighbours and to harass and subjugate them out of mere love of honour, what name does it deserve, except that of a huge robbery?* Of such wars, Velleius says they are wars *not entered into for justice, but for gain.* So Cicero says that *Courage without justice not only is not a part of virtue, but is an inhuman extravagance.* And Andronicus Rhodius speaks to the same effect.

IV. Other parties, in going to war, allege justificatory causes, which, when brought to the standard of right reason, turn out unjust; and then it appears, as Livy says, that what is aimed at is, not a trial of right, but of strength. Most kings, says Plutarch, use the two names, *peace* and *war*, only as coins, to procure, not what is just, but what is expedient. What are unjust causes, may be known in some measure from the just causes which we have been explaining: the straight line is the index of what is oblique. But for the sake of perspicuity we shall make some general remarks.

V. 1 That fear from a neighbouring power is not a sufficient cause, we have said above. For, that defense may be just, it must be necessary; and it cannot be this, except there be clear evidence, not only of the power, but of the *animus* of the party; and such evidence as amounts to moral certainty.

2 Hence we can by no means approve the opinion of those who hold it to be a just cause of war, if a neighbour, being prevented therefrom by no pact, establish a fortress on his own ground, or any other munition of war, which may possibly at some time be mischievous to us. For the proper remedies against such fears are opposing munitions, and the like, not force of arms. Therefore unjust were the wars of the Romans against Philip of Macedon, and of Lysimachus against Demetrius, except there were some other reason. I am much pleased with what Tacitus says of the Chauci: *The most noble people among the Germans, and a people that prefers to secure its greatness by its justice; not greedy, not passionate, but quiet and retired. They provoke no wars, they practise no robbery or plunder of their neighbours; and the great proof of their virtue and their strength is, that it is not by wrong-doing that they preserve their superiority. Yet they can promptly use arms, and if need be, raise armies: they are numerous in infantry and cavalry, and retain their reputation even in inaction.*

VI. Nor does utility generate a right, in the way in which necessity does.

VII. Thus when there is no want of opportunity of marriage, any marriage denied cannot supply a cause for war; though Hercules formerly took occasion to make war on Eurytus on such grounds, and Darius on the Scythians.

VIII. Neither is the desire of migrating from one place to another a just ground of war; that a nation leaving marshes and deserts, may become possessed of a more fertile soil; which Tacitus mentions as the reason of making war among the old Germans.

IX. It is no less unjust to claim lands on the ground of having discovered them, when they are occupied by another, even though the possessors be bad men, with wrong notions of God, and dull intellects. For those lands only can be discovered which belong to nobody.

X. 1 Nor is there required for ownership [to exclude such claim] either moral virtue, or religion, or perfection of intellect: except that this may, it would seem, be defended; that if there be any people altogether destitute of the use of reason, such may not have ownership, but out of charity those things ought to be given them only which are necessary to life. For what we have said above, concerning the sustentation of ownership, which the law of nations performs for infants, and persons out of their mind, pertains to those peoples with whom others have an intercourse of pacts; and if there be any people altogether irrational, they are not such: but I much doubt the fact.

2 Therefore it was unjust on the part of the Greeks to say, that the Barbarians were their natural enemies, merely on account of the diversity of manners, or because they seemed to be inferior in intellect.

XI. Nor again can we say of the liberty, either of individuals, or of cities, or states, (that is, *autonomy* or self-government,) that it is either by natural law, and at all times, an attribute of all, or that in the cases in which it is, it furnishes just ground for war. For when we say that liberty by nature belongs to men or to peoples, we are to understand that, of a natural right preceding all human pacts; and of liberty by negation of slavery, not of liberty in opposition to slavery;

so that man is not a slave by nature, but he is not by nature a creature that cannot be a slave. For in this latter sense, no one is free. And to this view pertains what is said by Albutius, that *No one is born free, and no one is born a slave;* these names came afterwards to belong to men by their fortune. So Aristotle says, that it is a result of law that one man is free, another a slave. Therefore they who have, by a legitimate course, come into slavery, either personal or civil, ought to be content with their condition; as St Paul teaches, *Art thou called being a servant? Care not for it.* 1 Cor. vii. 21.

XII. Nor is it less unjust to wish to subjugate any by arms, as being worthy to be slaves, or as philosophers sometimes speak, naturally slaves. For even if there be anything which is fit for me, it does not follow that any one has a right to impose it on me by force. For those who have the use of reason, ought to have a free election left them of what is useful to them and what is not, except another have a right over them.

XIII. 1 It would hardly be necessary to notice that the title given by some to the Roman Emperor is absurd, as if he had the right of ruling over the most remote and hitherto unknown peoples; except Bartolus, who was long held the prince of jurists, had ventured to pronounce every one a heretic who denies it; namely, because he sometimes calls himself the Lord of the World;

Nor should any one be moved by the argument of Dante, in which he tries to prove that such a right belongs to the emperor, because it is for the advantage of the human race. For the advantages which he adduces are outbalanced by disadvantages. For as a ship may be so large that it cannot be steered, so the number of subjects and the distance of places may be so great that they cannot subsist under one government.

2 But even if we grant that such a government is expedient, there does not follow any right of empire, for that can arise only from consent or from punishment.

XIV. 1 There have also been persons who have asserted the right of the Church, even over the peoples who occupy the hitherto unknown parts of the earth. And yet St Paul plainly says, that he does not judge those who are outside the boundary of Christianity. *What have I to do to judge them that are without?* 1 Cor. v. 12. And the right of judging which pertained to the Apostles, though in its own way it pertained to the things of earth, yet was, as I may say, of a heavenly not of an earthly character; it was to be exercised, not by arms or by scourges, but by the word of God generally set forth,

4 Whether Christian kings may make war on kings who reject Christianity, on that ground, as a punishment, we have sufficiently discussed above.

XV. I will also give a warning not superfluous, but because, comparing old speculations with new, I foresee a great evil if it be not averted. A just cause of war cannot be derived from any explanation of the divine prophecies. For besides that unfulfilled prophecies can hardly be interpreted with certainty without the spirit of prophecy, even if the events are certain, we may be wrong as to the time. And lastly, the prediction, except there be an absolute command of God, gives no right, since the events which are predicted by God are often brought to pass by wicked men or wicked actions.

XVI. This also must be observed; that if any one has a claim upon him, which is not a claim of justice, but of some other virtue, as liberality, kindness, mercy, charity; as this claim cannot be prosecuted in a court of justice, so also it cannot be asserted by arms. For neither the one nor the other of these can be resorted to, in order that what is demanded may be done for a moral reason: it is requisite besides, that there be in us some right to that very thing: which right sometimes divine and human laws give with respect to the claims which rest upon other virtues [than justice]; and when this happens, then there is introduced a new reason of obligation, and the matter belongs to justice. When that is wanting, the war is unjust for that reason: as was, for instance, the war of the Romans against the king of Cyprus, because he was ungrateful. For he who has bestowed a benefit has no *right* to require a return: if he had, it would be a contract, not a benefit.

XVII. 1 We must remark also that this often happens; that there is a just cause really existing for the war, but that the putting it in action becomes vicious from the intention of the agent: either because something else, not in itself unlawful, incites him more than the right, as for instance, the desire of honour, or some advantage, public or private, which is expected from the war, distinct from the justificatory cause; or because there is introduced some affection plainly unlawful, as a pleasure in doing mischief to another without respect of good. So Aristides says that the Phoceans were deservedly destroyed; but that Philip was not in the right when he destroyed them, as not being really in earnest in defense of religion, but seeking to increase his empire.

2 *An eminent and ancient cause of war,* says Sallust, *is a deep-seated desire of empire and of wealth.* So Tacitus, *Gold and riches, a principal cause of war.* And so in Seneca's tragedy of the *Hippolytus.* And so Augustine.

3 But these causes, in which a justifying cause of the war is not wanting, do indeed imply a fault in him who makes the war; but yet the war itself is not thereby unjust: and, therefore, for such a war, no restitution is due.

Chapter XXIII. *Of Doubtful Causes of War.*

I. What Aristotle wrote is most true, that certainty is not to be found in morals as it is in mathematics: . . .

Thus between that which ought to be done, and that which is entirely unlawful, there is a medium which is allowable, nearer sometimes to the one, and sometimes to the other: whence an ambiguity often takes place, like twilight between day and night, or cold water gradually heated.

. . . . . .

2 It often happens that the judgment does not pronounce a certain decision, but hesitates: and if this hesitation cannot be cleared off by an attentive consideration, Cicero's rule must be followed; those advise well who direct you not to do anything of which you doubt whether it is just or unjust: and so the Hebrew masters say, *Abstain from doubtful things.*

VI. War is a very weighty matter, being a thing from which great calamities fall upon the innocent. Therefore when opinions are balanced, peace must have the preference. So Silius Italicus praises Fabius.

But there are three ways in which controversies may be prevented from breaking out into war.

VII. 1 The first is, Conference. *There are two ways of settling disputed questions,* says Cicero; *one by discussion, the other by force: and the first being the character of man, the second of brutes, we are to have recourse to the latter, only if the former fails.*

VIII. 1 Another way is Compromise, or Arbitration, between parties who have no common judge. As Thucydides says, It is wicked to proceed against him as a wrong doer, who is ready to refer the question to an arbitrator.

IX. The third way is by Lot; which method is commended for this purpose by Dio Chrysostom, and much earlier by Solomon, Prov. xviii. 18. [*The lot causeth contentions to cease, and parteth between the mighty.*]

CHAPTER I. *General Rules as to what is lawful in War by Natural Law; and herein of deceit and falsehood [in War.]*

I. We have seen who may carry on war, and from what causes they may do it lawfully. It follows that we consider what is lawful in war, and to what extent; and this is to be considered either nakedly, or as depending on antecedent promise: and nakedly, first by Natural Law, and next by the Law of Nations. Let us then see what is allowed by Natural Law.

II. 1 First, as we have already repeatedly said, the means which lead to an end in a moral matter receive their intrinsic value from the end: wherefore the steps that are necessary [to a lawful end], *necessity* being taken not in physical exactness but morally, we have a right to use. By Right, I mean Right taken strictly, such as implies a competence to act in respect of society alone. Wherefore, if I cannot otherwise preserve my life, I may, by any force which I can use, repel him who assails it, even if he be without fault; as we have elsewhere noted: because this right does not properly arise from the fault of another, but from the right which nature gives me for my own preservation.

2 Further, I may take possession of a thing belonging to another, from which a certain danger impends over me, without consideration of another's fault: not however so as to become the owner of it, (for that is not a step suitable to the end,) but to keep it till sufficient provision is made for my security: which question we have also elsewhere treated. So by Natural Law I have a right to take from another a thing of mine which he detains; and if that is too difficult, another thing of the same value: and the like I may do for the sake of recovering a debt: and in this case my ownership also is consequent, because the equality which has been disturbed cannot be restored in any other way.

3 So also when punishment is just, all force is just without which punishment cannot be attained: and every thing which is part of the punishment, as the destruction of property by burning or otherwise; that is, within just limits, corresponding to the offense.

III. It is to be noted in the second place, that these rights are not only to be regarded with reference to the origin of the war, but also with reference to causes *subnascent*, that is, growing up during the progress of the war: as also in civil suits, after the point in dispute is dealt with, there often arises a new right to the party. Thus those who join themselves to the party which attacks me, whether as allies or as subjects, give me a right of defending myself against them. So again those who mingle themselves in a war which is unjust, especially if they may know and ought to know that it is unjust, become bound to make good the expense and damage, because they occasion damage with fault. Thus too, those who join in a war undertaken without a plausible reason, incur the desert of punishment, in proportion to the injustice which belongs to their act. So Plato approves a war carried on *till those who are guilty are compelled to undergo penalties to the satisfaction of the innocent who suffer by it.*

IV. 1 It is to be observed in the third place, that upon the right of thus acting, many consequences follow indirectly and extraneously to the intent of the actor, to which of themselves he would not have a right. How this holds in self-defense we have elsewhere explained. Thus in order to recover what is ours, if we cannot take exactly so much, we have a right to take more; under the obligation however of restoring the excess of value. Thus a ship occupied by pirates, or a house by robbers, may be battered to pieces, although there may be in the ship or in the house a few infants or women, or other innocent persons who may thus be put in danger. *He is not guilty of the death of another,* says Augustine, *who has walled round his own possessions, if any one be injured or killed by the wall falling.*

2 But as we have often warned the reader, that which is agreeable to strict right is not always lawful in all respects: for often goodwill to our neighbour does not permit use to use rigorous rights. Wherefore the events which take place extraneously to our intent, and which we see to be likely, are to be provided against, except the good to which our action tends be much greater than the evil which is apprehended; or except, the good and the evil being equal, the hope of the good is much greater than the fear of the evil; a point which is to be left to the decision of prudence; with the caution that we are always, in a doubtful case, to regard the interest of others rather than our own, as the safer course.

From these general rules we may see what is lawful against an enemy by Natural Law.

V. 1 But the question often arises, what is lawful against those who are not enemies, or will not allow themselves to be so called, but who provide our enemies with supplies of various kinds. This has been a point sharply contested, both anciently and recently; one party defending the rigorous rights of war, the other, the freedom of commerce.

2 In the first place, we must make a distinction as to the things supplied. For there are some articles of supply which are useful in war only, as arms; others which are of no use in war, but are only luxuries; others which are useful both in war, and out of war, as money, provisions, ships and their furniture. In matters of the first kind, that is true which Amalasuintha said to Justinian, that they are of the party of the enemy who supply him with what is necessary in war. The second class of objects is not a matter of complaint. So Seneca says that he would do kindnesses even to a tyrant, if the service so rendered neither gave him greater power for the common mischief, nor confirmed the power which he had, but was only what might be given him without any public evil.

3 In the third class, objects of ambiguous use, the state of the war is to be considered. For if I cannot defend myself except by intercepting what is sent, necessity, as elsewhere explained, gives us a right to intercept it, but under the obligation of restitution, except there be cause to the contrary. If the supplies sent impede the exaction of my rights, and if he who sends them may know this; as if I were besieging a town, or blockading a port, and if surrender or peace were expected; he will be bound to me for damages; as a person would who liberates my debtor from prison, or assists his flight to my injury; and to the extent of the damage, his property may be taken, and ownership thereof be assumed for the sake of recovering my debt. If he have not yet caused damage, but have tried to cause it, I shall have a right, by the retention of his property, to compel him to give security for the future, by hostages, pledges, or in some other way.

VI. 1 As to the mode of acting in war, force and terror are the appropriate means. Whether it is allowable to use stratagem also, is a common question. It is assumed that it is, by Homer, Pindar, Virgil, Solon, Silius. [See the passages quoted.]

3 The Roman Jurists call it good deceit (*bonus dolus*) which a man practises against an enemy, and say that it makes no difference whether any one elude the enemy by force or by fraud. So Eustathius. Among the Theologians, Augustine says the same; and Chrysostom, that the generals who had conquered by deceit were most praised.

4 But there are not wanting opinions which bear the other way, of which we will adduce some. The determination of this question depends on this, whether deceit in its kind be always a bad thing:

VII. It is to be noted, therefore, that deceit may be of two kinds, as it consists in a negative or in a positive act. I extend the term *deceit* to acts of a negative kind, on the authority of Labeo, who refers the act to deceit not evil, when any one by dissimulation

defends his own or another's goods. Undoubtedly Cicero spoke too generally, when he said that simulation and dissimulation are to be entirely removed from our scheme of life. For since we are not bound to disclose to others all that we know or all that we wish, it follows that we may dissemble, that is, conceal and keep secret, some things from some persons. As Augustine says, *It is lawful to conceal in prudence the truth under a certain dissimulation.*

VIII. 1 Deceit which consists in a positive act, if it be perpetrated by things, is called *simulation*, if by words, a *lie*. Some lay down this distinction between these two, that they say that words are naturally the signs of notions, but that things are not so. But the contrary is true, that words, by nature, and extraneously to the will of man, have no signification; except inarticulate sounds, as of grief; which, however, may rather be called actions than words.

XVII. 1 What learned men commonly lay down, goes further than what we have said;—namely, that we may utter falsehoods to an enemy. Thus to the rule *not to lie*, an exception, *unless to an enemy*, is added by Plato, Xenophon, Philo among the Jews, Chrysostom among the Christians. And to this case you may refer the promise of the men of Jabesh (1 Sam. xi. 10), that they would come out on the morrow; and the act of Elisha when he misled his pursuers (2 Kings vi. 19); and the saying of Valerius Lævinus who boasted that he had killed Pyrrhus.

2 To the third, fourth and fifth of the preceding remarks belongs a passage of Eustratius on Aristotle's Ethics. And Quintilian says, that a lie to prevent a murder, or the destruction of one's country, though at other times a thing blameable in a slave, is then commendable in a free man.

3 These doctrines are not approved of by the school of Theologians of more recent times, who have followed Augustine almost exclusively in all points. But this same school allows of tacit interpretations, which are so repugnant to common usage, that we may doubt whether it would not be better to admit false speaking towards some parties, in the cases of which we have spoken, or some of them, (for I do not here pretend to give accurate rules), rather than thus make such indiscriminate exceptions as to *what is* false speaking: thus when they say, *I do not know*, they hold that it may mean, *I do not know that I shall tell you;* when they say, *I have not*, they hold that it may mean, *I have not to give to you;* and others of this kind, which the common sense of mankind repudiates; and which, if they are admitted, there is no reason why he who affirms may not be held to deny, and he who denies to affirm.

XVIII. But it is to be observed that what we have said of false speaking in assertory discourses, applied so that it can damage none except a public enemy, is not to be referred to promissory declarations. For from a promise, as we have partly said, a new and special right is conferred on him to whom the promise is made; and this holds even between enemies, without any exception as to hostility existing at the moment; and not only in express promises, but also in tacit ones, as we shall shew in speaking of parley, when we come to that part which concerns the keeping of faith in war.

Chapter VII. *Of the Right over Prisoners of War.*

I. 1 By nature, that is, in the primeval state of nature, and without the act of man, no men are slaves, as we have elsewhere said; and in this sense we may assent to what the jurists say, that slavery is against nature. But that slavery should have its origin in human act, that is, in convention or delict, is not repugnant to natural justice, as we have also shewn.

2 But by the laws of nations, of which we now speak, slavery is more comprehensive, both as to persons, and effects. For, if we regard the persons, it is not those only who surrender themselves, or promise slavery, who are reckoned slaves; but all persons whatever who are taken in a regular war, as soon as they are brought *intra præsidia*, as Pomponius says. Nor is delict requisite; the lot of all is alike: even of those, as we have said, who by their destiny are found within the enemies' boundaries when war breaks out.

3 So Polybius says, *What punishment have these justly incurred? some one may say, when he sees men sold with their wives and children, when they have been conquered in war. These calamities are by the laws of war to be borne by those who have done no wrong.* And hence, as Philo notes, *many good men have, by various misfortunes, lost the liberty to which they were born.*

II. And not only do they themselves become slaves, but their posterity for ever; that is, those who are born of a slave-mother in slavery. And this is what Martianus says, that by the Law of Nations, those are born our slaves, who are born of our slave-servants. The womb was subjected to slavery, says Tacitus, speaking of the wife of a German leader: [Arminius, whose wife was pregnant when she came into the power of the Romans. *Gronov.*]

III. 1 The effects of this right are unlimited, so that the master may do any thing lawfully to the slave, as Seneca says. There is no suffering which may not be inflicted on such slaves with impunity; no act which may not in any manner be commanded or extorted; so that even cruelty in the masters, towards persons of servile condition, is unpunished; except so far as the Civil Law imposes limits and punishments for cruelty. *In all nations alike*, says Caius, *we may see that the masters have the power of life and death over slaves.* He adds afterwards, that by the Roman Law, limits were set to this power, that is, on Roman ground. So Donatus on Terence, *What is not lawful from a master to a slave?*

2 And all the property which is taken becomes the right of the master, along with the person. The slave who is under the power of another, can have nothing of his own, says Justinian.

IV. Hence the opinion is refuted, or at least restricted, of those who say that incorporeal things are not acquired by right of war.

V. 1 All these powers are introduced by the Laws of Nations for no other cause than this; that the captors, induced by so many advantages, may willingly abstain from the extreme rigour by which they were allowed to put captives to death, either immediately or after any delay, as we have said. *They are called servi*, says Pomponius, *because the conquerors commonly sell them, and so preserve them from being killed.* I have said that they may *willingly* abstain: for it is not a compact by which they are compelled to abstain, if you look at the Laws of Nations; but a mode of persuading them to adopt a more useful course.

2 For the same reason, this right is allowed to be transferred to others, like the ownership of things. And this right is extended so as to apply to the offspring, on this account; that otherwise, if the captors had used their extreme right, they would never have been born.

VI. 1 But what some theologians hold, that they who are captured in an unjust war, or born of such captives, have no moral right to escape, except to their own people, I do not hesitate to pronounce a mistake.

Chapter XXV. *The Conclusion, with admonitions to Good Faith and Peace.*

I. 1 And here I think that I may make an end; not that I have said all that might be said, but that enough has been said to lay the foundations; on which, if any one will erect a fairer superstructure, he will be so far from being the object of any grudging on my part, that I shall be grateful to him. Only before I dismiss the reader, as when I spoke of undertaking a war, I added admonitions on the duty of avoiding war as much as possible, so now I will add a few admonitions which may tend in war, and after war, to the preservation of good faith and peace; and of good faith, both on other accounts, and that the hope of peace may not be destroyed. For not only is each commonwealth kept together by good faith, as Cicero says, but that greater society of which nations are the members. If Faith be taken away, as Aristotle says, *the intercourse of men is abolished.*

2 Therefore Cicero rightly says, that it is atrocious to break that faith which holds life together; *the holiest good of the human heart,* as Seneca speaks. And this, the supreme rulers of mankind ought to be more careful of preserving, in proportion as they have more impunity for their violations of it: so that if faith be taken away, they will be like wild beasts, whose strength is an object of general horror. And in other parts of its sphere, justice has often somewhat that is obscure; but the bond of good faith is manifest of itself, and indeed is used to remove obscurity from all other matters.

3 And therefore it is especially the office of kings, to cherish good faith; first, for the sake of conscience, and then, for the sake of good opinion, by which the authority of kingdoms stands. Let them be certain therefore that they who instil into them acts of deceit, are themselves the deceivers they would make *them.* Doctrines cannot long work well, which make man unfit for society with man; and we may add, hateful to God.

II. In the next place, a mind serene and trusting in God cannot be retained in the whole administration of a war, except it always look to peace. As Sallust most truly says, *Wise men carry on war for the sake of peace:* and to this the opinion of Augustine agrees; and of Aristotle. It is a ferine force which is prominent in war; and must be tempered with humanity, that we may not cease to be men, by imitating brutes.

III. If therefore a peace sufficiently safe can be had, it is not ill secured by the condonation of offenses, and damages, and expenses: especially among Christians, to whom the Lord has given his peace as his legacy. And so St Paul, his best interpreter, exhorts us to live at peace with all men. As Sallust says, A good man takes up the beginning of war reluctantly, and does not follow its extremes willingly.

IV. This of itself ought to be enough; but often human Utility draws men the same way: those first who are the weakest; for a long struggle with a more powerful adversary is perilous; and as in a ship, we must avert a greater calamity by some loss, putting away anger and hope, fallacious advisers, as Livy says. So Aristotle.

V. But also this is for the benefit of the stronger: for as Livy also says, To them peace, if they grant it, is bounteous and creditable, and better than a victory merely hoped for. For they must recollect that Mars is on both sides. So Aristotle. And so in the oration for peace in Diodorus. And there is much to be feared from the courage of despair, like the dying bites of a wild beast.

VI. If the two parties reckon themselves equal, then, as Cæsar holds, is the best time for treating of peace, since each trusts in himself.

VII. Peace made on any conditions whatever is, by all means, to be kept, on account of the sacredness of good faith, of which we speak; and care must be had to avoid, not only perfidy, but anything which may exasperate the mind of the other party. For what Cicero says of private friendships, you may adapt also to public ones; that as all such connexions are to be maintained with the utmost conscience and good faith, so especially those in which a reconciliation has taken place of a previous enmity.

VIII. May God write these lessons—He who alone can—on the hearts of all those who have the affairs of Christendom in their hands: and may he give to those persons a mind fitted to understand and to respect Rights, divine and human; and lead them to recollect always that the ministration committed to them is no less than this; —that they are the governors of Man, a creature most dear to God!

Thomas Hobbes was born prematurely in 1588 when his mother heard that the Spanish Armada, organized by Catholic Spain to invade and overthrow the Protestant Queen Elizabeth I, was approaching England. He later jested that "fear and I were born twins", and indeed the emphasis given to fear of violence and the need for security in his theory of the basis of civil society lends import to his jest. He was brought up by a wealthy uncle who took his education very seriously, sending him to Magdalen College, Oxford at the age of 14. On graduating in 1608, Hobbes was employed as tutor to the son of William Cavendish, Earl of Devonshire. This gave him an excellent library to work from, entrees to important people and opportunities to travel. Later on, 1646, he was briefly the tutor in mathematics to the future King Charles II, who had just fled to Paris. Thus Hobbes' political associations were conservative and his loyalties were strongly attached to the Monarchy. But as we shall see, his philosophy was modern and radically materialistic in tone.

In his first journey to the Continent in 1610 Hobbes became acquainted with the work of Kepler and Galileo. On his return to England he had several meetings with Francis Bacon. From these sources he acquired a contempt for Aristotelianism and a resolution to pursue a life of learning. He read Thucydides and translated it into English thinking it would show, through the defeat of the Athenians, the dangers of democracy. On his second trip to the Continent, in 1629, he learned about geometry, and wondered whether his somewhat cynical views of human nature - now reinforced by having read Machiavelli - might not serve as axioms or postulates from which a political theory might be derived. On his third trip to the Continent (1634-37) he became acquainted with Pierre Gassendi, one of the founders of the new materialism who later became a firm friend, and visited with Galileo, the father of modern physics, in Italy. He returned to England with the outlines of a philosophical system within which the justification of a monarchical form of government would be based on a materialistic account of the nature of man rather than on claims of divine right. His first effort in this direction was a manuscript entitled Elements of Law which was circulated, but not published, in 1640. His mechanistic psychology, from which he derived both motivations and concepts of good and bad, was materialistic; but his conclusions about the proper form of government were absolutistic and monarchical. The conclusions were not viewed with favor by the proponents of parliamentary rule who were engaged in a continuous struggle against the absolutist claims of Charles I. When the parliamentarians impeached the Earl of Stafford, one of Charles' chief advisers (they later had him executed), Hobbes fled to Paris in fear for his life. The next years, between 1640 and 1651 when he returned to England, were the most productive of his life. In was in this period that he tutored the future Charles II, published De Cive (part II of Elements of Law expanded) in 1642, wrote a book on optics, and composed The Leviathan from which the selections which follow were taken. Meanwhile in England, the puritan anti-royalists, led militarily by Oliver Cromwell, had defeated King Charles I's forces in 1649 and had had the king beheaded. When Hobbes returned to England in 1651 his Leviathan was timely since it advocated a single sovereign with absolute rights based on a compact between the subjects; the question of the appropriate form of government was a a matter of lively discussion. In 1653 Cromwell dismissed parliament and set up his own dictatorship, called The Protectorate. With restoration of the monarchy in 1660 Hobbes enjoyed the favor (and a pension) of his erstwhile pupil Charles II. He remained active until he was ninety and died in 1679.

The selections from The Leviathan which follow are important for Hobbes' emphasis on a) the equality of all men in a state of nature, b) laws or rights derived from man's primary motives of self-preservation and advantage, c) the concept of "Warre" as a state of nature which is dangerous to self-interest while "Peace" is a state in which men are kept in line by an absolute sovereign power, d)the non-existence of Justice, or Right or Wrong apart from such a government, e) the central role of compacts in his political theory. In Chapter XX Hobbes argues that government by conquest or victory in war (and consequent slavery) is justified by the same principles which justify "instituted" (by agreement) rule. Yet in Ch XXI he lets the right of self-preservation justify resistance to military service.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the NATURALL CONDITION *of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery.*

NAture hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.

Men by nature Equall.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in [61] those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.

From Equality proceeds Diffidence.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

From Diffidence Warre.

Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. [62]

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of *Time*, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Out of Civil States, there is alwayes Warre *of every one against every one.*

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

The Incommodities of such a War.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knowes there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries

shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them: which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it. [63]

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of *America*, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.

In such a Warre, nothing is Unjust.

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre, the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no *Mine* and *Thine* distinct; but onely that to be every mans, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions that encline men to Peace.

The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters. [64]

CHAP. XIV.

Of the first and second NATURALL LAWES, *and of* CONTRACTS.

THe RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call *Jus Naturale*, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

Right of Nature what.

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.

Liberty what.

A LAW OF NATURE, *(Lex Naturalis,)* is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound *Jus*, and *Lex*, *Right* and *Law*; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

A Law of Nature what.

Difference of Right and Law.

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, *That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.* The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, *to seek Peace, and follow it.* The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, *By all means we can, to defend our selves.*

Naturally every man has Right to every thing.

The Fundamentall Law of Nature.

From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; *That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and* [65] *defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe.* For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre. But if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the Gospell; *Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.*

The se[c]ond Law of Nature.

CHAP. XV.

Of other Lawes of Nature.

FRom that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there followeth a Third; which is this, *That men performe their Covenants made:* without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre.

The third Law of Nature, Justice.

And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is *Unjust:* And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than *the not Performance of Covenant.* And whatsoever is not Unjust, is *Just.*

Justice and Injustice what.

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The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall; For Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.

The Laws of Nature are Eternal;

The [same] Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.

And yet Easie.

And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy For Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is *Good*, and *Evill*, in the conversation, and Society of man-kind. *Good*, and *Evill*, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: [80] From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long a man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: And consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are *Justice*, *Gratitude*, *Modesty*, *Equity*, *Mercy*, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, *Morall Vertues*; and their contrarie *Vices*, Evill. Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie.

The Science of these Lawes, is the true Morall Philosophy.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a COMMON-WEALTH.

THe finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of those Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

The End of Common-wealth, particular Security:

Chap. 13.

For the Lawes of Nature (as *Justice*, *Equity*, *Modesty*, *Mercy*, and (in summe) *doing to others, as wee would be done to,*) of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.

Which is not to be had from the Law of Nature:

* * * * *

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, *I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or. to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.* This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that *Mortall God*, to which wee owe under the *Immortall God*, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength [88] conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is *One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.*

The Generation of a Common-wealth.

The Definition of a Common-wealth.

And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have *Soveraigne Power*; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

Soveraigne, and Subject, what.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the RIGHTS *of Soveraignes by Institution.*

A *Common-wealth* is said to be *Instituted*, when a *Multitude* of men do Agree, and *Covenant, every one, with every one,* that to whatsoever *Man*, or *Assembly of Men*, shall be given by the major part, the *Right* to *Present* the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their *Representative*;) every one, as well he that *Voted for it*, as he that *Voted against it*, shall *Authorise* all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

The Act of Instituting a Common-wealth, what.

The Consequences to such Institution, are

1. The Subjects cannot change the forme of government.

From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the *Rights*, and *Facultyes* of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former Covenant to any thing epugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission.

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And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

2. Soveraigne Power cannot be forfeited.

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection.

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6. The Soveraigne is judge of what is necessary for the Peace and Defence of his Subjects.

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home, and [91] Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same.

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9. And of making War, and Peace, as he shall think best:

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expences thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the *Militia*, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.

CHAP. XX.

Of Dominion PATERNALL, *and* DESPOTICALL.

A *Common-wealth by Acquisition*, is that, where the Soveraign Power is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force when men singly, or many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all the [102] actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his Power.

A Common wealth by Acquisition.

And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if it were true, no man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged to Obedience. It is true, that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised.

Wherein different from a Common-wealth by Institution.

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Despoticall Dominion how attained.

Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Δεσπότης, which signifieth a *Lord*, or *Master*; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the [104] Vanquished, to avoyd the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word *Servant* (whether it be derived from *Servire*, to Serve, or from *Servare*, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.

Not by the Victory, but by the Consent of the Vanquished.

It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he commeth in, and Submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor obliged

by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit.

And that which men do, when they demand (as it is now called) *Quarter*, (which the Greeks called *Ζωγρία, taking alive,*) is to evade the present fury of the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome, or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in security, and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.

The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.

In summe, the Rights and Consequences of both *Paternall* and *Despoticall* Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the LIBERTY *of Subjects.*

LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irrationall, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall. *Liberty what.*

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Liberty of Subjects how to be measured.

To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign.

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Subjects have Liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawfully invade them;

First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd. Therefore,

If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other [112] thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey. *Are not bound to hurt themselves;*

If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority concerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in these words, *I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions*; in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to *kill me*, I am not bound to kill my selfe when he commands me. 'Tis one thing to say, *Kill me, or my fellow, if you please*; another thing to say, *I will kill my selfe, or my fellow.* It followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.

Nor to warfare, unlesse they voluntarily undertake it.

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse without Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the Guil-[113]ty man may as well do, as the Innocent.

John Locke was born into a Puritan family in Somerset shire in 1632. His father was an attorney who fought as a captain in the parliamentary armies against Charles I in the first Civil War (1642-46). He was a schoolboy in Westminister School when Charles I was beheaded in 1649. As a student at Oxford, Christ Church College, from 1652 to 1656 when he earned a B.A. in medecine, he saw Oliver Cromwell ascend to the Protectorate. Although he inherited some property (several farms and a small mine) when his father died in 1661, and although he spent much of his life as a confidant and consultant to prominent government leaders, he was by choice an academic, and held positions as student, lecturer and don at Christ Church,Oxford until 1684 when he was removed by the partisans of James II for political reasons. In 1667 he was invited by Anthony Ashley Cooper, later the Earl of Shaftesbury, to live in the latter's family as personal physician. Locke became much more than that, serving as confidant, advisor, and in several admistrative positions for Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury was rich and politically powerful, first a supporter of the King, then of Parliament, then after Cromwell's rise an architect of the restoration of Charles II for whom he was Lord Chancellor, and finally as a plotter against the dictatorial James I followed by his exile and death in Holland in1682-3. Locke was deeply involved in these activities and a factor in the "Glorius Revolution" which brought William III and Mary II to the throne, and with them an era of parliamentary government and toleration. Locke was also a confidant of Lord Somer, chief figure until 1700 in William's government. He died, famous and influential, in 1704. He is known today as one of the great English philosophers. His Essay Concerning the the Human Understanding (1689) is one of the classics of empiricist philosophy. The second of his Two Treatises of Government, published anonymously in 1890, is the source of the selections which follow.

In the first three pages of our selections, we have the main tenets of Locke's theory of the origin, extent and end of civil government. Like Hobbes, he begins with a discussion of a State of Nature in which all men are equal. But unlike Hobbes, he does not equate the state of nature with a state of war; he maintains that the Law of Nature, disclosed by reason, includes not only the right of self-preservation, but also an obligation to preserve the rights of other men to life, liberty and goods, unless to do justice to an offender. This includes a natural right of each man to own such property as "he hath mixed his labour with". Like Hobbes, Locke suggests that civil government begins with a compact among men to give up certain rights. But unlike Hobbes, these rights are not given up to an absolute monarch (which would be "inconsistent with civil society"). Rather, he distinguishes three functions of government - legislative, judicial and executive - and makes the legislative function supreme over the other two, with all civil government justified only the consent of the governed. The rights given up are only 1) the right to do what one thinks is best for oneself and mankind, which is given over to the legislature and through them to the executive, and 2) the right to punish offenders, which rest with the judiciary. These rights are not given up, as in Hobbes, to avoid the"nasty, brutish" state of war which is nature; rather they are given up to secure an even safer, more comfortable society than that of Locke's relatively benign state of Nature.

In his account of the origins and ends of government we find the roots of Locke's views about government gained by conquest in war, as well as his views on just and unjust wars, and rules of warfare (Ch XVI); we also see the grounds on which he sanctions resistance to tyranny (Ch XVIII) as well as the people's right to replace governments when powers are abused(Ch XIX). Locke's theory of government - equality of men, individual rights to life, liberty and property, government based on consent of the governed, and his specific enumeration of modes of abuse of power in such a context - surfaced in most significant ways in Jefferson's text of the American Declaration of Independence, and thus provided the theoretical groundwork for the modern epoch of history which has been dominated by the great free democracies.

CHAPTER II.

Of the State of Nature.

4. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure. And, being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

7. And that all men may be restrained from invading other's rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. For the law of Nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain if there were nobody that in the state of Nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders; and if any one in the state of Nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.

8. And thus, in the state of Nature, one man comes by a power over another, but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint. For these two are the only reasons why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of Nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security, and so he becomes dangerous to mankind; the tie which is to secure them from injury and violence being slighted and broken by him, which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of Nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and, by his example, others from doing the like mischief. And in this case, and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of Nature.

CHAPTER III.

Of the State of War.

16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction; and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but sedate, settled design upon another man's life puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction; for by the fundamental law of Nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred, and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion, because they are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as a beast of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.

19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of Nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant as a state of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation; and a state of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruction are one from another. Men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of Nature. But force, or a declared design of force upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war; and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, though he be in society and a fellow-subject.

CHAPTER V.

Of Property.

25. WHETHER we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink and such other things as Nature affords for their subsistence, or "revelation," which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah and his sons, it is very clear that God, as King David says (Psalm cxv. 16), "has given the earth to the children of men," given it to mankind in common. But, this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to have a property in anything, I will not content myself to answer, that, if it be difficult to make out "property" upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man but one universal monarch should have any "property" upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity; but I shall endeavour to show how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the commoners.

26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature, and nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state, yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial, to any particular men. The fruit or venison which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his—*i.e.*, a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it before it can do him any good for the support of his life.

27. Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a "property" in his own "person." This nobody has any right to but himself. The "labour" of his body and the "work" of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this "labour" being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.

28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. . . . it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state Nature leaves it in, which begins the property, without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus, the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut, and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property without the assignation or consent of anybody. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

CHAPTER VII.

Of Political or Civil Society.

87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of Nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property—that is, his life, liberty, and estate against the injuries and attempts of other men, but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto punish the offences of all those of that society, there, and there only, is political society where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it.

89. Wherever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society. . . . And wherever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of Nature.

90. And hence it is evident that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted for the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all. For the end of civil society being to avoid and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of Nature which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case by setting up a known authority to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey.* Wherever any persons are who have not such an authority to appeal to, and decide any difference between them there, those persons are still in the state of Nature. And so is every absolute prince in respect of those who are under his dominion.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of the Beginning of Political Societies.

95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of Nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.

97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact if he be left free and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of Nature.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.

123. If man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name—property.

124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.

Firstly, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.

125. Secondly: in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's.

126. Thirdly: in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.

127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society.

128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of Nature; by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society distinct from all other creatures, and were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other, no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and associate into lesser combinations. The other power a man has in the state of Nature is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular political society, and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.

129. The first power—viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of Nature.

130. Secondly. The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, which he might before employ in the execution of the law of Nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit, to assist the executive power of the society as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require, which is not only necessary but just, since the other members of the society do the like.

131. But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands of the society,

whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees, by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.

134. The great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society, the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power, as the first and fundamental natural law which is to govern even the legislative. Itself is the preservation of the society and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it. Nor can any edict of anybody else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed; for without this the law could not have that which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent of the society, over whom nobody can have a power to make laws* but by their own consent and by authority received from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts.

CHAPTER XVI.

Of Conquest.

175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on anything but the consent of the people, yet such has been the disorders ambition has filled the world with, that in the noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history of mankind, this consent is little taken notice of; and, therefore, many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government. But conquest is as far from setting up any government as demolishing a house is from building a new one in the place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth by destroying the former; but, without the consent of the people, can never erect a new one.

176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with another, and unjustly invades another man's right, can, by such an unjust war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by all men, who will not think that robbers and pirates have a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master, or that men are bound by promises which unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber break into my house, and, with a dagger at my throat, make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him, would this give him any title? Just such a title by his sword has an unjust conqueror who forces me into submission. The injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown or some petty villain. The title of the offender and the number of his followers make no difference in the offence, unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, great robbers punish little ones to keep them in their obedience; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs, because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world, and have the power in their own possession which should punish offenders. What is my remedy against a robber that so broke into my house? Appeal to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is denied, or I am crippled and cannot stir; robbed, and have not the means to do it. If God has taken away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my son, when able, may seek the relief of the law, which I am denied; he or his son may renew his appeal till he recover his right. But the conquered, or their children, have no court—no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did, to Heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors, which was to have such a legislative over them as the majority should approve and freely acquiesce in.

From whence it is plain that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered.

177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom.

First, it is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest, but must, at least, be as much free men as they were before. And most commonly they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with their leader, and enjoy a part of the spoil and other advantages that attend the conquering sword, or, at least, have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them.

179. Secondly, I say, then, the conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that unjust force that is used against him. For the people having given to their governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war (for they never had such a power in themselves), they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and injustice that is committed in an unjust war any farther than they actually abet it, no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use upon the people themselves or any part of their fellow-subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one than to the other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction, but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together; but yet this alters not the right; for the conqueror's power over the lives of the conquered being only because they have used force to do or maintain an injustice, he can have that power only over those who have concurred in that force; all the rest are innocent, and he has no more title over the people of that country who have done him no injury, and so have made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other who, without any injuries or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him.

180. Thirdly, the power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a just war is perfectly despotical; he has an absolute power over the lives of those who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have forfeited them, but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. This I doubt not but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world; there being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries than to say such an one conquered it, as if conquest, without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession. But when we consider that the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, is seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of the conquered not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the conquering swords.

183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side as could be supposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit; his life is at the victor's mercy, and his service and goods he may appropriate to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children, they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their shares in the estate he possessed. For example, I in the state of Nature (and all commonwealths are in the state of Nature one with another) have injured another man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it is come to a state of war wherein my defending by force what I had gotten unjustly makes me the aggressor. I am conquered; my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not my wife's and children's. They made not the war, nor assisted in it. I could not forfeit their lives, they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a share in my estate, that neither could I forfeit. And my children also, being born of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance. Here then is the case: The conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received, and the children have a title to their father's estate for their subsistence. For as to the wife's share, whether her own labour or compact gave her a title to it, it is plain her husband could not forfeit what was hers. What must be done in the case? I answer: The fundamental law of Nature being that all, as much as may be, should be preserved, it follows that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both—viz., for the conqueror's losses and children's maintenance, he that hath and to spare must remit something of his full satisfaction, and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish without it.

For the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land in any part of the world, where all the land is possessed, and none lies waste. And if I have not taken away the conqueror's land which, being vanquished, it is impossible I should, scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the value of mine, supposing it of an extent any way coming near what I had overrun of his, and equally cultivated too. The destruction of a year's product or two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can be done.

185. Over those, then, that joined with him in the war, and over those of the subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity even of those that did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his conquest, no right of dominion. They are free from any subjection to him, and if their former government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themselves.

186. The conqueror, it is true, usually by the force he has over them, compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his conditions, and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them; but the inquiry is, what right he has to do so? If it be said they submit by their own consent, then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains only to be considered whether promises, extorted by force, without right, can be thought consent, and how far they bind. To which I shall say, they bind not at all; because whatsoever another gets from me by force, I still retain the right of, and he is obliged presently to restore.

190. Every man is born with a double right. First, a right of freedom to his person, which no other man has a power over, but the free disposal of it lies in himself. Secondly, a right before any other man, to inherit, with his brethren, his father's goods.

196. The short of the case in conquest, is this: The conqueror, if he have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all that actually aided and concurred in the war against him, and a right to make up his damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the right of any other. Over the rest of the people, if there were any that consented not to the war, and over the children of the captives themselves or the possessions of either he has no power, and so can have, by virtue of conquest, no lawful title himself to dominion over them, or derive it to his posterity; but is an aggressor, and puts himself in a state of war against them,

222. The reasons why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; . . .
whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men against force and violence. Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society, and either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit), provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society.

CHAPTER XVII.

Of Usurpation.

197. As conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation is a kind of domestic conquest, with this difference—that an usurper can never have right on his side, it being no usurpation but where one is got into the possession of what another has right to. This, so far as it is usurpation, is a change only of persons, but not of the forms and rules of the government; for if the usurper extend his power beyond what, of right, belonged to the lawful princes or governors of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to usurpation.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Of Tyranny.

199. As usurpation is the exercise of power which another hath a right to, so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to; and this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private, separate advantage. When the governor, however entitled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule, and his commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.

202. Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command to compass that upon the subject which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate, and acting without authority may be opposed, as any other man who by force invades the right of another. This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority to seize my person in the street may be opposed as a thief and a robber if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant and such a legal authority as will empower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in the highest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable that the eldest brother, because he has the greatest part of his father's estate, should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brothers' portions? Or, that a rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason for rapine and oppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great aggravation of it. For the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great than a petty officer, no more justifiable in a king than a constable. But so much the worse in him as that he has more trust put in him, is supposed, from the advantage of education and counsellors to have better knowledge and less reason to do it, having already a greater share than the rest of his brethren.

203. May the commands, then, of a prince be opposed? May he be resisted, as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion.

204. To this I answer: That force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force. Whoever makes any opposition in any other case draws on himself a just condemnation, both from God and man; and so no such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested.

208. Fourthly: But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be maintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy, which is due by law, be by the same power obstructed, yet the right of resisting, even in such manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, disturb the government. For if it reach no farther than some private men's cases, though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them, yet the right to do so will not easily engage them in a contest wherein they are sure to perish; it being as impossible for one or a few oppressed men to disturb the government where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for a raving madman, or heady malcontent to overturn a well-settled state, the people being as little apt to follow the one as the other.

209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people, or if the mischief and oppression has light only on some few, but in such cases as the precedent and consequences seem to threaten all, and they are persuaded in their consciences that their laws, and with them, their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too, how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force used against them I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments whatsoever, when the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally suspected of their people, the most dangerous state they can possibly put themselves in; wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so easy to be avoided. It being as impossible for a governor, if he really means the good of his people, and the preservation of them and their laws together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family not to let his children see he loves and takes care of them.

210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and actions of another, arts used to elude the law, and the trust of prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince's hand to do good, not harm, to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it was given; if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates chosen, suitable to such ends, and favoured, or laid by proportionably as they promote or oppose them; if they see several experiments made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured, though publicly proclaimed against, which is readiest to introduce it, and the operators in it supported as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and liked the better, and a long train of acting show the counsels all tending that way, how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind which way things are going; or, from casting about how to save himself, than he could from believing the captain of a ship he was in was carrying him and the rest of the company to Algiers, when he found him always steering that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and provisions did often force him to turn his course another way for some time, which he steadily returned to again as soon as the wind, weather, and other circumstances would let him?

CHAPTER XIX.

Of the Dissolution of Governments.

211. He that will, with any clearness, speak of the dissolution of government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. That which makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of Nature into one politic society, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate and act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual, and almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them.

The world is too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of this way of dissolving of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and there wants not much argument to prove that where the society is dissolved, the government cannot remain; that being as impossible as for the frame of a house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and displaced by a whirlwind, or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake.

212. Besides this overturning from without, governments are dissolved from within:

. . . . . .

When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those who, without authority, would impose anything upon them. Every one is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of the society, the declaring of the public will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have no such authority or delegation.

213. This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth, who misuse the power they have, it is hard to consider it aright, and know at whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of government in which it happens. Let us suppose, then, the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons:—First, a single hereditary person having the constant, supreme, executive power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two within certain periods of time. Secondly, an assembly of hereditary nobility. Thirdly, an assembly of representatives chosen, *pro tempore*, by the people. Such a form of government supposed, it is evident—

214. First, that when such a single person or prince sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws which are the will of the society declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed. For that being, in effect, the legislative whose rules and laws are put in execution, and required to be obeyed when other laws are set up, and other rules pretended and enforced than what the legislative, constituted by the society, have enacted, it is plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not being thereunto authorized, by the fundamental appointment of the society, or subverts the old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and so sets up a new legislative.

215. Secondly, when the prince hinders the legislative

from assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted, the legislative is altered. For it is not a certain number of men—no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of debating and leisure of perfecting what is for the good of the society wherein the legislative consists; when these are taken away, or altered, so as to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is truly altered. For it is not names that constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them; so that he who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the government.

216. Thirdly, when, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors or ways of election are altered without the consent and contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered. For if others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto do choose, or in another way than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people.

217. Fourthly, the delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power, either by the prince or by the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the government. For the end why people entered into society being to be preserved one entire, free, independent society, to be governed by its own laws, this is lost whenever they are given up into the power of another.

218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince is evident, because he, having the force, treasure, and offices of the State to employ, and often persuading himself or being flattered by others, that, as supreme magistrate, he is incapable of control; he alone is in a condition to make great advances towards such changes under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers as factious, seditious, and enemies to the government;

219. There is one way more whereby such a government may be dissolved, and that is: When he who has the supreme executive power neglects and abandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution; this is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government. For laws not being made for themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the society to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and function. When that totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the people become a confused multitude without order or connection. Where there is no longer the administration of justice for the securing of men's rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly is no government left.

220. In these, and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative differing from the other by the change of persons, or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good. For the society can never, by the fault of another, lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself, which can only be done by a settled legislative and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it.

224. But it will be said this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. To which I answer:

First: no more than any other hypothesis. For when the people are made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors as much as you will for sons of Jupiter, let them be sacred and divine, descended or authorized from Heaven; give them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish and seek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakness, and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer itself. He must have lived but a little while in the world, who has not seen examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world.

225. Secondly: I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither they are going, it is not to be wondered that they should then rouse themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected, and without which, ancient names and specious forms are so far from being better, that they are much worse than the state of Nature or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.

226. Thirdly: I answer, that this power in the people of providing for their safety anew by a new legislative when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust by invading their property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it.

228. But if they who say it lays a foundation for rebellion mean that it may occasion civil wars or intestine broils to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magistrates when they invade their properties, contrary to the trust put in them, and that, therefore, this doctrine is not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world; they may as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbour's. If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has for peace sake to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered what a kind of peace there will be in the world which consists only in violence and rapine, and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf?

229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation, of the properties of their people?

William Penn, the founder of the state of Pennsylvania, was born in 1644. His father was an Admiral in the British navy who showed a remarkable ability to preserve his station in the shifting political tides of his time, commanding the fleet which captured Jamaica during Cromwell's reign, and serving as second in command to the Duke of York (later James II) when the latter was Lord High Admiral during Charles the II's reign. In this exalted family background young William Penn was at first a rather modish "fine gentleman". However, he was expelled from Oxford for religious non-conformity, and after a healthy caning was hustled off to France where he was presented at the French court and joined its gay life while receiving instruction in Calvinist theology. Returning to England he served in the Army in Ireland and did a short stint in the Navy where he began a lifelong friendship with the Duke of York (later James II). He was thus well on his way towards a prominent position in the military establishment, when he got mixed up with the Quakers.

The Religious Society of Friends, derisively called Quakers, originated in England in the mid-1650's under the tutelage of George Fox. It was the extreme culmination of the protestant revolution. Quakers held that no priest, or ceremony or formal church was necessary for the communion between individual men and God. Fox taught that there was "that of God" within every person and that by quiet seeking and meditation the needed understanding and guidance would be provided by the "Divine Light within". Well-read in the Bible, Fox stressed the teachings from the Sermon on the Mount, and Friends opposed bearing arms or taking part in war, and insisted on the equality of all men and women as equally bearers of the Light; thus opposing slavery, working for prison reform, and regarding heathens as well as Christians as equal in God's sight. Penn became a Quaker in 1666 when he was twenty-two. He father was not pleased. Among other offenses, young William refused to remove his hat in the presence of his father, the Duke of York or the King. After a vigorous trouncing failed to bring him around, his father cut him off without a farthing - though later they were reconciled. Like other Quakers in those years of religious strife, Penn was imprisoned for his beliefs - in his case at Newgate prison, and the Tower of London. Nevertheless, Penn persisted in writing Quaker tracts and books, and went on preaching missions in England, the Netherlands and Germany.

Penn's father died in 1670 after having been knighted as Sir William Penn (Sr) by King Charles II. But when he died King Charles was in his debt to the ammount of something like sixteen thousand pounds. In 1681 William Penn, the son, cancelled that debt in return for a charter from the King for a tract of land larger than England itself. The land was named Pennsylvania after the father of William Penn by a relieved debt-ridden King Charles. Shortly thereafter he received a further grant from his friend the Duke of York which covered what is now Delaware. Thus began Penn's"Holy Experiment". He drew up plans for the City of Philadelphia, advertised to get colonists for his "free colony for all mankind" in which no religions would be persecuted and the government would rest on consent of the governed. He set sail to join his colonists in 1682. Although Penn's principles of Liberty and Equality were viewed by the establishment with as much horror as Communism is viewed by defenders of capitalistic democracy today, within twenty years Pennsylvania was the most thriving and prosperous of all the colonies as well as, in Lord Acton's words, having the "most deocratic constitution in the world" and serving as"an almost solitary example of freedom". Particularly notable in the process, was Penn's aimiable and just treaty with the Indians which preserved good faith and relations between Indians and Quakers as long as the latter ruled.

Thus from a background of considerable experience in the management of civil affairs, as well as the horrors of intolerance and wars, Penn wrote the following simple, unassuming, but clear, proposal for a European Peace. Penn's plan antedated by 20 years a similar but more elaborately worked out plan by Abbe Saint-Pierre published in 1713. Saint-Pierre's plan was re-written in shorter form by Jean Jacques Rousseau and published under the title, Paix Perpetuelle, in 1761. This in turn was acknowledged by Kant to have influenced his 1795 essay on Perpetual Peace.

AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE PRESENT AND FUTURE PEACE OF EUROPE, BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EUROPEAN DYET, PARLIAMENT, OR ESTATES.

Beati Pacifici. Cedant arma togae.

TO THE READER:

I have undertaken a Subject that I am very sensible requires one of more sufficiency than I am Master of to treat it, as, in Truth, it deserves, and the groaning State of Europe calls for; but since Bunglers may Stumble upon the Game, as well as Masters, though it belongs to the Skilful to hunt and catch it. I hope this Essay will not be charged upon me for a Fault, if it appear to be neither Chimerical nor Injurious, and may provoke abler Pens to improve and perform the Design with better Judgment and Success. I will say no more in Excuse of myself, for this Undertaking, but that it is the Fruit of my solicitous Thoughts, for the Peace of Europe, and they must want Charity as much as the world needs Quiet, to be offended with me for so Pacifick a Proposal. Let them censure my Management, so they prosecute the Advantage of the Design; for 'till the Millenary Doctrine be accomplished, there is nothing appears to me so beneficial an Expedient to the Peace and Happiness of this Quarter of the World.

AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE PRESENT AND FUTURE PEACE OF EUROPE, &c.

SECT. I. *Of Peace, and its Advantages.*

He must not be a Man but a Statue of Brass or Stone, whose Bowels do not melt when he beholds the bloody *Tragedies* of this War, in *Hungary*, *Germany*, *Flanders*, *Ireland*, and at Sea: The Mortality of sickly and languishing Camps and Navies, and the mighty prey the Devouring Winds and Waves have made upon Ships and Men since 88. And as this with Reason ought to affect human Nature, and deeply Kindred, so there is something very moving that becomes prudent Men to consider, and that is the vast Charge that has accompanied that Blood, and which makes no mean Part of these *Tragedies;* Especially if they deliberate upon the uncertainty of the War, that they know not how or when it will end, and that the Expense cannot be less, and the Hazard is as great as before. So that in the Contraries of Peace we see the Beauties and Benefits of it; which under it, such is the Unhappiness of Mankind, we are too apt to nauseate, as the full Stomach loaths the Honey-Comb; and like that unfortunate Gentleman, that having a fine and a good Woman to his Wife, and searching his Pleasure in forbidden and less agreeable Company, said, when reproach'd with his Neglect of better Enjoyments, *That he could love his Wife of all Women, if she were not his Wife*, tho' that increased his Obligation to prefer her. It is a great Mark of the Corruption of our Natures, and what ought to humble us extremely, and excite the Exercise of our Reason to a nobler and juster Sense, that we cannot see the Use and Pleasure of our Comforts but by the Want of them. As if we could not taste the Benefit of Health, but by the Help of Sickness; nor understand the Satisfaction of Fulness without the Instruction of Want; nor, finally, know the Comfort of Peace, but by the Smart and Penance of the Vices of War: And without Dispute that is not the least Reason that God is pleased to Chastise us so frequently with it. What can we desire better than *Peace*, but the *Grace* to use it? *Peace* preserves our Possessions; We are in no Danger of Invasions: Our Trade is free and Safe, and we rise and lye down without Anxiety. The Rich bring out their Hoards, and employ the poor Manufacturers; Buildings and divers Projections, for Profit and Pleasure, go on: It excites Industry, which brings Wealth, as that gives the Means of Charity and Hospitality, not the lowest ornaments of a Kingdom or Commonwealth. But War, like the Frost of 83, seizes all these Comforts at once, and stops the civil Channel of Society. The Rich draw in their Stock, the Poor turn Soldiers, or Thieves, or starve: No Industry, no Building, no Manufactory, little Hospitality or Charity; but what the Peace gave, the War devours. I need say no more upon this Head, when the Advantages of Peace, and Mischiefs of War, are so many and sensible to every Capacity under all Governments, as either of them prevails. I shall proceed to the next Point. *What is the best Means of Peace;* which will conduce much to open my Way to what I have to propose.

SECT. II. *Of the Means of Peace, which is Justice rather than War.*

As *Justice* is a Preserver, so it is a better Procurer of Peace than War. Tho' *Pax quaeritur bello* be an usual Saying, *Peace is the end of War*, and as such it was taken up by O. C. for his Motto; Yet the Use generally made of that expression shews us, that properly and truly speaking, Men seek their Wills by *War* rather than Peace, and that as they will violate it to obtain them, so they will hardly be brought to think of Peace, unless their Appetites be some Way gratified. If we look over the Stories of all Times, we shall find the Aggressors generally moved by Ambition; the Pride of Conquest and Greatness of Dominion more than Right. But as those *Leviathans* appear rarely in the World, so I shall anon endeavor to make it evident they had never been able to devour the Peace of the World, and ingross whole Countries as they have done, if the *Proposal* I have to make for the Benefit of our present Age had been then in Practice. The Advantage that Justice has upon War is seen by the Success of *Embassies*, that so often prevent War by hearing the *Pleas* and *Memorials* of *Justice* in the Hands and Mouths of the *Wronged Party*. Perhaps it may be in a good Degree owing to *Reputation* or *Poverty*, or some Particular *Interest* or *Conveniency* of *Princes* and *States*, as much as *Justice;* but it is certain, that as War cannot in any Sense be justified, but upon Wrongs received, and Right, upon Complaint, refused; So the Generality of Wars have their Rise from some such Pretension. This is better seen and understood at Home; for that which prevents a Civil War in a Nation, is that which

may prevent it Abroad, viz: *Justice;* and we see where that is notably obstructed, War is kindled between the *Magistrates* and *People* in particular Kingdoms and States; which, however it may be unlawful on the side of the *People*, we see never fails to follow, and ought to give the same Caution to Princes, as if it were the Right of the People to do it: Tho' I must needs say, *the Remedy is almost ever worse than the Disease:* The Aggressors seldom getting what they seek, or performing, if they prevail, what they promised: And the *Blood and Poverty* that usually attend the Enterprise, weigh more on Earth, as well as in Heaven, than what they lost or suffered, or what they get by endeavoring to mend their *Condition*, comes to: Which *Disappointment* seems to be the Voice of Heaven, and Judgment of God against those violent Attempts. But to return, I say, *Justice is the Means of Peace*, betwixt the *Government* and the *People*, and one *Man* and *Company* and another. It prevents *Strife*, and at last ends it: For besides *Shame* or *Fear*, to contend longer, he or they being under *Government*, are constrained to bound their *Desires* and *Resentment* with the *Satisfaction* the Law gives. Thus *Peace* is maintained by *Justice*, which is a Fruit of *Government*, as *Government* is from *Society*, and *Society* from *Consent*.

SECT. III. *Government, its Rise and End under all Models.*

Government is an Expedient against *Confusion;* a Restraint upon all *Disorder;* Just Weights and an even Balance: That one may not injure another, nor himself, by *Intemperance*.

This was at first without *Controversie*, *Patrimonial*, and upon the Death of the Father or Head of the Family, the eldest Son or Male of Kin succeeded. But Time breaking in upon this Way of Governing, as the World multiply'd, it fell under other *Claims* and *Forms;* and is as hard to trace to its Original, as are the Copies we have of the first Writings of *Sacred* or *Civil* Matters. It is certain the most Natural and Human is that of *Consent*, for that binds freely, (as I may say) when Men hold their *Liberty* by true *Obedience* to Rules of their own making. No Man is Judge in his own Cause, which ends the *Confusion* and *Blood* of so many *Judges* and *Executioners*. For out of *Society* every Man is his own *King*, does what he lists at his own Peril: But when he comes to incorporate himself, he submits that *Royalty* to the *Conveniency* of the *Whole*, from whom he receives the Returns of *Protection*. So that he is not now his own Judge nor Avenger, neither is his *Antagonist*, but the *Law*, in indifferent Hands between both. And if he be Servant to others that before was free, he is also served of others that formerly owed him no *Obligation*. Thus while we are not our own, every Body is ours, and we get more than we lose, the Safety of the *Society* being the Safety of the *Particulars* that constitute it. So that while we seem to submit to, and hold all we have from *Society*, it is by *Society* that we keep what we have.

Government then is the *Prevention* or *Cure* of *Disorder*, and the Means of *Justice*, as that is of *Peace:* For this Cause they have *Sessions*, *Terms*, *Assizes*, and *Parliaments*, to overrule Men's *Passions* and *Resentments*, that they may not be *Judges* in their own *Cause*, nor *Punishers of* their own *Wrongs*, which, as it is very incident to *Men* in their *Corrupt State*, so, for that Reason, they would observe no Measure; nor on the other Hand would any be easily reduced to their Duty. Not that Men know not what is right, their Excesses, and wherein they are to blame, by no Means; nothing is plainer to them: But so depraved is Human Nature, that without Compulsion some Way or other, too many would not readily be brought to do what they know is right and fit, or avoid what they are satisfy'd they should not do: Which brings me near to the Point I have undertaken; and for the better Understanding of which, I have thus briefly treated of *Peace*, *Justice*, and *Government*, as a necessary *Introduction*, because the Ways and Methods by which *Peace* is preserved in particular *Governments*, will help those *Readers* most concerned in my *Proposal* to conceive with what Ease as well as advantage the Peace of *Europe* might be procured and Kept; which is the End designed by me, with all Submission to those Interested in this little *Treatise*.

SECT. IV. *Of a General Peace, or the Peace of Europe, and the Means of it.*

In my first Section, I showed the *Desirableness of Peace;* in my next, the Truest Means of it; to wit, *Justice not War*. And in my last, that this Justice was the Fruit of *Government*, as Government itself was the Result of *Society* which first came from a Reasonable Design in Men of Peace. Now if the *Soveraign Princes of Europe*, who represent that Society, or Independent State of Men that was previous to the Obligations of Society, would, for the same Reason that engaged Men first into Society, *viz: Love of Peace and Order*, agree to meet by their Stated Deputies in a *General Dyet*, *Estates*, or *Parliament*, and there Establish Rules of Justice for Soveraign Princes to observe one to another; and thus to meet Yearly, or once in Two or Three Years at farthest, or as they shall see Cause, and to be stiled, *The Soveraign or Imperial Dyet*, *Parliament*, *or State of Europe;* before which Soveraign Assembly, should be brought all Differences depending between one Soveraign and another, that can not be made up by private Embassies, before the Sessions begin; and that if any of the Soveraignties that Constitute these Imperial States, shall refuse to submit their Claim or Pretensions to them, or to abide and perform the Judgment thereof, and seek their Remedy by Arms, or delay their Compliance beyond the Time prefixt in their Resolutions, all the other Soveraignties, United as One Strength, shall compel the Submission and Performance of the Sentence, with Damages to the Suffering Party, and Charges to the Soveraignties that obliged their Submission. To be sure, *Europe* would quietly obtain the so much desired and needed Peace, to *Her harassed Inhabitants;* no Soveraignty in *Europe* having the Power and therefore can not show the Will to dispute the Conclusion; and, consequently, *Peace* would be procured, and continued in *Europe*.

SECT. V. *Of the Causes of Difference, and Motives to Violate Peace.*

There appears to me but Three Things upon which Peace is broken, Viz: To *Keep*, to *Recover*, or to *Add*.

First, to Keep what is Ones Right, from the Invasion of an Enemy; in which I am purely *Defensive*. *Secondly*, To Recover, when I think myself Strong enough, that which by Violence, I, or my Ancestors have lost by the Arms of a Stronger Power; in which I am Offensive; Or, *Lastly*, To increase my Dominion by the Acquisition of my Neighbour's Countries, as I find them Weak, and myself Strong. To gratify which Passion, there will never want some Accident or other for a Pretense: And Knowing my own Strength, I will be my own *Judge and Carver*. This *Last* will find no Room in the *Imperial States*: They are an unpassable Limit to that Ambition. But the other *Two* may come as soon as they please, and find the Justice of the Soveraign Court. And considering how few there are of those *Sons of Prey*, and how early they show themselves, it may be not once in an Age or Two, this Expedition being established, the Ballance can not well be broken.

SECT. VI. *Of Titles, upon which those Differences may arise.*

But I easily forsee a Question that may be answered in our Way, and that is this; *What is Right? Or else we can never know what is Wrong: It is very fit that this should be Established.* But that is fitter for the Soveraign States to resolve than me. And yet that I may lead a Way to the Matter, I say that Title is either by a long and *undoubted Succession*, as the Crowns of *Spain*, *France*, and *England;* or by *Election*, as the Crown of *Poland*, and the *Empire;* or by *Marriage*, as the Family of the *Stewarts* came by *England;* the *Elecier of Brandenburg*, to the Dutchy of *Cleve:* and we, in Ancient Time, to divers Places abroad; or by Purchase, as hath been frequently done in *Italy* and *Germany;* or by Conquest, as the *Turk* in *Christendom*, the *Spaniards* in *Flanders*, formerly mostly in the *French* Hands and the *French* in *Burgundy*, *Normandy*, *Lorrain*, *French-County*, &c. This last Title is, Morally Speaking, only Questionable. It has indeed obtained a Place among the Rolls of Titles, but it was engross'd and recorded by the Point of the sword, and in Bloody Characters. What can not be controuled or resisted, must be submitted to; but all the World knows the Date of the length of such Empires, and that they expire with the Power of the Possessor to defend them. And yet there is a little allowed to Conquest too, when it has the Sanction of Articles of Peace to confirm it: Tho' that hath not always extinguished the Fire, but it lies, like Embers and Ashes, ready to Kindle so soon as there is fit Matter prepared for it. Nevertheless, when Conquest has been confirmed by a Treaty, and Conclusion of Peace, I must confess it is an Adopted Title; and if not so Genuine and Natural, yet being engrafted, it is fed by that which is the Security of *Better Titles*, *Consent*. There is but one Thing more to be mentioned in this Section, and that is from what Time Titles shall take their Beginning, or how far back we may look to confirm or dispute them. It would be very bold and inexcusable in me, to determine so tender a Point, but be it more or less Time, as to the last General Peace at *Nimeguen*, or to the commencing of this War, or to the Time of the Beginning of the Treaty of Peace, I must submit it to the Great Pretenders and Masters in that Affair. But something every Body must be willing to give or quit, that he may keep the rest, and by this Establishment be forever freed of the Necessity of losing more.

SECT. VII. *Of the Composition of these Imperial States.*

The Composition and Proportion of this *Soveraign Part*, or *Imperial State*, does, at the first Look, seem to carry with it no small Difficulty what votes to allow for the Inequality of the Princes and States. But with Submission to better Judgments, I can not think it invincible; For if it be possible to have an Estimate of the Yearly Value of the several Soveraign Countries, whose Delegates are to make up this August Assembly, The Determination of the Number of Persons or Votes in the States for every Soveraignty will not be impracticable. Now that *England*, *France*, *Spain*, the *Empire*, &c., may be pretty exactly estimated, is so plain a Case, by considering the Revenue of Lands, the Exports and Entries at the Custom Houses, the Books of Rates, and Surveys that are in all Governments, to proportion Taxes for the Support of them, that the least Inclination to the *Peace of Europe* will not stand or halt at this Objection. I will, with Pardon on all Sides give an Instance far from Exact; nor do I pretend to it, or offer it for an Estimate; for I do it at Random: Only this, as wide as it is from the Just Proportion, will give some Aim to my *Judicious Reader*, what I would be at: Remembering, I design not by any Computation, an Estimate from the Revenue of the Prince, but the Value of the Territory, the Whole being concerned as well as the Prince. And a Juster Measure it is to go by, since one Prince may have more Revenue than another, who has much a Richer Country: Tho' in the Instance I am now about to make, the Caution is not so necessary, because, as I said before, I pretend to no Manner of Exactness, but go wholly by Guess, being but for Example's Sake. I suppose the *Empire of Germany* to send Twelve; *France*, Ten; *Spain*, Ten; *Italy*, which comes to *France*, Eight; *England*, Six; *Portugal*, Three; *Sweedland*, Four; *Denmark*, Three; *Poland*, Four; *Venice*, Three; the *Seven Provinces*, Four; *The Thirteen Cantons*, and little *Neighbouring Soveraignties*, Two; Dukedoms of *Holstein* and *Courland*, One: And if the *Turks* and *Muscovites* are taken in, as seems but fit and just, they will make *Ten apiece more*. The *Whole* makes Ninety. A great Presence when they represent the *Fourth, and now The Best and Wealthiest Part of the Known World; where Religion and Learning, Civility and Arts have their Seat and Empire*. But it is not absolutely necessary there should be always so many Persons, to represent the larger Soveraignties; for the Votes may be given by one Man of any Soveraignty, as well as by Ten or Twelve: Tho' the fuller the Assembly of States is, the more Solemn, Effectual, and Free the Debates will be, and the Resolutions must needs come with greater Authority. The Place of their First Session should be Central, as much as is possible, afterwards as they agree.

SECT. VIII. *Of the Regulations of the Imperial States in Session.*

To avoid Quarrel for Precedency, the Room may be

Round, and have divers Doors to come in and go out at, to prevent Exceptions. If the whole Number be cast in Tens, each chusing One, they may preside by Turns, to whom all Speeches should be addressed, and who should collect the Sense of the Debates, and state the Question for a Vote, which, in my Opinion, should be by the *Ballot* after the Prudent and Commendable Method of the *Venetians:* Which, in a great Degree, prevents the ill Effects of Corruption; because if any of the Delegates of that High and Mighty Estates could be so Vile, False, and Dishonorable, as to be influenced by Money, they have the Advantage of taking their Money that will give it them and of Voting undiscovered to the Interest of their Principles, and their own Inclinations; as they that do understand the *Balloting Box* do very well know. A Shrewd Stratagem and an Experimental Remedy against *Corruption*, at least Corrupting: For who will give their Money where they may so easily be Cozened, and where it is Two to One they will be so; for they that will take Money in such Cases, will not stick to Lye heartly to them that give it, rather than wrong their Country, when they know their Lye can not be detected.

It seems to me, that nothing in this *Imperial Parliament* should pass, but by Three Quarters of the Whole, at least Seven above the Ballance. I am sure it helps to prevent Treachery, because if Money could ever be a Temptation in such a Court, it would cost a great Deal of Money to weigh down the wrong Scale. All Complaints should be delivered in Writing in the Nature of *Memorials* and *Journals* kept by a proper Person, in a *Trunk or Chest*, which should have as many differing Locks, *as there are Tens in the States.* And if there were a *Clerk for each Ten*, and a *Pew or Table for those Clerks in the Assembly;* and at the End of Every Session *One out of each Ten* were appointed to Examine and Compare the *Journal of those Clerks*, and then lock them up as I have before expressed, it would be clear and Satisfactory. And each Soveraignty if they please, as is but very fit, may have an *Exemplification*, or *Copy of the said Memorials*, and the *Journal of Proceedings* upon them. The *Liberty and Rules of Speech*, to be sure, they can not fail in, who will be *Wisest* and *Noblest* of each Soveraignty, for its own Honour and Safety. If any Difference can arise between those that come from the same Soveraignty that then One of the Major Number do give the Balls of that Soveraignty. I should think it extremely necessary, that every Soveraignty should be present under great Penalties, and that none leave the Session without Leave, till *All* be finished; and that Neutralities in Debates should by no Means be endured: For any such Latitude will quickly open a Way to unfair Proceedings, and be followed by a Train, both of seen, and unseen Inconveniences. I will say little of the *Language* in which the *Session of the Soveraign Estates should be held*, but to be sure it must be in *Latin* or *French*; the first would be very well for Civilians, but the last most easie for Men of Quality.

SECT. IX. *Of the Objections that may be advanced against the Design.*

I will first give an Answer to the Objections that may be offered against my *Proposal:* And in my next and last Section, I shall endeavour to shew some of the manifold Conveniences that would follow this *European League*, or *Confederacy.*

The first of them is this, *That the strongest and Richest Soveraignty will never agree to it, and if it should, there would be Danger of Corruption more than of Force one Time or other.* I answer to the first Part, he is not stronger than all the rest, and for that Reason you should promote this, and compel him into it; especially before he be so, for then, it will be too late to deal with such an one. To the last Part of the Objection, I say the Way is as open now as then; and it may be the Number fewer, and as easily come at. However, if Men of Sense and Honour, and Substance, are chosen, they will either scorn the Baseness, or have wherewith to pay for the Knavery: At least they may be watch't so, that one may be a check upon the other, and all prudently limited by the Soveraignty they Represent. In all great Points, especially before a final Resolve, they may be obliged to transmit to their Principles, the Merits of such important Cases depending, and receive their last Instructions: which may be done in four and Twenty Days at the most, as the Place of their Session may be appointed.

The Second is, *That it will endanger an Effeminacy by such a Disuse of the Trade of Soldiery; That if there should be any Need for it, upon any Occasion, we should be at a Loss as they were in* Holland in 72.

There can be no Danger of Effeminacy, because each Soveraignty may introduce as temperate or Severe a Discipline in the Education of Youth, as they please, by low Living, and due Labour. Instruct them in Mechanical Knowledge, and in Natural Philosophy, by Operation, which is the Honour of the *German* Nobility. This would make them Men: Neither *Women* nor *Lyons*: For *Soldiers* are t'other Extream to Effeminacy. But the Knowledge of Nature, and the useful as well as agreeable Operations of Art, give Men an Understanding of themselves, of the World they are born into, how to be useful and serviceable, both to themselves and others: and how to save and help, not injure or destroy. The Knowledge of Government in General; the particular Constitutions of *Europe;* and above all of his own Country, are very recommending Accomplishments. This fits him for the *Parliament*, and *Council at Home*, and the *Courts of Princes and Services* in the *Imperial States abroad.* At least, he is a good Common-Wealths-Man, and can be useful to the Publick, or retire, as there may be Occasion.

To the other Part of the Objection, *of being at a loss for Soldiery as they were in* Holland *in* 72. The Proposal answers for it itself. One has War no more than the other; and will be as much to seek upon Occasion. Nor is it to be thought that any one will keep up such an Army after such an *Empire* is on Foot, which may hazard the Safety of the rest. However, if it be seen requisit, the Question may be askt, by Order of the Soveraign States, why such an one either raises or keeps up a formidable Body of Troops, and he obliged forthwith to reform or Reduce them; lest any one, by keeping up a great Body of Troops, should surprize a Neighbour. But a small Force in every other Soveraignty, as it is

capable or accustomed to maintain, will certainly prevent that Danger, and Vanquish any such Fear.

The Third Objection is, *That there will be great Want of Employment for younger Brothers of Families; and that the Poor must either turn Soldiers or Thieves.* I have answer'd that in my Return to the Second Objection. We shall have the more *Merchants and Husbandmen*, or *Ingenious Naturalists*, if the Government be but any Thing Solicitous of the *Education of their Youth:* Which, next to the present and immediate Happiness of any Country, ought of all Things to be the *Care* and *Skill* of the Government. For such as the Youth of any Country is bred, such is the next Generation, and the Government in good or bad Hands.

I am come now to the last Objection, *That Soveraign Princes and States will hereby become not Soveraign: a Thing they will never endure.* But this also, under Correction, is a Mistake, for they remain as Soveraign at Home as ever they were. Neither their Power over their People, nor the usual Revenue they pay them, is diminished: It may be the War Establishment may be reduced, which will indeed of Course follow, or be better employed to the Advantage of the Publick. So that the *Soveraignties* are as they were, for none of them have now any Soveraignty over one another: And if this be called a lessening of their Power, it must be only because the great Fish can no longer eat up the little ones, and that each Soveraignty is *equally defended* from Injuries, and disabled from committing them: *Cedant Arma Togæ* is a Glorious Sentence; the *Voice of the Dove; the Olive Branch of Peace.* A Blessing so great, that when it pleases God to chastise us severely for our Sins, it is with the *Rod of War* that, for the most Part, he whips us: And Experience tells us none leaves deeper Marks behind it.

SECT. X. *Of the real Benefits that flow from this Proposal about Peace.*

I am come to my last Section, in which I shall enumerate some of those many *real Benefits* that flow from this Proposal, for the Present and Future *Peace* of *Europe*.

Let it not, I pray, be the least, that it prevents the Spilling of so much *Humane and Christian Blood:* For a Thing so offensive to God, and terrible and afflicting to Men, as that has ever been, must recommend our Expedient beyond all Objections. For what can a Man give in Exchange for his Life, as well as Soul? And tho' the chiefest in Government are seldom personally exposed, yet it is a Duty incumbent upon them to be tender of the Lives of their People; since without all Doubt, they are accountable to God for the Blood that is spilt in their Service. So that besides the Loss of so many Lives, of importance to any Government, both for Labour and Propagation, the Cries of so many Widows, Parents and Fatherless are prevented, that cannot be very pleasant in the Ears of any Government, and is the *Natural Consequence of War in all Government.*

There is another *manifest Benefit* which redounds to *Christendom*, by this *Peaceable* Expedient. *The Reputation of Christianity will in some Degree be recovered in the Sight of Infidels;* which, by the many Bloody and unjust *Wars of Christians*, not only with them, but *one* with *another*, hath been greatly impaired. For, to the Scandal of that Holy Profession, *Christians*, that glory in their *Saviour's Name*, have long devoted the Credit and Dignity of it to their worldly Passions, as often as they have been excited by the Impulses of Ambition or Revenge. They have not always been in the Right: Nor has Right been the Reason of *War:* And not only *Christians* against *Christians*, but the same Sort of *Christians* have embrewed *their Hands in one another's Blood:* Invoking and Interesting, all they could, the *Good* and *Merciful God to prosper their Arms to their Brethren's Destruction:* Yet their *Saviour* has told them, *that he came to save, and not to destroy the Lives of Men:* To give and plant *Peace* among Men: And if in any Sense he may be said to send *War*, it is the *Holy War* indeed; for it is to send against the *Devil*, and not the *Persons of Men*. Of all his Titles this seems the most Glorious as well as comfortable for us, that he is the *Prince of Peace*. It is his *Nature*, his *Office*, his *Work*, and the *End*, and excellent Blessings of his Coming, who is both the Maker and Preserver of our *Peace* with God. And it is very remarkable, that in all the *New Testament* he is but once called *Lyon*, but frequently the *Lamb of God;* to denote to us his *Gentle*, *Meek*, and *Harmless Nature;* and that those who desire to be the *Disciples* of his *Cross and Kingdom*, for they are *inseparable*, must be like him, as St. *Paul*, St. *Peter*, and St. *John*, tell us. Nor is it said the *Lamb* shall lye down with the *Lyon*, but the *Lyon* shall lye down with the *Lamb*. That is *War* shall yield to *Peace*, and the Soldier turn Hermite. To be sure, *Christians* should not be apt to strive, not *swift* to Anger against any Body, and less with one another, and least of all for the uncertain and fading Enjoyments of this Lower World: And no Quality is exempted from this Doctrine. Here is a wide Field for the Reverend Clergy of *Europe* to act their Part in, who have so much the Possession of Princes and People too. May they recommend and labour this pacifick Means I offer, which will end Blood, if not Strife; and then *Reason*, upon free Debate, will be *Judge*, and not the *Sword*. So that both *Right* and *Peace*, which are the Desire and Fruit of wise Governments, and the choice Blessings of any Country, seem to succeed the Establishment of this Proposal.

The third Benefit is, that it saves *Money*, both to the Prince and People; and thereby prevents those Grudgings and Misunderstandings between them that are wont to follow the devouring Expences of *War*, and enables both to perform Publick Acts for *Learning*, *Charity*, *Manufactures*, *etc.* The Virtues of Government and Ornaments of Countries. Nor is this all the *Advantage* that follows to *Soveraignties*, upon this *Head* of Money and good *Husbandry*, to whose Service and Happiness this short Discourse is dedicated; for it saves the great Expence that frequent and splendid Embassies require, and all their Appendages of *Spies and Intelligence*, which in the most prudent Governments, have devoured mighty Sums of Money; and that not without some *immoral Practices also:* Such as *Corrupting of Servants* to betray their *Masters*, by revealing their Secrets; not to be defended by *Christian* or *Old Roman Virtues*. But here, where there is nothing to fear, there is little to know, and there-

fore the *Purchase* is either *cheap*, or may be wholly *spared*. I might mention *Pensions* to the *Widows* and *Orphans* of such as dye in Wars, and of those that have been *disabled* in them; which rise high in the Revenue of some Countries.

Our fourth Advantage is, that the *Towns, Cities and Countries, that might be laid waste by the Rage of War, are thereby preserved:* A Blessing that would be very well understood in *Flanders* and *Hungary*, and indeed upon all the *Borders* of *Soveraignties*, which are almost ever the *Stages* of Spoil and Misery; of which the Stories of *England and Scotland* do sufficiently inform us without looking over the *Water*.

The fifth Benefit of this Peace, is the *Ease and Security of Travel and Traffick:* An Happiness never understood since the *Roman Empire* has been broken into so many *Soveraignties*. But we may easily conceive the Comfort and *Advantage* of travelling through the Governments of *Europe* by a *Pass* from any of the *Soveraignties* of it, which this League and State of *Peace* will *naturally make Authentick:* They that have travel'd *Germany*, where is so great a Number of *Soveraignties*, know the Want and Value of this Privilege, by the many *Stops and Examinations* they meet with by the Way: But especially such as have made the *great Tour of Europe*. This leads to the Benefit of an *Universal Monarchy*, without the Inconveniences that attend it: For when the whole was one *Empire*, tho' these Advantages were enjoyed, yet the several Provinces, that now make the *Kingdoms and States* of *Europe*, were under some Hardship from the great Sums of *Money* remitted to the Imperial Seat, and the Ambition and Avarice of their several *Pro-consuls* and *Governours*, and the great *Taxes* they paid to the *Numerous Legions of Soldiers*, that they maintained for their own Subjection, who were not wont to entertain that Concern for them (being uncertainly there, and having their Fortunes to make) which their respective and proper *Soveraigns* have always shown for them. So that to be *Ruled by Native Princes or States*, with the Advantage of that Peace and Security that can only render an *Universal Monarchy desirable*, is peculiar to our Proposal, and for that Reason it is to be preferred.

Another Advantage is, *The Great Security it will be to* Christians *against the Inroads of the* Turk, *in their most Prosperous Fortune*. For it had been impossible for the *Port*, to have prevailed so often, and so far from *Christendom*, but by the Carelessness, or Wilful Connivence, if not Aid, of some *Christian Princes*. And for the same Reason, why no *Christian Monarch* will adventure to oppose, or break such an Union, the *Grand Seignior* will find himself obliged to concur, for the Security of what he holds in *Europe:* Where, with all his Strength, he would feel it an Over-Match for him. *The Prayers, Tears, Treason, Blood and Devastation, that War has cost in* Christendom, *for these Two last Ages especially, must add to the Credit of our Proposal, and the Blessing of the* Peace *thereby humbly recommended.*

The Seventh Advantage of an *European, Imperial Dyet, Parliament*, or *Estates, is, That it will beget and increase Personal Friendship between Princes and States*, which tends to the Rooting up of Wars, and Planting Peace in a Deep and Fruitful Soil. For Princes have the Curiosity of seeing the Courts and Cities of other Countries, as well as Private Men, if they could as securely and familiarly gratify their Inclinations. It were a great Motive to the Tranquility of the World, *That they could freely Converse Face to Face, and Personally and Reciprocally Give and Receive Marks of Civility and Kindness.* An *Hospitality* that leaves these Impressions behind it, will hardly let Ordinary Matters prevail, to Mistake or Quarrel one another. Their *Emulation would be in the Instances of Goodness, Laws, Customs, Learning, Arts, Buildings*; and in particular those that relate to *Charity*, the True Glory of some Governments, where Beggars are as much a Rarity, as in other Places it would be to see none.

Nor is this all the Benefit that would come by this *Freedom* and *Interview of Princes:* For *Natural Affection* would hereby be preserved, which we see little better than lost, *from the Time their Children*, or *Sisters, are Married into Other Courts*. For the present State and Insincerity of Princes forbid them the Enjoyment of that Natural Comfort which is possest by Private Families: Insomuch, that from the Time a Daughter, or Sister is Married to another Crown, Nature is submitted to Interest, and that, for the most Part, grounded not upon Solid or Commendable Foundations, but *Ambition*, or *Unjust Avarice*. I say, this Freedom, that is the Effect of our Pacifick Proposal, restores *Nature* to Her Just Right and Dignity in the Families of Princes, and them to the Comfort She brings, wherever She is preserved in Her proper Station. Here *Daughters* may Personally intreat their *Parents*, and *Sisters* their *Brothers*, for a good Understanding between them and their *Husbands*, where Nature, not crush'd by Absence, and Sinister Interests, but acting by the Sight and Lively Entreaties of such near Relations, is almost sure to prevail. They cannot easily resist the most affectionate Addresses of such powerful Solicitors, *as their Children, and Grand-Children*, and their *Sisters, Nephews*, and *Nieces:* And so backward from *Children to Parents*, and *Sisters to Brothers*, to keep up and preserve their own Families, by a good Understanding between their Husbands and them.

To conclude this Section, there is yet another Manifest Privilege that follows this *Intercourse* and Good Understanding, which methinks should be very moving with Princes, viz. *That hereby they may chuse Wives for themselves*, such as they Love, and not by *Proxy* meerly to gratify Interest; an ignoble Motive; and that rarely begets, or continues that *Kindness* which ought to be between Men and their Wives. A Satisfaction very few Princes ever knew, and to which all other Pleasures ought to resign. Which has often obliged me to think, *That the Advantage of Private Men upon Princes, by Family Comforts, is a sufficient Ballance against their Greater Power and Glory: The one being more in* Imagination, *than* Real; *and often* Unlawful; *but the other*, Natural, Solid, *and* Commendable. Besides, it is certain, Parents Loving Well before they are Married, which very rarely happens to Princes, *has Kind and Generous Influences upon their Offspring: Which, with their Example, makes them better Husbands, and Wives, in their Turn.* This, in great Measure, prevents Unlawful Love, and the Mischiefs of those Intriegues that are wont to

follow them: What *Hatred, Feuds, Wars, and Desolations have, in divers Ages, flown from Unkindness between Princes and their Wives?* What *Unnatural Divisions among their Children, and Ruin to their Families, if not Loss of their Countries by it?* Behold an Expedient to prevent it, a Natural and Efficacious One: Happy to Princes, and Happy to their People also. For Nature being renewed and strengthened by these Mutual Pledges and Endearments, I have mentioned, will leave those soft and kind Impressions behind in the Minds of Princes that *Court and Country* will very easily discern and feel the Good Effects of: Especially if they have the Wisdom to show that they Interest themselves in the Prosperity of the Children and Relations of their Princes. For it does not only incline them to be Good, but engage those Relations to become Powerful Suitors to their Princes for them, if any Misunderstanding should unhappily arise between them and their *Soveraigns:* Thus ends this *Section*. It now rests to conclude the Discourse, in which, if I have not pleased my *Reader*, or answered his Expectation, it is some Comfort to me I meant well, and have cost him but little Money and Time; and Brevity is an Excuse, if not a Virtue, where the Subject is not agreeable, or is but ill prosecuted.

THE CONCLUSION.

I Will conclude this *my Proposal of an European, Soveraign*, or *Imperial Dyet, Parliament*, or *Estates*, with that which I have touch'd upon before, and which falls under the Notice of every One concerned, by coming Home to their Particular and Respective Experience within their own *Soveraignties*. That by the same *Rules of Justice and Prudence*, by which Parents and Masters Govern their Families, and Magistrates their Cities, and Estates their Republicks, and Princes and Kings their Principalities and Kingdoms, *Europe* may obtain and Preserve *Peace among Her Soveraignties*. For Wars are the *Duels of Princes;* and as Government in Kingdoms and States, *Prevents Men being Judges and Executioners for themselves*, over-rules Private Passions as to Injuries or Revenge, and subjects the Great as well as the Small to the *Rule of Justice*, that Power might not vanquish or oppress Right, nor one Neighbour act an *Independency and Soveraignty upon another*, while they have resigned that Original Claim to the Benefit and Comfort of Society; so this being soberly weighed in the Whole, and Parts of it, it will not be hard to conceive or frame, nor yet to execute the Design I have here proposed.

And for the better understanding and perfecting of the *Idea*, I here present to the *Soveraign Princes and Estates of Europe*, for the Safety and Tranquility of it, I must recommend to their Perusals *Sir William Temple's Account of the United Provinces;* which is an Instance and Answer, upon *Practice*, to all the Objections that can be advanced against the Practicability of my Proposal: Nay, it is an Experiment that not only comes to our Case, but exceeds the Difficulties that can render its Accomplishment disputable. For there we shall find *Three Degrees of Soveraignties to make up every Soveraignty in the General States.* I will reckon them backwards: First, *The States General themselves;* then the *Immediate Soveraignties* that Constitute them, which are those of the *Provinces*, answerable to the *Soveraignties of Europe*, that by their *Deputies* are to compose the *European Dyet, Parliament* or *Estates* in our Proposal: And then there are the several Cities of each *Province*, that are so many *Independent* or *Distinct Soveraignties*, which compose those of the *Provinces*, as those of the *Provinces* do compose the *States General* at the *Hague*.

But I confess I have the Passion to wish heartily, that the Honour of Proposing and Effecting so. Great and Good a Design, might be owing to *England*, of all the Countries in *Europe*, as something of the Nature of our Expedient was, in Design and Preparation, to the Wisdom, Justice, and Valour, *of Henry the Fourth of France*, whose Superior Qualities raising his Character above those of His Ancestors, or Contemporaries, deservedly gave Him the Stile of *Henry the Great*. For *He was upon obliging the Princes and Estates of Europe to a Political Ballance*, when the *Spanish Faction*, for that Reason, contrived, and accomplished *His Murder*, by the Hands of *Ravilliac*. I will not then fear to be censured, for proposing an *Expedient* for the Present and Future *Peace of Europe*, when it was not only the *Design, but Glory of One of the Greatest Princes that ever reigned in it;* and is found Practicable in the Constitution of one of the Wisest and Powerfullest States of it. So that to conclude, I have very Little to answer for in all this Affair; because, if it succeed, I have so Little to deserve: For this *Great King's Example tells us it is fit to be done;* and Sir *William Temple's History* shews us, by a Surpassing Instance, *That it may be done;* and *Europe*, by her Incomparable Miseries, makes it now *Necessary to be done:* That my Share is only thinking of it at this Juncture, and putting it into the Common Light for the Peace and Prosperity of *Europe*.

JEFFERSON (1743-1826)

Thomas Jefferson was born in Albemarle County, Virginia in 1743 where he was embued with democratic ideals by his western countrymen. After graduating from the college of William and Mary in 1762, he became a lawyer and entered the Virginia House of Burgesses where, from 1769-75, he became a leading opponent of British rule over the colonies. His Summary View of the Rights of British Americans (1774) and Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking up Arms (1775) as well as the Declaration of Independence (1776) made him the primary writer of the American Revolution. As the following selection shows, the latter document was almost entirely his own work, though with deletions and some minor additions by John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and others on the floor of the Continental Congress. In 1776 he took the lead in reforming the laws of Virginia abolishing laws which perpetuated aristocracy and instituting the bill establishing religious freedom. He was governor of Virgina from 1779-1781, minister to France in 1785, and George Washington's Secretary of State from 1790 to 1793. He was Vice-President from 1797 to 1801 when he began the first of two four year terms as President of the United States. The election in 1800 which brought him the Presidency is sometimes called "the revolution of 1800" for it marked the end of Federalist domination. The Federalists, headed by Alexander Hamiliton favored strong federal government, the great merchants, landowners and industrialists, were strongly pro-British, and instituted the Alien and Sedition Acts, all of which Jefferson opposed. Jefferson's party, first called Republicans, then Democratic Republicans, and finally just Democrats, was opposed to all of these things, favoring France (and the French Revolution), states rights and de-centralized government, and individual democratic rights. A philosopher-statesman, architect, scientist and inventor, violinist and book-lover, he helped found the University of Virginia, designing its buildings and planning its curriculum, and was President of the American Philosophical Society (1797-1815). He died July 4th 1826, just fifty years after the Declaration of Independence.

Jefferson's defense of a war - a revolutionary war - illustrates perfectly, and with enormous historical impact, the influence of the philosophical movements which dominated Europe in the 1600s and 1700s. This was a period which cultural historians have called the Enlightenment, or "Age of Reason". Based on the writings of such thinkers as Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton and, above all, John Locke, men came to believe again in a universe which was governed by laws of nature which men could apprehend through the use of observation and reason. Placing their faith in the good sense of natural man with the information of his senses and his power of reasoning, they attacked spiritual and scientific dogmatism and authority, intolerance, censorship, and restrictions on individual liberties. With a secular view of the world and a belief in the possibility of progress and perfectability, they looked upon the state as the necessary instrument for future development. Central to their social philosophy was the belief in natural rights - the belief that reason shows us not only how the natural world works, but what is right and wrong in transactions among men. Jefferson as a whole person, as a thinker, and as a statesman was a perfect embodiment of the Enlightenment.

Many of the central ideas of the Enlightenment are found in Grotius, Hobbes, William Penn, Bentham and Kant, but it is clearly John Locke who was closest in most respects to Jefferson's thought. Like Locke, Jefferson held that the rights to life and liberty are natural rights given by God but comprehended by reason, that all men are created equal, the government must rest on consent of the governed. His justification of revolution is almost straight out of Locke: we don't revolt for 'light and transient causes' (for "little mismanagements", Locke), but "when a long train of abuses and usurpations...pursuing the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism..." (Locke: "when a long train of abuses... all tending the same way, makes the design visible to the people") then "it is their duty to throw off such government" (Locke: then, "it is not to be wondered that..." the people should seek to change the ruler). What is not so clear, perhaps, is why this change must be achieved by force of arms. These were arguments to establish the cause as just. Did they justify the means as well?

Congress proceeded the same day [4] to consider the declaration of Independance which had been reported & lain on the table the Friday preceding, and on Monday referred to a commee of the whole. The pusillanimous idea that we had friends in England worth keeping terms with, still haunted the minds of many. For this reason those passages which conveyed censures on the people of England were struck out, lest they should give them offence. The clause too, reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa, was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary still wished to continue it. Our northern brethren also I believe felt a little tender under those censures; for tho' their people have very few slaves themselves yet they had been pretty considerable carriers of them to others. The debates having taken up the greater parts of the 2d 3d & 4th days of July were,[1] in the evening of the last, closed the declaration was reported by the commee, agreed to by the house and signed by every member present except Mr. Dickinson.[2] As the sentiments of men are known not only by what they receive, but what they reject also, I will state the form of the declaration as originally reported. The parts struck out by Congress shall be distinguished by a black line drawn under them; & those inserted by them shall be placed in the margin or in a concurrent column.[3]

A DECLARATION BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN GENERAL CONGRESS ASSEMBLED

When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate & equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with inherent and inalienable (certain) rights; that among these are life, liberty, & the pursuit of happiness: that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, & to institute new government, laying it's foundation on such principles, & organizing it's powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety & happiness. Prudence indeed will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light & transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses & usurpations begun at a distinguished period and pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty to throw off such government, & to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies; & such is now the necessity which constrains (alter) them to expunge their former systems of government. The history of the present king of Great Britain is a history of unremitting (repeated) injuries & usurpations, among which appears no solitary fact to contradict the uniform tenor of the rest but all have (all having) in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. To prove this let facts be submitted to a candid world for the truth of which we pledge a faith yet unsullied by falsehood.

He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome & necessary for the public good.

He has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate & pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; & when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.

He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature, a right inestimable to them, & formidable to tyrants only.

He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the deposi-

tory of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.

He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly & continually for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people.

He has refused for a long time after such dissolutions to cause others to be elected, whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise, the state remaining in the meantime exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without & convulsions within.

He has endeavored to prevent the population of these states; for that purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners, refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, & raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands.

He has suffered the administration of justice totally to cease in some of these states refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers. (obstructed by)

He has made our judges dependant on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, & the amount & paiment of their salaries.

He has erected a multitude of new offices by a self assumed power and sent hither swarms of new officers to harass our people and eat out their substance.

He has kept among us in times of peace standing armies and ships of war without the consent of our legislatures.

He has affected to render the military independant of, & superior to the civil power.

He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitutions & unacknowledged by our laws, giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation for quartering large bodies of armed troops among us; for protecting them by a mock-trial from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these states; for cutting off our trade with all parts of the world; for imposing taxes on us without our consent; for depriving us [ ] of the benefits of trial by jury; for transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offences; for abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighboring province, establishing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries, so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these states; for taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments; for suspending our own legislatures, & declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. (in many cases; colonies)

He has abdicated government here withdrawing his governors, and declaring us out of his allegiance & protection. (by declaring us out of his protection, and waging war against us.)

He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, & destroyed the lives of our people.

He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation & tyranny already begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy [ ] unworthy the head of a civilized nation. (scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, & totally)

He has constrained our fellow citizens taken captive on the high seas to bear arms against their country, to become the executioners of their friends & brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands.

He has [ ] endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, & conditions of existence. (excited domestic insurrection among us, & has)

He has incited treasonable insurrections of our fellow-citizens, with the allurements of forfeiture & confiscation of our property.

He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating it's most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating & carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobium of INFIDEL powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought & sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce. And that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he also obtruded them: thus paying

off former crimes committed against the LIBERTIES of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the LIVES of another.

In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms: our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injuries.

A prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant is unfit to be the ruler of a [ ] people who mean to be free. Future ages will scarcely believe that the hardiness of one man adventured, within the short compass of twelve years only, to lay a foundation so broad & so undisguised for tyranny over a people fostered & fixed in principles of freedom.

Nor have we been wanting in attention to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend a jurisdiction over these our states. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration & settlement here, no one of which could warrant so strange a pretension: that these were effected at the expense of our own blood & treasure, unassisted by the wealth or the strength of Great Britain: that in constituting indeed our several forms of government, we had adopted one common king, thereby laying a foundation for perpetual league & amity with them: but that submission to their parliament was no part of our constitution, nor ever in idea, if history may be credited: and, we [ ] appealed to their native justice and magnanimity as well as to the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations which were likely to interrupt our connection and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice & of consanguinity, and when occasions have been given them, by the regular course of their laws, of removing from their councils the disturbers of our harmony, they have, by their free election, re-established them in power. At this very time too they are permitting their chief magistrate to send over not only soldiers of our common blood, but Scotch & foreign mercenaries to invade & destroy us. These facts have given the last stab to agonizing affection, and manly spirit bids us to renounce forever these unfeeling brethren. We must endeavor to forget our former love for them and hold them as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends. We might have been a free and a great people together; but a communication of grandeur & of freedom it seems is below their dignity. Be it so, since they will have it. The road to happiness & to glory is open to us too. We will tread it apart from them, and acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our eternal separation [ ] !

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We must therefore and hold them as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends.

We therefore the representatives of the United States of America in General Congress assembled do in the name & by authority of the good people of these states reject & renounce all allegiance & subjection to the kings of Great Britain & all others who may hereafter claim by, through or under them: we utterly dissolve all political connection which may heretofore have subsisted between us & the people or parliament of Great Britain: & finally we do assert & declare these colonies to be free & independent states, & that as free & independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, & to do all other acts & things which independent states may of right do.

And for the support of this declaration we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, & our sacred honor.

We therefore the representatives of the United States of America in General Congress assembled, appealing to the supreme judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do in the name, & by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish & declare that these united colonies are & of right ought to be free & independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them & the state of Great Britain is, & ought to be, totally dissolved; & that as free & independent states they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce & to do all other acts & things which independant states may of right do.

And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine providence we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, & our sacred honor.[1]

The Declaration thus signed on the 4th, on paper was engrossed on parchment, & signed again on the 2d. of August.[1]

Jeremy Bentham was an English philosopher known primarily as the founder of the ethical theory, utilitarianism, but also by the legal profession for the theories of jurisprudence which followed from his utilitarianism, and by the economists for his influence on economic theory. He was born in London in 1748, entered Queen's College, Oxford University, at the age of twelve, graduated at the age of 15 in 1763 and immediately began the study of law, being admitted to the bar in 1767, at nineteen. However he never practiced law, though law was his major interest throughout his life. Instead he set about the task of reforming the legal system, developing a theory of jurisprudence and suggesting a better codification of both civil and penal law. He became the leader of the Philosophical Radicals, and he and his disciples exercised a profound influence on the course of legislation in England in the 19th century including reforms in criminal law, judicial organization and electoral laws. The theory of utilitarianism was subsequently taken up by John Stuart Mill, and Bentham's theory of jurisprudence was further developed by John Austin, the first professor of jurisprudence in the University of London which was founded by the movement Bentham started. Bentham died in 1832, the honored sage of a strong humanitarian movement.

Bentham did not write speculatively about the nature of the universe; he was not known either either as a materialist or dualist (like Hobbes or Locke), much less a theologian or idealist. Rather, he was a practical man, fiercely determined to stick to observable, common sense data. He insisted on very nominalistic, literal senses of the meanings of words and held that most of our words refer not to real entities but to fictitious ones. On such grounds he attacked both the legal notion of contracts and the social contract theories of government in Hobbes and Locke. He also held that concept of "natural rights" or "god-given rights" or "moral rights" was "nonsense on stilts". Persons might have certain rights bestowed by laws - legal rights; or they might have rights recognized by custom in their society. But whether such rights were good or bad was another question entirely, and the idea that above and beyond law and custom there exist some moral laws of nature, or some "higher" moral rights, was to take a fiction for fact. His primary motivation was to bring about a clear, coherent, humane and simplified legal system.

The foundation of Bentham's political, legal and economic theories and proposals, as well as his plan for a "Universal and Perpetual Peace", was his philosophical theory of ethics, utilitarianism. This theory was developed in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789[see p 145]. According to this theory, the way to determine whether a proposed action is good or bad, is to consider the expected effects of the action on the happiness (pleasures) or unhappiness (pains) of all persons who would be effected by it. One should add up the total ammount of good (happiness) that would be caused and subtract from it the total ammount of bad (unhappiness); if there was a greater ammount of happiness than unhappiness caused the act would be a good one; if it would cause more unhappiness than happiness, it would be bad. Among alternative acts the morally best one to choose would be that which would bring the greatest ammount of happiness to all people affected. In calculating ammounts of pleasure and pain (or happiness and unhappiness) one should consider both the duration and different degrees of intensity in each individual; and one should also recognize the many different kinds of pleasure and pain - including those related to pride, moral sensibilities,aesthetic tastes as well as physical pain or pleasure. Thus the over-all moral aim of the utilitarian principle is to aim always at the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. Whereas 'utility' had been previously thought of only in terms of utility to the conqueror, or to the monarch, or to the self-interested individual; Bentham gave a moral dimension to the concept, for often what is morally right for an individual will be an act which is contrary to his own wishes and desires but will be better for all concerned according to this criterion.

The following writings on the Objects of International Law, and A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace, were not published during Bentham's lifetime; but they show how utilitarianism can provide a different philosophical foundation for such projects than the theological doctrines,contract or natural rights theories we have seen in earlier thinkers.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY.

I. NATURE has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The *principle of utility* [1] recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.

But enough of metaphor and declamation: it is not by such means that moral science is to be improved.

II. The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work: it will be proper therefore at the outset to give an explicit and determinate account of what is meant by it. By the principle [1] of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.

III. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

[1] Note by the Author, July 1822.
To this denomination has of late been added, or substituted, the *greatest happiness* or *greatest felicity* principle: this for shortness, instead of saying at length *that principle* which states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right and proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action: of human action in every situation, and in particular in that of a functionary or set of functionaries exercising the powers of Government. The word *utility* does not so clearly point to the ideas of *pleasure* and *pain* as the words *happiness* and *felicity* do: nor does it lead us to the consideration of the *number*, of the interests affected; to the *number*, as being the circumstance, which contributes, in the largest proportion, to the formation of the standard here in question; the *standard of right and wrong*, by which alone the propriety of human conduct, in every situation, can with propriety be tried. This want of a sufficiently manifest connexion between the ideas of *happiness* and *pleasure* on the one hand, and the idea of *utility* on the other, I have every now and then found operating, and with but too much efficiency, as a bar to the acceptance, that might otherwise have been given, to this principle.

IV. The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious *body*, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its *members*. The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.

V. It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual [1]. A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be *for* the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.

VI. An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility, or, for shortness sake, to utility, (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.

VII. A measure of government (which is but a particular kind of action, performed by a particular person or persons) may be said to be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish it.

VIII. When an action, or in particular a measure of government, is supposed by a man to be conformable to the principle of utility, it may be convenient, for the purposes of discourse, to imagine a kind of law or dictate, called a law or dictate of utility: and to speak of the action in question, as being conformable to such law or dictate.

IX. A man may be said to be a partizan of the principle of utility, when the approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any measure, is determined by and proportioned to the tendency which he conceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the community: or in other words, to its conformity or unconformity to the laws or dictates of utility.

X. Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words *ought*, and *right* and *wrong*, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none.

XI. Has the rectitude of this principle been ever formally contested? It should seem that it had, by those who have not known what they have been meaning. Is it susceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for that which is used to prove every thing else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless.

ESSAY I.

OBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

If a citizen of the world had to prepare an universal international code, what would he propose to himself as his object? It would be the common and equal utility of all nations: this would be his inclination and his duty. Would or would not the duty of a particular legislator, acting for one particular nation, be the same with that of the citizen of the world? That moderation, which would be a virtue in an individual acting for his own interests, would it become a vice, or treason, in a public man commissioned by a whole nation? Would it be sufficient for him to pursue in a strict or generous manner their interests as he would pursue his own? — or would it be proper, that he should pursue their interests as he would pursue his own, or ought he so to regulate his course in this respect as they would regulate theirs, were it possible for them to act with a full knowledge of all circumstances? And in this latter case, would the course he would pursue be unjust or equitable? What ought to be required of him in this respect?

Whatever he may think upon these questions — how small soever may be the regard which it may be wished that he should have for the common utility, it will not be the less necessary for him to understand it. This will be necessary for him on two accounts: In the first place, that he may follow this object in so far as his particular object is comprised in it; — secondly, that he may frame according to it, the expectations that he ought to entertain, the demands he ought to make upon other nations. For, in conclusion, the line of common utility once drawn, this would be the direction towards which the conduct of all nations would tend — in which their common efforts would find least resistance — in which they would operate with the greatest force — and in which the equilibrium once established, would be maintained with the least difficulty.

Let us take, for example, the famous law with respect to prizes, adopted by so many nations at the suggestion of Catherine II. of Russia. How formidable soever may have been the initiating power, there is no reason to think that it was fear which operated upon so many nations, together so powerful, and some of them so remote: it must have been its equity, that is to say, its common utility, or, what amounts to the same thing, its apparent utility, which determined their acceptance of it. I say real or apparent; for it will be seen that this is not the place to decide without necessity upon a question so delicate and complex.

But ought the sovereign of a state to sacrifice the interests of his subjects for the advantage of foreigners? Why not? — provided it be in a case, if there be such an one, in which it would have been praiseworthy in his subjects to make the sacrifice themselves.

Probity itself, so praiseworthy in an individual, why should it not be so in a whole nation? Praiseworthy in each one, how can it be otherwise in all? It may have been true that Charles the Second did well in selling Dunkirk: he would not have done less well, had he not put the price in his own pocket.

It is the end which determines the means. Here the end changes (or at least appears to change;) it is therefore necessary that the means should change or appear to change also.

The end of the conduct which a sovereign ought to observe relative to his own subjects, — the end of the internal laws of a society, — ought to be the greatest happiness of the society concerned. This is the end which individuals will unite in approving, if they approve of any. It is the straight line — the shortest line — the most natural of all those by which it is possible for a sovereign to direct his course. The end of the conduct he ought to observe towards other men, what ought it to be, judging by the same principle? Shall it again be said, the greatest happiness of his own subjects? Upon this footing, the welfare, the demands of other men, will be as nothing in his eyes: with regard to them, he will have no other object than that of subjecting them to his wishes by all manner of means. He will serve them as he actually serves the beasts, which are used by him as they use the herbs on which they browse — in short, as the ancient Greeks, as the Romans, as all the models of virtue in antiquity, as all the nations with whose history we are acquainted, employed them.

Yet in proceeding in this career, he cannot fail always to experience a certain resistance — resistance similar in its nature and in its cause, if not always in its certainty and efficacy, to that which individuals ought from the first to experience in a more restricted career; so that, from reiterated experience, states ought either to have set themselves to seek out — or at least would have found, their line of least resistance, as individuals of that same society have already found theirs; and this will be the line which represents the greatest and common utility of all nations taken together.

The point of repose will be that in which all the forces find their equilibrium, from which the greatest difficulty would be found in making them to depart.

Hence, in order to regulate his proceedings with regard to other nations, a given sovereign has no other means more adapted to attain his own particular end, than the setting before his eyes the general end — the most extended welfare of all the nations on the earth. So that it happens that this most vast and extended end — this foreign end — will appear, so to speak, to govern and to carry with it the principal, the ultimate end; in such manner, that in order to attain to this, there is no method more sure for a sovereign than so to act, as if he had no other object than to attain to the other; — in the same manner as in its approach to the sun, a satellite has no other course to pursue than that which is taken by the planet which governs it.

For greater simplicity, let us therefore substitute everywhere this object to the other: — and though unhappily there has not yet been any body of law which regulates the conduct of a given nation, in respect to all other nations on every occasion, as if this had been, or say rather, as if this ought to be, the rule, — yet let us do as much as is possible to establish one.

1. The first object of international law for a given nation: — Utility general, in so far as it consists in doing no injury to the other nations respectively, saving the regard which is proper to its own well-being.

2. Second object: — Utility general, in so far as it consists in doing the greatest good possible to other nations, saving the regard which is proper to its own well-being.

3. Third object: — Utility general, in so far as it consists in the given nation not receiving any injury from other nations respectively, saving the regard due to the well-being of these same nations.

4. Fourth object: — Utility general, in so far as it consists in such state receiving the greatest possible benefit from all other nations, saving the regard due to the well-being of these nations.

It is to the two former objects that the duties which the given nation ought to recognise may be referred. It is to the two latter that the rights which it ought to claim may be referred. But if these same rights shall in its opinion be violated, in what manner, by what means shall it apply, or seek for satisfaction? There is no other mode but that of war. But war is an evil — it is even the complication of all other evils.

5. Fifth object: — In case of war, make such arrangements, that the least possible evil may be produced, consistent with the acquisition of the good which is sought for.

Expressed in the most general manner, the end that a disinterested legislator upon international law would propose to himself, would therefore be the greatest happiness of all nations taken together.

In resolving this into the most primitive principles, he would follow the same route which he would follow with regard to internal laws. He would set himself to prevent positive international offences — to encourage the practice of positively useful actions.

He would regard as a positive crime every proceeding — every arrangement, by which the given nation should do more evil to foreign nations taken together, whose interests might be affected, than it should do good to itself. For example, the seizing a port which would be of no use except as the means of advantageously attacking a foreign nation; — the closing against other nations, or another nation, the seas and rivers, which are the highways of our globe; — the employing force or fraud for preventing a foreign nation from carrying on commerce with another nation. But by their reciprocity, injuries may compensate one another.

In the same manner, he would regard as a negative offence every determination, by which the given nation should refuse to render positive services to a foreign nation, when the rendering of them would produce more good to the last-mentioned nation, than it would produce evil to itself. For example, if the given nation, without having reason to fear for its own preservation (occupying two countries of which the productions were different,) should obstinately prohibit commerce with them and a foreign nation: — or if when a foreign nation should be visited with misfortune, and require assistance, it should neglect to furnish it: — or, in conclusion, if having in its own power certain malefactors who have *malâ fide* committed crimes to the prejudice of the foreign nation, it should neglect to do what depends upon it to bring them to justice.

War is, as has been said, a species of procedure by which one nation endeavours to enforce its rights at the expense of another nation. It is the only method to which recourse can be had, when no other method of obtaining satisfaction can be found by complainants, who have no arbitrator between them sufficiently strong, absolutely to take from them all hope of resistance. But if internal procedure be attended by painful ills, international procedure is attended by ills infinitely more painful — in certain respects in point of intensity, commonly in point of duration, and always in point of extent. The counterpart of them will, however, be found in the catalogue of offences against justice.

The laws of peace would therefore be the substantive laws of the international code: the laws of war would be the adjective laws of the same code.

Written 1789, published posthumously.

A PLAN FOR AN UNIVERSAL AND PERPETUAL PEACE.

THE object of the present Essay is to submit to the world a plan for an universal and perpetual peace. The globe is the field of dominion to which the author aspires, — the press the engine, and the only one he employs, — the cabinet of mankind the theatre of his intrigue.

The happiest of mankind are sufferers by war; and the wisest, nay, even the least wise, are wise enough to ascribe the chief of their sufferings to that cause.

The following plan has for its basis two fundamental propositions:—1. The reduction and fixation of the force of the several nations that compose the European system; 2. The emancipation of the distant dependencies of each state.* Each of these propositions has its distinct advantages; but neither of them, it will appear, would completely answer the purpose without the other.

As to the utility of such an universal and lasting peace, supposing a plan for that purpose practicable, and likely to be adopted, there can be but one voice. The objection, and the only objection to it, is the apparent impracticability of it; — that it is not only hopeless, but that to such a degree that any proposal to that effect deserves the name of visionary and ridiculous. This objection I shall endeavour in the first place to remove; for the removal of this prejudice may be necessary to procure for the plan a hearing.

What can be better suited to the preparing of men's minds for the reception of such a proposal than the proposal itself?

Let it not be objected that the age is not ripe for such a proposal: the more it wants of being ripe, the sooner we should begin to do what can be done to ripen it; the more we should do to ripen it. A proposal of this sort, is one of those things that can never come too early nor too late.

Who that bears the name of Christian can refuse the assistance of his prayers? What pulpit can forbear to second me with its eloquence,—Catholics and Protestants, Church-of-England-men and Dissenters, may all agree in this, if in nothing else. I call upon them all to aid me with their countenance and their support.

The ensuing sheets are dedicated to the common welfare of all civilized nations; but more particularly of Great Britain and France.

The end in view is to recommend three grand objects, — simplicity of government, national frugality, and peace.

Reflection has satisfied me of the truth of the following propositions: —

I. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to have any foreign dependencies whatsoever.

II. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to have any treaty of alliance, offensive or defensive, with any other power whatever.

III. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to have any treaty with any power whatsoever, for the purpose of possessing any advantage whatsoever in point of trade, to the exclusion of any other nation whatsoever.

IV. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to keep up any naval force beyond what may be sufficient to defend its commerce against pirates.

V. That it is not the interest of Great Britain to keep on foot any regulations whatsoever of distant preparation for the augmentation or maintenance of its naval force; such as the Navigation Act, bounties on the Greenland trade, and other trades regarded as nurseries for seamen.

VI. VII. VIII. IX. & X. That all these several propositions are also true of France.

As far as Great Britain is concerned, I rest the proof of these several propositions principally upon two very simple principles.

I. That the increase of growing wealth in every nation in a given period, is necessarily limited by the quantity of capital it possesses at that period.

II. That Great Britain, with or without Ireland, and without any other dependency, can have no reasonable ground to apprehend injury from any one nation upon earth.

Turning to France, I substitute to the last of the two just-mentioned propositions the following: —

III. That France, standing singly, has at present nothing to fear from any other nation than Great Britain: nor, if standing clear of her foreign dependencies, would she have any thing to fear from Great Britain.

XI. That supposing Great Britain and France thoroughly agreed, the principal difficulties would be removed to the establishment of a plan of general and permanent pacification for all Europe.

XII. That for the maintenance of such a pacification, general and perpetual treaties might be formed, limiting the number of troops to be maintained.

XIII. That the maintenance of such a pacification might be considerably facilitated, by the establishment of a common court of judicature for the decision of differences between the several nations, although such court were not to be armed with any coercive powers.

XIV. That secresy in the operations of the foreign department ought not to be endured in England; being altogether useless, and equally repugnant to the interests of liberty and to those of peace.

Proposition I.—That it is not the interest of Great Britain to have any foreign dependencies whatsoever.

The truth of this proposition will appear if we consider, 1*st*, That distant dependencies increase the chances of war, —

1. By increasing the number of possible subjects of dispute.

2. By the natural obscurity of title in case of new settlements or discoveries.

3. By the particular obscurity of the evidence resulting from the distance.

4. By men's caring less about wars when the scene is remote, than when it is nearer home.

2*d*, That colonies are seldom, if ever, sources of profit to the mother country.

Profitable industry has five branches: — 1. Production of new materials, including agricultures, mining, and fisheries; 2. Manufactures; 3. Home trade; 4. Foreign trade; 5. Carrying trade. The quantity of profitable industry that can be carried on in a country being limited by that of the capital which the country can command, it follows that no part of that quantity can be bestowed upon any one branch, but it must be withdrawn from, or withholden from, all the others. No encouragement, therefore, can be given to any one, but it must be a proportionable discouragement to all the others. Nothing can be done by government to induce a man to begin or continue to employ his capital in any one of those branches, but it must induce him in the same degree to withdraw or withhold that capital from all the rest. Of these five branches, no one is to such a degree more beneficial to the public than the rest, as that it should be worth its while to call forth the powers of law to give it an advantage. But if there were any, it would unquestionably be the improvement and cultivation of land. Every fictitious encouragement to any one of these rival branches being a proportionable discouragement to agriculture. Every encouragement to any of those branches of manufacture which produce articles that are at present sold to the colonies, is a proportionable discouragement to agriculture.

When colonies are to be made out to be beneficial to the mother country, and the quantum of the benefit is to be estimated, the mode in which the estimate is made is curious enough. An account is taken of what they export, which is almost the whole of their produce. All this, it is said, while you have the colonies, is yours; this is exactly what you lose if you lose your colonies. How much of all this is really yours? Not one single halfpenny. When they let you take it from them, do they give it you for nothing? Not they indeed; they make you pay for it just as anybody else would do. How much? Just so much as you would pay them if they belonged to themselves or to anybody else.

For maintaining colonies there are several avowed reasons, besides others which are not avowed: of the avowed reasons, by far the principal one is, the benefit of trade. If your colonies were not subject to you, they would not trade with you; they would not buy any of your goods, or let you buy any of theirs; at least, you could not be sure of their doing so: if they were subject to anybody else they would not do so; for the colonies of other nations are, you see, not suffered to trade with you. Give up your colonies, you give up so much of your trade as is carried on with your colonies. No; we do not give up any such thing, — we do not give up anything whatsoever. Trade with colonies cannot, any more than with anywhere else, be carried on without capital: just so much of our capital as is employed in our trade with the colonies — just so much of it is not employed elsewhere — just so much is either kept or taken from other trades.

Suppose, then, any branch of trade or manufacture to decline — even suppose it lost altogether — is this any permanent loss to the nation? Not the smallest. We know the worst that can happen from any such loss; the capital that would otherwise have been employed in the lost branch will be employed in agriculture. The loss of the colonies, if the loss of the colony trade were the consequence of the loss of the colonies, would at the worst be so much gain to agriculture.

Other reasons against distant dominion may be found in a consideration of the good of the government. Distant mischiefs make little impression on those on whom the remedying of them depends. A single murder committed in London makes more impression than if thousands of murders and other cruelties were committed in the East Indies. The situation of Hastings, only because he was pre-

* Two original writers have gone before me in this line, Dean Tucker and Dr. Anderson. The object of the first was to persuade the world of the inutility of war, but more particularly of the war then raging when he wrote; the object of the second to show the inutility of the colonies.

sent, excited compassion in those who heard the detail of the cruelties committed by him with indifference.

The communication of grievances cannot be too quick from those who feel them to those who have the power to relieve them. The reason which in the old writs the king is made to assign for his interfering to afford relief, is the real cause which originally gave birth to that interference, — it is one of those few truths which have contrived to make their way through the thick cloud of lies and nonsense they contain. " See what it is that these people want," says the sovereign to the ministers of justice, " that I may not any more be troubled with their noise." The motive assigned to the unjust judge in the Gospel, is the motive which the sovereign, who is styled the fountain of justice, is thus made to avow.

The following, then, are the final measures which ought to be pursued: —

1. Give up all the colonies.
2. Found no new colonies.

The following is a summary of the reasons for giving up all the colonies: —

I. Interest of the mother-country.

1. Saving the expense of the establishments, civil and military.

2. Saving the danger of war — 1. For enforcing their obedience; 2. On account of the jealousy produced by the apparent power they confer.

3. Saving the expense of defending them, in case of war on other grounds.

4. Getting rid of the means of corruption afforded by the patronage — 1. Of their civil establishments; 2. Of the military force employed in their defence.

5. Simplifying the whole frame of government, and thereby rendering a competent skill in the business of government more attainable — 1. To the members of administration; 2. To the people.*

The stock of national intelligence is deteriorated by the false notions which must be kept up, in order to prevent the nation from opening its eyes and insisting upon the enfranchisement of the colonies.

At the same time, bad government results to the mother-country from the complication of interests, the indistinct views, and the consumption of time, occasioned by the load of distant dependencies.

II. Interest of the colonies.

Diminishing the chance of bad government resulting from — 1. Opposite interest; 2. Ignorance.

The real interests of the colony must be sacrificed to the imaginary interests of the mother-country. It is for the purpose of governing it badly, and for no other, that you can wish to get or to keep a colony. Govern it well, it is of no use to you. Govern it as well as the inhabitants would govern it themselves, — you must choose those to govern it whom they themselves would choose. You must sacrifice none of its interests to your own, — you must bestow as much time and attention to their interests as they would themselves: in a word, you must take those very measures, and none others, which they themselves would take. But would this be governing? and what would it be worth to you if it were?

After all, it would be impossible for you to govern them so well as they would govern themselves, on account of the distance.†

The following are approximating measures: —

1. Maintain no military force in any of the colonies.

2. Issue no moneys for the maintenance of any civil establishment in any of the colonies.

3. Nominate to the offices in the colonies as long as they permit you; — yield as soon as they contest such nomination.

4. Give general instructions to governors to consent to all acts presented to them.

5. Issue no moneys for fortifications.

Proposition II. — That it is not the interest of Great Britain to have any treaty of alliance, offensive or defensive, with any other power whatever.

Reason: saving the danger of war arising out of them.

And more especially ought not Great Britain to guarantee foreign constitutions.

Reason: saving the danger of war resulting from the odium of so tyrannical a measure.

Proposition III. — That it is not the interest of Great Britain to have any treaty with any power whatsoever, for the purpose of possessing any advantages whatsoever, in point of trade, to the exclusion of any other nation whatsoever.

That the trade of every nation is limited by the quantity of capital is so plainly and obviously true, as to challenge a place among self-evident propositions. But self-evident propositions must not expect to be easily admitted, if admitted at all, if the consequences of them clash with prevalent passions and confirmed prejudices.

Nations are composed of individuals. The trade of a nation must be limited by the same causes that limit the trade of the individual. Each individual merchant, when he has as much trade as his whole capital, and all the credit he can get by means of his capital can suffice for carrying on, can have no more. This being true of each merchant, is not less true of the whole number of merchants put together.

Many books directly recognise the proposition, that the quantity of trade a nation can carry on is limited — limited by the quantity of its capital. None dispute the proposition; but almost all, somewhere or other, proceed upon the opposite supposition; they suppose the quantity of trade to have no limitation whatsoever.

It is a folly to buy manufactured goods; wise to buy raw materials. Why? because you sell them to yourselves, or, what is still better, to foreigners, manufactured; and the manufacturer's profit is all clear gain to you. What is here forgotten is, that the manufacturer, to carry on his business, must have a capital; and that just so much capital as is employed in that way, is prevented from being employed in any other.

Hence the perfect inutility and mischievousness of all laws and public measures of government whatsoever, for the pretended encouragement of trade — all bounties in every shape whatsoever — all non-importation agreements and engagements to consume home manufactures in preference to foreign — in any other view than to afford temporary relief to temporary distress.

But of the two — prohibitions and bounties — penal encouragements and remuneratory — the latter are beyond comparison the most mischievous. Prohibitions, except while they are fresh, and drive men at a great expense out of the employments they are embarked in, are only nugatory. Bounties are wasteful and oppressive: they force money from one man in order to pay another man for carrying on a trade, which, if it were not a losing one, there would be no need of paying him for.

What then, are all modes of productive industry alike? May not one be more profitable than another? Certainly. But the favourite one is it, in fact, more profitable than any other? That is the question and the only question that ought to be put; and that is the very question which nobody ever thinks of putting.

Were it ever put and answered, and answered ever so clearly, it never could be of any use as a ground for any permanent plan of policy. Why? Because almost as soon as one branch is known to be more profitable than the rest, so soon it ceases so to be. — Men flock to it from all other branches, and the old equilibrium is presently restored. Your merchants have a monopoly as against foreigners? True, but they have no monopoly as against one another. Men cannot, in every instance, quit the less productive branch their capitals are already employed in, to throw them into this more productive one? True — but there are young beginners as well as old stagers; and the first concern of a young beginner, who has a capital to employ in a branch of industry, is to look out for the most profitable.

Objection: — Oh! but it is manufacture that creates the demand for the productions of agriculture. You cannot, therefore, increase the productions of agriculture but by increasing manufactures. No such thing. I admit the antecedent — I deny the consequence. Increase of manufactures certainly does create an increase in the demand for the productions of agriculture. Equally certain is it that the increase of manufactures is not necessary to produce an increase in that demand. Farmers can subsist without ribbons, gauzes, or fine cambrics. Weavers of ribbons, gauzes, or fine cambrics, cannot subsist without the productions of agriculture; necessary subsistence never can lose its value. Those who produce it are themselves a market for their produce. Is it possible that provisions should be too cheap? Is there any present danger of it? Suppose (in spite of the extreme absurdity of the supposition) that provisions were growing gradually too cheap, from the increase of the quantity produced, and the want of manufacturers to consume them, what would be

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* Reasons for giving up Gibraltar: —

1. The expense of the military establishment, viz. fortifications, garrisons, ordnance, recruiting service, victualling.

2. The means of corruption resulting from the patronage.

3. The saving the danger of war with Spain, to which the possession of the place is a perpetual provocation.

4. The price that might be obtained from Spain for the purchase of it.

5. Saving the occasional expense of defending it and victualling it in war.

6. The possession of it is useless. It is said to be useful only on account of the Levant trade: — but, 1. We could carry on that trade equally well without Gibraltar. 2. If we could not, we should suffer no loss. The capital employed in that trade would be equally productive if employed in any other. 3. Supposing this the most productive of all trades, yet what we lost by losing Gibraltar would only be equal to the difference between the per centage gained in that trade and the per centage gained in the next most productive trade. For, 4. We could still do as the Swedes, Danes, Dutch, &c., and as we did before we had possession of Gibraltar.

Reasons for giving up the East Indies: —

1. Saving the danger of war.

2. Getting rid of the means of corruption resulting from the patronage, civil and military.

3. Simplifying the government.

4. Getting rid of prosecutions that consume the time of parliament, and beget suspicion of injustice.

5. Preventing the corruption of the morals of the natives by the example of successful rapacity.

† It is in proportion as we see things — as they are brought within the reach of our attention and observation — that we care for them. A minister who would not kill one man with his own hands, does not mind causing the death of myriads by the hands of others at a distance.

the consequence? The increasing cheapness would increase the facility and disposition to marry: it would thence increase the population of the country; and the children thus produced, eating as they grew up, would keep down this terrible evil of a superabundance of provisions.

Provisions, the produce of agriculture, constantly and necessarily produce a market for themselves. The more provisions a man raises, over and above what is necessary for his own consumption, the more he has to give to others, to induce them to provide him with whatever, besides provisions, he chooses to have. In a word, the more he has to spare, the more he has to give to manufacturers; who, by taking it from him, and paying him with the produce of their labours, afford the encouragement requisite for the productions of the fruits of agriculture.

It is impossible, therefore, that you can ever have too much agriculture. It is impossible that while there is ground untilled, or ground that might be better tilled than it is, that any detriment should ensue to the community from the withholding or withdrawing capital from any other branch of industry, and employing it in agriculture. It is impossible, therefore, that the loss of any branch of trade can be productive of any detriment to the community, excepting always the temporary distress experienced by the individuals concerned in it for the time being, when the decline is a sudden one.

The following are the measures the propriety of which results from the above principles: —

1. That no treaties granting commercial preferences should be made.
2. That no wars should be entered into for compelling such treaties.
3. That no alliances should be contracted for the sake of purchasing them.
4. That no encouragements should be given to particular branches of trade, by —
   (1.) Prohibition of rival manufactures.
   (2.) Taxation of rival manufactures.
   (3.) Bounties* on the trade meant to be favoured.
5. That no treaties should be entered into insuring commercial preferences.

They are useless as they add nothing to the mass of wealth; they only influence the direction of it.

Proposition IV.—That it is not the interest of Great Britain to keep up any naval force beyond what may be sufficient to defend its commerce against pirates.

It is unnecessary, except for the defence of the colonies, or for the purposes of war, undertaken either for the compelling of trade or the formation of commercial treaties.

Proposition V.—That it is not the interest of Great Britain to keep on foot any regulations whatsoever of distant preparation for the augmentation or maintenance of its naval force — such as the navigation act, bounties on the Greenland trade, and other trades regarded as nurseries for seamen.

This proposition is a necessary consequence of the foregoing one.

Propositions VI. VII. VIII. IX. & X.

Propositions similar to the foregoing are equally true applied to France.

Proposition XI. — That supposing Great Britain and France thoroughly agreed, the principal difficulties would be removed to the establishment of a plan of general and permanent pacification for all Europe.

Proposition XII. — That for the maintenance of such a pacification, general and perpetual treaties might be formed, limiting the number of troops to be maintained.†

If the simple relation of a single nation with a single other nation be considered, perhaps the matter would not be very difficult. The misfortune is, that almost everywhere compound relations are found. On the subject of troops,—France says to England, Yes I would voluntarily make with you a treaty of disarming, if there were only you; but it is necessary for me to have troops to defend me from the Austrians. Austria might say the same to France; but it is necessary to guard against Prussia, Russia, and the Porte. And the like allegation might be made by Prussia with regard to Russia.

Whilst as to naval forces, if it concerned Europe only, the difficulty might perhaps not be very considerable. To consider France, Spain and Holland, as making together a counterpoise to the power of Britain,—perhaps on account of the disadvantages which accompany the concert between three separate nations, to say nothing of the tardiness and publicity of procedures under the Dutch Constitution,—perhaps England might allow to all together a united force equal to half or more than its own.

An agreement of this kind would not be dishonourable. If the covenant were on one side only, it might be so. If it regard both parties together, the reciprocity takes away the acerbity. By the treaty which put an end to the first Punic war, the number of vessels that the Carthaginians might maintain was limited. This condition was it not humiliating? It might be: but if it were, it must have been because there was nothing correspondent to it on the side of the Romans. A treaty which placed all the security on one side, what cause could it have had for its source? It could only have had one — that is the avowed superiority of the party thus incontestably secured, — such a condition could only have been a law dictated by the conqueror to the party conquered. The law of the strongest. None but a conqueror could have dictated it; none but the conquered would have accepted it.

On the contrary, whatsoever nation should get the start of the other in making the proposal to reduce and fix the amount of its armed force, would crown itself with everlasting honour. The risk would be nothing— the gain certain. This gain would be, the giving an incontrovertible demonstration of its own disposition to peace, and of the opposite disposition in the other nation in case of its rejecting the proposal.

The utmost fairness should be employed. The nation addressed should be invited to consider and point out whatever further securities it deemed necessary, and whatever further concessions it deemed just.

The proposal should be made in the most public manner:—it should be an address from nation to nation. This, at the same time that it conciliated the confidence of the nation addressed, would make it impracticable for the government of that nation to neglect it, or stave it off by shifts and evasions. It would sound the heart of the nation addressed. It would discover its intentions, and proclaim them to the world.

The cause of humanity has still another resource. Should Britain prove deaf and impracticable, let France, without conditions, emancipate her colonies, and break up her marine. The advantage even upon this plan would be immense, the danger none. The colonies I have already shown are a source of expense, not of revenue, — of burthen to the people, not of relief. This appears to be the case, even upon the footing of those expenses which appear upon the face of them to belong to the colonies, and are the only ones that have hitherto been set down to their account. But in fact the whole expense of the marine belongs also to that account, and no other. What other destination has it? What other can it have? None. Take away the colonies, what use would there be for a single vessel, more than the few necessary in the Mediterranean to curb the pirates.

In case of a war, where at present (1789) would England make its first and only attack upon France? In the colonies. What would she propose to herself from success in such an attack? What but the depriving France of her colonies. Were these colonies — these bones of contention — no longer hers, what then could England do? what could she wish to do?

There would remain the territory of France; with what view could Britain make any attack upon it in any way? Not with views of permanent conquest; — such madness does not belong to our age. Parliament itself, one may venture to affirm, without paying it any very extraordinary compliment, would not wish it. It would not wish it, even could it be accomplished without effort on our part, without resistance on the other. It would not, even though France herself were to solicit it. No parliament would grant a penny for such a purpose. If it did, it would not be a parliament a month. No king would lend his name to such a project. He would be dethroned as surely and as deservedly as James the Second. To say, I will be king of France, would be to say, in other words, I will be absolute in England.

Well, then, no one would dream of conquest. What other purpose could an invasion have? The plunder and destruction of the country. Such baseness is totally repugnant, not only to the spirit of the nation, but to the spirit of the times. Malevolence could be the only motive — rapacity could never counsel it; long before an army could arrive anywhere, everything capable of being plundered would be carried off. Whatever is portable, could be much sooner carried off by the owners, than by any plundering army. No expedition of plunder could ever pay itself.*

* All bounties on particular branches of trade do rather harm than good.

† Precedents.—1. Convention of disarmament between France and Britain 1787, — this is a precedent of the measure or stipulation itself; 2. Armed neutrality code, — this is a precedent of the mode of bringing about the measure, and may serve to disprove the impossibility of a general convention among nations; 3. Treaty forbidding the fortifying of Dunkirk.

* This brings to recollection the achievements of the war from 1755 to 1763. The struggle betwixt prejudice and humanity produced in conduct a result truly ridiculous. Prejudice prescribed an attack upon the enemy in his own territory, — humanity forbade the doing him any harm. Not only nothing was gained by these expeditions, but the mischief done to the country invaded was not nearly equal to the expense of the invasion. When a Japanese rips open his own belly, it is in the assurance that his enemy will follow his example. But in this instance, the Englishman ripped open his own belly that the Frenchman might get a scratch. Why was this absurdity acted? Because we were at war, — and when nations are at war something must be done, or at least appear to be done; and there was nothing else to be done. France was already stripped of all its distant dependencies.

Such is the extreme folly, the madness of war: on no supposition can it be otherwise than mischievous, especially between nations circumstanced as France and England. Though the choice of the events were absolutely at your command, you could not make it of use to you. If unsuccessful, you may be disgraced and ruined: if successful, even to the height of your wishes, you are still but so much the worse. You would still be so much the worse, though it were to cost you nothing. For not even any colony of your own planting, still less a conquest of your own making, will so much as pay its own expenses.

The greatest acquisitions that could be conceived would not be to be wished for, — could they even be attained with the greatest certainty, and without the least expense. In war, we are as likely not to gain as to gain — as likely to lose as to do either: we can neither attempt the one, nor defend ourselves against the other, without a certain and most enormous expense.

Mark well the contrast. All trade is in its essence advantageous — even to that party to whom it is least so. All war is in its essence ruinous; and yet the great employments of government are to treasure up occasions of war, and to put fetters upon trade.

Ask an Englishman what is the great obstacle to a secure and solid peace, he has his answer ready:—It is the ambition, perhaps he will add, the treachery of France. I wish the chief obstacle to a plan for this purpose were the dispositions and sentiments of France! — were that all, the plan need not long wait for adoption.

Of this visionary project, the most visionary part is without question that for the emancipation of distant dependencies. What will an Englishman say, when he sees two French ministers* of the highest reputation, both at the head of their respective departments, both joining in the opinion, that the accomplishment of this event, nay the speedy accomplishment of it, is inevitable, and one of them scrupling not to pronounce it as eminently desirable.

It would only be the bringing things back on these points to the footing they were on before the discovery of America. Europe had then no colonies — no distant garrisons — no standing armies. It would have had no wars but for the feudal system — religious antipathy — the rage of conquest — and the uncertainties of succession. Of these four causes, the first is happily extinct everywhere — the second and third almost everywhere, and at any rate in France and England — the last might, if not already extinguished, be so with great ease.

The moral feelings of men in matters of national morality are still so far short of perfection, that in the scale of estimation, justice has not yet gained the ascendency over force. Yet this prejudice may, in a certain point of view, by accident, be rather favourable to this proposal than otherwise. Truth, and the object of this essay, bid me to say to my countrymen, it is for you to begin the reformation — it is you that have been the greatest sinners. But the same considerations also lead me to say to them, you are the strongest among nations: though justice be not on your side, force is; and it is your force that has been the main cause of your injustice. If the measure of moral approbation had been brought to perfection, such positions would have been far from popular, prudence would have dictated the keeping them out of sight, and the softening them down as much as possible.

Humiliation would have been the effect produced by them on those to whom they appeared true—indignation on those to whom they appeared false. But, as I have observed, men have not yet learned to tune their feelings in unison with the voice of morality in these points. They feel more pride in being accounted strong, than resentment at being called unjust: or rather, the imputation of injustice appears flattering rather than otherwise, when coupled with the consideration of its cause. I feel it in my own experience; but if *I*, listed as I am as the professed and hitherto the only advocate in my own country in the cause of justice, set a less value on justice than is its due, what can I expect from the general run of men?

Proposition XIII.—That the maintenance of such a pacification might be considerably facilitated, by the establishment of a common court of judicature, for the decision of differences between the several nations, although such court were not to be armed with any coercive powers.

It is an observation of somebody's, that no nation ought to yield any evident point of justice to another. This must mean, evident in the eyes of the nation that is to judge, — evident in the eyes of the nation called upon to yield. What does this amount to? That no nation is to give up anything of what it looks upon as its rights — no nation is to make any concessions. Wherever there is any difference of opinion between the negociators of two nations, war is to be the consequence.

While there is no common tribunal, something might be said for this. Concession to notorious injustice invites fresh injustice.

Establish a common tribunal, the necessity for war no longer follows from difference of opinion. Just or unjust, the decision of the arbiters will save the credit, the honour of the contending party.

Can the arrangement proposed be justly styled visionary, when it has been proved of it—that

1. It is the interest of the parties concerned.
2. They are already sensible of that interest.
3. The situation it would place them in is no new one, nor any other than the original situation they set out from.

Difficult and complicated conventions have been effectuated: for examples, we may mention, —

1. The armed neutrality.
2. The American confederation.
3. The German diet.
4. The Swiss league.

Why should not the European fraternity subsist, as well as the German diet or the Swiss league? These latter have no ambitious views. Be it so; but is not this already become the case with the former?

How then shall we concentrate the approbation of the people, and obviate their prejudices?

One main object of the plan is to effectuate a reduction, and that a mighty one, in the contributions of the people. The amount of the reduction for each nation should be stipulated in the treaty; and even previous to the signature of it, laws for the purpose might be prepared in each nation, and presented to every other, ready to be enacted, as soon as the treaty should be ratified in each state.

By these means the mass of the people, the part most exposed to be led away by prejudices, would not be sooner apprized of the measure, than they would feel the relief it brought them. They would see it was for their advantage it was calculated, and that it could not be calculated for any other purpose.

The concurrence of all the maritime powers, except England, upon a former occasion, proved two points: the reasonableness of that measure itself, and the weakness of France in comparison with England. It was a measure not of ambition, but of justice — a law made in favour of equality — a law made for the benefit of the weak. No sinister point was gained, or attempted to be gained by it. France was satisfied with it. Why? because she was weaker than Britain; she *could* have no other motive — on no other supposition could it have been of any advantage to her. Britain was vexed at it. Why? For the opposite reason: she could have no other.

Oh my countrymen! purge your eyes from the film of prejudice — extirpate from your hearts the *black specks* of excessive jealousy, false ambition, selfishness, and insolence. The operations may be painful; but the rewards are glorious indeed! As the main difficulty, so will the main honour be with you.

What though wars should hereafter arise? the intermediate savings will not the less be so much clear gain.

Though, in the generating of the disposition for war, unjust ambition has doubtless had by far too great a share, yet jealousy, sincere and honest jealousy, must be acknowledged to have had a not inconsiderable one. Vulgar prejudice, fostered by passion, assigns the heart as the seat of all the moral diseases it complains of; but the principal and more frequent seat is really the head: it is from ignorance and weakness that men deviate from the path of rectitude, more frequently than from selfishness and malevolence. This is fortunate; — for the power of information and reason, over error and ignorance is much greater and much surer than that of exhortation, and all the modes of rhetoric, over selfishness and malevolence.

It is because we do not know what strong motives other nations have to be just, what strong indications they have given of the disposition to be so, how often we ourselves have deviated from the rules of justice,—that we take for granted, as an indisputable truth, that the principles of injustice are in a manner interwoven into the very essence of the hearts of other men.

The diffidence, which forms part of the character of the English nation, may have been one cause of this jealousy. The dread of being duped by other nations — the notion that foreign heads are more able, though at the same time foreign hearts are less honest than our own, has always been one of our prevailing weaknesses. This diffidence has perhaps some connexion with the *mauvaise honte* which has been remarked as commonly showing itself in our behavour, and which makes public speaking and public exhibition in every line a task so much more formidable to us than to other people.

This diffidence may, perhaps, in part be accounted for, from our living less in society, and accustoming ourselves less to mixed companies, than the people of other nations.

* Turgot and Vergennes.

But the particular cast of diffidence in question, the apprehension of being duped by foreign powers, is to be referred in part, and perhaps principally, to another cause — the jealousy and slight opinion we entertain of our ministers and public men; we are jealous of them as our superiors, contending against us in the perpetual struggle for power; we are diffident of them as being our fellow-countrymen, and of the same mould as ourselves.

Jealousy is the vice of narrow minds; — confidence the virtue of enlarged ones. To be satisfied that confidence between nations is not out of nature where they have worthy ministers, one need but read the account of the negotiation between De Wit and Temple, as given by Hume. I say, by Hume: — for as it requires negotiators like De Wit and Temple to carry on such a negotiation in such a manner, so it required a historian like Hume to do it justice. For the vulgar among historians know no other receipt for writing that part of history than the finding out whatever are the vilest and basest motives capable of accounting for men's conduct in the situation in question, and then ascribing it to those motives without ceremony and without proof.

Temple and De Wit, whose confidence in each other was so exemplary and so just — Temple and De Wit were two of the wisest as well as most honourable men in Europe. The age which produced such virtue, was, however, the age of the pretended popish plot, and of a thousand other enormities which cannot now be thought of without horror. Since then, the world has had upwards of a century to improve itself in experience, in reflection, in virtue. In every other line its improvements have been immense and unquestioned. Is it too much to hope that France and England might produce not a Temple and a De Wit,—virtue so transcendent as theirs would not be necessary,—but men who, in happier times, might achieve a work like theirs with less extent of virtue.

Such a Congress or Diet might be constituted by each power sending two deputies to the place of meeting; one of these to be the principal, the other to act as an occasional substitute.

The proceedings of such Congress or Diet should be all public.

Its power would consist,—1. In reporting its opinion;

2. In causing that opinion to be circulated in the dominions of each state.

Manifestoes are in common usage. A manifesto is designed to be read either by the subjects of the state complained of, or by other states, or by both. It is an appeal to them. It calls for their opinion. The difference is, that in that case nothing of proof is given; no opinion regularly made known.

The example of Sweden is alone sufficient to show the influence which treaties, the acts of nations, may be expected to have over the subjects of the several nations, and how far the expedient in question deserves the character of a weak one, or the proposal for employing and trusting to it, that of a visionary proposal.

The war commenced by the king of Sweden against Russia, was deemed by his subjects, or at least a considerable part of them, offensive, and as such, contrary to the constitution established by him with the concurrence of the states. Hence a considerable part of the army either threw up their commissions or refused to act; and the consequence was, the king was obliged to retreat from the Russian frontier and call a diet.

This was under a government, commonly, though not truly, supposed to be changed from a limited monarchy, or rather aristocracy, to a despotic monarchy. There was no act of any recognised and respected tribunal to guide and fix the opinion of the people. The only document they had to judge from was a manifesto of the enemy, couched in terms such as resentment would naturally dictate, and therefore none of the most conciliating, — a document which had no claim to be circulated, and of which the circulation, we may be pretty well assured, was prevented as much as it was in the power of the utmost vigilance of the government to prevent it.

3. After a certain time, in putting the refractory state under the ban of Europe

There might, perhaps, be no harm in regulating, as a last resource, the contingent to be furnished by the several states for enforcing the decrees of the court. But the necessity for the employment of this resource would, in all human probability, be superseded for ever by having recourse to the much more simple and less burthensome expedient, of introducing into the instrument by which such court was instituted, a clause guaranteeing the liberty of the press in each state, in such sort, that the diet might find no obstacle to its giving, in every state, to its decrees, and to every paper whatever which it might think proper to sanction with its signature, the most extensive and unlimited circulation.

Proposition XIV.—That secresy in the operations of the foreign department in England ought not to be endured, being altogether useless, and equally repugnant to the interests of liberty and peace.

The existence of the rule which throws a veil of secresy over the transactions of the Cabinet with foreign powers, I shall not take upon me to dispute — my objection is to the propriety of it.

Being asked in the House of Lords by Lord Stormont* about secret articles, the minister for foreign affairs refuses to answer. I blame him not. Subsisting rules, it seems to be agreed, forbid reply. They throw a general veil of secresy over the transactions of the Cabinet with foreign powers. I blame no man for the fault of the laws. It is these laws that I blame as repugnant to the spirit of the constitution, and incompatible with good government.

I take at once the boldest and the broadest ground — I lay down two propositions: —

1. That in no negociation, and at no period of any negociation, ought the negociations of the cabinet in this country to be kept secret from the public at large; much less from parliament and after inquiry made in parliament.†

2. That whatever may be the case with preliminary negociations, such secresy ought never to be maintained with regard to treaties actually concluded.

In both cases, to a country like this, such secresy is equally mischievous and unnecessary.

It is mischievous. Over measures of which you have no knowledge, you can apply no controul. Measures carried on without your knowledge you cannot stop, — how ruinous soever to you, and how strongly soever you would disapprove of them if you knew them. Of negociations with foreign powers carried on in time of peace, the principal terminations are treaties of alliance, offensive or defensive, or treaties of commerce. But by one accident or other, everything may lead to war.

That in new treaties of commerce as such, there can be no cause for secresy, is a proposition that will hardly be disputed. Only such negociations, like all others, may eventually lead to war, and everything connected with war, it will be said, may come to require secresy.

But rules which admit of a minister's plunging the nation into a war against its will, are essentially mischievous and unconstitutional.

It is admitted that ministers ought not to have it in their power to impose taxes on the nation against its will. It is admitted that they ought not to have it in their power to maintain troops against its will. But by plunging it into war without its knowledge they do both.

Parliament may refuse to carry on a war after it is begun: — Parliament may remove and punish the minister who has brought the nation into a war.

Sorry remedies these; add them both together, their efficacy is not worth a straw. Arrestment of the evil, and punishment of the authors, are sad consolations for the mischief of a war, and of no value as remedies in comparison with prevention. Aggressive war is a matter of choice: defensive, of necessity. Refusal of the means of continuing a war is a most precarious remedy, a remedy only in name. What, when the enemy is at your doors, refuse the materials for barricading them?

Before aggression, war or no war depends upon the aggressor; — once begun, the party aggrieved acquires a vote: He has his negative upon every plan for terminating the war. — What is to be done? Give yourself up without resistance to the mercy of a justly exasperated enemy? But this or the continuance of the war, is all the choice that is now left. In what state of things can this remedy be made to serve? Are you unsuccessful? — the remedy is inapplicable. Are you successful? — nobody will call for it.

Punishment of the authors of the war, punishment whatever it may be to the personal adversaries of the ministers, is no satisfaction to the nation. This is self-evident; but what is closer to the purpose and not less true, is, that in a case like this, the fear of punishment on such an account is no check to them: of a majority in parliament they are in possession, or they would not be ministers. That they should be abandoned by this majority is not in the catalogue of events that ought to be looked upon as possible: but between abandoning them and punishing them, there is a wide difference. Lord North was abandoned in the American war: he was not punished for it. His was an honest error in judgment, unstained by any *malâ fide* practice, and countenanced by a fair majority in parliament. And so may any other impolitic and unjust war be. This is not a punishing age. If bribe-taking, oppression, peculation, duplicity, treachery, every crime that can be committed by statesmen sinning against con-

* May 22, 1789.

† It lies upon the other side, at least, to put a case in which want of secresy may produce a specific mischief.

science, produce no desire to punish, what dependence can be placed on punishment in a case where the mischief may so easily happen without any ground for punishment? Mankind are not yet arrived at that stage in the track of civilization. Foreign nations are not yet considered as objects susceptible of an injury. For the citizens of other civilized nations, we have not so much feeling as for our negroes. There are instances in which ministers have been punished for making peace*— there are none where they have been so much as questioned for bringing the nation into war; and if punishment had been ever applied on such an occasion, it would be not for the mischief done to the foreign nation, but purely for the mischief brought upon their own; not for the injustice, but purely for the imprudence.

It has never been laid down as a rule that you should pay any regard to foreign nations: it has never been laid down that you should stick at anything which would give you an advantage in your dealings with foreign nations. On what ground could a minister be punished for a war, even the most unsuccessful, brought on by any such means? I did my best to serve you, he would say — the worse the measure was for the foreign nation, the more I took upon me: the greater therefore the zeal I showed for your cause: the event has proved unfavourable. Are zeal and misfortune to be represented as crimes?

A war unjust on the part of our own nation, by whose ministers it is brought on, can never be brought on but in pursuit of some advantage which, were it not for the injustice towards the foreign nation it would be for our interests to pursue. The injustice and the danger of retaliation being on all hands looked upon as nothing, the plea of the minister would always be, — "It was *your* interest I was pursuing." And the uninformed and unreflecting part of the nation, that is, the great body of the nation would echo to him, — "Yes, it was our interest you were preserving." The voice of the nation on these subjects can only be looked for in newspapers. But on these subjects the language of all newspapers is uniform:—"It is we that are always in the right, without a possibility of being otherwise. Against us other nations have no rights. If according to the rules of judging between individual and individual, we are right—we are right by the rules of justice: if not, we are right by the laws of patriotism, which is a virtue more respectable than justice."— Injustice, oppression, fraud, lying, whatever acts would be crimes, whatever habits would be vices, if manifested in the pursuit of individual interests, when manifested in pursuit of national interests, become sublimated into virtues. Let any man declare who has ever read or heard an English newspaper, whether this be not the constant tenor of the notions they convey. Party on this one point makes no difference. However hostile to one another on all other points, on this they have never but one voice — they write with the utmost harmony. Such are the opinions, and to these opinions the facts are accommodated as of course. Who would blush to misrepresent, when misrepresentation is a virtue?

But newspapers, if their voice make but a small part of the voice of the people, the instruction they give makes on these subjects the whole of the instruction which the people receive.

Such being the national propensity to error on these points, and to error on the worst side, the danger of parliamentary punishment for misconduct of this kind must appear equivalent to next to nothing, even in the eyes of an unconcerned and cool spectator. What must it appear then in the eyes of ministers themselves, acting under the seduction of self-partiality, and hurried on by the tide of business? No; the language which a minister on such occasions will hold to himself will be uniformly this,—"In the first place what I do is not wrong: in the next place, if it were, nothing should I have to fear from it."

Under the present system of secresy, ministers have, therefore, every seduction to lead them into misconduct; while they have no check to keep them out of it. And what species of misconduct? That in comparison of which all others are but peccadillos. Let a minister throw away £30,000 or £40,000 in pensions to his creatures. Let him embezzle a few hundred thousand for himself. What is that to fifty or a hundred millions, the ordinary burthen of a war? Observe the consequence. This is the department of all others in which the strongest checks are needful; at the same time, thanks to the rules of secresy of all the departments, this is the only one in which there are no checks at all. I say, then, the conclusion is demonstrated. The principle which throws a veil of secresy over the proceedings of the foreign department of the cabinet is pernicious in the highest degree, pregnant with mischiefs superior to everything to which the most perfect absence of all concealment could possibly give rise.

There still remains a sort of inexplicit notion which may present itself as secretly furnishing an argument on the other side. Such is the condition of the British nation: peace and war may be always looked upon as being to all human probability in good measure in her power. When the worst comes to the worst, peace may always be had by some unessential sacrifice. I admit the force of the argument: what I maintain is that it operates in my favour. Why? It depends upon two propositions, — the matchless strength of this country, and the uselessness of her foreign dependencies. I admit both. But both operate as arguments in my favour. Her strength places her above the danger of surprise, and above the necessity of having recourse to it to defend herself. The uselessness of her foreign dependencies prove *a fortiori*, the uselessness of engaging in wars for their protection and defence. If they are not fit to keep without war, much less are they worth keeping at the price of war. The inutility of a secret cabinet is demonstrated by this short dilemma. For offensive measures, cabinet secresy can never be necessary to this nation; for defence it can never be necessary to any.

My persuasion is that there is no state whatever in which any inconveniences capable of arising from publicity in this department would not be greatly overbalanced by the advantages; be the state ever so great or ever so small; ever so strong or ever so weak; be its form of government pure or mixed, single or confederated, monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical. The observations already given seem in all these cases sufficient to warrant the conclusion.

But in a nation like Britain, the safety of publicity, the inutility of secresy in all such business, stands upon peculiar grounds. Stronger than any two other nations, much stronger of course than any *one*, its superiority deprives it of all pretence of necessity of carrying points by surprise. Clandestine surprise is the resource of knavery and fear, of unjust ambition combined with weakness. Her matchless power exempts her from the one; her interest, if her servants could be brought to be governed by her evident interests, would forbid the other.

Taking the interest of the first servant of the state as distinct from and opposite to the nation, clandestinity may undoubtedly be, in certain cases, favourable to the projects of sceptred thieves and robbers. Without taking the precautions of a thief, the Great Frederic might probably enough not have succeeded in the enterprise of stealing Silesia from her lawful sovereign. Without an advantage of this sort, the triple gang might, perhaps, not have found it quite so easy to secure what they stole from Poland. Whether there can or cannot exist occasions on which it might, in this point of view, be the interest of a king of Great Britain to turn highwayman, is a question I shall waive: but a proposition I shall not flinch from is, that it never can be the interest of the nation to abet him in it. When those sceptred sinners sold themselves to the service of Mammon, they did not serve him for nought: the booty was all their own. Were we (I speak as one of the body of the nation) to assist our king in committing a robbery upon France, the booty would be his. He would have the naming to the new places, which is all the value that in the hands of a British robber such booty can be of to anybody. The privilege of paying for the horse and pistols is all that would be ours. The booty would be employed in corrupting our confidential servants: and this is the full and exact amount of what we should get by it.

Conquests made by New Zealanders have some sense in them; while the conquered fry, the conquerers fatten. Conquests made by the polished nations of antiquity, — conquests made by Greeks and Romans, — had some sense in them. Lands, moveables, inhabitants, everything went into the pocket. The invasions of France in the days of the Edwards and the Henrys, had a rational object. Prisoners were taken, and the country was stripped to pay their ransom. The ransom of a single prisoner, a Duke of Orleans, exceeded one-third of the national revenue of England.

Conquests made by a modern despot of the continent have still some sense in them. The new property being contiguous, is laid on to his old property; the inhabitants, as many as he thinks fit to set his mark upon, go to increase his armies; their substance, as much as he thinks fit to squeeze from them, goes into his purse.

* The fate of Queen Anne's last ministry may be referred in some degree to this cause: and owing to the particular circumstances of their conduct they perhaps deserved it. — See the Report of the Secret Committee of the House of Commons in the year 1715. The great crime of the Earl of Bute was making peace. The Earl of Shelburne was obliged to resign for having made peace. The great crime of Sir R. Walpole was keeping the peace. The nation was become tired of peace. Walpole was reproached with proposing half-a-million in the year for secret-service money. His errors were rectified — war was made — and in one year there was laid out in war four times what he had spent in the ten years before.

Conquests made by the British nation would be violations of common sense, were there no such thing as justice. They are bungling imitations of miserable originals, bating the essential circumstances. Nothing but confirmed blindness and stupidity can prompt us to go on imitating Alexander and Cæsar, and the New Zelanders, and Catherine and Frederic, without the profit.

If it be the king alone who gets the appointment to the places, it is a part of the nation, it may be said, that gets the benefit of filling them. A precious lottery! Fifty or one hundred millions the cost of the tickets. So many years purchase of ten or twenty thousand a-year, the value of the prizes. This if the scheme succeed:—what if it fail?

I do not say there are no sharers in the plunder:—it is impossible for the head of a gang to put the whole of it into his own pocket. All I contend for is, that robbery by wholesale is not so profitable as by retail:—if the whole gang together pick the pockets of strangers to a certain amount, the ringleaders pick the pockets of the rest to a much greater. Shall I or shall I not succeed in persuading my countrymen that it is not their interest to be thieves?

"Oh, but you mistake!" cries somebody, "we do not now make war for conquests, but for trade." More foolish still. This is a still worse bargain than before. Conquer the whole world, it is impossible you should increase your trade one halfpenny:—it is impossible you should do otherwise than diminish it. Conquer little or much, you pay for it by taxes:—but just so much as a merchant pays in taxes, just so much he is disabled from adding to the capital he employs in trade. Had you two worlds to trade with, you could only trade with them to the amount of your capital, and what credit, you might meet with on the strength of it. This being true of each trader, is so of all traders. Find a fallacy in this short argument if you can. If you obtained your new right of trading given you for nothing, you would not be a halfpenny the richer: if you paid for them by war or preparations for war; by just so much as you paid for these you would be the poorer.

The good people of England, along with the right of self-government, conquered prodigious right of trade. The revolution was to produce for them not only the blessings of security and power, but immense and sudden wealth. Year has followed after year, and to their endless astonishment, the progress to wealth has gone on no faster than before. One piece of good fortune still wanting, they have never thought of:—that on the day their shackles were knocked off, some kind sylph should have slipped a few thousand pounds into every man's pocket. There is no law against my flying to the moon. Yet I cannot get there. Why? Because I have no wings. What wings are to flying, capital is to trade.

There are two ways of making war for trade,—forcing independent nations to let you trade with them, and conquering nations, or pieces of nations, to make them trade with you. The former contrivance is to appearance the more easy, and the policy of it the more refined. The latter is more in the good old way, and the king does his own business and the nation's at the same time. He gets the naming to the places: and the nation cannot choose but join with him, being assured that it is all for the sake of getting them the trade. The places he lays hold of, good man, only out of necessity, and that they may not go a-begging:—on his own account, he has no more mind for them than a new-made bishop for the mitre, or a new-made speaker for the chair. To the increase of trade, both these plans of war equally contribute. What you get in both cases is the pleasure of the war.

The legal right of trading to part of America was conquered by France from Britain in the last war. What have they got by it? They have got Tobago, bankruptcy, and a revolution, for their fifty millions. Ministers, who to account for the bankruptcy are forced to say something about the war, call it a national one:—the king has not got by it,—therefore the nation has. What has it got? A fine trade, were there but capital to carry it on. With such room for trade, how comes there to be no more of it? This is what merchants and manufacturers are putting themselves to the torture to account for. The sylph so necessary elsewhere, was still more necessary to France; since, over and above her other work, there was the fifty millions spent in powder and shot to replace.

The King of France, however, by getting Tobago, probably obtained two or three thousand pounds worth of places to give away. This is what he got, and this is all that anybody got for the nation's fifty millions. Let us go on as we have begun, strike a bold stroke, take all their vessels we can lay hold of without a declaration of war, and who knows but what we may get it back again. With the advantages we now have over them, five times the success they are so pleased with, would be but a moderate expectation. For every fifty millions thus laid out, our king would get in places to the amount, not of two or three thousand pounds only, but say of ten, fifteen, or twenty thousand pounds. All this would be prodigious glory—and fine paragraphs and speeches, thanksgivings, and birth-day odes, might be sung and said for it: but for economy, I would much rather give the king new places to the same amount at home, if at this price his ministers would sell us peace.

The conclusion is, that as we have nothing to fear from any other nation or nations, nor want anything from other nations, we can have nothing to say to other nations, nor to hear from them,—that might not be as public as any laws. What then is the veil of secresy that enwraps the proceedings of the cabinet? A mere cloak for wickedness and folly—a dispensation to ministers to save them from the trouble of thinking—a warrant for playing all manner of mad and silly pranks, unseen and uncontrouled—a licence to play at hazard with their fellows abroad, staking our lives and fortunes upon the throw.

What, then, is the true use and effect of secresy? That the prerogatives of place may furnish an aliment to petty vanity,—that the members of *the circulation* may have as it were a newspaper to themselves,—that under favour of the monopoly, ignorance and incapacity may put on airs of wisdom,—that a man, unable to write or speak what is fit to be put into a newspaper, may toss up his head and say, I don't read newspapers—as if a parent were to say I don't trouble my head about schoolmasters,—and that a minister, secure from scrutiny in that quarter, may have the convenient opportunity, upon occasion, of filling the posts with obsequious cyphers, instead of effective men:—anything will do to make a minister whose writing may be written for him, and whose duty in speaking consists in silence.

This much must be confessed:—if secresy as against the nation be useless and pernicious to the nation, it is not useless and pernicious with regard to its servants. It forms part of the *douceurs* of office—a perquisite which will be valued in proportion to the insignificance of their characters and the narrowness of their views. It serves to pamper them up with notions of their own importance, and to teach the servants of the people to look down upon their masters.

Oh!—but if everything that were written were liable to be made public, were published, who would treat with you abroad? Just the same persons as treat with you at present. Negotiations, for fear of misrepresentation, would perhaps be committed somewhat more to writing than at present;—and where would be the harm? The king and his ministers might not have quite such such copious accounts, true or false, of the tittle-tattle of each court: or they must put into different hands the tittle-tattle, and the real business. And suppose your head servants were not so minutely acquainted with the mistresses and buffoons of kings and their ministers,—what matters it to you as a nation, who have no intrigues to carry on, no petty points to compass?

It were an endless task to fill more pages with the shadows that might be conjured up in order to be knocked down. I leave that task to any that will undertake it. I challenge party men—I invite the impartial lovers of their country and mankind to discuss the question—to ransack the stores of history, and imagination as well as history, for cases actual or possible, in which the want of secrecy in this line of business can be shown to be attended with any substantial prejudice.

As to the constitution, the question of cabinet-secresy having never been tried by the principles of the constitution, has never received a decision. The good old Tudor and Stuart principles have been suffered to remain unquestioned here. Foreign politics are questions of state. Under Elizabeth and James, nothing was to be inquired into—nothing was to be known—everything was matter of state. On other points the veil has been torn away: but with regard to these, there has been a sort of tacit understanding between ministers and people.

Hitherto war has been the national rage: peace has always come too soon,—war too late. To tie up the ministers' hands and make them continually accountable, would be depriving them of numberless occasions of seizing those happy advantages that lead to war: it would be lessening the people's chance of their favourite amusement. For these hundred years past, ministers, to do them justice, have generally been more backward than the people—the great object has rather been to force them into war, than to keep them out of it. Walpole and Newcastle were both forced into war.

It admits of no doubt, if we are really for war, and fond of it for its own sake, we can do no better than let things continue as they are. If we think peace better than war, it is equally certain that the law of secresy cannot be too soon abolished.

Such is the general confusion of ideas—such the power of the imagination—such the force of prejudice—that I verily believe the persuasion is not an uncommon one;—so clear in their notions are many worthy gentlemen, that they look upon war, if successful, as a cause of opulence and prosperity. With equal justice might they look upon the loss of a leg as a cause of swiftness.

Well, but if it be not directly the cause of opulence, it is indirectly; from the successes of war, come, say they, our prosperity, our

greatness; thence the respect paid to us by Foreign Powers — thence our security: and who does not know how necessary security is to opulence?

No; war is, in this way, just as unfavourable to opulence as in the other. In the present mode of carrying on war—a mode which it is in no man's power to depart from, security is in proportion to opulence. Just so far then as war is, by its direct effects, unfavourable to opulence, — just so far is it unfavourable to security.

Respect is a term I shall beg leave to change; respect is a mixture of fear and esteem, but for constituting esteem, force is not the instrument, but justice. The sentiment really relied upon for security is fear. By respect then is meant, in plain English, fear. But in a case like this, fear is much more adverse than favourable to security. So many as fear you, join against you till they think they are too strong for you, and then they are afraid of you no longer; — meantime they all hate you, and jointly and severally they do you as much mischief as they can. You, on your part, are not behindhand with them. Conscious or not conscious of your own bad intentions, you suspect theirs to be still worse. Their notion of your intentions is the same. Measures of mere self-defence are naturally taken for projects of aggression The same causes produce, on both sides, the same effects; each makes haste to begin for fear of being forestalled. In this state of things, if on either side there happen to be a minister or a would-be minister, who has a fancy for war, the stroke is struck, and the tinder catches fire.

At school, the strongest boy may perhaps be the safest. Two or more boys are not always in readiness to join against one. But though this notion may hold good in an English school, it will not bear transplanting upon the theatre of Europe.

Oh! but if your neighbours are really afraid of you, their fear is of use to you in another way — you get the turn of the scale in all disputes. Points that are at all doubtful, they give up to you of course. Watch the moment, and you may every now and then gain points that do not admit of doubt. This is only the former old set of fallacies exhibited in a more obscure form, and which, from their obscurity only, can show as new. The fact is, as has been already shown, there is no nation that has any points to gain to the prejudice of any other. Between the interests of nations, there is nowhere any real conflict: if they appear repugnant anywhere, it is only in proportion as they are misunderstood. What are these points? What points are these which, if you had your choice, you would wish to gain of them? Preferences in trade have been proved to be worth nothing, — distant territorial acquisitions have been proved to be worth less than nothing. When these are out of the question, what other points are there worth gaining by such means.

Opulence is the word I have first mentioned; but opulence is not the word that would be first pitched upon. The repugnancy of the connexion between war and opulence is too glaring: — the term opulence brings to view an idea too simple, too intelligible, too precise. Splendour, greatness, glory, these are terms better suited to the purpose. Prove first that war contributes to splendour and greatness, you may persuade yourself it contributes to opulence, because when you think of splendour you think of opulence. But splendour, greatness, glory, all these fine things, may be produced by useless success, and unprofitable and enervating extent of dominion obtained at the expense of opulence; and this is the way in which you may manage so as to prove to yourself, that the way to make a man run the quicker is to cut off one of his legs. And true enough it is, that a man who has had a leg cut off, and the stump healed, may hop faster than a man who lies in bed with both legs broken, can walk. And thus you may prove that Britain is in a better case after the expenditure of a glorious war, than if there had been no war; because France or some other country, was put by it into a still worse condition.

In respect, therefore, of any benefit to be derived in the shape of conquest, or of trade —of opulence or of respect—no advantage can be reaped by the employment of the unnecessary, the mischievous, and unconstitutional system of clandestinity and secresy in negotiation.

Immanuel Kant was born in Konigsberg, East Prussia, in 1724. Physically frail, the son of a saddler, a bachelor who lived his entire life in or near the bleak city of Konigsberg, Kant became one of the greatest of the world's philosophers. He attended the local high school or Collegium, and then the University of Konigsberg. After the University he lived in relative poverty for some twenty-five years, tutoring in several families and, after recieving his masters degree in 1755, lecturing as a privatdozent (unsalaried lecturer) in physics and mathematics as well as philosophy at the University. It was not until 1770, at the age of 46,that his poverty was relieved by an appointment to the chair of logic and metaphysics at the University. Although he had produced an impressive number of treatises before this, his greatest works were published between 1781 and 1797: The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysics (1783), Critique of Practical Reason (1790), Critique of Judgment(1790) and Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All of the selections which follow were produced in this period. Apart from an order from the King not to publish anything on religion, after his unorthodox Religion within the Limits of Reasons alone (1793), Kant's life was austere, marked only by periodic publications of what would become momentous contributions to philosophy. He died at the age of 80 in 1804.

The principal writings of Kant relating to war and peace were his Perpetual Peace; A Philosophical Sketch (1795) and a sort of philosophical commentary on the course and direction of human history, The Natural Principle of Political Order (1784). We have included the latter in its entirety for two reasons. First, it presents Kant's thesis that although the history of human actions in the world must be viewed scientifically as determined by universal natural laws, nevertheless an examination of the actual facts of history, with all of its wars and conflicts of interests, suggests the idea that nature is proceeding according to a plan which aims at a universal world government and perpetual peace. Secondly, we wish, later on, to compare Kant's manner of dealing with this approach with what Hegel did with it. In a sense Kant's thesis here was the forerunner of several major eschatological theories (theories which purport to deal scientifically with the final ends of history) including Hegel's and Marx's. Our selections from Perpetual Peace are concentrated on portions which deal with the relationship between morals and politics. The fascinating thing about Kant is the fact that he held that we can not prove scientifically ("by theoretical reason") that we have free will, that there is a Divine Purpose in the Universe, or that there are ultimate absolute laws of morals; yet he claims that our practical reason recognizes distinctions between what ought to be and what ought not to be and this is accompanied by our seeming to act as if we had free will. His whole philosophy is built around the seeming incompatibility between viewing the world as completely determined by natural laws from a scientific viewpoint, and viewing human actions a acts of free will subject to moral laws; his purpose is both to establish this dichotomy and reconcile its apparent incompatibility. In the question of war and peace this takes the interesting form of considering the role moral decisions (to achieve peace) should play in the decisions of national political leaders who must decide on the basis of realistic assessments of friends and opponents as subject to the natural laws of human nature, and who themselves must be governed primarily by considerations of self- and national-interest rather than utopian ideals.

To bring out the deep philosophical underpinnings of Kant's thoughts on war and peace, we first consider his concept of morality which, in contrast to utilitarianism, centers on motives rather than consequences(pp 156-7). Then we include briefly some of his thoughts on the relationship between the idea of a free will and the importance of causal determinism as a regulative principle for theoretical reason and science (pp 157-8). This is followed by The Natural Principle of Political Order, and then by the mentioned selections from Perpetual Peace, ending with a summary from Metaphysics of Morals. Throughout Kant's focus is on human beings as individuals, and his sympathies are with democracy and peace.

NOTHING can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other *talents* of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called *character*, is not good. It is the same with the *gifts of fortune*. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called *happiness*, *inspire* pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness. . . .

A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to nor take away anything from this value.

We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself, and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place, and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast, and make it shine forth so much the brighter.

The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, *not from the purpose* which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the *principle of volition* by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes that the purposes which we may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the *principle of the will* without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action. For the will stands between its *a priori* principle, which is formal, and its *a posteriori* spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined by something, it follows that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it.

The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would express thus: *Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law.* I may have *inclination* for an object as the effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have *respect* for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will. Similarly, I cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own or another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if another's, sometimes even love it; i.e. look on it as favourable to my own interest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, by no means as an effect—what does not subserve my inclination, but overpowers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its calculation—in other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence a command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the *law*, and subjectively *pure respect* for this practical law, and consequently the maxim [1] that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.

Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects—agreeableness of one's condition, and even the promotion of the happiness of others—could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than *the conception of law* in itself, *which certainly is only possible in a rational being*, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will.

But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e. I am never to act otherwise than so *that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.* Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides with this, and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here between the two significations which the question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise?

[1.] *The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of the Will.*

THE[1] *will* is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and *freedom* would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient independently on foreign causes *determining* it; just as *physical necessity* is the property that the causality of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity by the influence of foreign causes.

The preceding definition of freedom is *negative,* and therefore unfruitful for the discovery of its essence; but it leads to a *positive* conception which is so much the more full and fruitful. Since the conception of causality involves that of laws, according to which, by something that we call cause, something else, namely, the effect, must be produced [laid down]; hence, although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary, it must be a causality acting according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to this law, that something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality. What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is the property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: The will is in every action a law to itself, only expresses the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same. . . .

It[1] is not enough to predicate freedom of our own will, from whatever reason, if we have not sufficient grounds for predicating the same of all rational beings. For as morality serves as a law for us only because we are *rational beings,* it must also hold for all rational beings; and as it must be deduced simply from the property of freedom, it must be shown that freedom also is a property of all rational beings.

From THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1781):

There are only two modes of causality cogitable—the causality of *nature,* or of *freedom.* The first is the conjunction of a particular state with another preceding it in the world of sense, the former following the latter by virtue of a law. Now, as the causality of phænomena is subject to conditions of time, and the preceding state, if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect which would make its first appearance at a particular time, the causality of a cause must itself be an effect—must itself have *begun to be,* and therefore, according to the principle of the understanding, itself requires a cause.

We must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom, in the cosmological sense, a faculty of the *spontaneous* origination of a state; the causality of which, therefore, is not subordinated to another cause determining it in time. Freedom is in this sense a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains no empirical element; the object of which, in the second place, cannot be given or determined in any experience, because it is a universal law of the very possibility of experience, that everything which happens must have a cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself something that has *happened,* must also have a cause. In this view of the case, the whole field of experience, how far soever it may extend, contains nothing that is not subject to the laws of nature. But, as we cannot by this means attain to an absolute totality of conditions in reference to the series of causes and effects, reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which can begin to act of itself, and without any external cause determining it to action, according to the natural law of causality.

That reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least we are compelled so to represent it, is evident from the *imperatives,* which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many of our executive powers. The words *I ought* express a species of necessity, and imply a connection with grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the mind of man. Understanding knows nothing in nature but that *which is,* or has been, or will be. It would be absurd to say that anything in nature *ought* to be other than it is in the relations of time in which it stands; indeed, the *ought,* when we consider merely the course of nature, has neither application nor meaning.

The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the above remarks has not been to prove the *actual existence* of freedom, as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phænomena. . . . Freedom has been considered in the foregoing remarks only as a transcendental idea, by means of which reason aims at originating a series of conditions in the world of phænomena with the help of that which is sensuously unconditioned, involving itself, however, in an antinomy with the laws which itself prescribes for the conduct of the understanding. That this antinomy is based upon a mere illusion, and that nature and freedom are at least *not opposed* —this was the only thing in our power to prove, and the question which it was our task to solve.

In the transcendental æsthetic, we proved, that everything intuited in space and time—all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but phænomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, as presented to us—as extended bodies, or as series of changes—have no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought. This doctrine I call *Transcendental Idealism.*

Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external intuition—as intuited in space, and all changes in time—as represented by the internal sense, are real. For, as space is the form of that intuition which we call external, and without objects in space, no empirical representation could be given us; we can and ought to regard extended bodies in it as real. The case is the same with representations in time. But time and space, with all phænomena therein, are not in themselves *things.* They are nothing but representations, and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind.

Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the Cosmological Ideas.

The cosmological principle of totality could not give us any certain knowledge in regard to the *maximum* in the series of conditions in the world of sense, considered as a thing in itself. The actual regress in the series is the only means of approaching this maximum. This principle of pure reason, therefore, may still be considered as valid—not as an *axiom* enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as actual, but as a *problem* for the understanding, which requires it to institute and to continue, in conformity with the idea of totality in the mind, the regress in the series of the conditions of a given conditioned. For in the world of sense, that is, in space and time, every condition which we discover in our investigation of phænomena is itself conditioned; because sensuous objects are not things in themselves (in which case an absolutely unconditioned might be reached in the progress of cognition), but are merely empirical representations, the conditions of which must always be found in intuition. The principle of reason is therefore properly a mere rule—prescribing a regress in the series of conditions for given phænomena, and prohibiting any pause or rest on an absolutely unconditioned. It is, therefore, not a principle of the possibility of experience or of the empirical cognition of sensuous objects—consequently not a principle of the understanding; for every experience is confined within certain proper limits determined by the given intuition. Still less is it a *constitutive principle* of reason authorising us to extend our conception of the sensuous world beyond all possible experience. It is merely a principle for the enlargement and extension of experience as far as is possible for human faculties. It forbids us to consider any empirical limits as absolute. It is, hence, a principle of reason, which, as a *rule*, dictates how we ought to proceed in our empirical regress, but is unable to *anticipate* or indicate prior to the empirical regress what is given in the object itself. I have termed it for this reason a *regulative* principle of reason; while the principle of the absolute totality of the series of conditions, as existing in itself and given in the object, is a constitutive cosmological principle. This distinction will at once demonstrate the falsehood of the constitutive principle, and prevent us from attributing (by a transcendental *subreptio*) objective reality to an idea, which is valid only as a rule.

The principle of an unbroken connection between all events in the phænomenal world, in accordance with the unchangeable laws of nature, is a well-established principle of transcendental analytic which admits of no exception. The question, therefore, is: Whether an effect, determined according to the laws of nature, can at the same time be produced by a free agent, or whether freedom and nature mutually exclude each other? And here, the common, but fallacious hypothesis of the *absolute reality* of phænomena manifests its injurious influence in embarrassing the procedure of reason. For if phænomena are things in themselves, freedom is impossible. In this case, nature is the complete and all-sufficient cause of every event; and condition and conditioned, cause and effect, are contained in the same series, and necessitated by the same law. If, on the contrary, phænomena are held to be, as they are in fact, nothing more than mere representations, connected with each other in accordance with empirical laws, they must have a ground which is *not* phænomenal. But the causality of such an intelligible cause is not determined or determinable by phænomena; although its effects, as phænomena, must be determined by other phænomenal existences. This cause and its causality exist therefore out of and apart from the series of phænomena; while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the series of empirical conditions. Such an effect may therefore be considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, and necessary in relation to the phænomena from which it is a necessary consequence—a distinction which, stated in this perfectly general and abstract manner, must appear in the highest degree subtle and obscure.

The natural law, that everything which happens must have a cause, that the causality of this cause, that is, the action of the cause, (which cannot always have existed, but must be itself an *event*, for it precedes in time some effect which it has originated), must have itself a phænomenal cause, by which it is determined, and, consequently, that all events are empirically determined in an order of nature—this law, I say, which lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience, and of a connected system of phænomena or *nature*, is a law of the understanding, from which no departure, and to which no exception, can be admitted. For to except even a single phænomenon from its operation, is to exclude it from the sphere of possible experience, and thus to admit it to be a mere fiction of thought or phantom of the brain.

Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes, in which, however, *absolute totality* cannot be found.

Man is a phænomenon of the sensuous world, and at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess an empirical character, like all other natural phænomena. We remark this empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence of certain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate, or merely animal nature, we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous manner. But man, to whom nature reveals herself only through sense, cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through pure apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phænomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a purely intelligible object—intelligible, because its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties are understanding and reason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties, for it employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by means of these determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own conceptions, which, like the ideas of reason, are pure and non-empirical.

THE NATURAL PRINCIPLE OF THE POLITICAL ORDER

Whatever metaphysical theory may be formed regarding the freedom of the will, it holds equally true that the manifestations of the will in human actions are determined, like all other external events, by universal natural laws. Now history is occupied with the narration of these manifestations as facts, however deeply their causes may lie concealed. Hence in view of this natural principle of regulation, it may be hoped that when the play of the freedom of the human will is examined on the great scale of universal history a regular march will be discovered in its movements; and that, in this way, what appears to be tangled and unregulated in the case of individuals will be recognized in the history of the whole species as a continually advancing, though slow, development of its original capacities and endowments. Thus marriages, births and deaths appear to be incapable of being reduced to any rule by which their numbers might be calculated beforehand, on account of the great influence which the free will of man exercises upon them; and yet the annual statistics of great countries prove that these events take place according to constant natural laws. In this respect they may be compared with the very inconstant changes of the weather, which cannot be determined beforehand in detail, but which yet, on the whole, do not fail to maintain the growth of plants, the flow of rivers and other natural processes, in a uniform uninterrupted course. Individual men, and even whole nations, little think, while they are pursuing their own purposes—each in his own way and often one in direct opposition to another—that they are advancing unconsciously under the guidance of a purpose of nature which is unknown to them, and that they are toiling for the realization of an end which, even if it were known to them, might be regarded as of little importance.

Men, viewed as a whole, are not guided in their efforts merely by instinct, like the lower animals; nor do they proceed in their actions, like the citizens of a purely rational world, according to a preconcerted plan. And so it appears as if no regular systematic history of mankind would be possible, as in the case, for instance, of bees and beavers. Nor can one help feeling a certain repugnance in looking at the conduct of men as it is exhibited on the great stage of the world. With glimpses of wisdom appearing in individuals here and there, it seems, on examining it externally as if the whole web of human history were woven out of folly and childish vanity and the frenzy of destruction, so that at the end one hardly knows what idea to form of our race, albeit so proud of its prerogatives. In such circumstances there is no resource for the philosopher but, while recognizing the fact that a rational conscious purpose cannot be supposed to determine mankind in the play of their actions as a whole, to try whether he cannot discover a universal purpose of nature in this paradoxical movement of human things, and whether in view of this purpose a history of creatures who proceed without a plan of their own may nevertheless be possible according to a determinate plan of nature. We will accordingly see whether we can succeed in finding a clew to such a history; and, in the event of doing so, we shall then leave it to nature to bring forth the man who will be fit to compose it. Thus did she bring forth a Kepler, who, in an unexpected way, reduced the eccentric paths of the planets to definite laws; and then she brought forth a Newton, who explained those laws by a universal natural cause.

FIRST PROPOSITION

All the capacities implanted in a creature by nature are destined to unfold themselves, completely and conformably to their end, in the course of time.

This proposition is established by observation, external as well as internal or anatomical, in the case of all animals. An organ which is not to be used, or an arrangement which does not attain its end, is a contradiction in the teleological science of nature. For, if we turn away from that fundamental principle, we have then before us a nature moving without a purpose, and no longer conformable to law; and the cheerless gloom of chance takes the place of the guiding light of reason.

SECOND PROPOSITION

In man, as the only rational creature on earth, those natural capacities which are directed toward the use of his reason could be completely developed only in the species and not in the individual.

Reason, in a creature, is a faculty of which it is characteristic to extend the laws and purposes involved in the use of all its powers far beyond the sphere of natural instinct, and it knows no limit in its efforts. Reason, however, does not itself work by instinct, but requires experiments, exercise and instruction in order to advance gradually from one stage of insight to another. Hence each individual man would necessarily have to live an enormous length of time in order to learn by himself how to make a complete use of all his natural endowments. Otherwise, if nature should have given him but a short lease of life—as is actually the case—reason would then require the production of an almost inconceivable series of generations, the one handing down its enlightenment to the other, order that her germs, as implanted in our species may

be at last unfolded to that stage of development which is completely conformable to her inherent design. And the point of time at which this is to be reached must, at least in idea, form the goal and aim of man's endeavors, because his natural capacities would otherwise have to be regarded as, for the most part, purposeless and bestowed in vain. But such a view would abolish all our practical principles, and thereby also throw on nature the suspicion of practicing a childish play in the case of man alone, while her wisdom must otherwise be recognized as a fundamental principle in judging of all other arrangements.

THIRD PROPOSITION

Nature has willed that man shall produce wholly out of himself all that goes beyond the mechanical structure and arrangement of his animal existence, and that he shall participate in no other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself, apart from instinct, by his own reason.

Nature, according to this view, does nothing that is superfluous, and is not prodigal in the use of means for her ends. As she gave man reason and freedom of will on the basis of reason, this was at once a clear indication of her purpose in respect of his endowments. With such equipment, he was not to be guided by instinct nor furnished and instructed by innate knowledge; much rather must he produce everything out of himself. The invention of his own covering and shelter from the elements and the means of providing for his external security and defense, — for which nature gave him neither the horns of the bull, nor the claws of the lion, nor the fangs of the dog, — as well as all the sources of delight which could make life agreeable, his very insight and prudence, and even the goodness of his will, all these were to be entirely his own work. Nature seems to have taken pleasure in exercising her utmost parsimony in this case and to have measured her animal equipments very sparingly. She seems to have exactly fitted them to the most necessitous requirements of the mere beginning of an existence, as if it had been her will that man, when he had at last struggled up from the greatest crudeness of life to the highest capability and to internal perfection in his habit of thought, and thereby also — so far as it is possible on earth — to happiness, should claim the merit of it as all his own and owe it only to himself. It thus looks as if nature had laid more upon his rational self-esteem than upon his mere well-being. For in this movement of human life a great host of toils and troubles wait upon man. It appears, however, that the purpose of nature was not so much that he should have an agreeable life, but that he should carry forward his own self-culture until he made himself worthy of life and well-being. In this connection it is always a subject of wonder that the older generations appear only to pursue their weary toil for the sake of those who come after them, preparing for the latter another stage on which they may carry higher the structure which nature has in view; and that it is to be the happy fate of only the latest generations to dwell in the building upon which the long series of their forefathers have labored, without so much as intending it and yet with no possibility of participating in the happiness which they were preparing. Yet, however mysterious this may be, it is as necessary as it is mysterious when we once accept the position that one species of animals was destined to possess reason, and that, forming a class of rational beings mortal in all the individuals but immortal in the species, it was yet to attain to a complete development of its capacities.

FOURTH PROPOSITION

The means which nature employs to bring about the development of all the capacities implanted in men is their mutual antagonism in society, but only so far as this antagonism becomes at length the cause of an order among them that is regulated by law.

By this antagonism I mean the unsocial sociability of men; that is, their tendency to enter into society, conjoined, however, with an accompanying resistance which continually threatens to dissolve this society. The disposition for this manifestly lies in human nature. Man has an inclination to socialize himself by associating with others, because in such a state he feels himself more than a natural man, in the development of his natural capacities. He has, moreover, a great tendency to individualize himself by isolation from others, because he likewise finds in himself the unsocial disposition of wishing to direct everything merely according to his own mind; and hence he expects resistance everywhere, just as he knows with regard to himself that he is inclined on his part to resist others. Now it is this resistance or mutual antagonism that awakens all the powers of man, that drives him to overcome all his propensity to indolence, and that impels him, through the desire of honor or power or wealth, to strive after rank among his fellow men — whom he can neither bear to interfere with himself, nor yet let alone. Then the first real steps are taken from the rudeness of barbarism to the culture of civilization, which particularly lies in the social worth of man. All his talents are now gradually developed, and with the progress of enlightenment a beginning is made in the institution of a mode of

thinking which can transform the crude natural capacity for moral distinctions, in the course of time, into definite practical principles of action; and thus a pathologically constrained combination into a form of society is developed at last to a moral and rational whole. Without those qualities of an unsocial kind out of which this antagonism arises — which viewed by themselves are certainly not amiable but which every one must necessarily find in the movements of his own selfish propensities — men might have led an Arcadian shepherd life in complete harmony, contentment and mutual love, but in that case all their talents would have forever remained hidden in their germ. As gentle as the sheep they tended, such men would hardly have won for their existence a higher worth than belonged to their domesticated cattle; they would not have filled up with their rational nature the void remaining in the creation, in respect of its final end. Thanks be then to nature for this unsociableness, for this envious jealousy and vanity, for this unsatiable desire of possession or even of power. Without them all the excellent capacities implanted in mankind by nature would slumber eternally undeveloped. Man wishes concord; but nature knows better what is good for his species, and she will have discord. He wishes to live comfortably and pleasantly; but nature wills that, turning from idleness and inactive contentment, he shall throw himself into toil and suffering even in order to find out remedies against them, and to extricate his life prudently from them again. The natural impulses that urge man in this direction, the sources of that unsociableness and general antagonism from which so many evils arise, do yet at the same time impel him to new exertion of his powers, and consequently to further development of his natural capacities. Hence they clearly manifest the arrangement of a wise Creator, and do not at all, as is often supposed, betray the hand of a malevolent spirit that has deteriorated His glorious creation, or spoiled it from envy.

FIFTH PROPOSITION

The greatest practical problem for the human race, to the solution of which it is compelled by nature, is the establishment of a civil society, universally administering right according to law.

It is only in a society which possesses the greatest liberty, and which consequently involves a thorough antagonism of its members — with, however, the most exact determination and guarantee of the limits of this liberty in order that it may coexist with the liberty of others — that the highest purpose of nature, which is the development of all her capacities, can be attained in the case of mankind. Now nature also wills that the human race shall attain through itself to this, as to all the other ends for which it was destined. Hence a society in which liberty under external laws may be found combined in the greatest possible degree with irresistible power, or a perfectly just civil constitution, is the highest natural problem prescribed to the human species. And this is so because nature can only by means of the solution and fulfillment of this problem realize her other purposes with our race. A certain necessity compels man, who is otherwise so greatly prepossessed in favor of unlimited freedom, to enter into this state of coercion and restraint. Indeed, it is the greatest necessity of all that does this; for it is created by men themselves whose inclinations make it impossible for them to exist long beside each other in wild, lawless freedom. But in such a complete growth as the civil union these very inclinations afterward produce the best effects. It is with them as with the trees in a forest; for just because every one strives to deprive the other of air and sun they compel each other to seek them both above, and thus they grow beautiful and straight; whereas those that in freedom and apart from one another shoot out their branches at will grow stunted and crooked and awry. All the culture and art that adorn humanity and the fairest social order are fruits of that unsociableness which is necessitated of itself to discipline itself and which thus constrains man, by compulsive art, to develop completely the germs of his nature.

SIXTH PROPOSITION

This problem is likewise the most difficult of its kind, and it is the latest to be solved by the human race.

The difficulty which the mere idea of this problem brings into view is that man is an animal, and if he lives among others of his kind he has need of a master. For he certainly misuses his freedom in relation to his fellow men; and although as a rational creature he desires a law which may set bounds to the freedom of all, yet his own selfish animal inclinations lead him, wherever he can, to except himself from it. He, therefore, requires a master to break his self-will and compel him to obey a will that is universally valid, and in relation to which every one may be free. Where, then, does he obtain this master? Nowhere but in the human race. But this master is an animal too, and also requires a master. Begin, then, as he may, it is not easy to see how he can procure a supreme authority over public justice that would be essentially just, whether such an authority may be sought in a single person or in a society of many selected persons. The highest authority has to be just in itself, and yet to be a man. This problem is,

therefore, the most difficult of its kind; and, indeed, its perfect solution is impossible. Out of such crooked material as man is made of, nothing can be hammered quite straight. So it is only an approximation to this idea that is imposed upon us by nature.* It further follows that this problem is the last to be practically worked out, because it requires correct conceptions of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience founded on the practice of ages, and above all a good will prepared for the reception of the solution. But these three conditions could not easily be found together; and if they are found it can only be very late in time, and after many attempts to solve the problem have been made in vain.

SEVENTH PROPOSITION

The problem of the establishment of a perfect civil constitution is dependent on the problem of the regulation of the external relations between the states conformably to law; and without the solution of this latter problem it cannot be solved.

What avails it to labor at the arrangement of a commonwealth as a civil constitution regulated by law among individual men? The same unsociableness which forced men to it becomes again the cause of each commonwealth's assuming the attitude of uncontrolled freedom in its external relations, that is, as one State in relation to other States; and consequently any one State must expect from any other the same sort of evils as oppressed individual men and compelled them to enter into a civil union regulated by law. Nature has accordingly again used the unsociableness of men, and even of great societies and political bodies, her creatures of this kind, as a means to work out through their mutual antagonism a condition of rest and security. She works through wars, through the strain of never-relaxed preparation for them, and through the necessity which every State is at last compelled to feel within itself, even in the midst of peace, to begin some imperfect efforts to carry out her purpose. And, at last, after many devastations, overthrows and even complete internal exhaustion of their powers, the nations are driven forward to the goal which reason might easily have impressed upon them, even without so much sad experience. This is none other than the advance out of the lawless state of savages and the entering into a federation of nations. It is thus brought about that every State, including even the smallest, may rely for its safety and its rights not on its own power or its own judgment of right, but only on this great international federation (*foedus amphictionum*), on its combined power and on the decision of the common will according to laws. However visionary this idea may appear to be — and it has been ridiculed in the way in which it has been presented by an Abbé de St. Pierre or Rousseau (perhaps because they believed its realization to be so near) — it is nevertheless the inevitable issue of the necessity in which men involve one another. For this necessity must compel the nations to the very resolution — however hard it may appear — to which the savage in his uncivilized state was so unwillingly compelled when he had to surrender his brutal liberty and seek rest and security in a constitution regulated by law.

All wars are, accordingly, so many attempts — not, indeed, in the intention of men, but yet according to the purpose of nature — to bring about new relations between the nations; and by destruction, or at least dismemberment, of them all to form new political corporations. These new organizations, again, are not capable of being preserved either in themselves or beside one another, and they must therefore pass in turn through similar new revolutions, till at last, partly by the best possible arrangement of the civil constitution within, and partly by common convention and legislation without, a condition will be attained, which, in the likeness of a civil commonwealth and after the manner of an automaton, will be able to preserve itself.

Three views may be put forward as to the way in which this condition is to be attained. In the first place, it may be held that from an Epicurean concourse of causes in action it is to be expected that the States, like little particles of matter, will try by their fortuitous conjunctions all sorts of formations, which will be again destroyed by new collisions, till at last some one constitution will by chance succeed in preserving itself in its proper form, — a lucky accident which will hardly ever come about! In the second place, it may rather be maintained that nature here pursues a regular march in carrying our species up from the lower stage of animality to the highest stage of humanity, and that this is done by a compulsive art that is inherent in man, whereby his natural capacities and endowments are developed in perfect regularity through an apparently wild disorder. Or, in the third place, it may even be asserted that out of all these actions and reactions of men as a whole nothing at all — or at least nothing rational — will ever be produced; that it will be in the future as it has ever been in the past, and that no one will ever be able to say whether the discord which is so natural to our

* The part that has to be played by man is, therefore, a very artificial one. We do not know how it may be with the inhabitants of other planets or what are the conditions of their nature; but, if we execute well the commission of nature, we may certainly flatter ourselves to the extent of claiming a not insignificant rank among our neighbors in the universe. It may perhaps be the case that in those other planets every individual completely attains his destination in this life. With us it is otherwise; only the species can hope for this.

species may not be preparing for us, even in this civilized state of society, a hell of evils at the end; nay, that it is not perhaps advancing even now to annihilate again by barbaric devastation this actual state of society and all the progress hitherto made in civilization, — a fate against which there is no guarantee under a government of blind chance, identical as it is with lawless freedom in action, unless a connecting wisdom is covertly assumed to underlie the system of nature.

Now, which of these views is to be adopted depends almost entirely on the question whether it is rational to recognize harmony and design in the parts of the constitution of nature, and to deny them of the whole. We have glanced at what has been done by the seemingly purposeless state of savages; how it checked for a time all the natural capacities of our species, but at last by the very evils in which it involved mankind it compelled them to pass from this state, and to enter into a civil constitution, in which all the germs of humanity could be unfolded. And, in like manner, the barbarian freedom of the States, when once they were founded, proceeded in the same way of progress. By the expenditure of all the resources of the commonwealth in military preparations against each other, by the devastations occasioned by war, and still more by the necessity of holding themselves continually in readiness for it, the full development of the capacities of mankind are undoubtedly retarded in their progress; but, on the other hand, the very evils which thus arise, compel men to find out means against them. A law of equilibrium is thus discovered for the regulation of the really wholesome antagonism of contiguous States as it springs up out of their freedom; and a united power, giving emphasis to this law, is constituted, whereby there is introduced a universal condition of public security among the nations. And that the powers of mankind may not fall asleep, this condition is not entirely free from danger; but it is at the same time not without a principle which operates, so as to equalize the mutual action and reaction of these powers, that they may not destroy each other. Before the last step of bringing in a universal union of the States is taken — and accordingly when human nature is only halfway in its progress — it has to endure the hardest evils of all, under the deceptive semblance of outward prosperity; and Rousseau was not so far wrong when he preferred the state of the savages, if the last stage which our race has yet to surmount be left out of view. We are cultivated in a high degree by science and art. We are civilized, even to excess, in the way of all sorts of social forms of politeness and elegance. But there is still much to be done before we can be regarded as moralized. The idea of morality certainly belongs to real culture; but an application of this idea which extends no farther than the likeness of morality in the sense of honor and external propriety merely constitutes civilization. So long, however, as States lavish all their resources upon vain and violent schemes of aggrandizement, so long as they continually impede the slow movements of the endeavor to cultivate the newer habits of thought and character on the part of the citizens, and even withdraw from them all the means of furthering it, nothing in the way of moral progress can be expected. A long internal process of improvement is thus required in every commonwealth as a condition for the higher culture of its citizens. But all apparent good that is not grafted upon a morally good disposition is nothing but mere illusion and glittering misery. In this condition the human race will remain until it shall have worked itself, in the way that has been indicated, out of the existing chaos of its political relations.

EIGHTH PROPOSITION

The history of the human race, viewed as a whole, may be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about a political constitution, internally, and, for this purpose, also externally perfect, as the only state in which all the capacities implanted by her in mankind can be fully developed.

This proposition is a corollary from the preceding proposition. We see by it that philosophy may also have its millennial view, but in this case the chiliasm is of such a nature that the very idea of it — although only in a far-off way — may help to further its realization; and such a prospect is, therefore, anything but visionary. The real question is whether experience discloses anything of such a movement in the purpose of nature. I can only say it does a little; for the movement in this orbit appears to require such a long time till it goes full round that the form of its path and the relation of its parts to the whole can hardly be determined out of the small portion which the human race has yet passed through in this relation. The determination of this problem is just as difficult and uncertain as it is to calculate from all previous astronomical observations what course our sun, with the whole host of his attendant train, is pursuing in the great system of the fixed stars, although on the ground of the total arrangement of the structure of the universe and the little that has been observed of it, we may infer, confidently enough, the reality of such a movement. Human nature, however, is so constituted that it cannot be indifferent even in regard to the most distant epoch that may affect our

race, if only it can be expected with certainty. And such indifference is the less possible in the case before us when it appears that we might by our own rational arrangements hasten the coming of this joyous period for our descendants. Hence the faintest traces of the approach of this period will be very important to ourselves. Now the States are already in the present day involved in such close relations with each other that none of them can pause or slacken in its internal civilization without losing power and influence in relation to the rest; and hence the maintenance, if not the progress, of this end of nature is, in a manner, secured even by the ambitious designs of the States themselves. Further, civil liberty cannot now be easily assailed without inflicting such damage as will be felt in all trades and industries, and especially in commerce; and this would entail a diminution of the powers of the State in external relations. This liberty, moreover, gradually advances further. But if the citizen is hindered in seeking his prosperity in any way suitable to himself that is consistent with the liberty of others, the activity of business is checked generally; and thereby the powers of the whole State are again weakened. Hence the restrictions on personal liberty of action are always more and more removed, and universal liberty even in religion comes to be conceded. And thus it is that, notwithstanding the intrusion of many a delusion and caprice, the spirit of enlightenment gradually arises as a great good which the human race must derive even from the selfish purposes of aggrandizement on the part of its rulers, if they understand what is for their own advantage. This enlightenment, however, and along with it a certain sympathetic interest which the enlightened man cannot avoid taking in the good which he perfectly understands, must by and by pass up to the throne and exert an influence even upon the principles of government. Thus although our rulers at present have no money to spend on public educational institutions, or in general on all that concerns the highest good of the world — because all their resources are already placed to the account of the next war — yet they will certainly find it to be to their own advantage at least not to hinder the people in their own efforts in this direction, however weak and slow these may be. Finally, war itself comes to be regarded as a very hazardous and objectionable undertaking, not only from its being so artificial in itself and so uncertain as regards its issue on both sides, but also from the after-pains which the State feels in the ever-increasing burdens it entails in the form of national debt — a modern infliction — which it becomes almost impossible to extinguish. And to this is to be added the influence which every political disturbance of any State of our continent — linked as it is so closely to others by the connections of trade — exerts upon all the States and which becomes so observable that they are forced by their common danger, although without lawful authority, to offer themselves as arbiters in the troubles of any such State. In doing so, they are beginning to arrange for a great future political body, such as the world has never yet seen. Although this political body may as yet exist only in a rough outline, nevertheless a feeling begins, as it were, to stir in all its members, each of which has a common interest in the maintenance of the whole. And this may well inspire the hope that, after many political revolutions and transformations, the highest purpose of nature will be at last realized in the establishment of a universal cosmopolitical institution, in the bosom of which all the original capacities and endowments of the human species will be unfolded and developed.

NINTH PROPOSITION

A philosophical attempt to work out the universal history of the world according to the plan of nature in its aiming at a perfect civil union must be regarded as possible, and as even capable of helping forward the purpose of nature.

It seems, at first sight, a strange and even an absurd proposal to suggest the composition of a history according to the idea of how the course of the world must proceed, if it is to be conformable to certain rational laws. It may well appear that only a romance could be produced from such a point of view. However, if it be assumed that nature, even in the play of human freedom, does not proceed without plan and design, the idea may well be regarded as practicable; and, although we are too shortsighted to see through the secret mechanism of her constitution, yet the idea may be serviceable as a clew to enable us to penetrate the otherwise planless aggregate of human actions as a whole, and to represent them as constituting a system. For the idea may so far be easily verified. Thus, suppose we start from the history of Greece, as that by which all the older or contemporaneous history has been preserved, or at least accredited to us.* Then, if we study its influence upon the formation and malformation of the political institutions of the Roman people, which swallowed up the

* It is only a learned public which has had an uninterrupted existence from its beginning up to our time that can authenticate ancient history. Beyond it, all is *terra incognita*; and the history of the peoples who lived out of its range can only be begun from the date at which they entered within it. In the case of the Jewish people this happened in the time of the Ptolemies through the Greek translation of the Bible, without which little faith would have been given to their isolated accounts of themselves. From that date taken as a beginning, when it has been determined, their records may then be traced upward. And so it is with all other peoples. The first page of Thucydides, says Hume, is the beginning of all true history.

Greek states, and if we further follow the influence of the Roman Empire upon the Barbarians who destroyed it in turn, and continue this investigation down to our own day, conjoining with it episodically the political history of other peoples according as the knowledge of them has gradually reached us through these more enlightened nations, we shall discover a regular movement of progress through the political institutions of our continent, which is probably destined to give laws to all other parts of the world. Applying the same method of study everywhere, both to the internal civil constitutions and laws of the States and to their external relations to each other, we see how in both relations the good they contained served for a certain period to elevate and glorify particular nations, and with themselves their arts and sciences, — until the defects attaching to their institutions came in time to cause their overthrow. And yet their very ruin leaves always a germ of growing enlightenment behind, which, being further developed by every revolution, acts as a preparation for a subsequent higher stage of progress and improvement. Thus, as I believe, we can discover a clue which may serve for more than the explanation of the confused play of human things, or for the art of political prophecy in reference to future changes in States, — a use which has been already made of the history of mankind, even although it was regarded as the incoherent effect of an unregulated freedom! Much more than all this is attained by the idea of human history viewed as founded upon the assumption of a universal plan in nature. For this idea gives us a new ground of hope, as it opens up to us a consoling view of the future, in which the human species is represented in the far distance as having at last worked itself up to a condition in which all the germs implanted in it by nature may be fully developed, and its destination here on earth fulfilled. Such a justification of nature — or rather, let us say, of Providence — is no insignificant motive for choosing a particular point of view in contemplating the course of the world. For what avails it to magnify the glory and wisdom of the creation in the irrational domain of nature, and to recommend it to devout contemplation, if that part of the great display of the supreme wisdom which presents the end of it all in the history of the human race is to be viewed as only furnishing perpetual objections to that glory and wisdom? The spectacle of history if thus viewed would compel us to turn away our eyes from it against our will; and the despair of ever finding a perfect rational purpose in its movement would reduce us to hope for it, if at all, only in another world.

This idea of a universal history is no doubt to a certain extent of an *a priori* character, but it would be a misunderstanding of my object were it imagined that I have any wish to supplant the empirical cultivation of history, or the narration of the actual facts of experience. It is only a thought of what a philosophical mind — which, as such, must be thoroughly versed in history — might be induced to attempt from another standpoint. Besides, the praiseworthy circumstantiality with which our history is now written may well lead one to raise the question as to how our remote posterity will be able to cope with the burden of history as it will be transmitted to them after a few centuries. They will surely estimate the history of the oldest times, of which the documentary records may have been long lost, only from the point of view of what will interest them; and no doubt this will be what the nations and governments have achieved, or failed to achieve, in the universal world-wide relation. It is well to be giving thought to this relation; and at the same time to draw the attention of ambitious rulers and their servants to the only means by which they can leave an honorable memorial of themselves to latest times. And this may also form a minor motive for attempting to produce such a philosophical history.

ETERNAL PEACE

A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY

1795

FIRST SUPPLEMENT

THE GUARANTY OF ETERNAL PEACE

The guaranty of eternal peace is furnished by no less a power than the great artist Nature herself, *Natura daedala rerum.* The mechanical course of nature visibly exhibits a design to bring forth concord out of the discord of men, even against their will. This power as a cause working by laws which are unknown to us is commonly called fate; but, in view of the design manifested in the course of the world, it is to be regarded as the deep wisdom of a higher cause directed toward the realization of the final purpose of the human race and predetermining the course of the world by relation to it, and as such we call it providence.[8] This power we do not indeed perceive externally in the artistic formations of nature, nor can we even infer from them to it; but, as in all referring of the form of things to final causes generally, we not only can, but must, conjoin this thought with them in order to make their possibility conceivable after the analogy of the operations of human art. The relation and accord of these things to the moral purpose which reason immediately prescribes to us can only be represented by an idea which indeed theoretically transcends our experience, but which is practically determinable and is well founded in reality. Such, for example, is the idea of perpetual peace being a duty when the mechanism of nature is regarded as conducing to its realization. The employment of the term 'nature' rather than 'providence' for the designation of this power is more proper and more modest in view of the limits of human reason, when we are dealing with it merely from the theoretical and not from the religious point of view. For human reason, when dealing with the relation of effects to their causes, must keep within the limits of possible experience; and to speak of Providence as knowable by us in this relation would be putting on Icarian wings with presumptuous rashness in order to approach the mystery of His unfathomable purposes.

APPENDIX

I

ON THE DISCORDANCE BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS IN REFERENCE TO ETERNAL PEACE

The science of morals relates directly to practice in the objective sense, inasmuch as it is a system of unconditionally authoritative laws in accordance with which we ought to act. It is therefore a manifest absurdity, after admitting the authority of this conception of duty, to assert, notwithstanding, that we cannot so act; for, were it so, this conception would have no value. *Ultra posse nemo obligatur.* Hence there can be no conflict between political philosophy as the practical science of right, and moral philosophy as the theoretical science of right; and, consequently, there can be no opposition in this relation between practice and theory. An opposition can only arise between them when the science of morals is regarded as a general doctrine of prudence, or expediency, or a theory of the maxims by which we are to choose the means most conducive for the attainment of useful and advantageous objects; and this amounts to denying generally that there is a science of morals.

The tutelary divinity who is the guardian of the boundaries of morals does not yield to the Jupiter who is the limiting divinity of force, for he still stands under the sway of fate. In other words, reason is not sufficiently enlightened to foresee the series of the predetermining causes, which, with certainty, would enable it to predict the happy or unhappy consequences that would follow from the conduct of men according to the mechanism of nature, however much our wishes and hopes may be directed to it. But what we have to do, in order to continue on the path of duty according to rules of wisdom, reason shows us everywhere clearly enough in the light of the final end which we have to pursue.

The practical man, however, who regards morals as a mere theory, rejects our generous hopes of attaining to that end, even while admitting the distinction between what ought to be and what can be. He founds his unbelief specially upon the fact that he pretends to be able to foresee from the nature of man that men will never resolve to do what is required to bring about the result that leads to perpetual peace.

This amounts to saying that, when any one has once got the power in his hands, he will not allow the people to prescribe laws for him. Similarly, a State which has once entered into power so as to be subject to no external laws will not bring itself to submit to the judgment of other States as to how it shall seek to maintain its rights in relations to them; and even a continent, when it realizes its superiority to another which may not be at all in its way, will not neglect to use the means of strengthening its own power, even by spoliation or conquest. Thus it appears that all the theoretical plans relating to national law or international law or cosmopolitical law dissolve into empty unpractical ideas. On the other hand, a mode of practice, founded upon the empirical principles of human nature and considering nothing in the world too low for furnishing guidance for its maxims, seems as if it alone could hope to find a sure foundation for its system of political expediency.

Now, certainly, if there is no freedom nor any moral law founded upon it, so that all that happens or can happen is mere mechanism of nature, this would hold true, under that supposition; and politics, viewed as the art of applying the mechanical arrangements of nature to the government of men, would constitute the whole of practical wisdom, and the conception of law would be an empty and unreal one. But, on the other hand, it may be the case that it is indispensably necessary to combine the arrangements of nature with the method of politics and even to raise them to the position of conditions limiting its practice, and on this ground the possibility of uniting them must be admitted. I can thus easily enough think of a moral politician as one who holds the principles of political expediency in such a way that they can coexist with morals; but I cannot conceive of a political moralist who fashions a system of morality for himself so as to make it subordinate and subservient to the interest of the statesman.

The moral politician will adopt the following as his principle: "If certain defects which could not be prevented are found in the political constitution or in the relations of the State, it becomes a duty especially for the heads of the State to apply themselves to correct them as soon as possible, and to improve the constitution so that it may be brought into conformity with natural right, which is presented to them as a model in the idea of reason." Now it would manifestly be contrary to that political expediency which is in agreement with morals to destroy the existing bonds of national and cosmopolitical union before there was a better constitution ready to take their place; and hence it would be absurd to demand that every imperfection in the constitution should be at once violently removed. It may, however, be reasonably required that the maxim of the necessity of such an alteration should be consciously recognized by the supreme power in order that it may continue to make constant approximation toward realizing the constitution that best accords with righteous laws. A State may thus govern itself even in a republican manner although it may still possess a constitution grounded upon despotic power. And this may go on until the people gradually become capable of being influenced by the mere idea of the authority of the law, as if it possessed the physical power of the State, and in consequence come to be capable of legislating for themselves, which is the mode of government originally founded upon right. But if, through the violence of a revolution caused by the evils in the constitution, a more lawful constitution were attained even in a wrong way, it would no longer be proper to hold it permissible to bring back the people again to the old constitution, although every one who took part in the revolution by violence or intrigue may have been subjected by law to the penalties attached to rebels. As regards the external relations of the States, however, one State cannot be called upon by another to give up its constitution, although it may be a despotic one and is likely therefore to be the stronger in relation to external enemies, so long at least as that State runs a danger of being suddenly swallowed up by other States. Hence, when any such proposal is made, it must at least be allowed to defer the execution of it till a more opportune time.

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so much at least becomes clear: That men can as little escape from the conception of right in their private as in their public relations; and that they do not venture to found politics openly on the mere manipulations of expediency, nor to renounce all obedience to the conception of public right, as is most strikingly seen in the sphere of international law. On the contrary, they allow all proper honor to this conception in itself, although they may have to devise a hundred evasions and palliations in order to escape from it in practice and to attribute to a subtle statecraft the authority of the origin and the bond of all right. It will be well to put an end to this sophistry, if not to the injustice it veneers, and to bring the false advocates of the mighty ones of the world to confess that it is not in the interest of right but of might that they speak, and in a tone, too, as if they had themselves acquired the right to command. . . .

But, in order to bring practical philosophy into harmony with itself, it is necessary first of all to decide a preliminary question. That question is, whether, in

dealing with problems of the practical reason, we ought to begin from its material principle, as the end which is the object of the activity of the will, or from its formal principle, as that which is founded merely upon freedom in its external relation. This formal principle is expressed as follows: "Act so that you can will that your maxim shall become a universal law, whatever may be its end."

It cannot be doubted that the latter principle must take the precedence; for, as a principle of law, it is an unconditional necessity, whereas the former is obligatory only under the presupposition of the empirical conditions of the proposed end so existing that it can be realized; and if the end, as in the case of perpetual peace, should also be a duty, the duty would itself have to be deduced from the formal principle which regulates external action. Now the material principle is the principle of the political moralist, and it reduces the questions of national, international and universal law to the level of a mere technical problem. On the other hand, the formal principle is the principle of the moral politician, and the question of right becomes with him a moral problem. Their different methods of procedure are thus wide as the poles asunder in regard to the problem of bringing about perpetual peace which, in the view of the moralist, is not merely to be desired as a physical good but also as a state of things arising out of the recognition of duty.

The solution of the problem in question by the method of political expediency requires much knowledge of nature in order to be able to employ her mechanical arrangements for bringing about the end in view, and yet the result of them is wholly uncertain so far as regards the realization of perpetual peace. This holds true whichever of the three departments of public law we consider. It is uncertain whether under any circumstances the people would be better kept in obedience, and at the same time in prosperity, by severe treatment or by alluring baits of vanity; whether they would be better kept in order by the sovereignty of a single individual or by a combination of several heads; whether this would be best secured merely by an official nobility or by the exercise of popular power within the constitution; and also whether any such result, if attained, could be upheld for long. There are examples of the opposite result presented in history by all the different forms of government, with the exception of genuine republicanism only, which system, however, can alone be accepted by a moral politician. A form of international law professedly established upon statutes devised by foreign ministers is still more uncertain; for it is in fact but a thing of words without substantial reality and it rests upon compacts which, in the very act of their ratification, admit the secret reservation of the right to transgress them. On the other hand, the solution of the problem by the method of true political wisdom presses forward, so to speak, of itself; it becomes apparent to every one; it brings all artifice to naught; and it leads straight to the proper end. However, it must be accompanied with a prudent warning that it is not to be brought about in a precipitate manner nor with violence, but it must be unceasingly approached as the favor of circumstances will allow.

All this may be summed up in the exhortation: "Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and then will your object, the benefit of perpetual peace, be added unto you." For morality — and the same is also true with regard to the moral principles of public law and consequently in relation to polities knowable *a priori* — has this innate peculiarity: the less it makes conduct depend on the proposed physical or moral advantage the individual sets as his end, the more does it, in general, conform to this end.

* * * political maxims must not start from the prosperity and happiness that are to be expected in each State from following them, nor from the end which each of them makes the object of its will as the highest empirical principle of politics; but they must proceed from the pure conception of the duty of right or justice as an obligatory principle given *a priori* by pure reason. And this is to be held, whatever may be the physical consequences which follow from adopting these political principles. The world will certainly not perish from the fact that the number of the wicked thus becomes less. Moral evil has inherent in its nature this quality that, in carrying out its purposes, it is antagonistic and destructive to itself, especially in relation to such others as are also under its sway; and hence it must give place to the moral principle of goodness, although the progress to this may be slow.

There is, therefore, objectively in theory no antagonism at all between morals and politics. But subjectively, in consequence of the selfish propensity of men (which, however, as not founded upon rational maxims cannot properly be called practice), such an antagonism is found and it will perhaps always continue to exist, because it serves as a whet to virtue.

[Conclusion to the second part of The Philosophy of Law, which is contained in the Metaphysic of Morals, 1797]

CONCLUSION

If one cannot prove that a thing is, he may try to prove that it is not. And if he succeeds in doing neither (as often occurs), he may still ask whether it is in his interest to accept either of the alternatives hypothetically, from the theoretical or the practical point of view. In other words, a hypothesis may be accepted either to explain a certain phenomenon (as in astronomy to account for the retrogression and stationariness of the planets), or to attain a certain end, which again may be either pragmatic as belonging merely to the sphere of art, or moral as involving a purpose which it is a duty to adopt as a maxim of action. Now it is evident that the assumption (*suppositio*) of the practicability of such an end, though presented merely as a theoretical and problematical judgment, may be regarded as constituting a duty; and hence it is so regarded in this case. For, although there may be no positive obligation to believe in such an end, yet even if there were not the least theoretical probability of action being carried out in accordance with it, so long as its impossibility cannot be demonstrated, there still remains a duty incumbent upon us with regard to it.

Now, as a matter of fact, the moral-practical reason utters within us its irrevocable veto: "There shall be no war." So there ought to be no war, neither between you and me in the condition of nature, nor between us as members of States which, although internally in a condition of law, are still externally in their relation to each other in a condition of lawlessness: for this is not the way by which any one should prosecute his right. Hence the question no longer is as to whether perpetual peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative; but we must act on the supposition of its being real. We must work for what may perhaps not be realized and establish that constitution which yet seems best adapted to bring it about (mayhap republicanism in all States, together and separately). And thus we may put an end to the evil of wars, which have been the chief interest of the internal arrangements of all the States without exception. And, although the realization of this purpose may always remain but a pious wish, yet we do certainly not deceive ourselves in adopting the maxim of action that will guide us in working incessantly for it; for it is a duty to do this. To suppose that the moral law within us is itself deceptive would be sufficient to excite the horrible wish rather to be deprived of all reason than to live under such deception, and even to see one's self, according to such principles, degraded like the lower animals to the level of the mechanical play of nature.

It may be said that the universal and lasting establishment of peace constitutes not merely a part but the whole final purpose and end of the science of law as viewed within the limits of reason. The condition of peace is alone the certain condition of assuring the legally secure recognition of *meum* and *tuum* in the relations of men living in numbers contiguous to each other and who are bound together in a constitution, whose rule is derived not from the mere experience of those who have found it the best as a normal guide for others, but which must be taken by the reason *a priori* from the ideal of a juridical union of men under public laws generally. For all particular examples or instances, being able only to furnish illustration but not proof, are deceptive and at all events require a metaphysics to establish them by its necessary principles. And this is conceded indirectly even by those who turn metaphysics into ridicule when they say, as they often do, "The best constitution is that in which laws, not men, exercise the power." For what can be more metaphysically sublime in its own way than this very idea of theirs, which according to their own assertion has, notwithstanding, the most objective reality? This may be easily shown by reference to actual instances. And it is this very idea which alone can be carried out practically, if it is not forced on in a revolutionary and sudden way by violent overthrow of the existing defective constitution, which would produce for the time the momentary annihilation of the whole juridical state of society. But if the idea is carried forward by gradual reform and in accordance with fixed principles, it may lead by a continuous approximation to the highest political good, and to perpetual peace.

George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart, Germany in 1770. His life was spent writing and teaching: at Jena in 1801, at Heidelberg in 1816, and at Berlin from 1818 until his death in 1831. Living in one of the most chaotic and violent periods of modern history - that of the American and French Revolutions and the Napoleonic Wars - he nevertheless expounded a view in which the universe was essentially ideal in nature ("what is, is what ought to be") and consisted in the development and actualization of the aims and processes of a Divine Reason. The scope and depth of his thought exerted a wide influence. For a decade before his death he was in effect the official philosopher of the Prussian State. His views spread to England (T.H. Green, Bosanquet, McTaggart, Bradley), to the United States (Harris, Royce), and to Italy (Croce). Even among his strongest opponents he exerted a forceful impact. Kierkegaard, the founder of existentialism emphasized the centrality of the choosing individual person as against "the System" as he called Hegel's view of Universal Being. Marx, the founder of dialectical materialism retained the dialectical view of history, but rooted it in a materialistic view of the world process, rather than idealism. Dewey, the pragmatist, and Russell, the logical empiricist, were both Hegelians at one time but revolted, each in their own way. In political philosophy communists and fascists, conservatives and liberals have been nourished or stimulated to some degree by Hegel's thought. Though there are few Hegelians left today in the philosophical landscape, Hegel must clearly be numbered among the most influential of philosophers.

Hegel's philosophy of history, like Kant's (in The Natural Principle of Political Order), focused on the idea that human history is governed by a drive towards a certain end, and that the passions and self-interest of men together with the violence and wars which come from conflicts of those interests were necessary means towards the ultimate ends of Nature or Providence. But despite the striking similarity on this point, and Hegel's obvious debt to Kant, there were very important differences in their views which had radically different implications with respect to their positions on war and peace.

At the root of their differences was the dogmatic absolute idealism of Hegel, as contrasted to the tentative, anti-dogmatic "transcendental idealism" of Kant. Hegel claimed that Philosophy has proven that "Reason is the substance of the Universe; viz, that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence". He insisted that the Universe is an infinite, all-embracing cosmic mind or World-Spirit in the process of trying to realize its potentialities; we humans and our struggles are mere means and aspects in the Absolute's process of thinking itself out. Kant made no such claims. Kant focused his attention on the nature of understanding and reason in the human individual; he insisted that man can neither prove nor disprove by pure reason the existence or non-existence of God, the freedom or non-freedom of the will - much less Hegel's Absolute. At best we can adopt the speculative ideas involved as postulates to guide practical reason; our moral distinctions between the ought and the ought not may lead us to be guided by the idea of a just God, or free will - or the idea that Nature or Providence is steadily marching towards a universal civil society in which there may be perpetual peace - but it can never prove these ideas true. In Hegel the World-Spirit, or the currently dominant Nation State which expresses its current stage of development, is the locus of the Good and the Right; in general what is at any time, is what ought and what must be. The State is a living entity in itself, and its claims override any supposed moral claims of individuals. In Kant's ethical theory individual persons are ends-in-themselves, and the moral laws require that they be treated only as ends, never as means. In Hegel's theory the individual is never an end in itself, always a means in the march of Reason towards self-realization. To Kant, the march of history was possibly towards world-government and perpetual peace. To Hegel the aim of the cosmic Reason was "Freedom", i.e., its own development. To Hegel war had its glory and its justification; to Kant war was an evil, due to inclinations rather than the clear moral insights of practical reason.

II. History as a Process of Reason

The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the world; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process. This conviction and intuition is a hypothesis in the domain of history as such. In that of philosophy it is no hypothesis. It is there proved by speculative cognition, that Reason - and this term may suffice us, without investigating the relation sustained by the Universe to the Divine Being - is Substance, as well as Infinite Power. On the one hand, Reason is the substance of the Universe; viz, that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence. On the other hand, it is the Infinite Energy of the Universe; since Reason is not so powerless as to be incapable of producing anything by a mere ideal. It supplies its own nourishment and is the object of its own operations. While it is exclusively its own basis of existence, and absolute final aim, it is also the energizing power realizing this aim; developing it not only in the phenomena of the Natural, but also of the Spiritual Universe - the History of the World. That this "Idea" or "Reason" is the True, the Eternal, the absolutely powerful essence; that it reveals itself in the World, and that in that World nothing else is revealed but this and its honour and glory - is the thesis which, as we have said, has been proved in Philosophy, and is here regarded as demonstrated.

We have next to notice the rise of this idea - that Reason directs the World - in connection with a further application of it, in the form, viz. of the religious truth, that the world is not abandoned to chance and external contingent causes, but that a Providence controls it. The truth, then, that a Providence (that of God) presides over the events of world consorts with the proposition in question; for Divine Providence is Wisdom, endowed with an infinite Power, which realizes its aim, viz. the absolute rational design of the World. Reason is Thought conditioning itself with perfect freedom.

It was for a while the fashion to profess admiration for the wisdom of God as displayed in animals, plants, and isolated occurences. But, if it be allowed that Providence manifests itself in such objects and forms of existence, why not also in Universal History. Our intellectual striving aims at realizing the conviction that what was intended by eternal wisdom, is actually accomplished in the domain of existent, active Spirit, as well as in that of mere Nature. Our mode of treating the subject is, in this aspect, a Theodicaea - a justification of the ways of God, - so that the ill that is found in the world may be comprehended, and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil. On the one hand, the ultimate design of the World must be perceived; and, on the other hand, the fact that this design has been actually realized in it, and that evil has not been able permanently to assert a competing position.

III. The Aim of Reason, and how it realizes its aim

The enquiry into the essential destiny of Reason, as far as it is considered in reference to the World is identical with the question, what is the ultimate design of the World? And the expression implies that that design is destined to be realised. Two points of consideration suggest themselves: first, the import of this design - its abstract definition; and secondly, its realization.

A) The Abstract Nature of Spirit - that its definitive end is freedom

The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite - Matter. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom. Philosophy teaches that all the qualities of Spirit exist only through Freedom; that all are but a means for attaining Freedom; that all seek and produce this and this alone.

The destiny of the spiritual World, and, - since this is the substantial World, while the physical remains subordinate to it, or, in the language of speculation, has no truth as against the Spiritual, - the final cause of the World at large, we allege to be the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and ipso facto, the reality of that freedom. But that this term "Freedom", without further qualification, is an indefinite, and incalculable ambiguous term has never been more clearly known and felt than in modern times. Yet, for the present, we must content ourselves with the term itself without farther definition. This result it is, at which the process of the World's History has been continually aiming; and to which the sacrifices that have ever and anon been laid on the vast altar of the earth, through the long lapse of ages, have been offered. This is the only aim that sees itself realized and fulfilled; the only pole of repose amid the ceaseless change of events and conditions, and the sole efficient principle that pervades them. This final aim is God's purpose with the world; but God is the absolutely perfect Being, and can therefore, will nothing other than himself - his own Will. The Nature of His Will - that is, His Nature, itself - is what we here call the Idea of Freedom; translating the language of Religion into that of Thought. The question, then, which we may next put, is: What means does this principle of Freedom use for its realization? This is the second point we have to consider.

B) What means Spirit uses to realize its Idea (Freedom)

The question of the means by which Freedom develops itself to a World, conducts us to the phenomenon of History itself. Although Freedom is, primarily, an undeveloped idea, the means it uses are external and phenomenal; presenting themselves in History to our sensuous vision.

1) The Passions and interests of men, the primary means Spirit uses.

The first glance at History convinces us that the actions of men proceed from their needs, their passions, their characters and talents; and impresses us with the belief that such needs, passions and interests are the sole springs of action - the efficient agents in this scene of activity. Among these may, perhaps, be found aims of a liberal or universal kind - benevolence it may be, or noble patriotism; but such virtues and general views are but insignificant as compared with the World and its doings. Passions, private aims, and the satisfaction of selfish desires, are on the other hand the most effective springs of action. Their power lies in the fact that they respect none of the limitations which justice and morality would impose upon them; and that these natural impulses have a more direct influence over man than the artificial and tedious discipline that tends to order and self-restraint, law and morality.

When we look at this display of passions, and the consequences of their violence; the Unreason which is

associated not only with them, but even (rather we might say especially) with good designs and righteous aims; when we see the evil, the vice, the ruin that has befallen the most flourishing kingdoms which the mind of man ever created; we can scarce avoid being filled with sorrow at this universal taint of corruption: and, since this decay is not the work of mere nature, but of the Human Will - a moral embitterment - a revolt of the Good Spirit (if it have a place within us) may well be the result of our reflections. Without rhetorical exaggeration, a simply truthful combination of the miseries that have overwhelmed the noblest of nations and polities, and the finest exemplars of private virtue, - forms a picture of most fearful aspect, and excites emotions of the profoundest and most hopeless sadness, counterbalanced by no consolatory result. We endure in beholding it a mental torture, allowing no defence or escape but the consideration that what has happened could not be otherwise; that it is a fatality which no intervention could alter. And at last we draw back from the intolerable disgust with which these sorrowful reflections threaten us, into the more agreeable environment of our individual life - the Present formed by our aims and interests. In short we retreat into the selfishness that stands on the quiet shore, and thence enjoy in safety the distant spectacle of "wrecks confusedly hurled." But even regarding History as the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized - the question involuntarily arises - to what principle, to what final aim these enormous sacrifices have been offered.

Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of our investigation; the first the Idea, the second the complex of human passions; the one the Warp, the other the Woof of the vast arras-web of Universal History. The concrete mean and union of the two is Liberty, under the conditions of morality in a State. We have spoken of the Idea of Freedom as the nature of Spirit, and the absolute goal of History.

But the history of mankind does not begin with a conscious aim of any kind, as it is the case with the particular circles into which men form themselves of set purpose. The History of the World begins with its general aim - the realization of the Idea of Spirit - only in an implicit form that is, as Nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History (as already observed), is one directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus appearing in the form of merely natural existence, natural will - that which has been called the subjective side, - physical craving, instinct, passion, private interest, as also opinion and subjective conception, - spontaneously present themselves at the commencement. The mere social instinct implies a conscious purpose of security for life and property; and when society has been constituted, this purpose becomes more comprehensive. This vast congeries volitions, interests and activities, constitute the instruments and means of the World-Spirit for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realizing it. And this aim is none other than finding itself - coming to itself - and contemplating itself in concrete actuality. Those manifestations of vitality on the part of individuals and peoples, in which they seek and satisy their own purposes, are, at the same time, the means and instruments of higher and broader purpose of which they know nothing, - which they realize unconsciously.

If men are to act, they must not only intend the Good, but must have decided for themselves whether this or that particular thing is Good. What special course of action, however, is good or not, is determined, as regards the ordinary contingencies of private life, by the laws and customs of a State; and here no great difficulty is presented. Each individual has his position; he knows on the whole what a just, honourable course of conduct is.

2) World-Historical individuals

It is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations that History has to do with. In this sphere are presented those momentous collisions between existing, acknowledged duties, laws, and rights, and those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system; which assail and even destroy its foundations and existence; whose tenor may nevertheless seem good, - on the large scale advantageous, - yes, even indispensable and necessary. These contingencies realise themselves in History: they involve a general principle of a different order from that on which depends the permanence of a people or a State. This principle is an essential phase in the development of the creating Idea, of Truth striving and urging (consciousness of) itself. Historical men - World-Historical Individuals - are those in whose aims such a general principle lies.

Caesar, in danger of losing a position, not perhaps at that time of superiority, yet at least of equality with the others who were at the head of the State, and of succumbing to those who were just on the point of becoming his enemies, - belongs essentially to this category. These enemies - who were at the same time pursuing their personal aims - had the form of the constitution, and the power conferred by an appearance of justice, on their side. Caesar was contending for the maintenance of his position, honour, and safety; and, since the power of his opponents included the sovereignty over the provinces of the Roman Empire, his victory secured for him the conquest of the entire Empire; and he thus became - though leaving the form of the constitution - the Autocrat of the State. That which secured for him the execution of a design, which in the first instance was of negative import - the Autocracy of Rome, - was, however, at the same time an independently necessary feature in the history of Rome and of the world. It was not, then, his private gain merely, but an unconscious impulse that occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe. Such are all great historical men, whose own particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the World-Spirit.

Such individuals had no consciousness of the general idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs; on the contrary, they were practical, political men. But at the same time they were thinking men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time - what was ripe for development. This was the very Truth for their age, for their world; the next species in order, so to speak, and which was already formed in the womb of time. World-historical men - the Heroes of an epoch - must, therefore be recognized as its clear-sighted ones; their deeds, their words are the best of that time.

If we go on to cast a look at the fate of these World-Historical persons, whose vocation it was to be the agents of the World-Spirit, we shall find it to have been no happy one. They attained no calm enjoyment; their whole life was labour and trouble; their whole nature was nought else but their master-passion. When their object is attained they fall off like empty hulls from the

kernel. They die early like Alexander; they are murdered, like Caesar; transported to St. Helena, like Napoleon. This fearful consolation - that historical men have not enjoyed what is called happiness - this consolation those may draw from history, who stand in need of it; and it is craved by Envy - vexed at what is great and transcendent, - striving, therefore, to depreciate it, and to find some flaw in it.

They are great men, because they willed and accomplished something great; not a mere fancy, a mere intention, but that which met with the case and fell in with the needs of the age. This mode of considering them also excludes the so-called "psychological" view, which - serving the purpose of envy most effectively- contrives to refer all actions to the heart, - to bring them under such a subjective aspect - as that their authors appear to have done everything under the impulse of some passion, mean or grand, - some morbid craving, - and on account of these passions and cravings to have been not moral men. Alexander of Macedon partly subdued Greece, and then Asia; therefore he was possessed by a morbid craving for conquest. What pedagogue has not demonstrated of Alexander the Great - of Julius Caesar - that they were instigated by such passions, and were consequently immoral men? - whence the conclusion immediately follows that he, the pedagogue, is a better man than they because he has not such passions; a proof of which lies in the fact that he does not conquer Asia, - vanquish Darius and Porus, - but while he enjoys life himself, lets others enjoy it too. The Thersites of Homer who abuses the kings is a standing figure for all times. Blows - that is beating with a solid cudgel - he does not get in every age, as in the Homeric one; but his envy, his egotism, is the thorn which he has to carry in his flesh; the undying worm that gnaws him is the tormenting consideration that his excellent views and vituperations remain absolutely without result in the world.

3) The role of morals, ethics, religion

But though we might tolerate the idea that individuals, their desires and the gratification of them, are thus sacrificed, and their happiness given up to the empire of chance, to which it belongs; and that as a general rule, individuals come under the category of means to an ulterior end, - there is one aspect of human individuality which we should hesitate to regard in that subordinate light, even in relation to the highest; since it is absolutely no subordinate element, but exists in those individuals as inherently eternal and divine, I mean morality, ethics, religion.

To this order belongs that in them which we would exclude from the category of mere means, - Morality, Ethics, Religion. That is to say, man is an object of existence in himself only in virtue of the Divine that is in him, - that which was designated at the outset as Reason; which, in view of its activity and power of self-determination, was called Freedom. And we affirm - without entering at present on the proof of the assertion - that Religion, Morality, etc., have their foundation and source in that principle, and so are essentially elevated above all alien necessity and chance. And here we must remark that individuals, to the extent of their freedom, are responsible for the depravation and enfeeblement of morals and religion.

In contemplating the fate which virtue, morality, and even piety experience in history, we must not fall into the Litany of Lamentations, that the good and pious often - or for the most part- fare ill in the world, while the evil-disposed and wicked prosper..

What makes men morally discontented (a discontent, bye the bye, on which they somewhat pride themselves), is that they do not find the present adapted to the realization of the aims which they hold to be right and just (more especially in modern times, ideals of political constitutions); they contrast unfavourably things as they are, with their idea of things as they ought to be. The pretensions thus contended for as legitimate in the name of that which has been stated as the ultimate aim of Reason, pass accordingly, for absolute aims, - to the same extent as Religion, Morals, Ethics. Nothing is now more common than the complaint that the ideals which imagination sets up are not realized - that these glorious dreams are destroyed by cold actuality. These Ideals - which in the voyage of life founder on the rocks of hard reality - may be in the first instance only subjective, and belong to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, imagining himself the highest and wisest

This subjective fault-finding, - which however, only keeps in view the particular and its deficiency, without taking notice of Reason pervading the whole, - is easy; and inasmuch as it asserts an excellent intention with regard to the good of the whole, and seems to result from a kindly heart, it feels authorized to give itself airs and assume great consequence. It is easier to discover a deficiency in individuals, in states and in Providence, than to see their real import and value. From this merely negative fault-finding a proud position is taken , - one which overlooks the object, without having entered into it, - without having comprehended its positive aspect. Age generally makes men more tolerant; youth is always discontented. The tolerance of age is the result of the ripeness of a judgment which, not merely as the result of indifference, is satisfied even with what is inferior; but, more deeply taught by the grave experience of life, has been led to perceive the substantial, solid worth of the object in question.

The insight then to which - in contradistinction from those ideals - philosophy is to lead us, is, that the real world is as it ought to be - that the truly good - the universal divine reason - is not merely an abstraction, but a vital principle capable of realizing itself. This Good, this Reason, in its most concrete form, is God. God governs the world; the actual working of his government - the carrying out of his plan - is the History of the World. This plan philosophy strives to comprehend; for only that which has been developed as the result of it, possesses bona fide reality.

c) The shape which the perfect embodiment of Spirit assumes - - The State

The third point to be analyzed is, therefore - what is the object to be realized by these means; i.e., what is the form it assumes in the realm of reality. ... it is the moral Whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his recognizing, believing in and willing that which is common to the Whole. And this must not be understood as if the subjective will of the social unit attained its gratification and enjoyment through that common Will; as if this were a means provided for its benefit; as if the individual, in his relations to other individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order that this universal limitation - the

mutual constraint of all - might secure a small space of liberty for each. Rather, we affirm, are Law, Morality, Government, and they alone, the positive reality and completion of freedom.

It is the absolute interest of Reason that this moral Whole should exist; and herein lies the justification and merit of heroes who have founded states, - however rude these may have been, In the history of the World, only those peoples can come under our notice which form a state. For it must be understood that this latter is the realization of Freedom, i.e., of the absolute final aim, and that it exists for its own sake. It must be further understood that all the worth which the human being possesses - all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the State.

The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth. We have in it, therefore, the object of History in a more definite shape than before; that in which Freedom obtains objectivity, and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity. For Law is the objectivity of Spirit, volition its true form. Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys itself- it is independent and so free. When the State or our country constitutes a community of existence; when the subjective will of man submits to laws, - the contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes.

The error which first meets us is the direct contradictory of our principle that the state presents the realization of Freedom; the opinion, viz., that man is free by nature, but that in society, in the State, he must limit this natural freedom. When a man is spoken of as "free by Nature", the mode of his existence as well as his destiny is implied. This merely natural and primary condition is intended. In this sense a "state of Nature" is assumed in which mankind at large are in the possession of their natural rights with the unconstrained exercise and enjoyment of their freedom. What we find such a state of Nature to be in actual experience, answers exactly to the Idea of a merely natural condition. Freedom as the ideal of that which is original and natural, does not exist as original and natural. Rather it must be sought out and won; and that by an incalculable medial discipline of the intellectual and moral powers. The State of Nature is, therefore, predominantly that of injustice and violence, of untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings.

Limitation is certainly produced by Society and the State, but it is a limitation of the mere brute emotions and rude instincts; as also, in a more advanced stage of culture, of the premeditated self-will of caprice and passion. This kind of constraint is part of the instrumentality by which only, the consciousness of Freedom and the desire for its attainment, in its true form can be obtained. To the Ideal of Freedom, Law and Morality are indispensable requisite; and they are in and for themselves universal existences, objects and aims; which are discovered only by the activity of thought, separating itself from the merely sensuous, and developing itself, in opposition thereto; and which must on the other hand, be introduced into and incorporated with the originally sensuous will, and that contrarily to its natural inclination. The perpetually recurring misapprehension of Freedom consists in regarding that term only in its formal, subjective sense, abstracted from its essential objects and aims; thus a constraint put upon impulse, passion - pertaining to the particular individual as such - a limitation of caprice and self-will is regarded as a fettering of Freedom. We should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation. Society and State are the very conditions in which Freedom is realized.

Summing up what has been said of the State, we find that we have been led to call its vital principle, as actuating the individuals who compose it, - Morality. The State, its laws, its arrangements, constitute the rights of its members; its natural features, its mountains, air, and waters, are their country, their fatherland, their outward material property; the history of this State their deeds; what their ancestors have produced belongs to them and lives in their memory. All is their possession, just as they are possessed by it; for it constitutes their existence, their being.

It is this matured totality which constitutes one Being, the spirit of one People. To it the individual members belong. None remains behind it, still less advances beyond it. This spiritual Being (the Spirit of his Time) is his; he is representative of it; it is that in which he originated, and in which he lives. This Spirit of a People is a determinate and particular Spirit, and is, as just stated, modified by the degree of its historical development. This Spirit, then constitutes the basis and substance of those other forms of a nation's consciousness, which have been noticed. For Spirit in its self-consciousness must become an object of contemplation to itself, and objectivity involves, in the first instance, the rise of differences which make up a total of distinct spheres of objective spirit; in the same way as the Soul exists only as the complex of its faculties, which in their form of concentration in a simple unity produce that Soul. It is thus One Individuality which, presented in its essence as God, is honoured and enjoyed in Religion; which is exhibited as an object of sensuous contemplation in Art; and is apprehended as an intellectual conception, in Philosophy. In virtue of the original identity of their essence, purport and object, these various forms are inseparably united with the Spirit of the State. Only in connection with this particular religion, can this particular political constitution exist; just as in such or such a State, such and such a Philosophy or order of Art.

The remark next in order is, that each particular National genius is to be treated as only One Individual in the process of Universal History. For that history is the exhibition of the divine absolute development of Spirit in its highest forms,- that graduation by which it attains its truth and consciousness of its self. The forms which these grades of progress assume are the characteristic "National Spirits" of History; the peculiar tenor of their moral life, of their Government, their Art, Religion and Science. To realize these grades is the boundless impulse of the WorldSpirit - the goal of its irresistible urging; for this division into organic members, and the full development of each, is its Idea.

The State.

257. The state is the realized ethical idea or ethical spirit. It is the will which manifests itself, makes itself clear and visible, substantiates itself. It is the will which thinks and knows itself, and carries out what it knows, and in so far as it knows. The state finds in ethical custom its direct and unreflected existence, and its indirect and reflected existence in the self-consciousness of the individual and in his knowledge and activity. Self-consciousness in the form of social disposition has its substantive freedom in the state, as the essence, purpose, and product of its activity.

Note.—Were the state to be considered as exchangeable with the civic society, and were its decisive features to be regarded as the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of the individual as such would be the ultimate purpose of the social union. It would then be at one's option to be a member of the state.— But the state has a totally different relation to the individual. It is the objective spirit, and he has his truth, real existence, and ethical status only in being a member of it. Union, as such, is itself the true content and end, since the individual is intended to pass a universal life. His particular satisfactions, activities, and way of life have in this authenticated substantive principle their origin and result.

259. (*a*) The idea of the state has direct actuality in the individual state. It, as a self-referring organism, is the constitution or internal state-organization or polity.

(*b*) It passes over into a relation of the individual state to other states. This is its external organization or polity.

(*c*) As universal idea, or kind, or species, it has absolute authority over individual states. This is the spirit which gives itself reality in the process of world-history.

Addition.—The state as an actual thing is pre-eminently individual, and, what is more, particular. Individuality as distinguished from particularity is an element of the idea of the state itself, while particularity belongs to history. Any two states, as such, are independent of each other. Any relation between the two must be external. A third must therefore stand above and unite them. Now this third is the spirit, which gives itself reality in world-history, and constitutes itself absolute judge over states.

Note.—It is a very distorted account of the matter when the state, in demanding sacrifices from the citizens, is taken to be simply the civic community, whose object is merely the security of life and property. Security cannot possibly be obtained by the sacrifice of what is to be secured.

Herein is to be found the ethical element in war. War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil. It is not a merely external accident, having its accidental ground in the passions of powerful individuals or nations, in acts of injustice, or in anything which ought not to be. Accident befalls that which is by nature accidental, and this fate is a necessity. So from the standpoint of the conception and in philosophy the merely accidental vanishes, because in it, as it is a mere appearance, is recognized its essence, namely, necessity. It is necessary that what is finite, such as life and property, should have its contingent nature exposed, since contingency is inherent in the conception of the finite. This necessity has in one phase of it the form of a force of nature, since all that is finite is mortal and transient. But in the ethical life, that is to say, the state, this force and nature are separated. Necessity becomes in this way exalted to the work of freedom, and becomes a force which is ethical. What from the standpoint of nature is transient, is now transient because it is willed to be so; and that, which is fundamentally negative, becomes substantive and distinctive individuality in the ethical order.

It is often said, for the sake of edification, that war makes short work of the vanity of temporal things. It is the element by which the idealization of what is particular receives its right and becomes an actuality. Moreover, by it, as I have elsewhere expressed it, "finite pursuits are rendered unstable, and the ethical health of peoples is preserved. Just as the movement of the ocean prevents the corruption which would be the result of perpetual calm, so by war people escape the corruption which would be occasioned by a continuous or eternal peace."— The view that this quotation contains merely a philosophical idea, or, as it is sometimes called, a justification of providence, and that actual war needs another kind of justification, will be taken up later. The idealization, which comes to the surface in war, viewed as an accidental foreign relation, is the same as the ideality by virtue of which the internal state functions are organic elements of the whole. This principle is found in history in such a fact as that successful wars have prevented civil broils and strengthened the internal power of the state. So, too, peoples, who have been unwilling or afraid to endure internal sovereignty, have been subjugated by others, and in their struggles for independence have had honour and success small in proportion to their failure to establish within themselves a central political power; their freedom died through their fear of its dying. Moreover, states, which have no guarantee of independence in the strength of their army, states, *e.g.*, that are very small in comparison with their neighbours, have continued to subsist because of their internal constitution, which merely of itself would seem to promise them neither internal repose nor external security. These phenomena are illustrations of our principle drawn from history.

Addition.—In peace the civic life becomes more and more extended. Each separate sphere walls itself in and becomes exclusive, and at last there is a stagnation of mankind. Their particularity becomes more and more fixed and ossified. Unity of the body is essential to health, and where the organs become hard death ensues. Everlasting peace is frequently demanded as the ideal towards which mankind must move. Hence, Kant proposed an

alliance of princes, which should settle the controversies of states, and the Holy Alliance was probably intended to be an institution of this kind. But the state is individual, and in individuality negation is essentially implied. Although a number of states may make themselves into a family, the union, because it is an individuality, must create an opposition, and so beget an enemy. As a result of war peoples are strengthened, nations, which are involved in civil quarrels, winning repose at home by means of war abroad. It is true that war occasions insecurity of possessions, but this real insecurity is simply a necessary commotion. From the pulpit we hear much regarding the uncertainty, vanity, and instability of temporal things. At the very same time every one, no matter how much he is impressed by these utterances, thinks that he will manage to retain his own stock and store. But if the uncertainty comes in the form of hussars with glistening sabres, and begins to work in downright earnest, this touching edification turns right about face, and hurls curses at the invader. In spite of this, wars arise, when they lie in the nature of the matter. The seeds spring up afresh, and words are silenced before the earnest repetitions of history.

325. Sacrifice for the sake of the individuality of the state is the substantive relation of all the citizens, and is, thus, a universal duty. It is ideality on one of its sides, and stands in contrast to the reality of particular subsistence. Hence it itself becomes a specific relation, and to it is dedicated a class of its own, the class whose virtue is bravery.

326. Dissensions between states may arise out of any one specific side of their relations to each other. Through these dissensions the specific part of the state devoted to defence receives its distinguishing character. But if the whole state, as such, is in danger of losing its independence, duty summons all the citizens to its defence. If the whole becomes a single force, and is torn from its internal position and goes abroad, defence becomes converted into a war of conquest.

Note.—The weaponed force of the state constitutes its standing army. The specific function of defending the state must be intrusted to a separate class. This proceeding is due to the same necessity by which each of the other particular elements, interests, or affairs, has a separate place, as in marriage, the industrial class, the business class, and the political class. Theorizing, which wanders up and down with its reasons, goes about to contemplate the greater advantages or the greater disadvantages of a standing army. Mere opinion decides against an army, because the conception of the matter is harder to understand than are separate and external sides. Another reason is that the interests and aims of particularity, expenses, consequent higher taxation, etc., are counted of greater concern by the civic community than is the absolutely necessary. On this view the necessary is valuable only as a means to the preservation of the various special civic interests.

327. Bravery taken by itself is a formal virtue, since in it freedom is farthest removed from all special aims, possessions, and enjoyments, and even from life. But it involves a negation or renunciation of only external realities, and does not carry with it a completion of the spiritual nature. Thus, the sentiment of courage may be based upon any one of a variety of grounds, and its actual result may be not for the brave themselves, but only for others.

Addition.—The military class is the class of universality. To it are assigned the defence of the state and the duty of bringing into existence the ideality implicit in itself. In other words it must sacrifice itself. Bravery is, it is true, of different sorts. The courage of the animal, or the robber, the bravery due to a sense of honour, the bravery of chivalry, are not yet the true forms of it. True bravery in civilized peoples consists in a readiness to offer up oneself in the service of the state, so that the individual counts only as one amongst many. Not personal fearlessness, but the taking of one's place in a universal cause, is the valuable feature of it. In India five hundred men conquered twenty thousand, who were by no means cowardly but lacked the sense of co-operation.

328. The content of bravery as a sentiment is found in the true absolute final end, the sovereignty of the state. Bravery realizes this end, and in so doing gives up personal reality. Hence, in this feeling are found the most rigorous and direct antagonisms. There is present in it a self-sacrifice, which is yet the existence of freedom. In it is found the highest self-control or independence, which yet in its existence submits to the mechanism of an external order and a life of service. An utter obedience or complete abnegation of one's own opinion and reasonings, even an absence of one's own spirit, is coupled with the most intense and comprehensive direct presence of the spirit and of resolution. The most hostile and hence most personal attitude towards individuals is allied with perfect indifference, or even, it may be, a kindly feeling towards them as individuals.

Note.—To risk one's life is indeed something more than fear of death, but it is yet a mere negative, having no independent character and value. Only the positive element, the aim and content of the act, gives significance to the feeling of fearlessness. Robbers or murderers, having in view a crime, adventurers bent upon gratifying merely their own fancy, risk their lives without fear.—The principle of the modern world, that is, the thought and the universal, have given bravery a higher form. It now seems to be mechanical in its expression, being the act not of a particular person, but of a member of the whole. As antagonism is now directed, not against separate persons, but against a hostile whole, personal courage appears as impersonal. To this change is due the invention of the gun; and this by no means chance invention has transmuted the merely personal form of bravery into the more abstract.

333. International law, or the law which is universal and is meant to hold absolutely good between states, is to be distinguished from the special content of positive treaties, and has at its basis the proposition that treaties, as they involve the mutual obligations of states, must be kept inviolate. But because the relation of states to one another has sovereignty as its principle, they are so far in a condition of nature one to the other. Their rights have reality not in a general will, which is constituted as a superior power, but in their particular wills. Accordingly the fundamental proposition of international law remains a good intention, while in the actual situation the relation established by the treaty is being continually shifted or abrogated.

Note.—There is no judge over states, at most only a referee or mediator, and even the mediatorial function is only an accidental thing, being due to particular wills. Kant's idea was that eternal peace should be secured by an alliance of states. This alliance should settle every dispute, make impossible the resort to arms for a decision, and be recognized by every state. This idea assumes that states are in accord, an agreement which, strengthened though it might be by moral, religious, and other considerations, nevertheless always rested on the private sovereign will, and was therefore liable to be disturbed by the element of contingency.

334. Therefore, when the particular wills of states can come to no agreement, the controversy can be settled only by war.

338. Although in war there prevails force, contingency, and absence of right, states continue to recognize one another as states. In this fact is implied a covenant, by virtue of which each state retains absolute value. Hence, war, even when actively prosecuted, is understood to be temporary, and in international law is recognized as containing the possibility of peace. Ambassadors, also, are to be respected. War is not to be waged against internal institutions, or the peaceable family and private life, or private persons.

Addition.—Modern wars are carried on humanely. One person is not set in hate over against another. Personal hostilities occur at most in the case of the pickets. But in the army as an army, enmity is something undetermined, and gives place to the duty which each person owes to another.

339. For the rest, the capture of prisoners in time of war, and in time of peace the concession of rights of private intercourse to the subjects of another state, depend principally upon the ethical observances of nations. In them is embodied that inner universality of behaviour, which is preserved under all relations.

Addition.—The nations of Europe form a family by virtue of the universal principle of their legislation, their ethical observances, and their civilization. Amongst them international behaviour is ameliorated, while there prevails elsewhere a mutual infliction of evils. The relation of one state to another fluctuates; no judge is present to compose differences; the higher judge is simply the universal and absolute spirit, the spirit of the world.

340. As states are particular, there is manifested in their relation to one another a shifting play of internal particularity of passions, interests, aims, talents, virtues, force, wrong, vice, and external contingency on the very largest scale. In this play even the ethical whole, national independence, is exposed to chance. The spirit of a nation is an existing individual having in particularity its objective actuality and self-consciousness. Because of this particularity it is limited. The destinies and deeds of states in their connection with one another are the visible dialectic of the finite nature of these spirits. Out of this dialectic the universal spirit, the spirit of the world, the unlimited spirit, produces itself. It has the highest right of all, and exercises its right upon the lower spirits in world-history. The history of the world is the world's court of judgment.

346. Since history is the embodiment of spirit in the form of events, that is, of direct natural reality, the stages of development are present as direct natural principles. Because they are natural, they conform to the nature of a multiplicity, and exist one outside the other. Hence, to each nation is to be ascribed a single principle, comprised under its geographical and anthropological existence.

347 To the nation, whose natural principle is one of these stages, is assigned the accomplishment of it through the process characteristic of the self-developing self-consciousness of the world-spirit. In the history of the world this nation is for a given epoch dominant, although it can make an epoch but once (§ 346). In contrast with the absolute right of this nation to be the bearer of the current phase in the development of the world-spirit, the spirits of other existing nations are void of right, and they, like those whose epochs are gone, count no longer in the history of the world.

350. It is the absolute right of the idea to come visibly forth, and proceeding from marriage and agriculture (§ 203, *note*) realize itself in laws and objective institutions. This is true whether its realization appears in the form of divine law and beneficence or in the form of force and wrong. This right is the right of heroes to found states.

351. In the same way civilized nations may treat as barbarians the peoples who are behind them in the essential elements of the state. Thus, the rights of mere herdsmen, hunters, and tillers of the soil are inferior, and their independence is merely formal.

Note.—Wars and contests arising under such circumstances are struggles for recognition in behalf of a certain definite content. It is this feature of them which is significant in world-history.

Karl von Clausewitz has been called "The Philosopher of War" in something of the spirit that Aristotle was called "The Philosopher" by latter-day scholastics. There are, of course, as our other readings show, many other philosophers of war with very different philosophies. But it may be said that von Clausewitz was indeed a very important philosopher of war and one whose views have seemed, particularly in many military circles, to be the last word on the subject. Whether they ought to be so viewed is a very different question.

Von Clausewitz was a Prussian General, born at Burg, Germany in 1780. At the age of 12 he entered the Prussian Army as a Fahnenjunker, or ensign, and served in campaigns on the Rhine when he was 13 or 14 (in 1793-4). From 1801 to 1803 he attended the Military School at Berlin where he attracted the attention of the head, General Scharnhorst, who aided his subsequent advancement. In the Napoleonic Wars (from 1803-1815) Clausewitz played a minor role. In 1806 he was aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, was wounded, taken prisoner and sent to France for several years. In the service of Russia in 1812, he played a role in persuading the Prussian General Yorck von Wartenburg to drop out of Napoleon's Grande Armée as it was beating a disastrous retreat from Moscow. The result, known as the Convention of Taurogen, was a turning point which made possible an alliance of Prussia, Russia and Great Brittain against Napoleon. Later, having re-entered the Prussia army, he fought at Waterloo when Napoleon was finally defeated. In 1818 he became a Major General and the Director of the General Academy of War at Berlin. The major part of the writing of his classic work On War apparently was done between around 1816 and 1830; but the book, at his request, was not published until after his death. In 1830 he was appointed to a position in Breslau as Chief of the 2nd Artillery District, and the following year served as Chief of Staff to Field Marshall Count Gneisenau. He died at 51 in 1831.

No better summary of von Clausewitz's views can be given, I think, than the following by Anatol Rappaport in the Penquin edition (1968) of On War:

Clausewitz views war as a rational instrument of national policy. The three words 'rational', 'instrument', and 'national' are the key concepts of his paradigm. In this view, the decision to wage war 'ought' to be rational, in the sense that it ought to be based on estimated costs and gains of the war. Next, war 'ought' to be instrumental, in the sense that it ought to be waged in order to achieve some goal, never for its own sake; and also in the sense that strategy and tactics ought to be directed towards just one end, namely towards victory. Finally, war 'ought' to be national, in the sense that its objective should be to advance the interests of a national state and that the entire effort of the nation ought to be mobilized in the service of the military objective.

We have paraphrased Clausewitz's philosophy in terms of what, according to its precepts, war *ought* to be. Actually, Clausewitz says what war *is*. At the same time he is well aware that actual decisions to wage war or to avoid it were often made without due considerations of relevant circumstances; that strategies and tactics were often determined by matters irrelevant to the objectives of war; and that, until his own time, wars had not been national wars. Thus the discrepancy between what Clausewitz says war is, and what many wars actually were, is not to be ascribed to ignorance of facts. Tradition, rooted in the ideas of the ancients and continuing throughout the centuries of European thought, ascribed to philosophy the task of discovering the essences of phenomena. Whether the essence was in the origin of the phenomenon in question (as Plato thought) or became manifest in the unfolding of the phenomenon (as Aristotle thought), *it* (the essence), rather than the accidental and variable realizations of the phenomenon, was traditionally assumed to be the proper subject of a philosophical investigation. Therefore, for Clausewitz, the difference between 'what is' and 'what ought to be' was not as sharp as it may appear in our more empirically oriented age. In depicting war as rational, instrumental, and national, Clausewitz thought that he was revealing the 'true nature' of war, stripped of non-essentials with which it may have been encumbered in particular historical contexts.

The explicit distinction between what war is and what it 'ought' to be is drawn by Clausewitz on another level of abstraction. His 'ought' must be understood at the outset in its logical, not its prescriptive sense.[1] Clausewitz starts out by defining war: *War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.* From this definition it follows *logically* (according to Clausewitz) that every war ought to end in a complete victory of one side over the other, and also that 'moderation in war is an absurdity' since failure to utilize all the force at one's disposal defeats the purpose of war. War conceived in this way Clausewitz calls 'war in the abstract' or 'absolute war'. (Its relation to 'total war', of which we had a foretaste in our century, will be discussed below.)

Real wars differ from abstract war, says Clausewitz, because idealized conditions are never realized. Mobilization of forces is not instantaneous; events are governed not only by strict causality but also by chance; psychological factors are important determinants of decisions made by men, etc. Clausewitz subsumes all these perturbing circumstances under the concept of 'friction', an obvious allusion to the analogous concept in physics, which is invoked to explain the discrepancy between real and idealized mechanical processes.

It therefore seemed to Clausewitz that having taken 'friction' into account, he has grasped the 'true nature' of real war and so made the connexion between theory and experience. From the vantage point of a *comparative* philosophy of war, however, we can see that even Clausewitz's 'realistic' theory is only one of several possible idealized abstractions.

ON WAR

BY

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NEW AND REVISED EDITION

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

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BOOK I

ON THE NATURE OF WAR

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS WAR?

1. INTRODUCTION.

We propose to consider first the single elements of our subject, then each branch or part, and, last of all, the whole, in all its relations—therefore to advance from the simple to the complex. But it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole, because it is particularly necessary that in the consideration of any of the parts their relation to the whole should be kept constantly in view.

2. DEFINITION.

We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of War used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a War, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will: each endeavours to throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further resistance.

War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.

Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say, physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of States and Law), is therefore the *means;* the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate *object.* In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside as something we can eliminate from our calculations.

3. UTMOST USE OF FORCE.

Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the Art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as War, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. The former then dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side.

This is the way in which the matter must be viewed and it is to no purpose, it is even against one's own interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair because the horror of its elements excites repugnance.

* * * * *

Therefore, if we find civilised nations do not put their prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on War, and has taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of mere instinct. The invention of gunpowder, the constant progress of improvements in the construction of firearms, are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the adversary which lies at the bottom of the conception of War is in no way changed or modified through the progress of civilisation.

We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the first extreme with which we meet (*first reciprocal action*).

4. THE AIM IS TO DISARM THE ENEMY.

We have already said that the aim of all action in War is to disarm the enemy, and we shall now show that this, theoretically at least, is indispensable.

If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand; but the disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a transitory nature, at least in appearance, otherwise the enemy, instead of yielding, will hold out, in the prospect of a change for the better. Every change in this position which is produced by a continuation of the War should

therefore be a change for the worse. The worst condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed. If, therefore, the enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of War, he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened with it. From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of Warfare. Now War is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass, because an absolute state of endurance would not be making War; therefore, what we have just said as to the aim of action in War applies to both parties. Here, then, is another case of reciprocal action. As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did to him. This is the second reciprocal action, and leads to a second extreme (*second reciprocal action*).

5. UTMOST EXERTION OF POWERS.

If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely, *the sum of available means* and *the strength of the Will*. The sum of the available means may be estimated in a measure, as it depends (although not entirely) upon numbers; but the strength of volition is more difficult to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives. Granted we have obtained in this way an approximation to the strength of the power to be contended with, we can then take a review of our own means, and either increase them so as to obtain a preponderance, or, in case we have not the resources to effect this, then do our best by increasing our means as far as possible. But the adversary does the same; therefore, there is a new mutual enhancement, which, in pure conception, must create a fresh effort towards an extreme. This is the third case of reciprocal action, and a third extreme with which we meet (*third reciprocal action*).

6. MODIFICATION IN THE REALITY.

Thus reasoning in the abstract, the mind cannot stop short of an extreme, because it has to deal with an extreme, with a conflict of forces left to themselves, and obeying no other but their own inner laws. If we should seek to deduce from the pure conception of War an absolute point for the aim which we shall propose and for the means which we shall apply, this constant reciprocal action would involve us in extremes, which would be nothing but a play of ideas produced by an almost invisible train of logical subtleties. If, adhering closely to the absolute, we try to avoid all difficulties by a stroke of the pen, and insist with logical strictness that in every case the extreme must be the object, and the utmost effort must be exerted in that direction, such a stroke of the pen would be a mere paper law, not by any means adapted to the real world.

Even supposing this extreme tension of forces was an absolute which could easily be ascertained, still we must admit that the human mind would hardly submit itself to this kind of logical chimera. There would be in many cases an unnecessary waste of power, which would be in opposition to other principles of statecraft; an effort of Will would be required disproportioned to the proposed object, which therefore it would be impossible to realise, for the human will does not derive its impulse from logical subtleties.

But everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to reality. In the former, everything must be subject to optimism, and we must imagine the one side as well as the other striving after perfection and even attaining it. Will this ever take place in reality? It will if,

(1) War becomes a completely isolated act, which arises suddenly, and is in no way connected with the previous history of the combatant States.

(2) If it is limited to a single solution, or to several simultaneous solutions.

(3) If it contains within itself the solution perfect and complete, free from any reaction upon it, through a calculation beforehand of the political situation which will follow from it.

7. WAR IS NEVER AN ISOLATED ACT.

With regard to the first point, neither of the two opponents is an abstract person to the other, not even as regards that factor in the sum of resistance which does not depend on objective things, viz., the Will. This Will is not an entirely unknown quantity; it indicates what it will be to-morrow by what it is to-day. War does not spring up quite suddenly, it does not spread to the full in a moment; each of the two opponents can, therefore, form an opinion of the other, in a great measure, from what he is and what he does, instead of

judging of him according to what he, strictly speaking, should be or should do. But, now, man with his incomplete organisation is always below the line of absolute perfection, and thus these deficiencies, having an influence on both sides, become a modifying principle.

8. WAR DOES NOT CONSIST OF A SINGLE INSTANTANEOUS BLOW.

The second point gives rise to the following considerations :—

If War ended in a single solution, or a number of simultaneous ones, then naturally all the preparations for the same would have a tendency to the extreme, for an omission could not in any way be repaired ; the utmost, then, that the world of reality could furnish as a guide for us would be the preparations of the enemy, as far as they are known to us ; all the rest would fall into the domain of the abstract. But if the result is made up from several successive acts, then naturally that which precedes with all its phases may be taken as a measure for that which will follow, and in this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and thus modifies the effort towards the extreme. . . .

Now, it is possible to bring all the movable military forces of a country into operation at once, but not all fortresses, rivers, mountains, people, &c.—in short, not the whole country, unless it is so small that it may be completely embraced by the first act of the War. Further, the co-operation of allies does not depend on the Will of the belligerents ; and from the nature of the political relations of states to each other, this co-operation is frequently not afforded until after the War has commenced, or it may be increased to restore the balance of power.

That this part of the means of resistance, which cannot at once be brought into activity, in many cases, is a much greater part of the whole than might at first be supposed, and that it often restores the balance of power, seriously affected by the great force of the first decision, will be more fully shown hereafter. Here it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in a moment of time is contradictory to the nature of War.

. . . . .

9. THE RESULT IN WAR IS NEVER ABSOLUTE.

Lastly, even the final decision of a whole War is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered State often sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations. How much this must modify the degree of tension, and the vigour of the efforts made, is evident in itself.

10. THE PROBABILITIES OF REAL LIFE TAKE THE PLACE OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE EXTREME AND THE ABSOLUTE.

In this manner, the whole act of War is removed from the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost. If the extreme is no longer to be apprehended, and no longer to be sought for, it is left to the judgment to determine the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it, and this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the real world by the *laws of probability*. Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions, but individual States and Governments, once the War is no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found.

From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other, and act accordingly.

11. THE POLITICAL OBJECT NOW REAPPEARS.

Here the question which we had laid aside forces itself again into consideration (*see* No. 2), viz., *the political object of the War*. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller, it may be expected, will be the means of resistance which he will employ ; but the smaller his preparation, the smaller will ours require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether.

Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made. This it cannot be in itself, but it is so in relation to both the belligerent States, because we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions.

. . . . .

If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political object, that action will in general diminish as the political object diminishes, and in a greater degree the more the political object dominates. Thus it is

explained how, without any contradiction in itself, there may be Wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from a War of extermination down to the mere use of an army of observation. This, however, leads to a question of another kind which we have hereafter to develop and answer.

* * * * *

20. THEREFORE, THE ELEMENT OF CHANCE ONLY IS WANTING TO MAKE OF WAR A GAME, AND IN THAT ELEMENT IT IS LEAST OF ALL DEFICIENT.

We see from the foregoing how much the objective nature of War makes it a calculation of probabilities; now there is only one single element still wanting to make it a game, and that element it certainly is not without: it is chance. There is no human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in close connection with chance as War. But together with chance, the accidental, and along with it good luck, occupy a great place in War.

21. WAR IS A GAME BOTH OBJECTIVELY AND SUBJECTIVELY.

If we now take a look at the *subjective nature* of War, that is to say, at those conditions under which it is carried on, it will appear to us still more like a game. Primarily the element in which the operations of War are carried on is danger; but which of all the moral qualities is the first in danger? *Courage*. Now certainly courage is quite compatible with prudent calculation, but still they are things of quite a different kind, essentially different qualities of the mind; on the other hand, daring reliance on good fortune, boldness, rashness, are only expressions of courage, and all these propensities of the mind look for the fortuitous (or accidental), because it is their element.

We see, therefore, how, from the commencement, the absolute, the mathematical as it is called, nowhere finds any sure basis in the calculations in the Art of War; and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all the coarse and fine threads of its web, and makes War of all branches of human activity the most like a gambling game.

* * * * *

The War of a community—of whole Nations, and particularly of civilised Nations—always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is, therefore, a political act. Now if it was a perfect, unrestrained, and absolute expression of force, as we had to deduce it from its mere conception, then the moment it is called forth by policy it would step into the place of policy, and as something quite independent of it would set it aside, and only follow its own laws, just as a mine at the moment of explosion cannot be guided into any other direction than that which has been given to it by preparatory arrangements. This is how the thing has really been viewed hitherto, whenever a want of harmony between policy and the conduct of a War has led to theoretical distinctions of the kind. But it is not so and the idea is radically false. War in the real world as we have already seen, is not an extreme thing which expends itself at one single discharge; it is the operation of powers which do not develop themselves completely in the same manner and in the same measure. . .

* * * * *

25. DIVERSITY IN THE NATURE OF WARS.

The greater and the more powerful the motives of a War, the more it affects the whole existence of a people. The more violent the excitement which precedes the War, by so much the nearer will the War approach to its abstract form, so much the more will it be directed to the destruction of the enemy, so much the nearer will the military and political ends coincide, so much the more purely predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.

The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, more the General and his Army; the third, more the Government. The passions which break forth in War must already have a latent existence in the peoples. The range which the display of courage and talents shall get in the realm of probabilities and of chance depends on the particular characteristics of the General and his Army, but the political objects belong to the Government alone.

These three tendencies, which appear like so many different law-givers, are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject, and at the same time variable in degree. A theory which would leave any one of them out of account, or set up any arbitrary relation between them, would immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone.

The problem is, therefore, that theory shall keep itself poised in a manner between these three tendencies, as between three points of attraction.

[BOOK I.]

CHAPTER III

THE GENIUS FOR WAR

EVERY special calling in life, if it is to be followed with success, requires peculiar qualifications of understanding and soul. Where these are of a high order, and manifest themselves by extraordinary achievements, the mind to which they belong is termed *genius*.

What we have to do is to bring under consideration every common tendency of the powers of the mind and soul towards the business of War, the whole of which common tendencies we may look upon as the *essence of military genius*. We say "common," for just therein consists military genius, that it is not one single quality bearing upon War, as, for instance, courage, while other qualities of mind and soul are wanting or have a direction which is unserviceable for War, but that it is *an harmonious association of powers*, in which one or other may predominate, but none must be in opposition.

If we look at a wild, warlike race, then we find a warlike spirit in individuals much more common than in a civilised people; for in the former almost every warrior possesses it, whilst in the civilised whole, masses are only carried away by it from necessity, never by inclination. But amongst uncivilised people we never find a really great General, and very seldom what we can properly call a military genius, because that requires a development of the intelligent powers which cannot be found in an uncivilised state. That a civilised people may also have a warlike tendency and development is a matter of course; and the more this is general, the more frequently also will military spirit be found in individuals in their armies. Now as this coincides in such case with the higher degree of civilisation, therefore from such nations have issued forth the most brilliant military exploits, as the Romans and the French have exemplified. The greatest names in these and in all other nations that have been renowned in War belong strictly to epochs of higher culture.

From this we may infer how great a share the intelligent powers have in superior military genius. We shall now look more closely into this point.

War is the province of danger, and therefore courage above all things is the first quality of a warrior.

Courage is of two kinds: first, physical courage, or courage in presence of danger to the person; and next, moral courage, or courage before responsibility, whether it be before the judgment-seat of external authority, or of the inner power, the conscience. We only speak here of the first.

Courage before danger to the person, again, is of two kinds. First, it may be indifference to danger, whether proceeding from the organism of the individual, contempt of death, or habit: in any of these cases it is to be regarded as a permanent condition.

Secondly, courage may proceed from positive motives, such as personal pride, patriotism, enthusiasm of any kind. In this case courage is not so much a normal condition as an impulse.

We may conceive that the two kinds act differently. The first kind is more certain, because it has become a second nature, never forsakes the man; the second often leads him farther. In the first there is more of firmness, in the second, of boldness. The first leaves the judgment cooler, the second raises its power at times, but often bewilders it. The two combined make up the most perfect kind of courage.

War is the province of physical exertion and suffering. In order not to be completely overcome by them, a certain strength of body and mind is required, which, either natural or acquired, produces indifference to them. With these qualifications, under the guidance of simply a sound understanding, a man is at once a proper instrument for War; and these are the qualifications so generally to be met with amongst wild and half-civilised tribes. If we go further in the demands which War makes on its votaries, then we find the powers of the understanding predominating. War is the province of uncertainty: three-fourths of those things upon which action in War must be calculated, are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty. Here, then, above all a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to search out the truth by the tact of its judgment.

An average intellect may, at one time, perhaps hit upon this truth by accident; an extraordinary courage, at another, may compensate for the want of this tact; but in the majority of cases the average result will always bring to light the deficient understanding.

War is the province of chance. In no sphere of human activity is such a margin to be left for this intruder, because none is so much in constant contact with him on all sides. He increases the uncertainty of every circumstance, and deranges the course of events.

From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, this continual interposition of chance, the actor

in War constantly finds things different from his expectations; and this cannot fail to have an influence on his plans, or at least on the presumptions connected with these plans. If this influence is so great as to render the pre-determined plan completely nugatory, then, as a rule, a new one must be substituted in its place; but at the moment the necessary data are often wanting for this, because in the course of action circumstances press for immediate decision, and allow no time to look about for fresh data, often not enough for mature consideration.

If we take a general view of the four elements composing the atmosphere in which War moves, of *danger*, *physical effort*, *uncertainty*, and *chance*, it is easy to conceive that a great force of mind and understanding is requisite to be able to make way with safety and success amongst such opposing elements, a force which, according to the different modifications arising out of circumstances we find termed by military writers and annalists as *energy firmness*, *staunchness*, *strength of mind and character*

CHAPTER VI

INFORMATION IN WAR

By the word "information" we denote all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country; therefore, in fact, the foundation of all our ideas and actions.

Great part of the information obtained in War is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character. What is required of an officer is a certain power of discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment can give. The law of probability must be his guide. This is not a trifling difficulty even in respect of the first plans, which can be formed in the chamber outside the real sphere of War, but it is enormously increased when in the thick of War itself one report follows hard upon the heels of another; it is then fortunate if these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability, and thus themselves call forth a scrutiny. It is much worse for the inexperienced when accident does not render him this service, but one report supports another, confirms it, magnifies it, finishes off the picture with fresh touches of colour, until necessity in urgent haste forces from us a resolution which will soon be discovered to be folly, all those reports having been lies, exaggerations, errors, &c. &c.

Firm in reliance on his own better convictions, the Chief must stand like a rock against which the sea breaks its fury in vain. The *rôle* is not easy; he who is not by nature of a buoyant disposition, or trained by experience in War, and matured in judgment, may let it be his rule to do violence to his own natural conviction by inclining from the side of fear to that of hope; only by that means will he be able to preserve his balance. . . . no important undertaking was ever yet carried out without the Commander having to subdue new doubts in himself at the time of commencing the execution of his work. Ordinary men who follow the suggestions of others become, therefore, generally undecided on the spot; . . .

. . . . .

CHAPTER VII

FRICTION IN WAR

As long as we have no personal knowledge of War, we cannot conceive where those difficulties lie of which so much is said, and what that genius and those extraordinary mental powers required in a General have really to do. . . .

Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen War. Suppose now a traveller, who towards evening expects to accomplish the two stages at the end of his day's journey, four or five leagues, with post-horses, on the high road—it is nothing. He arrives now at the last station but one, finds no horses, or very bad ones; then a hilly country, bad roads; it is a dark night, and he is glad when, after a great deal of trouble, he reaches the next station, and finds there some miserable accommodation. So in War, through the influence of an infinity of petty circumstances, which cannot properly be described on paper, things disappoint us, and we fall short of the mark. A powerful iron will overcomes this friction; it crushes the obstacles, but certainly the machine along with them. We shall often meet with this result. Like an obelisk towards which the principal streets of a town converge, the strong will of a proud spirit stands prominent and commanding in the middle of the Art of War.

Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real War from War on paper.

[BOOK VIII. CHAP. VI.]

B.—*WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY*

HAVING made the requisite examination on both sides of that state of antagonism in which the nature of War stands with relation to other interests of men individually and of the bond of society, in order not to neglect any of the opposing elements—an antagonism which is founded in our own nature, and which, therefore, no philosophy can unravel—we shall now look for that unity into which, in practical life, these antagonistic elements combine themselves by partly neutralising each other. We should have brought forward this unity at the very commencement if it had not been necessary to bring out this contradict on very plainly, and also to look at the different elements separately. Now, this unity is *the conception that War is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.*

We know, certainly, that War is only called forth through the political intercourse of Governments and Nations; but in general it is supposed that such intercourse is broken off by War, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its own.

We maintain, on the contrary, that War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means. We say mixed with other means in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the War itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the War progress, and to which they are attached, are only the general features of policy which run all through the War until peace takes place. And how can we conceive it to be otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different Nations and Governments? Is not War merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.

Accordingly, War can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.

This kind of idea would be indispensable even if War was perfect War, the perfectly unbridled element of hostility, for all the circumstances on which it rests, and which determine its leading features, viz., our own power, the enemy's power, Allies on both sides, the characteristics of the people and their Governments respectively, &c., as enumerated in the first chapter of the first book—are they not of a political nature, and are they not so intimately connected with the whole political intercourse that it is impossible to separate them? But this view is doubly indispensable if we reflect that real War is no such consistent effort tending to an extreme, as it should be according to the abstract idea, but a half-and-half thing, a contradiction in itself; that, as such, it cannot follow its own laws, but must be looked upon as a part of another whole—and this whole is policy.

Policy in making use of War avoids all those rigorous conclusions which proceed from its nature; it troubles itself little about final possibilities, confining its attention to immediate probabilities. If such uncertainty in the whole action ensues therefrom, if it thereby becomes a sort of game, the policy of each Cabinet places its confidence in the belief that in this game it will surpass its neighbour in skill and sharpsightedness.

Thus policy makes out of the all-overpowering element of War a mere instrument, changes the tremendous battle-sword, which should be lifted with both hands and the whole power of the body to strike once for all, into a light handy weapon, which is even sometimes nothing more than a rapier to exchange thrusts and feints and parries.

Thus the contradictions in which man, naturally timid, becomes involved by War may be solved, if we choose to accept this as a solution.

If War belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from thence. If policy is grand and powerful, so also will be the War, and this may be carried to the point at which War attains to *its absolute form.*

In this way of viewing the subject, therefore, we need not shut out of sight the absolute form of War, we rather keep it continually in view in the background.

Only through this kind of view War recovers unity; only by it can we see all Wars as things of *one* kind; and it is only through it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of view from which great plans may be traced out and determined upon.

It is true the political element does not sink deep into the details of War. Vedettes are not planted, patrols do not make their rounds from political considerations; but small as is its influence in this respect, it is great in the formation of a plan for a whole War, or a campaign, and often even for a battle.

For this reason we were in no hurry to establish this view at the commencement. While engaged with particulars, it would have given us little help, and, on

the other hand, would have distracted our attention to a certain extent ; in the plan of a War or campaign it is indispensable.

There is, upon the whole, nothing more important in life than to find out the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of, and then to keep to that point ; for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity from *one* standpoint ; and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency.

If, therefore, in drawing up a plan of a War, it is not allowable to have a two-fold or three-fold point of view, from which things may be looked at, now with the eye of a soldier, then with that of an administrator, and then again with that of a politician, &c., then the next question is, whether *policy* is necessarily paramount and everything else subordinate to it.

That policy unites in itself, and reconciles all the interests of internal administrations, even those of humanity, and whatever else are rational subjects of consideration is presupposed, for it is nothing in itself, except a mere representative and exponent of all these interests towards other States. That policy may take a false direction, and may promote unfairly the ambitious ends, the private interests, the vanity of rulers, does not concern us here ; for, under no circumstances can the Art of War be regarded as its preceptor, and we can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests ge erally of the whole community.

The only question, therefore, is whether in framing plans for a War the political point of view should give way to the purely military (if such a point is conceivable), that is to say, should disappear altogether, or subordinate itself to it, or whether the political is to remain the ruling point of view and the military to be considered subordinate to it.

That the political point of view should end completely when War begins is only conceivable in contests which are Wars of life and death, from pure hatred : as Wars are in reality, they are, as we before said, only the expressions or manifestations of policy itself. The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the War ; it is the intelligent faculty, War only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.

If we reflect on the nature of real War, and call to mind what has been said in the third chapter of this book, *that every War should be viewed above all things according to the probability of its character, and its leading features as they are to be deduced from the political forces and proportions*, and that often—indeed we may safely affirm, in our days, *almost* always—War is to be regarded as an organic whole, from which the single branches are not to be separated, in which therefore every individual activity flows into the whole, and also has its origin in the idea of this whole, then it becomes certain and palpable to us that the superior standpoint for the conduct of the War, from which its leading lines must proceed, can be no other than that of policy.

From this point of view the plans come, as it were, out of a cast ; the apprehension of them and the judgment upon them become easier and more natural, our convictions respecting them gain in force, motives are more satisfying, and history more intelligible.

At all events from this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things a necessary conflict between the political and military interests, and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as imperfect knowledge only. That policy makes demands on the War which it cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that it knows the instrument which it is going to use, therefore, contrary to a natural and indispensable supposition. But if policy judges correctly of the march of military events, it is entirely its affair to determine what are the events and what the direction of events most favourable to the ultimate and great end of the War.

In one word, the Art of War in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes.

According to this view, to leave a great military enterprise, or the plan for one, to *a purely military judgment and decision* is a distinction which cannot be allowed, and is even prejudicial ; indeed, it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of a War, that they may give a *purely military opinion* upon what the Cabinet ought to do ; but still more absurd is the demand of Theorists that a statement of the available means of War should be laid before the General, that he may draw out a purely military plan for the War or for a campaign in accordance with those means. Experience in general also teaches us that notwithstanding the multifarious branches and scientific character of military art in the present day, still the leading outlines of a War are always determined by the Cabinet, that is, if we would use

technical language, by a political not a military organ.

This is perfectly natural. None of the principal plans which are required for a War can be made without an insight into the political relations; and, in reality, when people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy on the conduct of a War, they say in reality something very different to what they intend. It is not this influence but the policy itself which should be found fault with. If policy is right, that is, if it succeeds in hitting the object, then it can only act with advantage on the War. If this influence of policy causes a diver gence from the object, the cause is only to be looked for in a mistaken policy.

It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it can exercise a prejudicial effect on War by the course it prescribes. Just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant sometimes says what he does not intend, so policy, when intending right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views.

This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain knowledge of the nature of War is essential to the management of political intercourse.

But before going further, we must guard ourselves against a false interpretation of which this is very susceptible. We are far from holding the opinion that a War Minister smothered in official papers, a scientific engineer, or even a soldier who has been well tried in the field, would, any of them, necessarily make the best Minister of State where the Sovereign does not act for himself; or, in other words, we do not mean to say that this acquaintance with the nature of War is the principal qualification for a War Minister; elevation, superiority of mind, strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he must possess; a knowledge of War may be supplied in one way or the other. France was never worse advised in its military and political affairs than by the two brothers Belleisle and the Duke of Choiseul, although all three were good soldiers.

If War is to harmonise entirely with the political views and policy, to accommodate itself to the means available for War, there is only one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are not combined in one person, which is, to make the Commander-in-Chief a member of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions. But then, again, this is only possible when the Cabinet, that is, the Government itself, is near the theatre of War, so that things can be settled without a serious waste of time.

This is what the Emperor of Austria did in 1809, and the allied Sovereigns in 1813, 1814, 1815, and the arrangement proved completely satisfactory.

The influence of any military man except the General-in-Chief in the Cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able vigorous action. The example of France in 1793, 1794, 1795, when Carnot, while residing in Paris, managed the conduct of the War, is to be avoided, as a system of terror is not at the command of any but a revolutionary government.

We shall now conclude with some reflections derived from history.

In the last decade of the past century, when that remarkable change in the Art of War in Europe took place by which the best Armies found that a part of their method of War had become utterly unserviceable, and events were brought about of a magnitude far beyond what any one had any previous conception of, it certainly appeared that a false calculation of everything was to be laid to the charge of the Art of War. It was plain that while confined by habit within a narrow circle of conceptions, she had been surprised by the force of a new state of relations, lying, no doubt, outside that circle, but still not outside the nature of things.

Those observers who took the most comprehensive view ascribed the circumstance to the general influence which policy had exercised for centuries on the Art of War, and undoubtedly to its very great disadvantage, and by which it had sunk into a half-measure, often into mere sham-fighting. They were right as to fact, but they were wrong in attributing it to something accidental, or which might have been avoided.

Others thought that everything was to be explained by the momentary influence of the particular policy of Austria, Prussia, England, &c., with regard to their own interests respectively.

But is it true that the real surprise by which men's minds were seized was confined to the conduct of War, and did not rather relate to policy itself? That is: Did the ill success proceed from the influence of policy on the War, or from a wrong policy itself?

The prodigious effects of the French Revolution abroad were evidently brought about much less through new methods and views introduced by the French in the conduct of War than through the changes which it wrought in state-craft and civil administration, in the character of Governments, in the condition of the people, &c. That other Governments took a mistaken view of all these things; that they endeavoured, with their ordinary

means, to hold their own against forces of a novel kind and overwhelming in strength—all that was a blunder in policy.

Would it have been possible to perceive and mend this error by a scheme for the War from a purely military point of view? Impossible. For if there had been a philosophical strategist, who merely from the nature of the hostile elements had foreseen all the consequences, and prophesied remote possibilities, still it would have been practically impossible to have turned such wisdom to account.

If policy had risen to a just appreciation of the forces which had sprung up in France, and of the new relations in the political state of Europe, it might have foreseen the consequences which must follow in respect to the great features of War, and it was only in this way that it could arrive at a correct view of the extent of the means required as well as of the best use to make of those means.

We may therefore say, that the twenty years' victories of the Revolution are chiefly to be ascribed to the erroneous policy of the Governments by which it was opposed.

It is true these errors first displayed themselves in the War, and the events of the War completely disappointed the expectations which policy entertained. But this did not take place because policy neglected to consult its military advisers. That Art of War in which the politician of the day could believe, namely, that derived from the reality of War at that time, that which belonged to the policy of the day, that familiar instrument which policy had hitherto used—*that* Art of War, I say, was naturally involved in the error of policy, and therefore could not teach it anything better. It is true that War itself underwent important alterations both in its nature and forms, which brought it nearer to its absolute form; but these changes were not brought about because the French Government had, to a certain extent, delivered itself from the leading-strings of policy; they arose from an altered policy, produced by the French Revolution, not only in France, but over the rest of Europe as well. This policy had called forth other means and other powers, by which it became possible to conduct War with a degree of energy which could not have been thought of otherwise.

Therefore, the actual changes in the Art of War are a consequence of alterations in policy; and, so far from being an argument for the possible separation of the two, they are, on the contrary, very strong evidence of the intimacy of their connection.

Therefore, once more: War is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear its character, it must measure with its scale: the conduct of War, in its great features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born in Röcken, Prussia in 1844. His father was a Lutheran minister, and both parents were children of ministers. Nietzsche's father became mentally ill in 1848 and died in 1849. Nietzsche was raised in a household, from the time he was five, which consisted entirely of women - his mother, sister, father's mother and two maiden aunts. In a boarding school near Naumburg from 1858-64 he acquired an excellent classical education and often stood at the head of his class, though plagued by near-sightedness and headaches. He studied Greek and Latin at the Universities of Bonn and Leipzig. As a student at Liepzig he published several papers which were very successful, and so impressed the influential Professor Ritschl that he was recommended for and awarded a chair in Philology at the age of 24 at the University of Basel. He was made a full professor the next year, in 1870. He stayed there until 1879, when eye trouble and nervousness led him to leave. He moved from place to place for ten years, writing a book a year and seeking relief from his poor health. In 1889 he became insane and remained hopelessly so until he died in 1900.

What is so striking about Nietzsche, in the context of various philosophies of war and peace,is the contrast between the life he lived and his philosophy which extolled with such passion the virtues of the warrior, the predator, the cruelty and irrationality of basic animal instincts. Though born into a family of Christian clergymen, he attacked Christianty - as well as the utilitarian and Kantian ethics which shared the concept of the equality of all men and the duty to be considerate and compassionate towards others. Raised in a household of women, his views on the role of women and their relationship to men stands as one of the most eloquent and vicious expressions of male chauvinism. A perennially sickly, though personally engaging, individual, devoted more and more - until he became insane - to the writing of books, his philosophy again and again lauds the superman, the blonde beast, the warrior. Nietzsche had only two brief experiences with the military; ten months in 1867-8 which ended in a formal discharge due to an injury incurred when he hit his chest on the pommel of his saddle while jumping with his horse, and one month in 1870 when,after volunteering as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War, he returned to German with dysentery and diptheria. What is beyond dispute is the brilliance of his prose style, and the wide influence which his writings exerted, particularly among Germanic people.

Nietzsche was not a systematic philosopher. In general he wrote in aphorisms. His training was in philology and classical literature. Yet certain themes run through his works with great consistency. His first work, The Birth of Tragedy, was in the field of aesthetics. In it he contrasts the cult of Dionysius which gave free rein to instincts and animal desires to that of Apollo which stressed classical harmony and restraint by the intellect. He aligns himself with Dionysians.

In the following selections we examine first Nietzsche's attacks on Christian morality, which he sees as based on pity and weakness as opposed to the will to power and greatness. This is extended to an attack on the "herding animal" morality which argues for democracy and equality as opposed to nobility and distinctions of rank; and with this an attack on both Bentham's utilitarianism and Kant's formalism. He praises the instincts, the "beast of prey", the exercise of cruelty. His "master-morality" is then contrasted with the "slave-morality" he condemns as corrupting western civilization. From this we move to his panagyrics on the soldier's profession, war, and warriors,and end with a proposal for"genuine peace" which is built upon the rejection of the doctrine that armies are only for defense and the claim that only a complete military superiority is likely to lead to an elimination of all arms.

Although many of Nietzsche's followers insist that he was a harmless, gentle, brilliant intellectual more devoted to higher spiritual power than to physical force, his attitudes and ideas were taken up with fervor by the Nazis and Fascists, though not necessarily through a direct literary descent.

Selections are from The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, edited by Dr. Oscar Levy, MacMillan, 1924.

From ANTICHRIST 2

What is good? All that enhances the feeling of power, the Will to Power, and power itself in man. What is bad?—All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness?—The feeling that power is *increasing*,—that resistance has been overcome.

Not contentment, but more power; not peace at any price, but war; not virtue, but efficiency* (virtue in the Renaissance sense, *virtù*, free from all moralic acid). The weak and the botched shall perish: first principle of our humanity. And they ought even to be helped to perish.

What is more harmful than any vice?—Practical sympathy with all the botched and the weak—Christianity.

3

The problem I set in this work is not what will replace mankind in the order of living beings (—Man is an *end*—); but, what type of man must be *reared*, must be *willed*, as having the highest value, as being the most worthy of life and the surest guarantee of the future.

This more valuable type has appeared often enough already: but as a happy accident, as an exception, never as *willed*. He has rather been precisely the most feared; hitherto he has been almost the terrible in itself;—and from out the very fear he provoked there arose the will to rear the type which has now been reared, *attained*: the domestic animal, the gregarious animal, the sick animal man,—the Christian.

5

We must not deck out and adorn Christianity: it has waged a deadly war upon this *higher* type of man, it has set a ban upon all the fundamental instincts of this type, and has distilled evil and the devil himself out of these instincts:—the strong man as the typical pariah, the villain. Christianity has sided with everything weak, low, and botched; it has made an ideal out of *antagonism* against all the self-preservative instincts of strong life: it has corrupted even the reason of the strongest intellects, by teaching that the highest values of intellectuality are sinful, misleading and full of temptations. The most lamentable example of this was the corruption of Pascal, who believed in the perversion of his reason through original sin, whereas it had only been perverted by his Christianity.

* The German "*Tuchtigkeit*" has a nobler ring than our word "efficiency."—TR.

6

. . . . .

I call an animal, a species, an individual corrupt, when it loses its instincts, when it selects and *prefers* that which is detrimental to it. A history of the "higher feelings," of "human ideals"—and it is not impossible that I shall have to write it—would almost explain why man is so corrupt. Life itself, to my mind, is nothing more nor less than the instinct of growth, of permanence, of accumulating forces, of power: where the will to power is lacking, degeneration sets in. My contention is that all the highest values of mankind *lack* this will, —that the values of decline and of *nihilism* are exercising the sovereign power under the cover of the holiest names.

7

Christianity is called the religion of *pity*.—Pity is opposed to the tonic passions which enhance the energy of the feeling of life: its action is depressing. A man loses power when he pities. By means of pity the drain on strength which suffering itself already introduces into the world is multiplied a thousandfold. Through pity, suffering itself becomes infectious; in certain circumstances it may lead to a total loss of life and vital energy, which is absurdly out of proportion to the magnitude of the cause (—the case of the death of the Nazarene). This is the first standpoint: but there is a still more important one. Supposing one measures pity according to the value of the reactions it usually stimulates, its danger to life appears in a much more telling light. On the whole, pity thwarts the law of development which is the law of selection. It preserves that which is ripe for death, it fights in favour of the disinherited and the condemned of life; thanks to the multitude of abortions of all kinds which it maintains in life, it lends life itself a sombre and questionable aspect. People have dared to call pity a virtue (—in every *noble* culture it is considered as a weakness—); people went still further, they exalted it to *the* virtue, the root and origin of all virtues. . .

THE ANTICHRIST

What Belongs to Greatness.—Who can attain to anything great if he does not feel the force and will in himself *to inflict* great pain? The ability to suffer is a small matter: in that line, weak women and even slaves often attain masterliness. But not to perish from internal distress and doubt when one inflicts great anguish and hears the cry of this anguish—that is great, that belongs to greatness.

THE JOYFUL WISDOM, IV 325.

From BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL

Morality in Europe at present is herding-animal morality; and therefore, as we understand the matter, only one kind of human morality, beside which, before which, and after which many other moralities, and above all *higher* moralities, are or should be possible. Against such a "possibility," against such a "should be," however, this morality defends itself with all its strength; it says obstinately and inexorably: "I am morality itself and nothing else is morality!" Indeed, with the help of a religion which has humoured and flattered the sublimest desires of the herding-animal, things have reached such a point that we always find a more visible expression of this morality even in political and social arrangements: the *democratic* movement is the inheritance of the Christian movement. That its *tempo*, however, is much too slow and sleepy for the more impatient ones, for those who are sick and distracted by the herding-instinct, is indicated by the increasingly furious howling, and always less disguised teeth-gnashing of the anarchist dogs, who are now roving through the highways of European culture. Apparently in opposition to the peacefully industrious democrats and Revolution-ideologues, and still more so to the awkward philosophasters and fraternity-visionaries who call themselves Socialists and want a "free society," those are really at one with them all in their thorough and instinctive hostility to every form of society other than that of the *autonomous* herd (to the extent even of repudiating the notions "master" and "servant"—*ni dieu ni maitre*, says a socialist formula); at one in their tenacious opposition to every special claim, every special right and privilege (this means ultimately opposition to *every* right, for when all are equal, no one needs "rights" any longer); at one in their distrust of punitive justice (as though it were a violation of the weak, unfair to the *necessary* consequences of all former society); but equally at one in their religion of sympathy, in their compassion for all that feels, lives, and suffers (down to the very animals, up even to "God"—the extravagance of "sympathy for God" belongs to a democratic age); altogether at one in the cry and impatience of their sympathy, in their deadly hatred of suffering generally, in their almost feminine incapacity for witnessing it or *allowing* it; at one in their involuntary beglooming and heart-softening, under the spell of which Europe seems to be threatened with a new Buddhism; at one in their belief in the morality of *mutual* sympathy, as though it were morality in itself, the climax, the *attained* climax of mankind, the sole hope of the future, the consolation of the present, the great discharge from all the obligations of the past; altogether at one in their belief in the community as the *deliverer*, in the herd, and therefore in "themselves."

I see no one in Europe who has (or *discloses*) an idea of the fact that philosophising concerning morals might be conducted in a dangerous, captious, and ensnaring manner—that *calamity* might be involved therein. Observe, for example, the indefatigable, inevitable English utilitarians: how ponderously and respectably they stalk on, stalk along (a Homeric metaphor expresses it better) in the footsteps of Bentham, just as he had already stalked in the footsteps of the respectable Helvétius! (no, he was not a dangerous man, Helvétius, *ce sénateur Pococurante*, to use an expression of Galiani). No new thought, nothing of the nature of a finer turning or better expression of an old thought, not even a proper history of what has been previously thought on the subject: an *impossible* literature, taking it all in all, unless one knows how to leaven it with some mischief. . . . . In the end, they all want *English* morality to be recognised as authoritative, inasmuch as mankind, or the "general utility," or "the happiness of the greatest number,"—no! the happiness of *England*, will be best served thereby. They would like, by all means, to convince themselves that the striving after *English* happiness, I mean after *comfort* and *fashion* (and in the highest instance, a seat in Parliament), is at the same time the true path of virtue; in fact, that in so far as there has been virtue in the world hitherto, it has just consisted in such striving. Not one of those ponderous, conscience-stricken herding-animals (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as conducive to the general welfare) wants to have any knowledge or inkling of the facts that the "general welfare" is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all grasped, but is only a nostrum,—that what is fair to one *may not* at all be fair to another, that the requirement of one morality for all is really a detriment to higher men, in short, that there is a *distinction of rank* between man and man, and consequently between morality and morality. They are an unassuming and fundamentally mediocre species of men, these utilitarian Englishmen, and, as already remarked, in so far as they are tedious, one cannot think highly enough of their utility. One ought even to *encourage* them,

From ANTICHRIST: II

One word more against Kant as a *moralist*. A virtue *must* be *our* invention, our most personal defence and need: in every other sense it is merely a danger. That which does not constitute a condition of our life, is merely harmful to it: to possess a virtue merely because one happens to respect the concept "virtue," as Kant would have us do, is pernicious. "Virtue," "Duty," "Goodness in itself,"

goodness stamped with the character of impersonality and universal validity—these things are mere mental hallucinations, in which decline the final devitalisation of life and Kœnigsbergian Chinadom find expression. The most fundamental laws of preservation and growth, demand precisely the reverse, namely:—that each should discover *his* own virtue, his own Categorical Imperative. A nation goes to the dogs when it confounds its concept of duty with the general concept of duty. Nothing is more profoundly, more thoroughly pernicious, than every impersonal feeling of duty, than every sacrifice to the Moloch of abstraction.—Fancy no one's having thought Kant's Categorical Imperative *dangerous to life!* . . . The instinct of the theologist alone took it under its wing!—An action stimulated by the instinct of life, is proved to be a proper action by the happiness that accompanies it: and that nihilist with the bowels of a Christian dogmatist regarded happiness as an *objection*. . . . What is there that destroys a man more speedily than to work, think, feel, as an automaton of "duty," without internal promptings, without a profound personal predilection, without joy? This is the recipe *par excellence* of decadence and even of idiocy. . . .

Instinct at fault in anything and everything, hostility to nature as an instinct, German decadence made into philosophy —*that is Kant!*

From BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL:

197.

The beast of prey and the man of prey (for instance, Cæsar Borgia) are fundamentally misunderstood, "nature" is misunderstood, so long as one seeks a "morbidness" in the constitution of these healthiest of all tropical monsters and growths, or even an innate "hell" in them — as almost all moralists have done hitherto. Does it not seem that there is a hatred of the virgin forest and of the tropics among moralists? And that the "tropical man" must be discredited at all costs, whether as disease and deterioration of mankind, or as his own hell and self-torture? And why? In favour of the "temperate zones"? In favour of the temperate men? The "moral"? The mediocre?—This for the chapter: "Morals as Timidity."

229. .... One ought to learn anew about cruelty, and open one's eyes; one ought at last to learn impatience, in order that such immodest gross errors—as, for instance, have been fostered by ancient and modern philosophers with regard to tragedy—may no longer wander about virtuously and boldly. Almost everything that we call "higher culture" is based upon the spiritualising and intensifying of *cruelty*—this is my thesis; the "wild beast" has not been slain at all, it lives, it flourishes, it has only been—transfigured. That which constitutes the painful delight of tragedy is cruelty; that which operates agreeably in so-called tragic sympathy, and at the basis even of everything sublime, up to the highest and most delicate thrills of metaphysics, obtains its sweetness solely from the intermingled ingredient of cruelty. What the Roman enjoys in the arena, the Christian in the ecstasies of the cross, the Spaniard at the sight of the faggot and stake, or of the bull-fight, the present-day Japanese who presses his way to the tragedy, the workman of the Parisian suburbs who has a homesickness for bloody revolutions, the Wagnerienne who, with unhinged will, "undergoes" the performance of "Tristan and Isolde"—what all these enjoy and strive with mysterious ardour to drink in, is the philtre of the great Circe "cruelty."

From GENEALOGY OF MORALS:

Deep within all these noble races there lurks the beast of prey, bent on spoil and conquest. This hidden urge has to be satisfied from time to time, the beast let loose in the wilderness. This goes as well for the Roman, Arabian, German, Japanese nobility as for the Homeric heroes and the Scandinavian vikings. The noble races have everywhere left in their wake the catchword "barbarian." And even their highest culture shows an awareness of this trait and a certain pride in it (as we see, for example, in Pericles' famous funeral oration, when he tells the Athenians: "Our boldness has gained us access to every land and sea, and erected monuments to itself *for both good and evil.*") This "boldness" of noble races, so headstrong, absurd, incalculable, sudden, improbable (Pericles commends the Athenians especially for their *rathumia*), their utter indifference to safety and comfort, their terrible pleasure in destruction, their taste for cruelty —all these traits are embodied by their victims in the image of the "barbarian," the "evil enemy," the Goth or the Vandal. The profound and icy suspicion which the German arouses as soon as he assumes power (we see it happening again today) harks back to the persistent horror with which Europe for many centuries witnessed the raging of the blond Teutonic beast (although all racial connection between the old Teutonic tribes and ourselves has been lost).

BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL. 260.

In a tour through the many finer and coarser moralities which have hitherto prevailed or still prevail on the earth, I found certain traits recurring regularly together, and connected with one another, until finally two primary types revealed themselves to me, and a radical distinction was brought to light. There is *master-morality* and *slave-morality*;—I would at once add, however, that in all higher and mixed civilisations, there are also attempts at the reconciliation of the two moralities; but one finds still oftener the confusion and mutual misunderstanding of them, indeed, sometimes their close juxtaposition—even in the same man, within one soul. The distinctions of moral values have either originated in a ruling caste, pleasantly conscious of being different from the ruled—or among the ruled class, the slaves and dependents of all sorts. In the first case, when it is the rulers who determine the conception "good," it is the exalted, proud disposition which is regarded as the distinguishing feature, and that which determines the order of rank. The noble type of man separates from himself the beings in whom the opposite of this exalted, proud disposition displays itself: he despises them. Let it at once be noted that in this first kind of morality the antithesis "good" and "bad" means practically the same as "noble" and "despicable";—the antithesis "good" and "*evil*" is of a different origin. The cowardly, the timid, the insignificant, and those thinking merely of narrow utility are despised; moreover, also, the distrustful, with their constrained glances, the self-abasing, the dog-like kind of men who let themselves be abused, the mendicant flatterers, and above all the liars:—it is a fundamental belief of all aristocrats that the common people are untruthful. "We truthful ones"—the nobility in ancient Greece called themselves. It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were at first applied to *men*, and were only derivatively and at a later period applied to *actions*; it is a gross mistake, therefore, when historians of morals start with questions like, "Why have sympathetic actions been praised?" The noble type of man regards *himself* as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: "What is injurious to me is injurious in itself"; he knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things; he is a *creator of values*. He honours whatever he recognises in himself: such morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow:—the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not—or scarcely—out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the superabundance of power. The noble man honours in himself the powerful one, him also who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and how to keep silence, who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and hardness, and has reverence for all that is severe and hard. "Wotan placed a hard heart in my breast," says an old Scandinavian Saga: it is thus rightly expressed from the soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is even proud of *not* being made for sympathy; the hero of the Saga therefore adds warningly: "He who has not a hard heart when young, will never have one." The noble and brave who think thus are the furthest removed from the morality which sees precisely in sympathy, or in acting for the good of others, or in *désintéressement*, the characteristic of the moral; faith in oneself, pride in oneself, a radical enmity and irony towards "selflessness," belong as definitely to noble morality, as do a careless scorn and precaution in presence of sympathy and the "warm heart."—It is the powerful who *know* how to honour, it is their art, their domain for invention. . . . The ability and obligation to exercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge—both only within the circle of equals,—artfulness in retaliation, *raffinement* of the idea in friendship, a certain necessity to have enemies (as outlets for the emotions of envy, quarrelsomeness, arrogance—in fact, in order to be a good *friend*): all these are typical characteristics of the noble morality, which, as has been pointed out, is not the morality of "modern ideas," and is therefore at present difficult to realise, and also to unearth and disclose.—It is otherwise with the second type of morality, *slave-morality*. Supposing that the abused, the oppressed, the suffering, the unemancipated, the weary, and those uncertain of themselves, should moralise, what will be the common element in their moral estimates? Probably a pessimistic suspicion with regard to the entire situation of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man, together with his situation. The slave has an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful; he has a scepticism and distrust, a *refinement* of distrust of everything "good" that is there honoured—he would fain persuade himself that the very happiness there is not genuine. On the other hand, *those* qualities which serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers are brought into prominence and flooded with light; it is here that sympathy, the kind, helping hand, the warm heart, patience, diligence, humility, and friendliness attain to honour; for here these are the most useful qualities, and almost

the only means of supporting the burden of existence. Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility. Here is the seat of the origin of the famous antithesis "good" and "*evil*":—power and dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety, and strength, which do not admit of being despised. According to slave-morality, therefore, the "evil" man arouses fear; according to master-morality, it is precisely the "good" man who arouses fear and seeks to arouse it, while the bad man is regarded as the despicable being. The contrast attains its maximum when, in accordance with the logical consequences of slave-morality, a shade of depreciation—it may be slight and well-intentioned—at last attaches itself even to the "good" man of this morality; because, according to the servile mode of thought, the good man must in any case be the *safe* man: he is good-natured, easily deceived, perhaps a little stupid, *un bonhomme*. Everywhere that slave-morality gains the ascendency, language shows a tendency to approximate the significations of the words "good" and "stupid."

From THE GREEK STATE: ... I cannot help seeing in the prevailing international movements of the present day, and the simultaneous promulgation of universal suffrage, the effects of the *fear of war* above everything else, yea I behold behind these movements, those truly international homeless money-hermits, as the really alarmed, who, with their natural lack of the State-instinct, have learnt to abuse politics as a means of the Exchange, and State and Society as an apparatus for their own enrichment. Against the deviation of the State-tendency into a money-tendency, to be feared from this side, the only remedy is war and once again war, in the emotions of which this at least becomes obvious, that the State is not founded upon the fear of the war-demon, as a protective institution for egoistic individuals, but in love to fatherland and prince, it produces an ethical impulse, indicative of a much higher destiny. If I therefore designate as a dangerous and characteristic sign of the present political situation the application of revolutionary thought in the service of a selfish State-less money-aristocracy, if at the same time I conceive of the enormous dissemination of liberal optimism as the result of modern financial affairs fallen into strange hands, and if I imagine all evils of social conditions together with the necessary decay of the arts to have either germinated from that root or grown together with it, one will have to pardon my occasionally chanting a Pæan on war. Horribly clangs its silvery bow; and although it comes along like the night, war is nevertheless Apollo, the true divinity for consecrating and purifying the State. First of all, however, as is said in the beginning of the "Iliad," he lets fly his arrow on the mules and dogs. Then he strikes the men themselves, and everywhere pyres break into flames. Be it then pronounced that war is just as much a necessity for the State as the slave is for society, and who can avoid this verdict if he honestly asks himself about the causes of the never-equalled Greek art-perfection?

He who contemplates war and its uniformed possibility, the *soldier's profession*, with respect to the hitherto described nature of the State, must arrive at the conviction, that through war and in the profession of arms is placed before our eyes an image, or even perhaps the *prototype of the State*. Here we see as the most general effect of the war-tendency, an immediate decomposition and division of the chaotic mass into *military castes*, out of which rises, pyramid-shaped, on an exceedingly broad base of slaves, the edifice of the "martial society." The unconscious purpose of the whole movement constrains every individual under its yoke, and produces also in heterogeneous natures as it were a chemical transformation of their qualities until they are brought into affinity with that purpose. In the highest castes one perceives already a little more of what in this internal process is involved at the bottom, namely the creation of the *military genius*—with whom we have become acquainted as the original founder of states. In the case of many States, as, for example, in the Lycurgian constitution of Sparta, one can distinctly perceive the impress of that fundamental idea of the State, that of the creation of the military genius. If we now imagine the military primal State in its greatest activity, at its proper "labour," and if we fix our glance upon the whole technique of war, we cannot avoid correcting our notions picked up from everywhere, as to the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of labour" by the question, whether the idea of dignity is applicable also to that labour, which has as its purpose the destruction of the "dignified" man, as well as to the man who is entrusted with that "dignified labour," or whether in this warlike task of the State those mutually contradictory ideas do not neutralise one another. I should like to think the warlike man to be a *means* of the military genius and his labour again only a tool in the hands of that same genius; and not to him, as absolute man and non-genius, but to him as a means of the genius—whose pleasure also can be to choose his tool's destruction as a mere pawn sacrificed on the strategist's chessboard—is due a degree of dignity, of that dignity namely, *to have been deemed worthy of being a means of the genius*. But what is shown here in a single instance is valid in the most general sense; every human being, with his total activity, only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of *the* genius, consciously or unconsciously; ....

Warlike and peaceful people.—Art thou a man who has the instincts of a warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend? The rest of mankind, all those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord, "freedom," "equal rights": these things are but names and steps for one and the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary for them to defend themselves,—such men become discontented with themselves when they are obliged to offer resistance: they would fain create circumstances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst came to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit: all these things are better than waging war—thus does the Christian's instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born warrior's character there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his circumstances and in the development of every one of his qualities: weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised by the former.

THE WILL TO POWER 923.

X.—WAR AND WARRIORS.

By our best enemies we do not want to be spared, nor by those either whom we love from the very heart. So let me tell you the truth!

My brethren in war! I love you from the very heart. I am, and was ever, your counterpart. And I am also your best enemy. So let me tell you the truth!

I know the hatred and envy of your hearts. Ye are not great enough not to know of hatred and envy. Then be great enough not to be ashamed of them!

And if ye cannot be saints of knowledge, then, I pray you, be at least its warriors. They are the companions and forerunners of such saintship.

I see many soldiers; could I but see many warriors! "Uniform" one calleth what they wear; may it not be uniform what they therewith hide!

Ye shall be those whose eyes ever seek for an enemy—for *your* enemy. And with some of you there is hatred at first sight.

Your enemy shall ye seek; your war shall ye wage, and for the sake of your thoughts! And if your thoughts succumb, your uprightness shall still shout triumph thereby!

Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars—and the short peace more than the long.

You I advise not to work, but to fight. You I advise not to peace, but to victory. Let your work be a fight, let your peace be a victory!

One can only be silent and sit peacefully when one hath arrow and bow; otherwise one prateth and quarrelleth. Let your peace be a victory!

Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you: it is the good war which halloweth every cause.

War and courage have done more great things than charity. Not your sympathy, but your bravery hath hitherto saved the victims.

"What is good?" ye ask. To be brave is good. Let the little girls say: "To be good is what is pretty, and at the same time touching."

They call you heartless: but your heart is true, and I love the bashfulness of your goodwill. Ye are ashamed of your flow, and others are ashamed of their ebb.

Ye are ugly? Well then, my brethren, take the sublime about you, the mantle of the ugly!

And when your soul becometh great, then doth it become haughty, and in your sublimity there is wickedness. I know you.

In wickedness the haughty man and the weakling meet. But they misunderstand one another. I know you.

Ye shall only have enemies to be hated, but not enemies to be despised. Ye must be proud of your enemies; then, the successes of your enemies are also your successes.

Resistance—that is the distinction of the slave. Let your distinction be obedience. Let your commanding itself be obeying!

To the good warrior soundeth "thou shalt" pleasanter than "I will." And all that is dear unto you, ye shall first have it commanded unto you.

Let your love to life be love to your highest hope; and let your highest hope be the highest thought of life!

Your highest thought, however, ye shall have it commanded unto you by me—and it is this: man is something that is to be surpassed.

So live your life of obedience and of war! What matter about long life! What warrior wisheth to be spared!

I spare you not, I love you from my very heart, my brethren in war!—

Thus spake Zarathustra

THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA.

WAR AS A REMEDY.—For nations that are growing weak and contemptible war may be prescribed as a remedy, if indeed they really want to go on living. National consumption as well as individual admits of a brutal cure. The eternal will to live and inability to die is, however, in itself already a sign of senility of emotion. The more fully and thoroughly we live, the more ready we are to sacrifice life for a single pleasurable emotion. A people that lives and feels in this wise has no need of war.

HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN. 187.

The Will to Power 861

It is necessary for *higher* men to declare war upon the masses! In all directions mediocre people are joining hands in order to make themselves masters. Everything that pampers, that softens, and that brings the "people" or "woman" to the front, operates in favour of universal suffrage —that is to say, the dominion of *inferior* men. But we must make reprisals, and draw the whole state of affairs (which commenced in Europe with Christianity) to the light of day and to judgment.

4. THE LORDS OF THE EARTH.

954.

A certain question constantly recurs to us; it is perhaps a seductive and evil question; may it be whispered into the ears of those who have a right to such doubtful problems—those strong souls of to-day whose dominion over themselves is unswerving: is it not high time, now that the type "gregarious animal" is developing ever more and more in Europe, to set about rearing, thoroughly, artificially, and consciously, an opposite type, and to attempt to establish the latter's virtues? And would not the democratic movement itself find for the first time a sort of goal, salvation, and justification, if some one appeared who availed himself of it—so that at last, beside its new and sublime product, slavery (for this must be the end of European democracy), that higher species of ruling and Cæsarian spirits might also be produced, which would stand upon it, hold to it, and would elevate themselves through it? This new race would climb aloft to new and hitherto impossible things, to a broader vision, and to its task on earth.

960.

From now henceforward there will be such favourable first conditions for greater ruling powers as have never yet been found on earth. And this is by no means the most important point. The establishment has been made possible of international race unions which will set themselves the task of rearing a ruling race, the future "lords of the earth"—a new, vast aristocracy based upon the most severe self-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be stamped upon thousands of years: a higher species of men which, thanks to their preponderance of will, knowledge, riches, and influence, will avail themselves of democratic Europe as the most suitable and supple instrument they can have for taking the fate of the earth into their own hands, and working as artists upon man himself. Enough! The time is coming for us to transform all our views on politics.

THE MEANS TOWARDS GENUINE PEACE.—No government will nowadays admit that it maintains an army in order to satisfy occasionally its passion for conquest. The army is said to serve only defensive purposes. This morality, which justifies self-defence, is called in as the government's advocate. This means, however, reserving morality for ourselves and immorality for our neighbour, because he must be thought eager for attack and conquest if our state is forced to consider means of self-defence.—At the same time, by our explanation of our need of an army (because he denies the lust of attack just as our state does, and ostensibly also maintains his army for defensive reasons), we proclaim him a hypocrite and cunning criminal, who would fain seize by surprise, without any fighting, a harmless and unwary victim. In this attitude all states face each other to-day. They presuppose evil intentions on their neighbour's part and good intentions on their own. This hypothesis, however, is an *inhuman* notion, as bad as and worse than war. Nay, at bottom it is a challenge and motive to war, foisting as it does upon the neighbouring state the charge of immorality, and thus provoking hostile intentions and acts. The doctrine of the army as a means of self-defence must be abjured as completely as the lust of conquest. Perhaps a memorable day will come when a nation renowned in wars and victories, distinguished by the highest development of military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifice to these objects, will voluntarily exclaim, "We will break our swords," and will destroy its whole military system, lock, stock, and barrel. Making ourselves defenceless (after having been the most strongly defended) from a loftiness of sentiment—that is the means towards genuine peace, which must always rest upon a pacific disposition. The so-called armed peace that prevails at present in all countries is a sign of a bellicose disposition, of a disposition that trusts neither itself nor its neighbour, and, partly from hate, partly from fear, refuses to lay down its weapons. Better to perish than to hate and fear, and twice as far better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared—this must some day become the supreme maxim of every political community!—Our liberal representatives of the people, as is well known, have not the time for reflection on the nature of humanity, or else they would know that they are working in vain when they work for "a gradual diminution of the military burdens." On the contrary, when the distress of these burdens is greatest, the sort of God who alone can help here will be nearest. The tree of military glory can only be destroyed at one swoop, with one stroke of lightning. But, as you know, lightning comes from the cloud and from above.

HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.

William James was born in New York City in 1842. His father was Henry James Sr., who had inherited considerable wealth and a rather eccentric theological scholar in the Swedenborgian tradition. William James' brother, Henry James achieved fame as a novelist. James' education was unconventional; his father vigorously encouraged his sons to pursue their own interests, and James in his younger years attended schools in England, France, Switzerland, and Germany. At home he was exposed to spirited intellectual discussions often with men like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., and Ralph Waldo Emerson. In 1861 he entered Harvard majoring in science, and in 1864 he transferred to the Harvard Medical School. While in medical school he went to Brazil with Agassiz on a scientific expedition and contracted smallpox. This led to a pattern of ill health which plagued James throughout the rest of his life. He received his medical degree in 1869, but after teaching anatomy and physiology at Harvard in 1873-74 he turned to psychology in 1875 and finally to philosophy in 1879. His Principles of Psychology (1890) is something of a classic in the history of modern psychology, and his books in Philosophy include The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life(1891), The Will to Believe and Other Essays (1897), The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), Pragmatism (1907), A Pluralistic Universe (1909), and The Meaning of Truth (1909). The essay which follows, The Moral Equivalent of War, was written in 1910, the year James died.

James is best known in philosophy as one, perhaps the, major expositor and proponent of the philosophy of pragmatism. This philosophy has as a central motivation, the aim of turning intellectual inquiry away from the search for absolute objective truths - or rather from the efforts to establish by proofs and arguments this or that claim about the nature or structure of external, non-human reality - and to turn it instead towards consideration of the ways in which ideas, conceptions, theories, and beliefs may be useful for human purposes. In this spirit, in his earlier work he insisted that men had the right to believe in God or in Free will, even though he insisted (on somewhat Kantian grounds) the absolute truth of such beliefs were impossible to establish, - if, and for those person to whom, such beliefs served to enrich life or add value and significance. In the field of science, in which he was well-trained, he insisted on viewing theories, concepts and laws of science, as instruments to be judged and used in terms of how they could be usefully used in the conduct of human life. In his later periods, particularly with and after the book Pragmatism, he held that the word 'truth' really means, practically, what is useful; that in fact people accept beliefs, statements of historical "fact", theories of science, etc., not because they establish them as corresponding to an objective reality which exists independently of mankind, but because it "works", it is useful in their dealings with others and in the conduct of their own experiences,to accept them. What doesn't "work", is rejected as false. Thus human knowledge, on James' account, is a body of useful ideas, not a description of objective independent non-human reality. This re-definition of "truth" and "knowledge" aroused much opposition, and scarcely prevailed. But the re-direction of attention, away from proofs of metaphysical claims and towards analysis of human operations and uses of language and concepts, had a significant impact on philosophy.

In the essay "The Moral Equivalent of War" there is little explicit trace of the philosophical positions mentioned above. But the motivation - a positive concern with constructive, rich improvement of human lives - as well as the more personal sense of vigor, of respect for the virtues associated with the military - courage, willingness to sacrifice for others, a thirst for challenge and danger - are by no means unconnected with the broad and generous open-mindedness, tolerance, and relish in the face of philosophical uncertainty, which characterized his philosophy. In a sense, James has appropriated some of the aesthetic values which Nietzsche associated with War and Warriors, without extolling the kind of physical violence and chaos which goes with actual military warfare.

THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR*

THE war against war is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party. The military feelings are too deeply grounded to abdicate their place among our ideals until better substitutes are offered than the glory and shame that come to nations as well as to individuals from the ups and downs of politics and the vicissitudes of trade. There is something highly paradoxical in the modern man's relation to war. Ask all our millions, north and south, whether they would vote now (were such a thing possible) to have our war for the Union expunged from history, and the record of a peaceful transition to the present time substituted for that of its marches and battles, and probably hardly a handful of eccentrics would say yes. Those ancestors, those efforts, those memories and legends, are the most ideal part of what we now own together, a sacred spiritual possession worth more than all the blood poured out. Yet ask those same people whether they would be willing in cold blood to start another civil war now to gain another similar possession, and not one man or woman would vote for the proposition. In modern eyes, precious though wars may be, they must not be waged solely for the sake of the ideal harvest. Only when forced upon one, only when an enemy's injustice leaves us no alternative, is a war now thought permissible.

It was not thus in ancient times. The earlier men were hunting men, and to hunt a neighboring tribe, kill the males, loot the village and possess the females, was the most profitable, as well as the most exciting, way of living. Thus were the more martial tribes selected, and in chiefs and people a pure pugnacity and love of glory came to mingle with the more fundamental appetite for plunder.

Modern war is so expensive that we feel trade to be a better avenue to plunder; but modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors. Showing war's irrationality and horror is of no effect upon him. The horrors make the fascination. War is the *strong* life; it is life *in extremis;* war-taxes are the only ones men never hesitate to pay, as the budgets of all nations show us.

History is a bath of blood. The Iliad is one long recital of how Diomedes and Ajax, Sarpedon and Hector *killed.* No detail of the wounds they made is spared us, and the Greek mind fed upon the story. Greek history is a panorama of jingoism and imperialism — war for war's sake, all the citizens being warriors. It is horrible reading, because of the irrationality of it all — save for the purpose of making 'history' — and the history is that of the utter ruin of a civilization in intellectual respects perhaps the highest the earth has ever seen.

Those wars were purely piratical. Pride, gold, women, slaves, excitement, were their only motives. In the Peloponnesian war for example, the Athenians ask the inhabitants of Melos (the island where the 'Venus of Milo' was found), hitherto neutral, to own their lordship. The envoys meet, and hold a debate which Thucydides gives in full, and which, for sweet reasonableness of form, would have satisfied Matthew Arnold. "The powerful exact what they can," said the Athenians, "and the weak grant what they must." When the Meleans say that sooner than be slaves they will appeal to the gods, the Athenians reply: "Of the gods we believe and of men we know that, by a law of their nature, wherever they can rule they will. This law was not made by us, and we are not the first to have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as we do. So much for the gods; we have told you why we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you." Well, the Meleans still refused, and their town was taken. "The Athenians," Thucydides quietly says, "thereupon put to death all who were of military age and made slaves of the women and children. They then colonized the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own."

Alexander's career was piracy pure and simple, nothing but an orgy of power and plunder, made romantic by the character of the hero. There was no rational principle in it, and the moment he died his generals and governors attacked one another. The cruelty of those times is incredible. When Rome finally conquered Greece, Paulus Aemilius was told by the Roman Senate to reward his soldiers for their toil by 'giving' them the old kingdom of Epirus. They sacked seventy cities and carried off a hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants as slaves. How many they killed I know not; but in Etolia they killed all the senators, five hundred and fifty in number. Brutus was "the noblest Roman of them all," but to reanimate his soldiers on the eve of Philippi he similarly promises to give them the cities of Sparta and Thessalonica to ravage, if they win the fight.

Such was the gory nurse that trained societies to cohesiveness. We inherit the warlike type; and for most of the capacities of heroism that the human race is full of we have to thank this cruel history. Dead men tell no tales, and if there were any tribes of other type than this they have left no survivors. Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us. The popular imagination fairly fattens on the thought of wars. Let public opinion once reach a certain fighting pitch, and no ruler can withstand it. In the Boer war both governments began with bluff but couldn't stay there, the military tension was too much for them. In 1898 our people

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had read the word 'war' in letters three inches high for three months in every newspaper. The pliant politician McKinley was swept away by their eagerness, and our squalid war with Spain became a necessity.

At the present day, civilized opinion is a curious mental mixture. The military instincts and ideals are as strong as ever, but are confronted by reflective criticisms which sorely curb their ancient freedom. Innumerable writers are showing up the bestial side of military service. Pure loot and mastery seem no longer morally avowable motives, and pretexts must be found for attributing them solely to the enemy. England and we, our army and navy authorities repeat without ceasing, arm solely for 'peace,' Germany and Japan it is who are bent on loot and glory. 'Peace' in military mouths today is a synonym for 'war expected.' The word has become a pure provocative, and no government wishing peace sincerely should allow it ever to be printed in a newspaper. Every up-to-date dictionary should say that 'peace' and 'war' mean the same thing, now *in posse*, now *in actu*. It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive *preparation* for war by the nations *is the real war*, permanent, unceasing; and that the battles are only a sort of public verification of the mastery gained during the 'peace'-interval.

It is plain that on this subject civilized man has developed a sort of double personality. If we take European nations, no legitimate interest of any one of them would seem to justify the tremendous destructions which a war to compass it would necessarily entail. It would seem as though common sense and reason ought to find a way to reach agreement in every conflict of honest interests. I myself think it our bounden duty to believe in such international rationality as possible. But, as things stand, I see how desperately hard it is to bring the peace-party and the war-party together, and I believe that the difficulty is due to certain deficiencies in the program of pacificism which set the militarist imagination strongly, and to a certain extent justifiably, against it. In the whole discussion both sides are on imaginative and sentimental ground. It is but one utopia against another, and everything one says must be abstract and hypothetical. Subject to this criticism and caution, I will try to characterize in abstract strokes the opposite imaginative forces, and point out what to my own very fallible mind seems the best utopian hypothesis, the most promising line of conciliation.

In my remarks, pacificist though I am, I will refuse to speak of the bestial side of the war-*régime* (already done justice to by many writers) and consider only the higher aspects of militaristic sentiment. Patriotism no one thinks discreditable; nor does any one deny that war is the romance of history. But inordinate ambitions are the soul of every patriotism, and the possibility of violent death the soul of all romance. The militarily patriotic and romantic minded everywhere, and especially the professional military class, refuse to admit for a moment that war may be a transitory phenomenon in social evolution. The notion of a sheep's paradise like that revolts, they say, our higher imagination. Where then would be the steeps of life? If war had ever stopped, we should have to re-invent it, on this view, to redeem life from flat degeneration.

Reflective apologists for war at the present day all take it religiously. It is a sort of sacrament. Its profits are to the vanquished as well as to the victor; and quite apart from any question of profit, it is an absolute good, we are told, for it is human nature at its highest dynamic. Its 'horrors' are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of co-educational and zo-ophily, of 'consumer's leagues' and 'associated charities,' of industrialism unlimited, and femininism unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a cattleyard of a planet!

So far as the central essence of this feeling goes, no healthy minded person, it seems to me, can help to some degree partaking of it. Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible. Without risks or prizes for the darer, history would be insipid indeed; and there is a type of military character which every one feels that the race should never cease to breed, for every one is sensitive to its superiority. The duty is incumbent on mankind, of keeping military characters in stock — of keeping them, if not for use, then as ends in themselves and as pure pieces of perfection, — so that Roosevelt's weaklings and mollycoddles may not end by making everything else disappear from the face of nature.

This natural sort of feeling forms, I think, the innermost soul of army-writings. Without any exception known to me, militarist authors take a highly mystical view of their subject, and regard war as a biological or sociological necessity, uncontrolled by ordinary psychological checks and motives. When the time of development is ripe the war must come, reason or no reason, for the justifications pleaded are invariably fictitious. War is, in short, a permanent human *obligation*. General Homer Lea, in his recent bool 'The Valor of Ignorance,' plants himself squarely on this ground. Readiness for war is for him the essence of nationality, and ability in it the supreme measure of the health of nations.

Nations, General Lea says, are never stationary — they must necessarily expand or shrink, according to their vitality or decrepitude. Japan now is culminating; and by the fatal law in question it is impossible that her statesmen should not long since have entered, with extraordinary foresight, upon a vast policy of conquest — the game in which the first moves were her wars with China and Russia and her treaty with

England, and of which the final objective is the capture of the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, and the whole of our Coast west of the Sierra Passes. This will give Japan what her ineluctable vocation as a state absolute forces her to claim, the possession of the entire Pacific Ocean; and to oppose these deep designs we Americans have, according to our author, nothing but our conceit, our ignorance, our commercialism, our corruption, and our feminism. General Lea makes a minute technical comparison of the military strength which we at present could oppose to the strength of Japan, and concludes that the islands, Alaska, Oregon, and Southern California, would fall almost without resistance, that San Francisco must surrender in a fortnight to a Japanese investment, that in three or four months the war would be over, and our republic, unable to regain what it had heedlessly neglected to protect sufficiently, would then 'disintegrate,' until perhaps some Cæsar should arise to weld us again into a nation.

A dismal forecast indeed! Yet not unplausible, if the mentality of Japan's statesmen be of the Cæsarian type of which history shows so many examples, and which is all that General Lea seems able to imagine. But there is no reason to think that women can no longer be the mothers of Napoleonic or Alexandrian characters; and if these come in Japan and find their opportunity, just such surprises as 'The Valor of Ignorance' paints may lurk in ambush for us. Ignorant as we still are of the innermost recesses of Japanese mentality, we may be foolhardy to disregard such possibilities.

Other militarists are more complex and more moral in their considerations. The 'Philosophie des Krieges,' by S. R. Steinmetz is a good example. War, according to this author, is an ordeal instituted by God, who weighs the nations in its balance. It is the essential form of the State, and the only function in which peoples can employ all their powers at once and convergently. No victory is possible save as the resultant of a totality of virtues, no defeat for which some vice or weakness is not responsible. Fidelity, cohesiveness, tenacity, heroism, conscience, education, inventiveness, economy, wealth, physical health and vigor — there isn't a moral or intellectual point of superiority that doesn't tell, when God holds his assizes and hurls the peoples upon one another. *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht;* and Dr. Steinmetz does not believe that in the long run chance and luck play any part in apportioning the issues.

The virtues that prevail, it must be noted, are virtues anyhow, superiorities that count in peaceful as well as in military competition; but the strain on them, being infinitely intenser in the latter case, makes war infinitely more searching as a trial. No ordeal is comparable to its winnowings. Its dread hammer is the welder of men into cohesive states, and nowhere but in such states can human nature adequately develop its capacity. The only alternative is 'degeneration.'

Dr. Steinmetz is a conscientious thinker, and his book, short as it is, takes much into account. Its upshot can, it seems to me, be summed up in Simon Patten's word, that mankind was nursed in pain and fear, and that the transition to a 'pleasure-economy' may be fatal to a being wielding no powers of defence against its disintegrative influences. If we speak of the *fear of emancipation from the fear-régime,* we put the whole situation into a single phrase; fear regarding ourselves now taking the place of the ancient fear of the enemy.

Turn the fear over as I will in my mind, it all seems to lead back to two unwillingnesses of the imagination, one æsthetic, and the other moral; unwillingness, first to envisage a future in which army-life, with its many elements of charm, shall be forever impossible, and in which the destinies of peoples shall nevermore be decided quickly, thrillingly, and tragically, by force, but only gradually and insipidly by 'evolution'; and, secondly, unwillingness to see the supreme theatre of human strenuousness closed, and the splendid military aptitudes of men doomed to keep always in a state of latency and never show themselves in action. These insistent unwillingnesses, no less than other æsthetic and ethical insistencies, have, it seems to me, to be listened to and respected. One cannot meet them effectively by mere counter-insistency on war's expensiveness and horror. The horror makes the thrill; and when the question is of getting the extremest and supremest out of human nature, talk of expense sounds ignominious. The weakness of so much merely negative criticism is evident — pacificism makes no converts from the military party. The military party denies neither the bestiality nor the horror, nor the expense; it only says that these things tell but half the story. It only says that war is *worth* them; that, taking human nature as a whole, its wars are its best protection against its weaker and more cowardly self, and that mankind cannot *afford* to adopt a peace-economy.

Pacificists ought to enter more deeply into the æsthetical and ethical point of view of their opponents. Do that first in any controversy, says J. J. Chapman, *then move the point,* and your opponent will follow. So long as anti-militarists propose no substitute for war's disciplinary function, no *moral equivalent* of war, analogous, as one might say, to the mechanical equivalent of heat, so long they fail to realize the full inwardness of the situation. And as a rule they do fail. The duties, penalties, and sanctions pictured in the utopias they paint are all too weak and tame to touch the military-minded. Tolstoï's pacificism is the only exception to this rule, for it is profoundly pessimistic as regards all this world's values, and makes the fear of the Lord furnish the moral spur provided elsewhere by the fear of the enemy. But our socialistic peace-advocates all believe absolutely in this world's values; and instead of the fear of the Lord and the fear of the enemy, the only fear they reckon with is

the fear of poverty if one be lazy. This weakness pervades all the socialistic literature with which I am acquainted. Even in Lowes Dickinson's exquisite dialogue,* high wages and short hours are the only forces invoked for overcoming man's distaste for repulsive kinds of labor. Meanwhile men at large still live as they always have lived, under a pain-and-fear economy — for those of us who live in an ease-economy are but an island in the stormy ocean — and the whole atmosphere of present-day utopian literature tastes mawkish and dishwatery to people who still keep a sense for life's more bitter flavors. It suggests, in truth, ubiquitous inferiority.

Inferiority is always with us, and merciless scorn of it is the keynote of the military temper. "Dogs, would you live forever?" shouted Frederick the Great. "Yes," say our utopians, "let us live forever, and raise our level gradually." The best thing about our 'inferiors' today is that they are as tough as nails, and physically and morally almost as insensitive. Utopianism would see them soft and squeamish, while militarism would keep their callousness, but transfigure it into a meritorious characteristic, needed by 'the service,' and redeemed by that from the suspicion of inferiority. All the qualities of a man acquire dignity when he knows that the service of the collectivity that owns him needs them. If proud of the collectivity, his own pride rises in proportion. No collectivity is like an army for nourishing such pride; but it has to be confessed that the only sentiment which the image of pacific cosmopolitan industrialism is capable of arousing in countless worthy breasts is shame at the idea of belonging to *such* a collectivity. It is obvious that the United States of America as they exist today impress a mind like General Lea's as so much human blubber. Where is the sharpness and precipitousness, the contempt for life, whether one's own, or another's? Where is the savage 'yes' and 'no,' the unconditional duty? Where is the conscription? Where is the blood-tax? Where is anything that one feels honored by belonging to?

Having said thus much in preparation, I will now confess my own utopia. I devoutly believe in the reign of peace and in the gradual advent of some sort of a socialistic equilibrium. The fatalistic view of the war-function is to me nonsense, for I know that war-making is due to definite motives and subject to prudential checks and reasonable criticisms, just like any other form of enterprise. And when whole nations are the armies, and the science of destruction vies in intellectual refinement with the sciences of production, I see that war becomes absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity. Extravagant ambitions will have to be replaced by reasonable claims, and nations must make common cause against them. I see no reason why all this should not apply to yellow as well as to white countries, and I look forward to a future when acts of war shall be formally outlawed as between civilized peoples.

All these beliefs of mine put me squarely into the anti-militarist party. But I do not believe that peace either ought to be or will be permanent on this globe, unless the states pacifically organized preserve some of the old elements of army-discipline. A permanently successful peace-economy cannot be a simple pleasure-economy. In the more or less socialistic future towards which mankind seems drifting we must still subject ourselves collectively to those severities which answer to our real position upon this only partly hospitable globe. We must make new energies and hardihoods continue the manliness to which the military mind so faithfully clings. Martial virtues must be the enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock upon which states are built — unless, indeed, we wish for dangerous reactions against commonwealths fit only for contempt, and liable to invite attack whenever a centre of crystallization for military-minded enterprise gets formed anywhere in their neighborhood.

The war-party is assuredly right in affirming and reaffirming that the martial virtues, although originally gained by the race through war, are absolute and permanent human goods. Patriotic pride and ambition in their military form are, after all, only specifications of a more general competitive passion. They are its first form, but that is no reason for supposing them to be its last form. Men now are proud of belonging to a conquering nation, and without a murmur they lay down their persons and their wealth, if by so doing they may fend off subjection. But who can be sure that *other aspects of one's country* may not, with time and education and suggestion enough, come to be regarded with similarly effective feelings of pride and shame? Why should men not some day feel that it is worth a blood-tax to belong to a collectivity superior in *any* ideal respect? Why should they not blush with indignant shame if the community that owns them is vile in any way whatsoever? Individuals, daily more numerous, now feel this civic passion. It is only a question of blowing on the spark till the whole population gets incandescent, and on the ruins of the old morals of military honor, a stable system of morals of civic honor builds itself up. What the whole community comes to believe in grasps the individual as in a vise. The war-function has grasped us so far; but constructive interests may some day seem no less imperative, and impose on the individual a hardly lighter burden.

Let me illustrate my idea more concretely. There is nothing to make one indignant in the mere fact that life is hard, that men should toil and suffer pain. The planetary conditions once for all are such, and we can stand it. But that so many men, by mere

* "Justice and Liberty," N.Y., 1909.

accidents of birth and opportunity, should have a life of *nothing else* but toil and pain and hardness and inferiority imposed upon them, should have *no* vacation, while others natively no more deserving never get any taste of this campaigning life at all, — *this* is capable of arousing indignation in reflective minds. It may end by seeming shameful to all of us that some of us have nothing but campaigning, and others nothing but unmanly ease. If now — and this is my idea — there were, instead of military conscription a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against *Nature,* the injustice would tend to be evened out, and numerous other goods to the commonwealth would follow. The military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the people; no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man's relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life. To coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dishwashing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas. They would have paid their blood-tax, done their own part in the immemorial human warfare against nature; they would tread the earth more proudly, the women would value them more highly, they would be better fathers and teachers of the following generation.

Such a conscription, with the state of public opinion that would have required it, and the many moral fruits it would bear, would preserve in the midst of a pacific civilization the manly virtues which the military party is so afraid of seeing disappear in peace. We should get toughness without callousness, authority with as little criminal cruelty as possible, and painful work done cheerily because the duty is temporary, and threatens not, as now, to degrade the whole remainder of one's life. I spoke of the 'moral equivalent' of war. So far, war has been the only force that can discipline a whole community, and until an equivalent discipline is organized, I believe that war must have its way. But I have no serious doubt that the ordinary prides and shames of social man, once developed to a certain intensity, are capable of organizing such a moral equivalent as I have sketched, or some other just as effective for preserving manliness of type. It is but a question of time, of skilful propagandism, and of opinion-making men seizing historic opportunities.

The martial type of character can be bred without war. Strenuous honor and disinterestedness abound elsewhere. Priests and medical men are in a fashion educated to it, and we should all feel some degree of it imperative if we were conscious of our work as an obligatory service to the state. We should be *owned,* as soldiers are by the army, and our pride would rise accordingly. We could be poor, then, without humiliation, as army officers now are. The only thing needed henceforward is to inflame the civic temper as past history has inflamed the military temper. H. G. Wells, as usual, sees the centre of the situation. "In many ways, he says, "military organization is the most peaceful of activities. When the contemporary man steps from the street, of clamorous insincere advertisement, push, adulteration, underselling and intermittent employment into the barrack-yard, he steps on to a higher social plane, into an atmosphere of service and coöperation and of infinitely more honorable emulations. Here at least men are not flung out of employment to degenerate because there is no immediate work for them to do. They are fed and drilled and trained for better services. Here at least a man is supposed to win promotion by self-forgetfulness and not by self-seeking. And beside the feeble and irregular endowment of research by commercialism, its little short-sighted snatches at profit by innovation and scientific economy, see how remarkable is the steady and rapid development of method and appliances in naval and military affairs! Nothing is more striking than to compare the progress of civil conveniences which has been left almost entirely to the trader, to the progress in military apparatus during the last few decades. The house-appliances of today, for example, are little better than they were fifty years ago. A house of today is still almost as ill-ventilated, badly heated by wasteful fires, clumsily arranged and furnished as the house of 1858. Houses a couple of hundred years old are still satisfactory places of residence, so little have our standards risen. But the rifle or battleship of fifty years ago was beyond all comparison inferior to those we possess; in power, in speed, in convenience alike. No one has a use now for such superannuated things." *

Wells adds† that he thinks that the conceptions of order and discipline, the tradition of service and devotion, of physical fitness, unstinted exertion, and universal responsibility, which universal military duty is now teaching European nations, will remain a permanent acquisition, when the last ammunition has been used in the fireworks that celebrate the final peace. I believe as he does. It would be simply preposterous if the only force that could work ideals of honor and standards of efficiency into English or American natures should be the fear of being killed by the Germans or Japanese. Great indeed is Fear; but it is not, as our military enthusiasts believe and try to make us believe, the only stimulus known for awakening the higher ranges of men's spiritual energy. The amount of alteration in public opinion which my utopia postulates is vastly less than the difference between the mentality of those black warriors who pursued Stanley's party on the Congo with their cannibal war-cry of "Meat! Meat!" and that of the 'general staff' of any civilized nation. History has seen the latter interval bridged over: the former one can be bridged over much more easily.

* "First and Last Things," 1908, p. 215.
† "First and Last Things," 1908, p. 226.

Woodrow Wilson, 28th President of the United States, was born in Staunton Virginia in 1856. A descendant of Presbyterian ministers on both sides of his family, he graduated from Princeton University in 1879, studied law at the University of Virginia, but turned from the practice of law to the study of political science and jurisprudence at Johns Hopkins. After receiving his Ph.D. in 1886 he taught at Bryn Mawr, Wesleyan University and Princeton, before being elected the first non-clerical president of Princeton University, in 1902. In 1910 he ran successfully for the governorship of New Jersey, and he made such a name for himself as reform Democrat that he was elected President of the United States in 1912.

In 1914 World War I broke out in Europe. Wilson and his first Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan,at first favored neutrality and Wilson tried to maintain neutrality by diplomatic means. But American sales of arms and munitions, which could not be forbidden under neutrality, worked heavily in the interests of the British and against the Germans. The sinking of the Lusitania, with 1195 passengers of which 128 were Americans, by German U-boats, aroused a storm of protest which tilted American sympathies against the Germans. Despite an ultimatum to Germany, Wilson managed to win a second term in 1916 on the slogan, "He kept us out of war". The "Peace Without Victory" speech which follows was presented to the U.S. Senate on January 22, 1917. It contains the main principles of what came to be known as Wilsonianism: that the settlements which end the war must be ones that will not bring humiliation and injury to the losers, that they be expressed in agreements and treaties which can win the approval of all mankind rather than serving the interests only of those involved, that they be followed by a covenant or league among nations which will guarantee that such a catastrophe will never happen again by creating a force greater than that of any one nation or alliance of nations and which will guarantee equality of rights of all nations large or small, the freedom of the seas, free trade, and a program of arms limitations. This "Peace Without Victory" speech had little immediate effect; a week later Germany embarked on unrestricted submarine warfare, Wilson broke off relations, U.S.vessels were sunk, and on April 2, 1917 Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. But in the longer run Wilsonianism had an enormous influence. It had an immediate appeal to liberal and left groups in all countries. In his April 2nd War Message he held that "the present German submarine warfare against commerce [including food relief ships and hospital ships] is a warfare against mankind", but he welcomed the chance "to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience." "The world must be made safe for democracy," he continued. In January, 1918 he presented his Fourteen Points of a program for world peace. They included: I. "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at", II. Freedom of the seas, III. Free trade, IV. Disarmament, V. Impartial settlement of colonial claims based in part on the interests of the governed, and XIV. "A general association of nations". The other points dealt with specific, and relatively fair, restorations and dispositions of territories, which would not humiliate the enemy. Later in 1918 the Germans and their allies directed their requests for an Armistice to Wilson and proposed that the Fourteen points be the basis of negotiations. But Wilson was doomed to disappointment. The specific parts of the Fourteen Points which dealt with the disposition of spoils, were in conflict with a lot of secret agreements previously engaged on by his Allies. The Versailles Treaty became Hitler's main stepping stone to power and World War I, and though Wilson got his League of Nations, his achievement was largely neutralized by the refusal of the U.S. Senate to let America join it. His failure was due, no doubt, to several errors of political judgment. But in any case, he suffered a stroke while campaigning for his League, and died in 1924 a tragic and bitter man.

The League of Nations, however, lived on. The Covenant, consisting of 26 articles,was part of the Treaty of Versailles. It was drafted and finalized under Wilson's supervision. The League engaged in several successful peace-keeping ventures but was not strong enough to stop Japan in Manchuria, Italy in Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil War, or the Agressions of Hitler. In a sense, however, many of its ideals were re-born in the United Nations in 1945.

"Peace Without Victory" Speech to U.S.Senate, January 22, 1917

GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE: On the 18th of December last I addressed an identical note to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man, must take that for granted.

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honourable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They can not in honour withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a league for peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is

ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nation engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late.

No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American governments, elements consistent with their political faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

I do not mean to say that any American government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed

upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable—because I wish frankly to uncover realities. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquility of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this can not be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and cooperation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many

of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the cooperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe, and the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candour and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say. May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its

own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw .e nto competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

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(1) ***Covenant of the League of Nations*[1] *with Amendments in Force, June 26, 1945***

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and

by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 1

MEMBERSHIP AND WITHDRAWAL

1. The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accessions shall be effected by a declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

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[1] Entered into force on January 10, 1920. The texts printed in italics indicate ..e amendments. Article 6 as amended has been in force since August 13, 1924, and Article 4 as amended since July 29, 1926.

2. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guaranties of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

3. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.[2]

Article 2

EXECUTIVE ORGANS

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

Article 3

ASSEMBLY

1. The Assembly shall consist of representatives of the Members of the League.

2. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time, as occasion may require, at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

3. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

4. At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote and may have not more than three Representatives.

Article 4

COUNCIL

1. The Council shall consist of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers [United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan], together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain shall be Members of the Council.

2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League, whose Representatives shall always be Members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.

2. *bis. The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds' majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Coun-*

cil, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of re-eligibility.

3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one representative.

Article 5

VOTING AND PROCEDURE

1. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

2. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

3. The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

Article 6

SECRETARIAT AND EXPENSES

1. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staffs as may be required.

2. The first Secretary-General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

3. The secretaries and the staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council.

4. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the first head of the Communist government in Russia, and in effect the father of the Russian Revolution of October,1917, was born in Simbirsk (now called Ulyanovsk, after Lenin's original last name, Ulyanov) in 1870. About 350 miles west of Moscow, Simbirsk was a Volga river port, now an industrial city. Lenin's father was a civil service official. His brother was executed,when Lenin was in his teens,for participation in a plot on the life of Czar Alexander III whose reign (1845-1894) was marked by repression, censorship, increased limitations on the judiciary and local assemblies, forcible Russification of minorities and religious persecutions particularly of Jews. Lenin was thus early drawn into revolutionary activities. He studied Law at the University of Kazan, but was banished for revolutionary activities. He finished his law studies on his own and practiced law briefly, but soon gave it up to study Karl Marx's work and propagandize among the workers. He was exiled to Siberia from 1887 to 1900, after which he went abroad for five years. At a meeting of the Russian Social Democratic Party held in London in 1903 he argued that only a party of disciplined professional revolutionaries could bring socialism to Russia. At that meeting the Social Democratic Party of Russia split into two factions, the Bolshevik ('bolsheviki' means 'members of the majority') led by Lenin, and the Menshevik (minority) faction. Both groups were committed to Marxism, but the Mensheviks held that Russia would have to pass from its backward feudal type society, through an intermediate bourgeois (or capitalistic) regime, before a proletarian revolution for a socialist state would come about. (This was in line with Marx's analysis of the dialectic of history). Lenin's group, on the other hand, held that the peasants and workers must unite to overthrow the czar and set up a dictatorship of the proletariat. Although the Bolshevik faction lost its numerical majority in the Party very quickly, the two factions vied with one another until 1912 when they split into two parties. In World War I, the Bolsheviks hoped for defeat of Russia, while the Mensheviks were split on the issue. As the two following selections from Lenin show, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were far from being pacifists; on the contrary, they favored wars which would advance the cause of socialism and opposed wars which would further only the interests of capitalistic combines in dividing the resources and markets of the world. Even a "nationalist" war, e.g., a colony's war for independence of an imperialist power, might be a "just war" if it served this end of socialism; likewise, civil wars - if they were revolutions of the workers or proletariat - would be "just". Not disarmament and peace, as such, but the establishment of a classless society without exploitation, was Lenin's objective; wars which would advance this end were justified.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) had held that communism was inevitable as a result of revolution by workers within capitalistic systems. Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" (1916) extended Marx's view by holding, on the basis of current statistics, that capitalism proceeded by way of monopoly to international cartels, and that wars like World War I were essentially wars between capitalist countries to divide up resources and markets among these international corporations. Thus to achieve peace, with the classless society, it was necessary to combat the capitalist forces world wide. Only with world communism would world peace be attainable.

Lenin was in Switzerland during the early years of World War I. In February 1917 revolution broke out in Russia. After strikes, military mutinies, and an unsuccessful effort to dissolve the Duma (assembly), Czar Nicholas II fled and a moderate provisional government, backed by the Mensheviks, took over. The Germans permitted Lenin through their lines to Russia. Once there Lenin re-invigorated the soviets (worker's councils) in cities, and galvanized the Bolshevik faction into action. In October 1917 the Bolsheviks staged a coup, led by Trotsky, and Lenin, as head of the Council of People's Commissars,became a virtual dictator. There were two years of civil war (1918-20) between the Red Russians and White Russian (anti-Bolshevik) forces, before the Union of Soviet Social Republics (USSR) was firmly established. Lenin suffered strokes in 1922 and 1923, and died in January 1924.

THE WAR PROGRAMME OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

Let us examine the position of the advocates of disarmament.

I

The main argument is that the demand for disarmament is the clearest, most decisive, most consistent expression of the struggle against all militarism and against all war.

But this main argument is precisely the principal error of the advocates of disarmament. Socialists cannot, without ceasing to be Socialists, be opposed to all war.

In the first place, Socialists have never been, nor can they ever be, opposed to revolutionary wars. The bourgeoisie of the "Great" imperialist Powers has become thoroughly reactionary, and we regard the war which *this* bourgeoisie is now waging as a reactionary, slave-owners' and criminal war. But what about a war *against* this bourgeoisie? For example, a war waged by people who are oppressed by and dependent upon this bourgeoisie, by colonial peoples, for their liberation? In the theses of the *Internationale* group, in §5, we read: "In the era of this unbridled imperialism there can be no more national wars of any kind." This is obviously wrong.

The history of the twentieth century, this century of "unbridled imperialism," is replete with colonial wars. But what we Europeans, the imperialist oppressors of the majority of the peoples of the world, with our habitual, despicable European chauvinism, call "colonial wars" are often national wars, or national rebellions of those oppressed peoples. One of the main features of imperialism is that it accelerates the development of capitalism in the most backward countries, and thereby widens and intensifies the struggle against national oppression. This is a fact. It inevitably follows from this that imperialism must often give rise to national wars. *Junius*,[33] who in her pamphlet defends the above-quoted "theses," says that in the imperialist epoch every national war against one of the imperialist Great Powers leads to the intervention of another competing imperialist Great Power and thus, every national war is converted into an imperialist war. But this argument is also wrong. This *may* happen, but it does not always happen. Many colonial wars in the period between 1900 and 1914 did not follow this road. And it would be simply ridiculous if we declared, for instance, that after the present war, if it ends in the extreme exhaustion of all the belligerents, "there can be no" national, progressive, revolutionary wars "whatever," waged, say, by China in alliance with India, Persia, Siam, etc., against the Great Powers.

To deny all possibility of national wars under imperialism is wrong in theory, obviously mistaken historically, and in practice is tantamount to European chauvinism: we who belong to nations that oppress hundreds of millions of people in Europe, Africa, Asia, etc., must tell the oppressed peoples that it is "impossible" for them to wage war against "our" nations!

Secondly, civil wars are also wars. Whoever recognizes the class struggle cannot fail to recognize civil wars, which in every class society are the natural, and under certain conditions, inevitable continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle. All the great revolutions prove this. To repudiate civil war, or to forget about it, would mean sinking into extreme opportunism and renouncing the socialist revolution.

Thirdly, the victory of Socialism in one country does not at one stroke eliminate all war in general. On the contrary, it presupposes such wars. The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in the various countries. It cannot be otherwise under the commodity production system. From this it follows irrefutably that Socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously *in all* countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will remain bourgeois or prebourgeois for some time. This must not only create friction, but a direct striving on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war. It would be a war for Socialism, for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie. Engels was perfectly right when, in his letter to Kautsky, September 12, 1882,[34] he openly admitted that it was possible for *already victorious* Socialism to wage "defensive wars." What he had in mind was defence of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other countries.

Only after we have overthrown, finally vanquished, and expropriated the bourgeoisie of the whole world, and not only of one country, will wars become impossible. And from a scientific point of view it would be utterly wrong and utterly unrevolutionary for us to evade or gloss over the most important thing, namely, that the most difficult task, the one demanding the greatest amount of fighting in the *transition* to Socialism, is to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie. "Social" parsons and opportunists are always ready to dream about the future peaceful Socialism; but the very thing that distinguishes them from revolutionary Social-Democrats is that they refuse to think about and reflect on the fierce class struggle and class *wars* that are necessary for the achievement of this beautiful future.

We must not allow ourselves to be led astray by words. The term "defence of the fatherland," for instance, is hateful to many, because the avowed opportunists and the Kautskyites use it to cover up and gloss over the lies of the bourgeoisie in the *present* predatory war. This is a fact. It does not follow from this, however, that we must forget to ponder over the meaning of political slogans. Recognizing "defence of the fatherland" in the present war is nothing more nor

less than recognizing it as a "just" war, a war in the interests of the proletariat — nothing more nor less, we repeat, because invasions may occur in any war. It would be simply foolish to repudiate "defence of the fatherland" *on the part of* the oppressed nations in their wars *against* the imperialist Great Powers, or on the part of a victorious proletariat in *its* war against some Galliffet[35] of a bourgeois state.

Theoretically, it would be quite wrong to forget that every war is but the continuation of politics by other means; the present imperialist war is the continuation of the imperialist politics of two groups of Great Powers, and these politics were engendered and fostered by the sum total of the relationships of the imperialist epoch. But this very epoch must also necessarily engender and foster the politics of struggle against national oppression and of the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie, and therefore, also the possibility and the inevitability, first, of revolutionary national rebellions and wars; second, of proletarian wars and rebellions *against* the bourgeoisie; and, third, of a combination of both kinds of revolutionary war, etc.

II

To this must be added the following general considerations.

An oppressed class which does not strive to learn to use arms, to acquire arms, only deserves to be treated like slaves. We cannot forget, unless we become bourgeois pacifists or opportunists, that we are living in a class society, that there is no way out of this society, and there can be none, except by means of the class struggle. In every class society, whether it is based on slavery, serfdom, or, as at present, on wage labour, the oppressing class is armed. Not only the modern standing army, but even the modern militia — even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, Switzerland, for example — represent the bourgeoisie armed *against* the proletariat. This is such an elementary truth that it is hardly necessary to dwell upon it. It is sufficient to recall the use of troops against strikers in all capitalist countries.

The fact that the bourgeoisie is armed against the proletariat is one of the biggest, most fundamental, and most important facts in modern capitalist society. And in face of this fact, revolutionary Social-Democrats are urged to "demand" "disarmament"! This is tantamount to the complete abandonment of the point of view of the class struggle, the renunciation of all thought of revolution. Our slogan must be: the arming of the proletariat for the purpose of vanquishing, expropriating and disarming the bourgeoisie. These are the only tactics a revolutionary class can adopt, tactics which follow logically from the whole *objective development* of capitalist militarism, and dictated by that development. Only *after* the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historical mission, to throw all armaments on the scrap heap; and the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but *only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before.*

If the present war rouses among the reactionary Christian Socialists, among the whimpering petty bourgeoisie, *only* horror and fright, only aversion to all use of arms, to bloodshed, death, etc., then we must say: capitalist society is always an *endless horror.* And if this most reactionary of all wars is now preparing a *horrible end* for that society, we have no reason to drop into despair. At a time when, as everyone can see, the bourgeoisie itself is paving the way for the only legitimate and revolutionary war, namely, civil war against the imperialist bourgeoisie, the "demand" for disarmament, or more correctly, the dream of disarmament, is, objectively, nothing but an expression of despair.

IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1916)

Preface to French and German Editions, 1920

It is proved in the pamphlet that the war of 1914-18 was imperialistic (that is, an annexationist, predatory, plunderous war) on the part of both sides; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies, "spheres of influence" of finance capital, etc.

Proof of what was the true social, or rather, the true class character of the war is naturally to be found, not in the diplomatic history of the war, but in an analysis of the *objective* position of the ruling *classes* in *all* the belligerent countries. In order to depict this objective position one must not take examples or isolated data (in view of the extreme complexity of the phenomena of social life it is always possible to select any number of examples or separate data to prove any proposition), but the *whole* of the data concerning the *basis* of economic life in *all* the belligerent countries and the *whole* world.

Private property based on the labour of the small proprietor, free competition, democracy, all the catchwords with which the capitalists and their press deceive the workers and the peasants — are things of the distant past. Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries. And this "booty" is shared between two or three powerful world marauders armed to the teeth (America, Great Britain, Japan), who involve the whole world in *their* war over the sharing of *their* booty.

The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty dictated by monarchist Germany, and the subsequent much more brutal and despicable Versailles Treaty dictated by the "democratic" republics of America and France and also by "free" England,

have rendered a most useful service to humanity by exposing both the hired coolies of the pen of imperialism and the petty-bourgeois reactionaries, although they call themselves pacifists and Socialists, who sang praises to "Wilsonism," and who insisted that peace and reforms were possible under imperialism.

The tens of millions of dead and maimed left by the war — a war to decide whether the British or German group of financial marauders is to receive the most booty — and those two "peace treaties," are with unprecedented rapidity opening the eyes of the millions and tens of millions of people who are downtrodden, oppressed, deceived and duped by the bourgeoisie. Thus, out of the universal ruin caused by the war a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which, however prolonged and arduous its stages may be, cannot end otherwise than in a proletarian revolution and in its victory.

I. CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND MONOPOLIES

The enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid process of concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises are one of the most characteristic features of capitalism. Modern censuses of production give most complete and most exact data on this process.

In Germany, for example, out of every 1,000 industrial enterprises, large enterprises, i.e., those employing more than 50 workers, numbered three in 1882, six in 1895 and nine in 1907; and out of every 100 workers employed, this group of enterprises employed 22, 30 and 37, respectively.

Less than one-hundredth of the total enterprises utilize *more than three-fourths* of the total steam and electric power! Two million nine hundred and seventy thousand small enterprises (employing up to five workers), constituting 91 per cent of the total, utilize only 7 per cent of the total steam and electric power! Tens of thousands of huge enterprises are everything; millions of small ones are nothing.

In another advanced country of modern capitalism, the United States of America, the growth of the concentration of production is still greater. Here statistics single out industry in the narrow sense of the word and group enterprises according to the value of their annual output. In 1904 large-scale enterprises with an output of one million dollars and over numbered 1,900 (out of 216,180, i.e., 0.9 per cent). These employed 1,400,000 workers (out of 5,500,000, i.e., 25.6 per cent) and their output amounted to $5,600,000,000 (out of $14,800,000,000, i.e., 38 per cent). Five years later, in 1909, the corresponding figures were: 3,060 enterprises (out of 268,491, i.e., 1.1 per cent) employing 2,000,000 workers (out of 6,600,000, i.e., 30.5 per cent) with an output of $9,000,000,000 (out of $20,700,000,000, i.e., 43.8 per cent).*

Almost half the total production of all the enterprises of the country was carried on by *one-hundredth part* of these enterprises!

Thus, the principal stages in the history of monopolies are the following: 1) 1860-70, the highest stage, the apex of development of free competition; monopoly is in the barely discernible, embryonic stage. 2) After the crisis of 1873, a lengthy period of development of cartels; but they are still the exception. They are not yet durable. They are still a transitory phenomenon. 3) The boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03. Cartels become one of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism.

Cartels come to an agreement on the conditions of sale, terms of payment, etc. They divide the markets among themselves. They fix the quantity of goods to be produced. They fix prices. They divide the profits among the various enterprises, etc.

IV. THE EXPORT OF CAPITAL

Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition had undivided sway, was the export of *goods*. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule, is the export of *capital*.

As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will be utilized not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The possibility of exporting capital is created by the fact that a number of backward countries have already been drawn into world capitalist intercourse; main railways have either been or are being built there, the elementary conditions for industrial development have been created, etc. The necessity for exporting capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become "overripe" and (owing to the backward stage of agriculture and the impoverished state of the masses) capital cannot find a field for "profitable" investment.

Here are approximate figures showing the amount of capital invested abroad by the three principal countries:*

CAPITAL INVESTED ABROAD

(In billions of francs)

Year	Great Britain	France	Germany
1862	3.6	—	—
1872	15.0	10 (1869)	—
1882	22.0	15 (1880)	?
1893	42.0	20 (1890)	?
1902	62.0	27-37	12.5
1914	75-100.0	60	44.0

* Hobson, *Imperialism*, London, 1902, p. 58; Riesser, *op. cit.*, pp. 395 and 404; P. Arndt in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 7, 1916, S. 35; Neymarck in *Bulletin*; Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, p. 492; Lloyd George, Speech in the House of Commons, May 4, 1915, reported in the *Daily Telegraph*, May 5, 1915; B. Harms, *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft*, Jena,

1912, S. 235 et seq.; Dr. Siegmund Schilder, *Entwicklungstendenzen der Weltwirtschaft (Trends of Development of World Economy — Tr.)*, Berlin, 1912, Band 1, S. 150; George Paish, "Great Britain's Capital Investments, etc.," in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, 1910-11, p. 167 et seq.; Georges Diouritch, *L'expansion des banques allemandes à l'étranger, ses rapports avec le développement économique de l'Allemagne (Expansion of German Banks Abroad in Connection with the Economic Development of Germany — Tr.)*, Paris, 1909, p. 84.

This table shows that the export of capital reached formidable dimensions only in the beginning of the twentieth century. Before the war the capital invested abroad by the three principal countries amounted to between 175,000,000,000 and 200,000,000,000 francs. At the modest rate of 5 per cent, the income from this sum should have reached from 8 to 10 billion francs a year. A solid basis for imperialist oppression and the exploitation of most of the countries and nations of the world, for the capitalist parasitism of a handful of wealthy states!

VII. IMPERIALISM, AS A SPECIAL STAGE OF CAPITALISM

We must now try to sum up, put together, what has been said above on the subject of imperialism. Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves all along the line. Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly. Free competition is the fundamental characteristic of capitalism, and of commodity production generally; monopoly is the exact opposite of free competition, but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our eyes, creating large-scale industry and forcing out small industry, replacing large-scale by still larger-scale industry, and carrying concentration of production and capital to the point where out of it has grown and is growing monopoly: cartels, syndicates and trusts, and merging with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks, which manipulate thousands of millions. At the same time the monopolies, which have grown out of free competition, do not eliminate the latter, but exist over it and alongside of it, and thereby give rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts. Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system.

If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism. Such a definition would include what is most important, for, on the one hand, finance capital is the bank capital of a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist combines of industrialists; and, on the other hand, the division of the world is the transition from a colonial policy which has extended without hindrance to territories unseized by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolistic possession of the territory of the world which has been completely divided up.

But very brief definitions, although convenient, for they sum up the main points, are nevertheless inadequate, since very important features of the phenomenon that has to be defined have to be especially deduced. And so, without forgetting the conditional and relative value of all definitions in general, which can never embrace all the concatenations of a phenomenon in its complete development, we must give a definition of imperialism that will include the following five of its basic features: 1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; 2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this "finance capital," of a financial oligarchy; 3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; 4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist combines which share the world among themselves, and 5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.

We shall see later that imperialism can and must be defined differently if we bear in mind, not only the basic, purely economic concepts — to which the above definition is limited — but also the historical place of this stage of capitalism in relation to capitalism in general, or the relation between imperialism and the two main trends in the working-class movement. The point to be noted just now is that imperialism, as interpreted above, undoubtedly represents a special stage in the development of capitalism. To enable the reader to obtain the most well-grounded idea of imperialism possible, we deliberately tried to quote as largely as possible *bourgeois* economists who are obliged to admit the particularly incontrovertible facts concerning the latest stage of capitalist economy. With the same object in view, we have quoted detailed statistics which enable one to see to what degree bank capital, etc., has grown, in what precisely the transformation of quantity into quality, of developed capitalism into imperialism, was expressed. Needless to say, of course, all boundaries in nature and in society are conditional and changeable, that it would be absurd to argue, for example, about the particular year or decade in which imperialism "definitely" became established.

In the matter of defining imperialism, however, we have to enter into controversy, primarily, with K. Kautsky, the principal Marxian theoretician of the epoch of the so-called Second International — that is, of the twenty-five years between 1889 and 1914. The fundamental ideas expressed in our definition of imperialism were very resolutely at-

tacked by Kautsky in 1915, and even in November 1914, when he said that imperialism must not be regarded as a "phase" or stage of economy, but as a policy, a definite policy "preferred" by finance capital; that imperialism must not be "identified" with "present-day capitalism"; that if imperialism is to be understood to mean "all the phenomena of present-day capitalism" — cartels, protection, the domination of the financiers, and colonial policy — then the question as to whether imperialism is necessary to capitalism becomes reduced to the "flattest tautology," because, in that case, "imperialism is naturally a vital necessity for capitalism," and so on. The best way to present Kautsky's idea is to quote his own definition of imperialism, which is diametrically opposed to the substance of the ideas which we have set forth (for the objections coming from the camp of the German Marxists, who have been advocating similar ideas for many years already, have been long known to Kautsky as the objections of a definite trend in Marxism).

Kautsky's definition is as follows:

"Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex larger and larger areas of *agrarian*" (Kautsky's italics) "territory, irrespective of what nations inhabit those regions."*

This definition is utterly worthless because it one-sidedly, i.e., arbitrarily, singles out only the national question (although the latter is extremely important in itself as well as in its relation to imperialism), it arbitrarily and *inaccurately* connects this question *only* with industrial capital in the countries which annex other nations, and in an equally arbitrary and inaccurate manner pushes into the forefront the annexation of agrarian regions.

Imperialism is a striving for annexations — this is what the *political* part of Kautsky's definition amounts to. It is correct, but very incomplete, for politically, imperialism is, in general, a striving towards violence and reaction. For the moment, however, we are interested in the *economic* aspect of the question, which Kautsky *himself* introduced into *his* definition. The inaccuracies in Kautsky's definition are glaring. The characteristic feature of imperialism is *not* industrial *but* finance capital. It is not an accident that in France it was precisely the extraordinarily rapid development of *finance* capital, and the weakening of industrial capital, that, from the 'eighties onwards, gave rise to the extreme intensification of annexationist (colonial) policy. The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex *not only* agrarian territories, but even most highly industrialized regions (German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for Lorraine), because 1) the fact that the world is already divided up obliges those contemplating a *redivision* to reach out for *every kind* of territory, and 2) an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several Great Powers in the striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine *his* hegemony. (Belgium is particularly important for Germany as a base for operations against England; England needs Bagdad as a base for operations against Germany, etc.)

Kautsky refers especially — and repeatedly — to Englishmen who, he alleges, have given a purely political meaning to the word "imperialism" in the sense that he, Kautsky, understands it. We take up the work by the Englishman Hobson, *Imperialism,* which appeared in 1902, and there we read:

"The new imperialism differs from the older, first, in substituting for the ambition of a single growing empire the theory and the practice of competing empires, each motivated by similar lusts of political aggrandizement and commercial gain; secondly, in the dominance of financial or investing over mercantile interests."*

VIII. THE PARASITISM AND DECAY OF CAPITALISM

. . . Imperialism has the tendency to create privileged sections also among the workers, and to detach them from the broad masses of the proletariat.

It must be observed that in Great Britain the tendency of imperialism to divide the workers, to strengthen opportunism among them and to cause temporary decay in the working-class movement, revealed itself much earlier than the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries; for two important distinguishing features of imperialism were already observed in Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century, viz., vast colonial possessions and a monopolist position in the world market. Marx and Engels traced this connection between opportunism in the working-class movement and the imperialist features of British capitalism systematically, during the course of several decades. For example, on October 7, 1858, Engels wrote to Marx: "The English proletariat is becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy, and a bourgeois proletariat *as well as* a bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world this is, of course, to a certain extent justifiable."[15] Almost a quarter of a century later, in a letter dated August 11, 1881, Engels speaks of ". . . the worst type of English trade unions which allow themselves to be led by men bought by, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie."[16] In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: "You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy? Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal Radicals, and the workers merrily share the feast of England's monopoly of the colonies and the world market"* (Engels expressed similar ideas in the press in his preface to the second edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England,* which appeared in 1892).

This clearly shows the causes and effects. The causes are: 1) exploitation of the whole world by this country;

*Hobson, Imperialism, London, 1902 p 324

2) its monopolistic position in the world market; 3) its colonial monopoly. The effects are: 1) a section of the British proletariat becomes bourgeois; 2) a section of the proletariat permits itself to be led by men bought by, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie. The imperialism of the beginning of the twentieth century completed the division of the world among a handful of states, each of which today exploits (i.e., draws superprofits from) a part of the "whole world" only a little smaller than that which England exploited in 1858;

IX. THE CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM

Kautsky's theoretical critique of imperialism has nothing in common with Marxism and serves only as a preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the opportunists and the social-chauvinists, precisely for the reason that it evades and obscures the very profound and fundamental contradictions of imperialism: the contradictions between monopoly and free competition which exists side by side with it, between the gigantic "operations" (and gigantic profits) of finance capital and "honest" trade in the free market, the contradiction between cartels and trusts, on the one hand, and non-cartelized industry, on the other, etc.

The notorious theory of "ultraimperialism," invented by Kautsky, is just as reactionary. Compare his arguments on this subject in 1915, with Hobson's arguments in 1902.

Kautsky: "... Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultraimperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capitals? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question."*

Hobson: "Christendom thus laid out in a few great federal empires, each with a retinue of uncivilized dependencies, seems to many the most legitimate development of present tendencies, and one which would offer the best hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-Imperialism."

Kautsky called ultraimperialism or superimperialism what Hobson, thirteen years earlier, described as interimperialism. Except for coining a new and clever catchword, replacing one Latin prefix by another, the only progress Kautsky has made in the sphere of "scientific" thought is that he gave out as Marxism what Hobson, in effect, described as the cant of English parsons. After the Anglo-Boer War it was quite natural for this highly honourable caste to exert their maximum efforts to *console* the British middle class and the workers who had lost many of their relatives on the battlefields of South Africa and who were obliged to pay higher taxes in order to guarantee still higher profits for the British financiers. And what better consolation could there be than the theory that imperialism is not so bad; that it stands close to inter- (or ultra-) imperialism, which can ensure permanent peace? No matter what the good intentions of the English parsons, or of sentimental Kautsky, may have been, the only objective, i.e., real, social significance Kautsky's "theory" can have, is: a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present times, and directing it towards illusory prospects of an imaginary "ultraimperialism" of the future. Deception of the masses — there is nothing but this in Kautsky's "Marxian" theory.

Indeed, it is enough to compare well-known and indisputable facts to become convinced of the utter falsity of the prospects which Kautsky tries to conjure up before the German workers (and the workers of all lands). Let us consider India, Indo-China and China. It is known that these three colonial and semicolonial countries, with a population of six to seven hundred million, are subjected to the exploitation of the finance capital of several imperialist powers: Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S.A., etc. Let us assume that these imperialist countries form alliances against one another in order to protect or enlarge their possessions, their interests and their "spheres of influence" in these Asiatic states; these alliances will be "interimperialist," or "ultraimperialist" alliances. Let us assume that *all* the imperialist countries conclude an alliance for the "peaceful" division of these parts of Asia; this alliance would be an alliance of "internationally united finance capital." There are actual examples of alliances of this kind in the history of the twentieth century, for instance, the attitude of the powers to China. We ask, is it "conceivable," assuming that the capitalist system remains intact — and this is precisely the assumption that Kautsky does make — that such alliances would be more than temporary, that they would eliminate friction, conflicts and struggle in every possible form?

It is sufficient to state this question clearly to make it impossible for any reply to be given other than in the negative; for any other basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, of interests, of colonies, etc., than a calculation of the *strength* of the participants in the division, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc., is *in*conceivable. And the strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, for the *even* development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry, or countries is impossible under capitalism. Half a century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant country, as far as her capitalist strength was concerned, compared with the strength of England at that time; Japan was the same compared with Russia. Is it "conceivable" that in ten or twenty years' time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained *un*changed? Absolutely inconceivable.

Therefore, in the realities of the capitalist system, and not in the banal philistine fantasies of English parsons, or of the German "Marxist," Kautsky, "interimperialist" or "ultraimperialist" alliances, no matter what form they may assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing *all* the imperialist powers, are *in*evitably nothing more than a "truce" in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars; the one conditions the other, giving rise to alternating forms of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle out of *one and the same* basis of imperialist connections and relations within world economics and world politics.

MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI (1869-1948)

Mohandas K Gandhi, later called Mahatma (for "great soul"), was born of parents in the merchant-class caste in the city of Porbandar on the western coast of India in 1869. His education in India was followed by the study of law in London where he was admitted to the English bar in 1889. He pursued an unsuccessful law practice in India for two years, then went to South Africa in 1893 where his legal practice flourished and he became the leader of the Indian community in a fight against laws which discriminated against Indians. He devoted more and more time to this cause and read a great deal of Tolstoi, Ruskin and the Bhagavad-Gita. Then, in 1905, he decided to give up his western ways. He dressed in loinclothe and shawl, avoided material possessions and practiced celibacy. More importantly, he developed the idea of Satyagraha, or "truth-force", which became the cornerstone of his concept of non-violent methods for bringing about social change.

In 1906 the government of the Transvaal in South Africa introduced a bill requiring all of the 12,500 Indians to be registered by fingerprinting, with fines and deportation as penalties for Indians who did not produce their certificates of registration upon demand from police officers. Under Gandhi's leadership Indians met together and protested the bill. When it was passed anyway, they took an oath to refuse to register and go to jail rather than conform to this attack on their religion, national honour and self-respect. Gandhi and many others went to jail. The government passed additional repressive measures - one, invalidating Hindu and Mohammedan marriages, rendered their children illegitimate and incapable of inheriting property; another was a heavy head-tax. Gandhi organized a succession of Satyagraha campaigns (all non-violent, disobeying some unjust law) including a march of 4,000 across forbidden borders. At the same time he took actions to indicate that he bore no hatred and was careful not to take vengeful action. In 1914 the government gave in and the Indians won all of their demands including the abolition of the head-tax, elimination of registration and validation of their marriages. Gandhi's booklet, Hind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule, was written in this period (1908). It contained the program and principles by which, some thirty years later, India would gain its independence from the British. Indian Home Rule has twenty chapters; the first selection is from Chapter XVII, Passive Resistance, which presents Gandhi's concept of Sataygraha.

In 1915 Gandhi returned to India where he was recognized as a national leader of the highest stature. From that time until 1942, when Great Britain proposed steps for Indian self-government, Gandhi organized a variety of satyagraha campaigns, became a leader in the Indian National Congress, and achieved world-renown as a religious figure and possibly the first person in history to bring about a major international change by the systematic application of non-violent resistance. Besides his non-violent civil disobedience marches, he engaged in long fasts to stop his followers' demonstrations when they got out of control and turned into violence. He demonstrated whenever possible his lack of wish to harm his opponents.

As the era of World War II approached he was often asked how he would meet the violence and destructiveness of the Axis powers. Our remaining selections show a remarkable consistency in his argument that even against Nazi aggression, aerial warfare, the atom bomb and programs of racial genocide, non-violent resistance and satyagraha were the best methods.

Gandhi's last years were plagued by the violence which took place between Hindus and Moslems as India, divided (against Gandhi's will) into Pakistan (Moslem) and India (predominantly Hindu) embarked on independence. He was shot to death in 1948 by a Hindu fanatic who felt that Gandhi was too sympathetic with the Moslems.

Gandhi's philosophy, from the beginning, was much more than a merely political device. It was based, in Gandhi's own words, upon a "severe condemnation" of 'modern civilization', and a call upon Indians to renounce western materialism, including its emphasis on machines, and return to their simple crafts, love, and moral/religious values. He argued that India had not been taken by British forces; that Indians themselves had sold their country to the British. True, the British had come to India for commercial profit, and had used force to establish their commerce, but they had succeeded only because Indians succumbed to the lure of materialism and cooperated with the British. His was an anti-materialistic value system deeply rooted in Hinduism.

HIND SWARAJ
OR
INDIAN HOME RULE

CHAPTER XVII
PASSIVE RESISTANCE

READER: Is there any historical evidence as to the success of what you have called soul-force or truth-force? No instance seems to have happened of any nation having risen through soul-force. I still think that the evil-doers will not cease doing evil without physical punishment.

EDITOR: The poet Tulsidas has said: "Of religion, pity, or love, is the root, as egotism of the body. Therefore, we should not abandon pity so long as we are alive." This appears to me to be a scientific truth. I believe in it as much as I believe in two and two being four. The force of love is the same as the force of the soul or truth. We have evidence of its working at every step. The universe would disappear without the existence of that force. But you ask for historical evidence. It is, therefore, necessary to know what history means. The Gujarati equivalent means: "It so happened". If that is the meaning of history, it is possible to give copious evidence. But, if it means the doings of kings and emperors, there can be no evidence of soul-force or passive resistance in such history. You cannot expect silver ore in a tin mine. History, as we know it, is a record of the wars of the world, and so there is a proverb among Englishmen that a nation which has no history, that is, no wars, is a happy nation. How kings played, how they became enemies of one another, how they murdered one another, is found accurately recorded in history, and if this were all that had happened in the world, it would have been ended long ago. If the story of the universe had commenced with wars, not a man would have been found alive today. Those people who have been warred against have disappeared as, for instance, the natives of Australia of whom hardly a man was left alive by the intruders. Mark, please, that these natives did not use soul-force in self-defence, and it does not require much foresight to know that the Australians will share the same fate as their victims. "Those that take the sword shall perish by the sword." With us the proverb is that professional swimmers will find a watery grave.

The fact that there are so many men still alive in the world shows that it is based not on the force of arms but on the force of truth or love. Therefore, the greatest and most unimpeachable evidence of the success of this force is to be found in the fact that, in spite of the wars of the world, it still lives on.

Thousands, indeed tens of thousands, depend for their existence on a very active working of this force. Little quarrels of millions of families in their daily lives disappear before the exercise of this force. Hundreds of nations live in peace. History does not and cannot take note of this fact. History is really a record of every interruption of the even working of the force of love or of the soul. Two brothers quarrel; one of them repents and re-awakens the love that was lying dormant in him; the two again begin to live in peace; nobody takes note of this. But if the two brothers, through the intervention of solicitors or some other reason take up arms or go to law—which is another form of the exhibition of brute force,—their doings would be immediately noticed in the press, they would be the talk of their neighbours and would probably go down to history. And what is true of families and communities is true of nations. There is no reason to believe that there is one law for families and another for nations. History, then, is a record of an interruption of the course of nature. Soul-force, being natural, is not noted in history.

READER: According to what you say, it is plain that instances of this kind of passive resistance are not to be found in history. It is necessary to understand this passive resistance more fully. It will be better, therefore, if you enlarge upon it.

EDITOR: Passive resistance is a method of securing rights by personal suffering; it is the reverse of resistance by arms. When I refuse to do a thing that is repugnant to my conscience, I use soul-force. For instance, the Government of the day has passed a law which is applicable to me. I do not like it. If by using violence I force the Government to repeal the law, I am employing what may be termed body-force. If I do not obey the law and accept the penalty for its breach, I use soul-force. It involves sacrifice of self.

Everybody admits that sacrifice of self is infinitely superior to sacrifice of others. Moreover, if this kind of force is used in a cause that is unjust, only the person using it suffers. He does not make others suffer for his mistakes. Men have before now done many things which were subsequently found to have been wrong. No man can claim that he is absolutely in the right or that a particular thing is wrong because he thinks so, but it is wrong for him so long as that is his deliberate judgement. It is therefore meet that he should not do that which he knows to be wrong, and suffer the consequence whatever it may be. This is the key to the use of soul-force.

READER: You would then disregard laws—this is rank disloyalty. We have always been considered a law-abiding nation. You seem to be going even beyond the extremists. They say that we must obey

the laws that have been passed, but that if the laws be bad, we must drive out the law-givers even by force.

EDITOR: Whether I go beyond them or whether I do not is a matter of no consequence to either of us. We simply want to find out what is right and to act accordingly. The real meaning of the statement that we are a law-abiding nation is that we are passive resisters. When we do not like certain laws, we do not break the heads of law-givers but we suffer and do not submit to the laws. That we should obey laws whether good or bad is a newfangled notion. There was no such thing in former days. The people disregarded those laws they did not like and suffered the penalties for their breach. It is contrary to our manhood if we obey laws repugnant to our conscience. Such teaching is opposed to religion and means slavery. If the Government were to ask us to go about without any clothing, should we do so? If I were a passive resister, I would say to them that I would have nothing to do with their law. But we have so forgotten ourselves and become so compliant that we do not mind any degrading law.

A man who has realized his manhood, who fears only God, will fear no one else. Man-made laws are not necessarily binding on him. Even the Government does not expect any such thing from us. They do not say: "You must do such and such a thing," but they say: "If you do not do it, we will punish you." We are sunk so low that we fancy that it is our duty and our religion to do what the law lays down. If man will only realize that it is unmanly to obey laws that are unjust, no man's tyranny will enslave him. This is the key to self-rule or home-rule.

It is a superstition and ungodly thing to believe that an act of a majority binds a minority. Many examples can be given in which acts of majorities will be found to have been wrong and those of minorities to have been right. All reforms owe their origin to the initiation of minorities in opposition to majorities. If among a band of robbers a knowledge of robbing is obligatory, is a pious man to accept the obligation? So long as the superstition that men should obey unjust laws exists, so long will their slavery exist. And a passive resister alone can remove such a superstition.

To use brute force, to use gunpowder, is contrary to passive resistance, for it means that we want our opponent to do by force that which we desire but he does not. And if such a use of force is justifiable, surely he is entitled to do likewise by us. And so we should never come to an agreement. We may simply fancy, like the blind horse moving in a circle round a mill, that we are making progress. Those who believe that they are not bound to obey laws which are repugnant to their conscience have only the remedy of passive resistance open to them. Any other must lead to disaster.

READER : From what you say I deduce that passive resistance is a splendid weapon of the weak, but that when they are strong they may take up arms.

EDITOR: This is gross ignorance. Passive resistance, that is, soul-force, is matchless. It is superior to the force of arms. How, then, can it be considered only a weapon of the weak? Physical-force men are strangers to the courage that is requisite in a passive resister. Do you believe that a coward can ever disobey a law that he dislikes? Extremists are considered to be advocates of brute force. Why do they, then, talk about obeying laws? I do not blame them. They can say nothing else. When they succeed in driving out the English and they themselves become governors, they will want you and me to obey their laws. And that is a fitting thing for their constitution. But a passive resister will say he will not obey a law that is against his conscience, even though he may be blown to pieces at the mouth of a cannon.

What do you think? Wherein is courage required—in blowing others to pieces from behind a cannon, or with a smiling face to approach a cannon and be blown to pieces? Who is the true warrior —he who keeps death always as a bosom-friend, or he who controls the death of others? Believe me that a man devoid of courage and manhood can never be a passive resister.

This however, I will admit: that even a man weak in body is capable of offering this resistance. One man can offer it just as well as millions. Both men and women can indulge in it. It does not require the training of an army; it needs no jiu-jitsu. Control over the mind is alone necessary, and when that is attained, man is free like the king of the forest and his very glance withers the enemy.

Passive resistance is an all-sided sword, it can be used anyhow; it blesses him who uses it and him against whom it is used. Without drawing a drop of blood it produces far-reaching results. It never rusts and cannot be stolen. Competition between passive resisters does not exhaust. The sword of passive resistance does not require a scabbard. It is strange indeed that you should consider such a weapon to be a weapon merely of the weak.

Mechanical Warfare and Non-violence

"It has been objected, however," said Gandhiji, "that non-violence is all right in the case of . . . . . personal contact between the individual and his persecutors, but . . . The person who rains death from above has never any chance of even knowing who and how many he has killed. How can non-violence combat aerial warfare, seeing that there are no personal contacts? The reply to this is that behind the death-dealing bomb there is the human hand that releases it, and behind that still is the human heart that sets the hand in motion. And at the back of the policy of terrorism is the assumption that terrorism if applied in a sufficient measure will produce the desired result, namely, bend the adversary to the tyrant's will. But supposing a people make up their mind that they will never do the tyrant's will, nor retaliate with the tyrant's own methods, the tyrant will not find it worth his while to go on with his terrorism. If sufficient food is given to the tyrant, a time will come when he will have had more than surfeit. If all the mice in the world held conference together and resolved that they would no more fear the cat but all run into her mouth, the mice would live. I have actually seen a cat play with a mouse. She did not kill it outright but held it between her jaws, then released it, and again pounced upon it as soon as it made an effort to escape. In the end the mouse died out of sheer fright. The cat would have derived no sport, if the mouse had not tried to run away. I learnt the lesson of non-violence from my wife, when I tried to bend her to my will. Her determined resistance to my will on the one hand, and her quiet submission to the suffering my stupidity involved on the other, ultimately made me ashamed of myself, and cured me of my stupidity in thinking that I was born to rule over her, and in the end she became my teacher in non-violence. And what I did in South Africa was but an extension of the rule of Satyagraha which she unwillingly practised in her own person."

What about Dictatorships?

But one of the visitors objected: "You do not know Hitler and Mussolini. They are incapable of any kind of moral response. They have no conscience, and they have made themselves impervious to world opinion. Would it not be playing into the hands of these dictators if, for instance, the Czechs, following your advice, confronted them with non-violence? Seeing that dictatorships are unmoral by definition, would the law of moral conversion hold good in their case?"

"Your argument," replied Gandhiji, "presupposes that the dictators like Mussolini or Hitler are beyond redemption. But belief in non-violence is based on the assumption that human nature in its essence is one and therefore unfailingly responds to the advances of love. It should be remembered that they have up to now always found ready response to the violence that they have used. Within their experience, they have not come across organized non-violent resistance on an appreciable scale, if at all. Therefore it is not only highly likely, but I hold it to be inevitable, that they would recognize the superiority of non-violent resistance over any display of violence that they may be capable of putting forth. Moreover the non-violent technique that I have presented to the Czechs does not depend for its success on the goodwill of the dictators, for, a non-violent resister depends upon the unfailing assistance of God which sustains him throughout difficulties which would otherwise be considered insurmountable. His faith makes him indomitable."

The visitor retorted that these dictators wisely refrain from using force, but simply take possession of what they want. In the circumstances what can non-violent resisters do?

"Suppose," replied Gandhiji, "they come and occupy mines, factories and all sources of natural wealth belonging to the Czechs, then the following results can take place: (1) The Czechs may be annihilated for disobedience to orders. That would be a glorious victory for the Czechs and the beginning of the fall of Germany. (2) The Czechs might become demoralized in the presence of overwhelming force. This is a result common in all struggles. But if demoralization does take place, it would not be on account of non-violence, but it would be due to absence or inadequacy of non-violence. (3) The third thing that can take place is that Germany might use her new possessions for occupation by her surplus population. This, again, could not be avoided by offering violent resistance, for we have assumed that violent resistance is out of the question. Thus non-violent resistance is the best method under all conceivable circumstances.

"I do not think that Hitler and Mussolini are after all so very indifferent to the appeal of world opinion. But today these dictators feel satisfaction in defying world opinion because none of the so-called Great Powers can come to them with clean hands, and they have a rankling sense of injustice done to their people by the Great Powers in the past. Only the other day an esteemed English friend owned to me that Nazi Germany was England's sin, and that it was the treaty of Versailles that made Hitler."

Visitor: "What can I as a Christian do to contribute to international peace? How can international anarchy be broken down and non-violence made effective for establishing peace? Subject nations apart, how can nations at the top be made to disarm themselves?"

Gandhiji: "You as a Christian can make an effective contribution by non-violent action even though it may cost you your all. Peace will never come until the Great Powers courageously decide to disarm themselves. It seems to me that recent events must force that belief on the Great Powers. I have an implicit faith—a faith that today burns brighter than ever, after half a century's experience of people who can defend themselves violently or non-violently. Non-violent defence presupposes recklessness about one's life and property. If it is persisted in, it will in the end be a sure cure for *goondaism*. But non-violence cannot be learnt in a day. It requires practice. You can commence to learn it from now. You must be ready to lose your life or property or both. But that is implied in the art of non-violence. If you do not know how to defend yourself either way, the government will not be able to save you in spite of its best effort. No government, however powerful it may be, can without the active co-operation of the people. If even God only helps those who will help themselves, how much more true it must be of perishable governments! Do not lose nerve and think that tomorrow there will be no government and it will be all anarchy. You can be the government now, and you certainly will be in the contingency you contemplate or you will perish."

Sevagram, 4-6-'40

Harijan, 8-6-1940

Arabs, Jews and Palestine

Several letters have been received by me asking me to declare my views about the Arab-Jew question in Palestine and the persecution of the Jews in Germany. It is not without hesitation that I venture to offer my views on this very difficult question.

My sympathies are all with the Jews. I have known them intimately in South Africa. Some of them became life-long companions. Through these friends I came to learn much of their age-long persecution. They have been the untouchables of Christianity. The parallel between their treatment by Christians and the treatment of untouchables by Hindus is very close. Religious sanction has been invoked in both cases for the justification of the inhuman treatment meted out to them. Apart from the friendships, therefore, there is the more common universal reason for my sympathy for the Jews.

But my sympathy does not blind me to the requirements of justice. The cry for the national home for the Jews does not make much appeal to me. The sanction for it is sought in the Bible and the tenacity with which the Jews have hankered after return to Palestine. Why should they not, like other peoples of the earth, make that country their home where they are born and where they earn their livelihood?

Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs. What is going on in Palestine today cannot be justified by any moral code of conduct. The mandates have no sanction but that of the last war. Surely it would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews partly or wholly as their national home.

The nobler course would be to insist on a just treatment of the Jews wherever they are born and bred. The Jews born in France are French in precisely the same sense that Christians born in France are French. If the Jews have no home but Palestine, will they relish the idea of being forced to leave the other parts of the world in which they are settled? Or do they want a double home where they can remain at will? This cry for the national home affords a colourable justification for the German expulsion of the Jews.

But the German persecution of the Jews seems to have no parallel in history. The tyrants of old never went so mad as Hitler seems to have gone. And he is doing it with religious zeal. For, he is propounding a new religion of exclusive and militant nationalism in the name of which any inhumanity becomes an act of humanity to be rewarded here and hereafter. The crime of an obviously mad but intrepid youth is being visited upon his whole race with unbelievable ferocity. If there ever could be a justifiable war in the name of and for humanity, a war against Germany, to prevent the wanton persecution of a whole race, would be completely justified. But I do not believe in any war. A discussion of the pros and cons of such a war is, therefore, outside my horizon or province. . . .

Can the Jews resist this organized and shameless persecution? Is there a way to preserve their self-respect, and not to feel helpless, neglected and forlorn? I submit there is. No person who has faith in a living God need feel helpless or forlorn. Jehovah of the Jews is a God more personal than the God of the Christians, the Musalmans or the Hindus, though as a matter of fact, in essence, He is common to all and one without a second and beyond description. But as the Jews attribute personality to God and believe that He rules every action of theirs, they ought not to feel helpless. If I were a Jew and were born in Germany and earned my livelihood there, I would claim Germany as my home even as the tallest gentile German might, and challenge him to shoot me or cast me in the dungeon; I would refuse to be expelled or to submit to discriminating treatment. And for doing this I should not wait for the fellow Jews to join me in civil resistance, but would have confidence that in the end the rest were bound to follow my example. If one Jew or all the Jews were to accept the prescription here offered, he or they cannot be worse off than now. And suffering voluntarily undergone will bring them an inner strength and joy which no number of resolutions of sympathy passed in the world outside Germany can. Indeed, even if Britain, France and America were to declare hostilities against Germany, they can bring no inner joy, no inner strength. The calculated violence of Hitler may even result in a general massacre of the Jews by way of his first answer to the declaration of such hostilities. But if the Jewish mind could be prepared for voluntary suffering, even the massacre I have imagined could be turned into a day of thanksgiving and joy that Jehovah had wrought deliverance of the race even at the hands of the tyrant. For to the God-fearing, death has no terror. It is a joyful sleep to be followed by a waking that would be all the more refreshing for the long sleep.

. . . . the Jews of Germany can offer Satyagraha under infinitely better auspices than the Indians of South Africa. The Jews are a compact, homogeneous community in Germany. They are far more gifted than the Indians of South Africa. And they have organized world opinion behind them. I am convinced that, if someone with courage and vision can arise among them to lead them in non-violent action, the winter of their despair can in the twinkling of an eye be turned into the summer of hope. And what has today become a degrading man-hunt can be turned into a calm and determined stand offered by unarmed men and women possessing the strength of suffering given to them by Jehovah. It will be then a truly religious resistance offered against the godless fury of dehumanized man. The German Jews will score a lasting victory over the German gentiles in the sense that they will have converted the latter to an appreciation of human dignity. They will have rendered service to fellow-Germans and proved their title to be the real Germans as against those who are today dragging, however unknowingly, the German name into the mire. . . .

I am not defending the Arab excesses. I wish they had chosen the way of non-violence in resisting what they rightly regarded as an unwarrantable encroachment upon their country. But according to the accepted canons of right and wrong, nothing can be said against the Arab resistance in the face of overwhelming odds.

Let the Jews who claim to be the chosen race prove their title by choosing the way of non-violence for vindicating their position on earth. Every country is their home including Palestine not by aggression but by loving service.

TO EVERY BRITON

In 1896 I addressed an appeal to every Briton in South Africa on behalf of my countrymen who had gone there as labourers or traders and their assistants. It had its effect. However important it was from my viewpoint, the cause which I pleaded then was insignificant compared with the cause which prompts this appeal. I appeal to every Briton, wherever he may be now, to accept the method of non-violence instead of that of war, for the adjustment of relations between nations and other matters. Your statesmen have declared that this is a war on behalf of democracy. There are many other reasons given in justification. You know them all by heart. I suggest that, at the end of the war, whichever way it ends, there will be no democracy left to represent democracy. This war has descended upon mankind as a curse and a warning. It is a curse inasmuch as it is brutalizing man on a scale hitherto unknown. All distinctions between combatants and non-combatants have been abolished. No one and nothing is to be spared. Lying has been reduced to an art. Britain was to defend small nationalities. One by one they have vanished, at least for the time being. It is also a warning. It is a warning that, if nobody reads the writing on the wall, man will be reduced to the state of the beast, whom he is shaming by his manners. I read the writing when the hostilities broke out. But I had not the courage to say the word. God has given me the courage to say it before it is too late.

I appeal for cessation of hostilities, not because you are too exhausted to fight, but because war is bad in essence. You want to kill Nazism. You will never kill it by its indifferent adoption. Your soldiers are doing the same work of destruction as the Germans. The only difference is that perhaps yours are not as thorough as the Germans. If that be so, yours will soon acquire the same thoroughness as theirs, if not much greater. On no other condition can you win the war. In other words, you will have to be more ruthless than the Nazis. No cause, however just, can warrant the indiscriminate slaughter that is going on minute by minute. I suggest that a cause that demands the inhumanities that are being perpetrated today cannot be called just.

I do not want Britain to be defeated, nor do I want her to be victorious in a trial of brute strength, whether expressed through the muscle or the brain. Your muscular bravery is an established fact. Need you demonstrate that your brain is also as unrivalled in destructive power as your muscle? I hope you do not wish to enter into such an undignified competition with the Nazis. I venture to present you with a nobler and a braver way, worthy of the bravest soldier. I want you to fight Nazism without arms, or, if I am to retain the military terminology, with non-violent arms. I would like you to lay down the arms you have as being useless for saving you or humanity. You will invite Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to take what they want of the countries you call your possessions. Let them take possession of your beautiful island, with your many beautiful buildings. You will give all these but neither your souls, nor your minds. If these gentlemen choose to occupy your homes, you will vacate them. If they do not give you free passage out, you will allow yourselves man, woman and child, to be slaughtered, but you will refuse to owe allegiance to them.

This process or method, which I have called non-violent non-co-operation, is not without considerable success in its use in India. Your representatives in India may deny my claim. If they do, I shall feel sorry for them. They may tell you that our non-co-operation was not wholly non-violent, that it was born of hatred. If they give that testimony, I will not deny it. Had it been wholly non-violent, if all the non-co-operators had been filled with goodwill towards you, I make bold to say that you who are India's masters would have become her pupils and, with much greater skill than we have, perfected this matchless weapon and met the German and Italian friends' menace with it. Indeed the history of Europe during the past few months would then have been written differently. Europe would have been spared seas of innocent blood, the rape of so many small nations, and the orgy of hatred.

This is no appeal made by a man who does not know his business. I have been practising with scientific precision non-violence and its possibilities for an unbroken period of over fifty years. I have applied it in every walk of life, domestic, institutional, economic and political. I know of no single case in which it has failed. Where it has seemed sometimes to have failed, I have ascribed it to my imperfections. I claim no perfection for myself. But I do claim to be a passionate seeker after Truth, which is but another name for God. In the course of that search the discovery of non-violence came to me. Its spread is my life mission. I have no interest in living except for the prosecution of that mission.

I claim to have been a lifelong and wholly disinterested friend of the British people. At one time I used to be also a lover of your empire. I thought that it was doing good to India. When I saw that in the nature of things it could do no good, I used, and am still using, the non-violent method to fight imperialism. Whatever the ultimate fate of my country, my love for you remains, and will remain, undiminished. My non-violence demands universal love, and you are not a small part of it. It is that love which has prompted my appeal to you.

May God give power to every word of mine. In His name I began to write this, and in His name I close it. May your statesmen have the wisdom and courage to respond to my appeal. I am telling His Excellency the Viceroy that my services are at the disposal of His Majesty's Government, should they consider them of any practical use in advancing the object of my appeal.

New Delhi, 2-7-'40

Harijan, 6-7-1940

HOW TO COMBAT HITLERISM

Whatever Hitler may ultimately prove to be, we know what Hitlerism has come to mean. It means naked ruthless force reduced to an exact science and worked with scientific precision. In its effect it becomes almost irresistible.

In the early days of Satyagraha when it was still known as passive resistance, *The Star* of Johannesburg, stirred by the sight of a handful of Indians, wholly unarmed and incapable of organized violence even if they wished it, pitting themselves against an overwhelmingly armed government, had a cartoon in which the latter was depicted as a steam-roller representing irresistible force, and passive resistance was depicted as an elephant unmoved and comfortably planting himself in his seat. This was marked immovable force. The cartoonist had a true insight into the duel between the irresistible and the immovable forces. It was then

a stalmate. The sequel we know. What was depicted and appeared to be irresistible was successfully resisted by the immovable force of Satyagraha—call it suffering without retaliation. . . .

But to resume the thread of the argument. What will Hitler do with his victory? Can he digest so much power? Personally he will go as empty-handed as his not very remote predecessor Alexander. For the Germans he will have left not the pleasure of owning a mighty empire but the burden of sustaining its crushing weight. For they will not be able to hold all the conquered nations in perpetual subjection. And I doubt if the Germans of future generations will entertain unadulterated pride in the deeds for which Hitlerism will be deemed responsible. They will honour Herr Hitler as a genius, as a brave man, a matchless organizer, and much more. But I should hope that the Germans of the future will have learnt the art of discrimination even about their heroes. Anyway I think it will be allowed that all the blood that has been spilled by Hitler has added not a millionth part of an inch to the world's moral stature.

As against this imagine the state of Europe today if the Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the French and the English had all said to Hitler: "You need not make your scientific preparation for destruction. We will meet your violence with non-violence. You will, therefore, be able to destroy our non-violent army without tanks, battleships and airships." It may be retorted that the only difference would be that Hitler would have got without fighting what he has gained after a bloody fight. Exactly. The history of Europe would then have been written differently. Possession might (but only might) have been then taken under non-violent resistance, as it has been taken now after perpetration of untold barbarities. Under non-violence only those would have been killed who had trained themselves to be killed, if need be, but without killing anyone and without bearing malice towards anybody. I dare say that in that case Europe would have added several inches to its moral stature. And in the end I expect it is the moral worth that will count. All else is dross.

I have written these lines for the European Powers. But they are meant for ourselves. If my argument has gone home, is it not time for us to declare our changeless faith in non-violence of the strong and say we do not seek to defend our liberty with the force of arms, but we will defend it with the force of non-violence?

Sevagram, 18-6-'40
Harijan, 22-6-1940

THE ATOM BOMB

There have been cataclysmic changes in the world. Do I still adhere to my faith in truth and non-violence? Has not the atom bomb exploded that faith? Not only has it not done so but it has clearly demonstrated to me that the twins constitute the mightiest force in the world. Before it the atom bomb is of no effect. The two opposing forces are wholly different in kind, the one moral and spiritual, the other physical and material. The one is infinitely superior to the other which by its very nature has an end. The force of the spirit is ever progressive and endless. Its full expression makes it unconquerable in the world. In saying this I know that I have said nothing new. I merely bear witness to the fact. What is more, that force resides in everybody, man, woman, and child, irrespective of the colour of the skin. Only in many it lies dormant, but it is capable of being awakened by judicious training.

It is further to be observed that without the recognition of this truth and due effort to realize it, there is no escape from self-destruction. The remedy lies in every individual training himself for self-expression in every walk of life, irrespective of response by the neighbours.

Harijan, 10-2-1946

ATOM BOMB AND AHIMSA

It has been suggested by American friends that the atom bomb will bring in *ahimsa* (non-violence) as nothing else can. It will, if it is meant that its destructive power will so disgust the world that it will turn it away from violence for the time being. This is very like a man glutting himself with dainties to the point of nausea and turning away from them only to return with redoubled zeal after the effect of nausea is well over. Precisely in the same manner will the world return to violence with renewed zeal after the effect of disgust is worn out.

Often does good come out of evil. But that is God's, not man's plan. Man knows that only evil can come out of evil, as good out of good.

That atomic energy though harnessed by American scientists and army men for destructive purposes may be utilized by other scientists for humanitarian purposes is undoubtedly within the realm of possibility. But that is not what was meant by my American friends. They were not so simple as to put a question which connoted an obvious truth. An incendiary uses fire for his destructive and nefarious purpose, a housewife makes daily use of it in preparing nourishing food for mankind.

So far as I can see, the atomic bomb has deadened the finest feeling that has sustained mankind for ages. There used to be the so-called laws of war which made it tolerable. Now we know the naked truth. War knows no law except that of might. The atom bomb brought an empty victory to the allied arms but it resulted for the time being in destroying the soul of Japan. What has happened to the soul of the destroying nation is yet too early to see. Forces of nature act in a mysterious manner. We can but solve the mystery by deducing the unknown result from the known results of similar events. A slave-holder cannot hold a slave without putting himself or his deputy in the cage holding the slave. Let no one run away with the idea that I wish to put in a defence of Japanese misdeeds in pursuance of Japan's unworthy ambition. The difference was only one of degree. I assume that Japan's greed was more unworthy. But the greater unworthiness conferred no right on the less unworthy of destroying without mercy men, women and children of Japan in a particular area.

The moral to be legitimately drawn from the supreme tragedy of the bomb is that it will not be destroyed by counter-bombs even as violence cannot be by counter-violence. Mankind has to get out of violence only through non-violence. Hatred can be overcome only by love. Counter-hatred only increases the surface as well as the depth of hatred. I am aware that I am repeating what I have many times stated before and practised to the best of my ability and capacity. What I first stated was itself nothing new. It was as old as the hills. Only I recited no copy-book maxim but definitely announced what I believed in every fibre of my being. Sixty years of practice in various walks of life has only enriched the belief which experience of friends has fortified. It is however the central truth by which one can stand alone without flinching. I believe in what Max Muller said years ago, namely that truth needed to be repeated as long as there were men who disbelieved it.

Poona, 1-7-'46
Harijan, 7-7-1946

Benito Mussolini, dictator of Italy's Fascist Corporative State from 1928 to 1945, was born in Dovia, Italy in 1883.His father, an ardent socialist, was a blacksmith; his mother a schoolteacher. At 14 he was sent to a school run by the Salesian Friars, but was expelled when he rebelled against its strict discipline. He studied at a normal school, earned a degree and got a job teaching in an elementary school. But then he went to Switzerland in 1902 to avoid military service. He earned his living as a workman but was often in trouble with police for vagrancy or fighting. In 1904 he returned to Italy, did his military service and then taught school in 1907 and 1908. In 1909 he moved north to Trent, where he became editor of a Socialist newspaper, and wrote several literary works. He was expelled from Austria for advocating that Trent, which had always been Italian in language and culture but was then in Austria, should become part of Italy.He returned to Italy and in 1912 became the editor of the leading Socialist newspaper in Italy, Avanti. During those years he advocated armed insurrection and authoritarian rule. When World War I came, he turned strongly towards Italian nationalism. He angered the Socialist party, which opposed all participation in nationalist wars, by urging immediate entry into the war against Germany. He was expelled from the Socialist party in November, 1914 and from his editorship. He immediately founded a daily newspaper of his own, Il Popolo d'Italia, which was subsidized by the French who wanted Italy to join the war on their side. Mussolini published strong violent editorials in the effort to drive Italy into the war. When Italy did enter the war in May, 1915, Mussolini enlisted in the army. He became a corporal and served in the trenches from September 1915 to February 1917 when he was wounded.

In the unsettled period following World War I Mussolini organized a group of nationalistic, anti-Socialist, anti-Communist followers, mostly war veterans, into the first"fascist" organization, Fasci di combattimento, in March 1919. The Fascists adopted the black-shirted uniforms worn by troops of nationalist poet and irridentist, Gabriele D'Annuzio in September of that year when he captured Fiume in the name of Italy. Mussolini preached forcible restoration of order in answer to the strikes, parliamentary breakdown and social unrest which prevailed. He called upon the Italian people to bring back the glories of ancient Rome. He outlined a program of economic reorganization (the Fascist corporative state) which would appeal to the propertied classes. In the meantime his blackshirts practiced terrorism in armed groups. In 1921 he was elected to parliament and the National Fascist party was organized. In October 1922 his Fascist troops marched on Rome. The weak king, Victor Emmanuel III let them enter the city, and asked Mussolini, who had stayed behind in Milan, to form a government. The new premier soon became a dictator. Opposition was put down by secret police and Fascist militia, the press was regimented, and parliamentary government ended in 1928 when the state economy was re-organized along lines of the Fascist corporative state. Mussolini was called 'Il Duce' (the leader), and he brought great excitement to' Italian nationalists with grandiloquent speeches re-calling Rome's glory, and by outlining imperialistic aims, erecting monumental buildings and encouraging a high Italian birthrate. In 1935 and 1936 he conquered Ethiopia, a backward north-African nation still using bows and arrows, by mowing down the opposition with machine-gun fire. In 1936-9 he helped the fascist Spanish General Franco to victory over the elected popular front government in the Spanish Civil War. Mussolini entered World War II in June 1940, as Germany was completing the downfall of France; at that point Italy invaded southern France and France surrendered. Italian armies met a series of disasters - in Africa, Greece and Italy itself - in the remaining years of the war, until Italy was in effect being supported by the German armies through dictates of Hitler. In June 1943 the Grand Fascist Council asked the King to dismiss Mussolini and had him arrested and imprisoned. Two months later he was rescued and became head of a Fascist puppet government in northern Italy set up by Hitler. When Germany collapsed in 1945, Mussolini was captured, tried, shot with his mistress and hung upside down with her in a public square in Milan.

FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS

Like all sound political conceptions, Fascism is action and it is thought; action in which doctrine is immanent, and doctrine arising from a given system of historical forces in which it is inserted, and working on them from within (1). It has therefore a form correlated to contingencies of time and space; but it has also an ideal content which makes it an expression of truth in the higher region of the history of thought (2). There is no way of exercising a spiritual influence in the world as a human will dominating the will of others, unless one has a conception both of the transient and the specific reality on which that action is to be exercised, and of the permanent and universal reality in which the transient dwells and has its being. To know men one must know man; and to know man one must be acquainted with reality and its laws. There can be no conception of the State which is not fundamentally a conception of life: philosophy or intuition, system of ideas evolving within the framework of logic or concentrated in a vision or a faith, but always, at least potentially, an organic conception of the world.

Thus many of the practical expressions of Fascism — such as party organisation, system of education, discipline — can only be understood when considered in relation to its general attitude toward life. A spiritual attitude (3). Fascism sees in the world not only those superficial, material aspects in which man appears as an individual, standing by himself, self-centred, subject to natural law which instinctively urges him toward a life of selfish momentary pleasure; it sees not only the individual but the nation and the country; individuals and generations bound together by a moral law, with common traditions and a mission which suppressing the instinct for life closed in a brief circle of pleasure, builds up a higher life, founded on duty, a life free from the limitations of time and space, in which the individual, by self-sacrifice, the renunciation of self-interest, by death itself, can achieve that purely spiritual existence in which his value as a man consists.

The conception is therefore a spiritual one, arising from the general reaction of the century against the flacid materialistic positivism of the XIXth century. Anti-positivistic but positive; neither sceptical nor agnostic; neither pessimistic nor supinely optimistic as are, generally speaking, the doctrines (all negative) which place the centre of life outside man; whereas, by the exercise of his free will, man can and must create his own world.

Fascism wants man to be active and to engage in action with all his energies; it wants him to be manfully aware of the difficulties besetting him and ready to face them. It conceives of life as a struggle in which it behoves a man to win for himself a really worthy place, first of all by fitting himself (physically, morally, intellectually) to become the implement required for winning it. As for the individual, so for the nation, and so for mankind (4). Hence the high value of culture in all its forms (artistic, religious, scientific) (5), and the outstanding importance of education. Hence also the essential value of work, by which man subjugates nature and creates the human world (economic, political, ethical, intellectual).

This positive conception of life is obviously an ethical one. It invests the whole field of reality as well as the human activities which master it. No action is exempt from moral judgement; no activity can be despoiled of the value which a moral purpose confers on all things. Therefore life, as conceived of by the Fascist, is serious, austere, religious; all its manifestations are poised in a world sustained by moral forces and subject to spiritual responsabilities. The Fascist disdains an "easy" life (6).

The Fascist conception of life is a religious one (7), in which man is viewed in his immanent relation to a higher law, endowed with an objective will transcending the individual and raising him to conscious membership of a spiritual society. Those who perceive nothing beyond opportunistic considerations in the religious policy of the Fascist régime fail to realise that Fascism is not only a system of government but also and above all a system of thought.

In the Fascist conception of history, man is man only by virtue of the spiritual process to which he contributes as a member of the family, the social group, the nation, and in function of history to which all nations bring their contribution. Hence the great value of tradition in records, in language, in customs, in the rules of social life (8). Outside history man is a nonentity. Fascism is therefore opposed to all individualistic abstractions based on eighteenth century materialism; and it is opposed to all Jacobinistic utopias and innovations. It does not believe in the possibility of "happiness" on earth as conceived by the economistic literature of the XVIIIth century, and it therefore rejects the teleological notion that at some future time the human

family will secure a final settlement of all its difficulties. This notion runs counter to experience which teaches that life is in continual flux and in process of evolution. In politics Fascism aims at realism; in practice it desires to deal only with those problems which are the spontaneous product of historic conditions and which find or suggest their own solutions (9). Only by entering in to the process of reality and taking possession of the forces at work within it, can man act on man and on nature (10).

Anti-individualistic, the Fascist conception of life stresses the importance of the State and accepts the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with those of the State, which stands for the conscience and the universal will of man as a historic entity (11). It is opposed to classical liberalism which arose as a reaction to absolutism and exhausted its historical function when the State became the expression of the conscience and will of the people. Liberalism denied the State in the name of the individual; Fascism reasserts the rights of the State as expressing the real essence of the individual (12). And if liberty is to be the attribute of living men and not of abstract dummies invented by individualistic liberalism, then Fascism stands for liberty, and for the only liberty worth having, the liberty of the State and of the individual within the State (13). The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. Thus understood, Fascism, is totalitarian, and the Fascist State — a synthesis and a unit inclusive of all values — interprets, develops, and potentiates the whole life of a people (14).

No individuals or groups (political parties, cultural associations, economic unions, social classes) outside the State (15). Fascism is therefore opposed to Socialism to which unity within the State (which amalgamates classes into a single economic and ethical reality) is unknown, and which sees in history nothing but the class struggle. Fascism is likewise opposed to trade-unionism as a class weapon. But when brought within the orbit of the State, Fascism recognises the real needs which gave rise to socialism and trade-unionism, giving them due weight in the guild or corporative system in which divergent interests are coordinated and harmonised in the unity of the State (16).

Grouped according to their several interests, individuals form classes; they form trade-unions when organised according to their several economic activities; but first and foremost they form the State, which is no mere matter of numbers, the sum of the individuals forming the majority. Fascism is therefore opposed to that form of democracy which equates a nation to the majority, lowering it to the level of the largest number (17); but it is the purest form of democracy if the nation be considered — as it should be — from the point of view of quality rather than quantity, as an idea, the mightiest because the most ethical, the most coherent, the truest, expressing itself in a people as the conscience and will of the few, if not, indeed, of one, and tending to express itself in the conscience and the will of the mass, of the whole group ethnically moulded by natural and historical conditions into a nation, advancing, as one conscience and one will, along the self-same line of development and spiritual formation (18). Not a race, nor a geographically defined region, but a people, historically perpetuating itself; a multitude unified by an idea and imbued with the will to live, the will to power, self-consciousness, personality (19).

In so far as it is embodied in a State, this higher personality becomes a nation. It is not the nation which generates the State; that is an antiquated naturalistic concept which afforded a basis for XIXth century publicity in favor of national governments. Rather is it the State which creates the nation, conferring volition and therefore real life on a people made aware of their moral unity.

The right to national independence does not arise from any merely literary and idealistic form of self-consciousness; still less from a more or less passive and unconscious *de facto* situation, but from an active, self-conscious, political will expressing itself in action and ready to prove its rights. It arises, in short, from the existence, at least *in fieri*, of a State. Indeed, it is the State which, as the expression of a universal ethical will, creates the right to national independence (20).

A nation, as expressed in the State, is a living, ethical entity only in so far as it is progressive. Inactivity is death. Therefore the State is not only Authority which governs and confers legal form and spiritual value on individual wills, but it is also Power which makes its will felt and respected beyond its own frontiers, thus affording practical proof of the universal character of the decisions necessary to ensure its development. This implies organisation and expansion, potential if not actual. Thus the State equates itself to the will of man, whose development cannot be checked by obstacles and which, by achieving self-expression, demonstrates its own infinity (21).

The Fascist State, as a higher and more powerful expression of personality, is a force, but a spiritual one. It sums up all the manifestations of the moral and intellectual life of man. Its functions cannot therefore be limited to those of enforcing order and keeping the peace, as the liberal doctrine had it. It is no mere mechanical device for defining the sphere within which the individual may duly exercise

his supposed rights. The Fascist State is an inwardly accepted standard and rule of conduct, a discipline of the whole person; it permeates the will no less than the intellect. It stands for a principle which becomes the central motive of man as a member of civilised society, sinking deep down into his personality; it dwells in the heart of the man of action and of the thinker, of the artist and of the man of science: soul of the soul (22).

Fascism, in short, is not only a law-giver and a founder of institutions, but an educator and a promoter of spiritual life. It aims at refashioning not only the forms of life but their content — man, his character, and his faith. To achieve this purpose it enforces discipline and uses authority, entering into the soul and ruling with undisputed sway. Therefore it has chosen as its emblem the Lictor's rods, the symbol of unity, strength, and justice.

Notes to the first chapter

1. Philosophic conception

(1) If Fascism does not wish to die or, worse still, commit suicide, it must now provide itself with a doctrine. Yet this shall not and must not be a robe of Nessus clinging to us for all eternity, for tomorrow is some thing mysterious and unforseen. This doctrine shall be a norm to guide political and individual action in our daily life.

I who have myself dictated this doctrine, am the first to realise that the modest tables of our laws and programme—the theoretical and practical guidance of Fascism—should be revised, corrected, enlarged, developped, because already in parts they have suffered injury at the hand of time. I believe the essence and fundamentals of the doctrine are still to be found in the postulates which throughout two years have acted as a call to arms for the recruits of Italian Fascism. However, in taking those first fundamental assumptions for a starting point, we must proceed to carry our programme into a vaster field.

Italian Fascists, one and all, should cooperate in this task, one of vital importance to Fascism, and more especially those who belong to regions where—with and without agreement—peaceful coexistence has been achieved between two antagonistic movements.

The word I am about to use is a great one, but indeed I do wish that during the two months which are still to elapse before our National Assembly meets, the philosophy of Fascism could be created. Milan is already contributing with the first Fascist school of propaganda.

It is not merely a question of gathering elements for a programme, to be used as a solid foundation for the constitution of a party which must inevitably arise from the Fascist movement; it is also a question of denying the silly tale that Fascism is all made up of violent men. In point of fact among Fascists there are many men who belong to the restless but meditative class.

The new course taken by Fascist activity will in no way diminish the fighting spirit typical of Fascism. To furnish the mind with doctrines and creeds does not mean to disarm, rather it signifies to strengthen our power of action, and make us ever more conscious of our work. Soldiers who fight fully conscious of the cause make the best of warriors. Fascism takes for its own the twofold device of Mazzini: «Thought and Action». (*Letter to Michele Bianchi,* written on August 27, 1921, for the opening of the School of Fascist Culture and Propaganda in Milan, in *Messaggi e Proclami*, Milano, Libreria d'Italia, 1929, p. 39).

Fascists must be placed in contact with one another, their activity must be an activity of doctrine, an activity of the spirit and of thought.....

Had our adversaries been present at our meeting, they would have been convinced that Fascism is not only action, but thought as well..... (Speech before the National Council of the Fascist Party, August 8, 1924, in *La Nuova Politica dell'Italia,* Milano, Alpes, 1928, p. 267).

(2) To-day I hold that Fascism as an idea, a doctrine, a realisation, is universal; it is Italian in its particular institutions, but it is universal in the spirit, nor could it be otherwise. The spirit is universal by reason of its nature. Therefore anyone may foresee a Fascist Europe drawing inspiration for her institutions from the doctrine and practice of Fascism; Europe, in other words, giving a Fascist turn to the solution of problems which beset the modern State, the Twentieth Century State which is very different from the States existing before 1789, and the States formed immediately after. To-day Fascism fills universal requirements, Fascism solves the threefold problem of relations between State and individual, between State and associations, between associations and organised associations. (Message for the year IX, October 27, 1930, in *Discorsi del 1930*, Milano, Alpes, 1931, p. 211).

2. Spiritualised conception

(3) This political process is flanked by a philosophic process; if it be true that matter was on the altars for one century, to-day it is the spirit which takes its place. All manifestations peculiar to the democratic spirit are consequently repudiated: easy-goingness, improvisation, the lack of a personal sense of responsibility, the exaltation of numbers and of that mysterious divinity called «The People». All creations of the spirit—starting with those religious—are coming to the fore, and nobody dares keep up the attitude of anticlericalism which, for several decades, was a favourite with Democracy in the Western world. By saying that God is returning, we mean that spiritual values are returning. (*Da che parte va il mondo,* in *Tempi della Rivoluzione Fascista,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 34).

There is a field reserved more to meditation upon the supreme ends of life than to a research of these ends. Consequently science starts from experience, but breaks out fatally into philosophy and, in my opinion, philosophy alone can enlighten science and lead to the universal idea. (To the Congress of Science at Bologna, October 31, 1926, in *Discorsi del 1926*, Milano, Alpes, 1927, p. 268).

In order to understand the Fascist movement one must first appreciate the underlying spiritual phenomenon in all its vastness and depth. The manifestations of the movement have been of a powerful and decisive nature, but one should go further. In point of fact Italian Fascism has not only been a political revolt against weak and incapable governments who had allowed State authority to decay and were threatening to arrest the progress of the country, but also a spiritual revolt against old ideas which had corrupted the sacred principles of religion, of faith, of country. Fascism, therefore, has been a revolt of the people. (Message to the British people; January 5, 1924, in *Messaggi e Proclami*, Milano, Libreria d'Italia, 1929, p. 107).

3. Positive conception of life as a struggle

(4) Struggle is at the origin of all things, for life is full of contrasts: there is love and hatred, white and black, day and night, good and evil; and until these contrasts achieve balance, struggle fatefully remains at the root of human nature. However, it is good for it to be so. To-day we can indulge in wars, economic battles, conflicts of

ideas, but if a day came to pass when struggle ceased to exist, that day would be tinged with melancholy; it would be a day of ruin, the day of ending. But that day will not come, because history ever discloses new horizons. By attempting to restore calm, peace, tranquillity, one would be fighting the tendencies of the present period of dynamism. One must be prepared for other struggles and for other surprises. Peace will only come when people surrender to a Christian dream of universal brotherhood, when they can hold out hands across the ocean and over the mountains. Personally I do not believe very much in these idealisms, but I do not exclude them for I exclude nothing. (At the Politeama Rossetti, Trieste, September 20, 1920; in *Discorsi Politici,* Milano, Stab. Tipografico del « Popolo d'Italia », 1921, p. 107).

(5) For me the honour of nations consists in the contribution they have severally made to human civilization. (E. LUDWIG, *Talks with Mussolini,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 199).

4. Ethical conception

(6) I called the organisation *Fasci Italiani di Combattimento.* This hard metallic name comprised the whole programme of Fascism, as I dreamed it, as I wished it, as I have made it!

Comrades, this is still our programme: fight.

Life for the Fascist, is a continuous, ceaseless fight, which we accept with ease, with great courage, with the necessary intrepidity. (On the VIIth anniversary of the Foundation of the *Fasci,* March 28, 1926, in *Discorsi del 1926,* Milano, Alpes, 1927, p. 98).

You touch the core of Fascist philosophy. When recently a Finnish philosopher asked me to expound to him the significance of Fascism in one sentence, I wrote in German: « We are against the "easy" life! ». (E. LUDWIG: *Talks with Mussolini,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 190).

5. Religious conception

(7) If Fascism were not a creed how could it endow its followers with courage and stoicism? Only a creed which has soared to the heights of religion can inspire such words as passed the lips, now lifeless alas, of Federico Florio. (*Legami di Sangue,* in *Diuturna,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 256).

6. Historical and realistic conception

(8) Tradition certainly is one of the greatest spiritual forces of a people, inasmuch as it is a successive and constant creation of their soul. (*Breve Preludio,* in *Tempi della Rivoluzione Fascista,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 13).

(9) Our temperament leads us to appraise the concrete aspect of problems, rather than their ideological or mystical sublimation. Therefore we easily regain our balance. (*Aspetti del Dramma,* in *Diuturna,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 86).

Our battle is an ungrateful one, yet it is a beautiful battle since it compels us to count only upon our own forces. Revealed truths we have torn to shreds, dogmas we have spat upon, we have rejected all theories of paradise, we have baffled charlatans—white, red, black charlatans who placed miraculous drugs on the market to give « happiness » to mankind. We do not believe in programmes, in plans, in saints or apostles, above all we believe not in happiness, in salvation, in the promised land. (*Diuturna,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 223).

We do not believe in a single solution, be it economical, political or moral, a linear solution of the problems of life, because—oh illustrious choristers from all the sacristies—life is not linear and can never be reduced to a segment traced by primordial needs. (*Navigare necesse,* in *Diuturna,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 233).

(10) We are not and do not wish to be motionless mummies, with faces perpetually turned towards the same horizon, nor do we wish to shut ourselves up within the narrow hedges of subversive bigotry, where formulas, like prayers of a professed religion, are muttered mechanically. We are men, living men, who wish to give our contribution, however modest, to the creation of history. (*Audacia,* in *Diuturna,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 11).

We uphold moral and traditional values which Socialism neglects or despises; but, above all, Fascism has a horror of anything implying an arbitrary mortgage on the mysterious future. (*Dopo due anni,* in *Diuturna,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 242).

In spite of the theories of conservation and renovation, of tradition and progress expounded by the right and the left, we do not cling desperately to the past as to a last board of salvation: yet we do not dash headlong into the seductive mists of the future. (*Breve preludio,* in *Diuturna,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 14).

Negation, eternal immobility, mean damnation. I am all for motion. I am one who marches on..... (E. LUDWIG, *Talks with Mussolini,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 203).

7. The individual and liberty

(11) We were the first to state, in the face of demoliberal individualism, that the individual exists only in so far as he is within the State and subjected to the requirements of the State and that, as civilisation assumes aspects which grow more and more complicated, individual freedom becomes more and more restricted. (To the General Staff Conference of Fascism, in *Discorsi del 1929,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 280).

The sense of the State grows within the consciousness of Italians, for they feel that the State alone is the irreplaceable safeguard of their unity and independence; that the State alone represents continuity into the future of their stock and their history. (Message on the VIIth anniversary, October 25, 1929, *Discorsi del 1929,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 300).

If, in the course of the past eight years, we have made such astounding progress, you may well think suppose and forsee that in the course of the next fifty or eighty years the onward trend of Italy, of this Italy we feel to be so powerful, so full of vital fluid, will really be grandiose. It will be so especially if concord lasts among citizens, if the State continues to be sole arbitrator in political and social conflicts, if all remains within the State and nothing outside the State, because it is impossible to conceive any individual existing outside the State unless he be a savage whose home is in the solitude of the sandy desert. (Speech before the Senate, May 12, 1928, in *Discorsi del 1928,* Milano, Alpes, 1929, p. 109).

Fascism has restored to the State its sovereign functions by claiming its absolute ethical meaning, against the egotism of classes and categories; to the Government of the State, which was reduced to a mere instrument of electoral assemblies, it has restored dignity, as representing the personality of the State and its power of Empire. It has rescued State administration from the weight of factions and party interests. (To the Council of State, December 22, 1928, in *Discorsi del 1928,* Milano, Alpes, 1929, p. 358).

(12) Let no one think of denying the moral character of Fascism, for I should be ashamed to speak from this tribune if I did not feel that I represent the moral and spiritual powers of the State. What would the State be if it did not possess a spirit of its own, and a morality of its own, which lend power to the laws in virtue of which the State is obeyed by its citizens?

..... The Fascist State claims its ethical character: it is Catholic but above all it is Fascist, in fact it is exclusively and essentially Fascist. Catholicism completes Fascism, and this we openly declare,

but let no one think they can turn the tables on us, under cover of metaphysics or philosophy. (To the Chamber of Deputies, May 13, 1929, in *Discorsi del 1929,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 182).

..... a State which is fully aware of its mission and represents a people which are marching on; a State which necessarily transforms the people even in their physical aspect. In order to be something more than a mere administrator, the State must utter great words, expound great ideas and place great problems before this people (*Discorsi del 1929,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 183).

(13) The concept of freedom is not absolute because nothing is ever absolute in life. Freedom is not a right, it is a duty. It is not a gift, it is a conquest; it is not equality, it is a privilege. The concept of freedom changes with the passing of time. There is a freedom in times of peace which is not the freedom of times of war. There is a freedom in times of prosperity which is not a freedom to be allowed in times of poverty. (Fifth anniversary of the foundation of the *Fasci di Combattimento*, March 24, 1924, in *La nuova politica dell'Italia,* vol. III, Milano, Alpes, 1925, p. 30).

In our State the individual is not deprived of freedom. In fact, he has greater liberty than an isolated man, because the State protects him and he is part of the State. Isolated man is without defence. (E. LUDWIG, *Talks with Mussolini,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 129).

(14) To-day we may tell the world of the creation of the powerful united State of Italy, ranging from the Alps to Sicily; this State is expressed by a well-organised, centralised, unitarian democracy, wherein people circulate at ease. Indeed, gentlemen, either you admit the people into the citadel of the State and the people will defend it or, if you close them out, the people will assault it. (Speech before the Chamber of Deputies, May 26, 1927, in *Discorsi del 1927,* Milano, Alpes, 1928, p. 159).

In the Fascist regime the unity of classes, the political, social and moral unity of the Italian people is realised within the State, and only within the Fascist State. (Speech before the Chamber of Deputies, December 9, 1928, in *Discorsi del 1928,* Milano, Alpes, 1929, p. 333).

8. Conception of a corporative State

(15) We have created the united State of Italy — remember that since the Empire Italy had not been a united State! Here I wish to reaffirm solemnly our doctrine of the State. Here I wish to reaffirm with no weaker energy, the formula I expounded at the Scala in Milan « everything in the State, nothing against the State, nothing outside the State ». (Speech before the Chamber of Deputies, May 26, 1927, *Discorsi del 1927,* Milano, Alpes, 1928, p. 157).

(16) We are, in other words, a State which controls all forces acting in nature. We control political forces, we control moral forces we control economic forces, therefore we are a full-blown Corporative State..... We stand for a new principle in the world, we stand for sheer, categorical, definitive antithesis to the world of democracy, plutocracy, free-masonry, to the world which still abides by the fundamental principles laid down in 1789. (Speech before the new National Directory of the Party, April 7, 1926, in *Discorsi del 1926,* Milano, Alpes, 1927, p. 120).

The Ministry of Corporations is not a bureaucratic organ, nor does it wish to exercise the functions of syndical organisations which are necessarily independent, since they aim at organising, selecting and improving the members of syndicates. The Ministry of Corporations is an institution in virtue of which, in the centre and outside, integral corporation becomes an accomplished fact, where balance is achieved between interests and forces of the economic world. Such a balance is only possible within the sphere of the State, because the State alone transcends the contrasting interests of groups and individuals, in view of co-ordinating them to achieve higher aims. The achievement of these aims is speeded up by the fact that all economic organisations, acknowledged, safeguarded and supported by the Corporative State, exist within the orbit of Fascism; in other terms they accept the conception of Fascism in theory and in practice. (Speech at the opening of the Ministry of Corporations, July 31, 1926, in *Discorsi del 1926,* Milano, Alpes, 1927, p. 250).

We have constituted a Corporative and Fascist State, the State of national society, a State which concentrates, controls, harmonises and tempers the interests of all social classes, which are thereby protected in equal measure. Whereas, during the years of demo-liberal regime, labour looked with diffidence upon the State, was, in fact, outside the State and against the State, and considered the State an enemy of every day and every hour, there is not one working Italian today who does not seek a place in his Corporation or federation, who does not wish to be a living atom of that great, immense, living organisation which is the national Corporate State of Fascism. (On the Fourth Anniversary of the March on Rome, October 28, 1926, in *Discorsi del 1926*, Milano, Alpes, 1927, p. 340).

9. Democracy

(17) The war was 'revolutionary, in the sense that—with streams of blood—it did away with the century of Democracy, the century of number, the century of majorities and of quantities. (*Da che parte va il Mondo,* in *Tempi della Rivoluzione Fascista,* Milano. Alpes, 1930, p. 37).

(18) Cf. note 13.

(19) Race: it is a feeling and not a reality; 95 % a feeling. (E. LUDWIG, *Talks with Mussolini,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 75).

10. Conception of the State

(20) A nation exists inasmuch as it is a people. A people rise inasmuch as they are numerous, hard-working and well-regulated. Power is the outcome of this threefold principle. (To the General Assembly of the Party, March 10, 1929, in *Discorsi del 1929,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 24).

Fascism does not deny the State; Fascism maintains that a civic society, national or imperial, cannot be conceived unless in the form of a State (*Stato, anti-Stato, Fascismo,* in *Tempi della Rivoluzione Fascista,* Milano, Alpes, 1930, p. 94).

For us the Nation is mainly spirit and not only territory. There are States which owned immense territories and yet left no trace in the history of mankind. Neither is it a question of number, because there have been, in history, small, microscopic States, which left immortal, imperishable documents in art and philosophy.

The greatness of a nation is the compound of all these virtues and conditions. A nation is great when the power of the spirit is translated into reality. (Speech at Naples, October 24, 1922, in *Discorsi della Rivoluzione*, Milano, Alpes, 1928, p. 103).

We wish to unify the nation within the sovereign State, which is above everyone and can afford to be against everyone, since it represents the moral continuity of the nation in history. Without the State there is no nation. There are, merely, human aggregations subject to all the disintegrations which history may inflict upon them (Speech before the National Council of the Fascist Party, August 8 1924, in *La Nuova Politica dell'Italia*, vol. III; Milano, Alpes, 1928, p. 269)

II. Dynamic reality

(21) I believe that..... if a people wish to live they should develop a will to power, otherwise they vegetate, live miserably and become prey to a stronger people, in whom this will to power is developped to a higher degree. (Speech to the Senate, May 28, 1926).

(22) It is Fascism which has refashioned the character of the Italians, removing impurity from our souls, tempering us to all sacrifices, restoring the true aspect of strength and beauty to our Italian face. (Speech delivered at Pisa, May 25, 1926, in *Discorsi del 1926*, Milano, Alpes, 1927, p. 193).

It is not out of place to illustrate the intrinsic character and profound significance of the Fascist Levy. It is not merely a ceremony, but a very important stage in the system of education and integral preparation of Italian men which the Fascist revolution considers one of the fundamental duties of the State: fundamental indeed, for if the State does not fulfill this duty or in any way accepts to place it under discussion, the State merely and simply forfeits its right to exist. (Speech before the Chamber of Deputies, May 28, 1928, in *Discorsi del 1928*, Milano, Alpes, 1929, p. 68).

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DOCTRINE

Fascism is now clearly defined not only as a régime but as a doctrine. This means that Fascism, exercising its critical faculties on itself and on others, has studied from its own special standpoint and judged by its own standards all the problems affecting the material and intellectual interests now causing such grave anxiety to the nations of the world, and is ready to deal with them by its own policies.

First of all, as regards the future development of mankind, — and quite apart from all present political considerations — Fascism does not, generally speaking, believe in the possibility or utility of perpetual peace. It therefore discards pacifism as a cloak for cowardly supine renunciation in contra-distinction to self-sacrifice. War alone keys up all human energies to their maximum tension and sets the seal of nobility on those peoples who have the courage to face it. All other tests are substitutes which never place a man face to face with himself before the alternative of life or death. Therefore all doctrines which postulate peace at all costs are incompatible with Fascism. Equally foreign to the spirit of Fascism, even if accepted as useful in meeting special political situations -- are all internationalistic or League superstructures which, as history shows, crumble to the ground whenever the heart of nations is deeply stirred by sentimental, idealistic or practical considerations. Fascism carries this anti-pacifistic attitude into the life of the individual. " I don't care a damn „ (*me ne frego*) — the proud motto of the fighting squads scrawled by a wounded man on his bandages, is not only an act of philosophic stoicism, it sums up a doctrine which is not merely political: it is evidence of a fighting spirit which accepts all risks. It signifies a new style of Italian life. The Fascist accepts and loves life; he rejects and despises suicide as cowardly. Life as he understands it means duty, elevation, conquest; life must be lofty and full, it must be lived for oneself but above all for others, both near bye and far off, present and future.

The population policy of the régime is the consequence of these premises. The Fascist loves his neighbor, but the word " neighbor " does not stand for some vague and unseizable conception. Love of one's neighbor does not exclude necessary educational severity; still less does it exclude differentiation and rank. Fascism will have nothing to do with universal embraces; as a member of the community of nations it looks other peoples straight in the eyes; it is vigilant and on its guard; it follows others in all their manifestations and notes any changes in their interests; and it does not allow itself to be deceived by mutable and fallacious appearances.

Such a conception of life makes Fascism the resolute negation of the doctrine underlying so-called scientific and Marxian socialism, the doctrine of historic materialism which would explain the history of mankind in terms of the class-struggle and by changes in the processes and instruments of production, to the exclusion of all else.

That the vicissitudes of economic life — discoveries of raw materials, new technical processes, scientific inventions — have their importance, no one denies; but that they suffice to explain human history to the exclusion of other factors is absurd. Fascism believes now and always in sanctity and heroism, that is to say in acts in which no economic motive — remote or immediate — is at work. Having denied historic materialism, which sees in men mere puppets on the surface of history, appearing and disappearing on the crest of the waves while in the depths the real directing forces move and work, Fascism also denies the immutable and irreparable character of the class struggle which is the natural outcome of this economic conception of history; above all it denies that the class struggle is the preponderating agent in social transformations. Having thus struck a blow at socialism in the two main points of its doctrine, all that remains of it is the sentimental aspiration — old as humanity itself — toward social relations in which the sufferings and sorrows of the humbler folk will be al-

leviated. But here again Fascism rejects the economic interpretation of felicity as something to be secured socialistically, almost automatically, at a given stage of economic evolution when all will be assured a maximum of material comfort. Fascism denies the materialistic conception of happiness as a possibility, and abandons it to the economists of the mid-eighteenth century. This means that Fascism denies the equation: well-being = happiness, which sees in men mere animals, content when they can feed and fatten, thus reducing them to a vegetative existence pure and simple.

After socialism, Fascism trains its guns on the whole block of democratic ideologies, and rejects both their premises and their practical applications and implements. Fascism denies that numbers, as such, can be the determining factor in human society; it denies the right of numbers to govern by means of periodical consultations; it asserts the irremediable and fertile and beneficent inequality of men who cannot be levelled by any such mechanical and extrinsic device as universal suffrage. Democratic régimes may be described as those under which the people are, from time to time, deluded into the belief that they exercise sovereignty, while all the time real sovereignty resides in and is exercised by other and sometimes irresponsible and secret forces.

Fascism has outgrown the dilemma: monarchy v. republic, over which democratic régimes too long dallied, attributing all insufficiences to the former and proning the latter as a régime of perfection, whereas experience teaches that some republics are inherently reactionary and absolutist while some monarchies accept the most daring political and social experiments.

In one of his philosophic Meditations Renan — who had pre-fascist intuitions — remarks:

" Reason and science are the products of mankind, but it is chimerical to seek reason directly for the people and through the people. It is not essential to the existence of reason that all should be familiar with it; and even if all had to be initiated, this could not be achieved through democracy which seems fated to lead to the extinction of all arduous forms of culture and all highest forms of learning. The maxim that society exists only for the well-being and freedom of the individuals composing it does not seem to be in conformity with nature's plans, which care only for the species and seem ready to sacrifice the individual. It is much to be feared that the last word of democracy thus understood (and let me hasten to add that it is susceptible of a different interpretation) would be a form of society in which a degenerate mass would have no thought beyond that of enjoying the ignoble pleasures of the vulgar ".

So far Renan. In rejecting democracy Fascism rejects the absurd conventional lie of political equalitarianism, the habit of collective irresponsibility, the myth of felicity and indefinite progress. But if democracy be understood as meaning a régime in which the masses are not driven back to the margin of the State, then the writer of these pages has already defined Fascism as an organised, centralised, authoritarian democracy.

Fascism is definitely and absolutely opposed to the doctrines of liberalism, both in the political and the economic sphere. The importance of liberalism in the XIXth century should not be exaggerated for present-day polemical purposes, nor should we make of one of the many doctrines which flourished in that century a religion for mankind for the present and for all time to come.

. . . . .

A party governing a nation " totalitarianly " is a new departure in history. There are no points of reference nor of comparison. From beneath the ruins of liberal, socialist, and democratic doctrines, Fascism extracts those elements which are still vital. It preserves what may be described as " the acquired facts " of history; it rejects all else. That is to say, it rejects the idea of a doctrine suited to all times and to all people. Granted that the XIXth century was the century of socialism, liberalism, democracy, this does not mean that the XXth century must also be the century of socialism, liberalism, democracy. Political doctrines pass; nations remain. We are free to believe that this is the century of authority, a century tending to the " right ", a Fascist century. If the XIXth century was the century of the individual (liberalism implies individualism) we are free to believe that this is the " collective " century, and therefore the century of the State.

. . . . .

The key-stone of the Fascist doctrine is its conception of the State, of its essence, its functions, and its aims. For Fascism the State is absolute, individuals and groups relative. Individuals and groups are admissable in so far as they come within the State. Instead of directing the game and guiding the material and moral progress of the community, the liberal State restricts its activities to recording results. The Fascist State is wide awake and has a will of its own. For this reason it can be described as " ethical ". At the first quinquennial assembly of the regime, in 1929, I said:

" The Fascist State is not a night-watchman, solicitous

only of the personal safety of the citizens; not is it organised exclusively for the purpose of guarantying a certain degree of material prosperity and relatively peaceful conditions of life, a board of directors would do as much. Neither is it exclusively political, divorced from practical realities and holding itself aloof from the multifarious activities of the citizens and the nation. The State, as conceived and realised by Fascism, is a spiritual and ethical entity for securing the political, juridical, and economic organisation of the nation, an organisation which in its origin and growth is a manifestation of the spirit. The State guarantees the internal and external safety of the country, but it also safeguards and transmits the spirit of the people, elaborated down the ages in its language, its customs, its faith. The State is not only the present, it is also the past and above all the future. Transcending the individual's brief spell of life, the State stands for the immanent conscience of the nation. The forms in which it finds expression change, but the need for it remains. The State educates the citizens to civism, makes them aware of their mission, urges them to unity; its justice harmonises their divergent interests; it transmits to future generations the conquests of the mind in the fields of science, art, law, human solidarity; it leads men up from primitive tribal life to that highest manifestation of human power, imperial rule. The State hands down to future generations the memory of those who laid down their lives to ensure its safety or to obey its laws; it sets up as examples and records for future ages the names of the captains who enlarged its territory and of the men of genius who have made it famous. Whenever respect for the State declines and the disintegrating and centrifugal tendencies of individuals and groups prevail, nations are headed for decay".

Since 1929 economic and political development have everywhere emphasised these truths. The importance of the State is rapidly growing. The so-called crisis can only be settled by State action and within the orbit of the State.

* * * * *

The Fascist State is not indifferent to religious phenomena in general nor does it maintain an attitude of indifference to Roman Catholicism, the special, positive religion of Italians. The State has not got a theology but it has a moral code. The Fascist State sees in religion one of the deepest of spiritual manifestations and for this reason it not only respects religion but defends and protects it. The Fascist State does not attempt, as did Robespierre at the height of the revolutionary delirium of the Convention, to set up a "god" of its own; nor does it vainly seek, as does Bolschevism, to efface God from the soul of man. Fascism respects the God of ascetics, saints, and heroes, and it also respects God as conceived by the ingenuous and primitive heart of the people, the God to whom their prayers are raised.

The Fascist State expresses the will to exercise power and to command. Here the Roman tradition is embodied in a conception of strength. Imperial power, as understood by the Fascist doctrine, is not only territorial, or military, or commercial; it is also spiritual and ethical. An imperial nation, that is to say a nation which directly or indirectly is a leader of others, can exist without the need of conquering a single square mile of territory. Fascism sees in the imperialistic spirit — i. e. in the tendency of nations to expand — a manifestation of their vitality. In the opposite tendency, which would limit their interests to the home couutry, it sees a symptom of decadence. Peoples who rise or rearise are imperialistic; renunciation is characteristic of dying peoples. The Fascist doctrine is that best suited to the tendencies and feelings of a people which, like the Italian, after lying fallow during centuries of foreign servitude, is now reasserting itself in the world.

But imperialism implies discipline, the coordination of efforts, a deep sense of duty and a spirit of self-sacrifice. This explains many aspects of the practical activity of the régime, and the direction taken by many of the forces of the State, as also the severity which has to be exercised towards those who would oppose this spontaneous and inevitable movement of XXth century Italy by agitating outgrown ideologies of the XIXth century, ideologies rejected wherever great experiments in political and social transformations are being dared.

Never before have the peoples thirsted for authority, direction, order, as they do now. If each age has its doctrine, then innumerable symptoms indicate that the doctrine of our age is the Fascist. That it is vital is shown by the fact that it has aroused a faith; that this faith has conquered souls is shown by the fact that Fascism can point to its fallen heroes and its martyrs.

Fascism has now acquired throughout the world that universality which belongs to all doctrines which by achieving self-expression represent a moment in the history of human thought.

ADOLF HITLER (1889-1945)

Adolf Hitler, dictator of Germany from 1933 until his death in 1945, was born in Branau, Upper Austria in 1889. His father was an Austrian customs official. A high school drop-out, he moved to Vienna in 1907 after his mother died. He failed the admissions examination for the academy of arts twice, but lived on an inheritance and some income from the sale of postcards, which he copied. He joined the Bavarian army in World War I, became a corporal, was gassed and wounded and recieved the Iron Cross for bravery. Both before the war and after, he appeared as a political anti-Semite. With the defeat of Germany his nationalism and anti-Semitism became more extreme and he blamed the defeat on betrayal by Jews and Marxists.

At Munich Hitler joined with other veterans in the German Workers'party, and by 1921 it had been renamed the National Socialist German Workers', or Nazi, party, and Hitler was party chairman. Under his dictatorial control it became a paramilitary group and gained support from nationalist groups. In November 1923, Hitler tried to overthrow the republican Bavarian government, with his "beer-hall putsch". Officals of the Bavarian government were surrounded by Nazi storm troopers while meeting in a Munich beer-hall, and forced to swear loyalty to the "revolution" by their captors. When they were free again, however, the officials defeated the coup, arrested Hitler and had him sentenced to five years in Landsberg fortress. He only served nine months, since the authorities did not look unkindly upon his nationalistic fervor. But in those nine months he dictated the book Mein Kampf [my struggle] to Rudolph Hess, and this book - with its racism, strategy for world domination by the Aryans, mythic racist evolutionary theory, worship of power, distain for weakness and morality - became the bible of the Nazi movement. The party grew slowly until the depression of 1929 which brought it mass support. Hitler got support from bankers and industrialists by attacking Communism and promising to control labor unions. He was a magnetic orator, mixing Germanic self-pity with hatred and blame towards Jews and Marxists for all ills, and promises of security, jobs to workers. In 1932 he ran in the presidential campaign but lost to the popular German General von Hindenburg. In July the Nazis became the largest party in the Reichstag, and in 1933, with violent conflicts between Nazis and Communists and a deteriorating parliament, Hitler was asked to be chancellor by President Hindenburg.

Hitler consolidated his power quickly. A consummate Machiavellian, when the Reichstag (parliament) building caught fire he blamed the Communists, and won a Nazi majority in the consequent anti-communist hysteria. The Communists were then barred from the Reichstag, and with his storm troopers in the wings, Hitler was given dictatorial powers. Political opponents were jailed or murdered, Jews and Socialists were harrassed, arrested and deprived or rights. When Hindenburg died in 1934 the presidency and chancellorship were merged intc the office of Fuhrer (leader), and "Heil Hitler!" became the official term of greeting. Domestically, Hitler built autobahns(or freeways) and workers' villages, and re-activated the German economy. He also purveyed the most vicious anti-semitism, Nazified the systems of education and law, and predicted that his new order, "the Third Reich" would last 1000 years. At the same time he prepared for war, building up the military forces of Germany in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, which he denounced as unfair. In 1938 he had the Austrian chancellor, Dollfuss, assassinated and then proceeded to annex Austria to Germany. In 1939 his troops took over parts of Czechoslovakia on the pretext that the Germans there were "persecuted". He made a non-agression pact with Russia which allowed him to invade part of Poland (the Russians took over the rest). This act led the British and French, on September 3, 1939, to declare war on Germany, beginning World War II. In the Spring of 1940 Hitler invaded Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland and France, and sought, unsuccessfully, to conquer Britain by aerial attacks. His alliances with Italy and Japan, and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, From 1939-1945 Hitler promulgated what he called the "final solution of the Jewish question", murdering between 5 and 6 million Jews in concentration camps.

In April 1945, after most of Europe had been re-gained by the Allies and as Russian Troops were entering Berlin, Germany's defeat became obvious and Hitler, with his mistress, Eva Braun, committed suicide in the underground chancellory building. Hitler left Germany behind in chaos and defeat, many cities of Europe ruined, and a horrible legacy of war casualties and millions of Jews and political opponents who had been murdered. Surely this was one of the most terrible tyrannies the world has seen.

The selections which follow are drawn only from speeches, and writings in Mein Kampf, prior to 1929 - before Hitler gained power. Speeches after he gained power were often designed to decieve rather than to reveal his true intentions and beliefs; for example,he preceded his annexations of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland with a variety of pious declarations of his devotion to peace and lack of interest in any territorial gain. The British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, who unfortunately took him at his word, was later villified by his countrymen as an appeaser. Though there is no particular evidence that Hitler studied Nietzsche, von Clausewitz or Hegel, central ideas of these philosophers figured prominently in Hitler's view of the world: Nietzsche's contempt for weakness, pity, the"slave morality" of Christianity and democracy, and exaltation of "master-morality", the warrior, and the will to power; von Clausewitz' brilliant analysis of war as a mere continuation of political intercourse; Hegel's concept of history as an evolution, in which the spirit of nations - particularly of the dominant nation - leads the march and which "world-historical individuals" not bound by ordinary morality are the bearers and leaders of what is right and ought to be. These ideas were deeply embedded in the German intellectual tradition as Hitler grew up. But the more extreme facets of Hitler's theories - nordic superiority and German nationalism and anti-semitism - are more properly traced to purveyor's of racist doctrines including von Treitschke, the German historian, comte de Gobineau, a Frenchman who wrote on the inequality of races and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, an Englishman whose pro-german and anti-semitic view led him to become a German citizen, married to Wagner's daughter. Many of these ideas were filtered to Hitler through Alfred Rosenberg, editor of the Volkischer Beobachter. Nietzsche was often appealed to by Nazi apologists but was scarcely a proponent of German culture as he found it, and his treatment of Jews,though sterectypic, lacked the vitriol of Nazi doctrine.

From Chapter XI, Nation and Race

. . . men without exception wander about in the garden of Nature; they imagine that they know practically everything and yet with few exceptions pass blindly by one of the most patent principles of Nature's rule: the inner segregation of the species of all living beings on this earth.

Even the most superficial observation shows that Nature's restricted form of propagation and increase is an almost rigid basic law of all the innumerable forms of expression of her vital urge. Every animal mates only with a member of the same species. The titmouse seeks the titmouse, the finch the finch, the stork the stork, the field mouse the field mouse, the dormouse the dormouse, the wolf the she-wolf, etc.

Only unusual circumstances can change this, primarily the compulsion of captivity or any other cause that makes it impossible to mate within the same species. But then Nature begins to resist this with all possible means, and her most visible protest consists either in refusing further capacity for propagation to bastards or in limiting the fertility of later offspring; in most cases, however, she takes away the power of resistance to disease or hostile attacks.

This is only too natural.

Any crossing of two beings not at exactly the same level produces a medium between the level of the two parents. This means: the offspring will probably stand higher than the racially lower parent, but not as high as the higher one. Consequently, it will later succumb in the struggle against the higher level. Such mating is contrary to the will of Nature for a higher breeding of all life. The precondition for this does not lie in associating superior and inferior, but in the total victory of the former. The stronger must dominate and not blend with the weaker, thus sacrificing his own greatness. Only the born weakling can view this as cruel, but he after all is only a weak and limited man; for if this law did not prevail, any conceivable higher development of organic living beings would be unthinkable.

The consequence of this racial purity,[1] universally valid in Nature, is not only the sharp outward delimitation of the various races, but their uniform character in themselves. The fox is always a fox, the goose a goose, the tiger a tiger, etc., and the difference can lie at most in the varying measure of force, strength, intelligence, dexterity, endurance, etc., of the individual specimens. But you will never find a fox who in his inner attitude might, for example, show humanitarian tendencies toward geese, as similarly there is no cat with a friendly inclination toward mice.

Therefore, here, too, the struggle among themselves arises less from inner aversion than from hunger and love. In both cases, Nature looks on calmly, with satisfaction, in fact. In the struggle for daily bread all those who are weak and sickly or less determined succumb, while the struggle of the males for the female grants the right or opportunity to propagate only to the healthiest. And struggle is always a means for improving a species' health and power of resistance and, therefore, a cause of its higher development.

If the process were different, all further and higher development would cease and the opposite would occur. For, since the inferior always predominates numerically over the best, if both had the same possibility of preserving life and propagating, the inferior would multiply so much more rapidly that in the end the best would inevitably be driven into the background, unless a correction of this state of affairs were undertaken. Nature does just this by subjecting the weaker part to such severe living conditions that by them alone the number is limited, and by not permitting the remainder to increase promiscuously, but making a new and ruthless choice according to strength and health.

No more than Nature desires the mating of weaker with stronger individuals, even less does she desire the blending of a higher with a lower race, since, if she did, her whole work of higher breeding, over perhaps hundreds of thousands of years, might be ruined with one blow.

Historical experience offers countless proofs of this. It shows with terrifying clarity that in every mingling of Aryan blood with that of lower peoples the result was the end of the cultured people. North America, whose population consists in by far the largest part of Germanic elements who mixed but little with the lower colored peoples, shows a different humanity and culture from Central and South America, where the predominantly Latin immigrants often mixed with the aborigines on a large scale. By this one example, we can clearly and distinctly recognize the effect of racial mixture. The Germanic inhabitant of the American continent, who has remained racially pure and unmixed, rose to be master of the continent; he will remain the master as long as he does not fall a victim to defilement of the blood.

The result of all racial crossing is therefore in brief always the following:

(a) Lowering of the level of the higher race;

(b) Physical and intellectual regression and hence the beginning of a slowly but surely progressing sickness.

To bring about such a development is, then, nothing else but to sin against the will of the eternal creator.

And as a sin this act is rewarded.

When man attempts to rebel against the iron logic of Nature, he comes into struggle with the principles to which he himself owes his existence as a man. And this attack[1] must lead to his own doom.

Here, of course, we encounter the objection of the modern pacifist, as truly Jewish in its effrontery as it is stupid! 'Man's rôle is to overcome Nature!'

Millions thoughtlessly parrot this Jewish nonsense and end up by really imagining that they themselves represent a kind of conqueror of Nature; though in this they dispose of no other weapon than an idea, and at that such a miserable one, that if it were true no world at all would be conceivable.

It is idle to argue which race or races were the original representative of human culture and hence the real founders of all that we sum up under the word 'humanity.' It is simpler to raise this question with regard to the present, and here an easy, clear answer results. All the human culture, all the results of art, science, and technology that we see before us today, are almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan. This very fact admits of the not unfounded inference that he alone was the founder of all higher humanity, therefore representing the prototype of all that we understand by the word 'man.' He is the Prometheus of mankind from whose bright forehead the divine spark of genius has sprung at all times, forever kindling anew that fire of knowledge which illumined the night of silent mysteries and thus caused man to climb the path to mastery over the other beings of this earth. Exclude him — and perhaps after a few thousand years darkness will again descend on the earth, human culture will pass, and the world turn to a desert.

If we were to divide mankind into three groups, the founders of culture, the bearers of culture, the destroyers of culture, only the Aryan could be considered as the representative of the first group. From him originate the foundations and walls of all human creation, and only the outward form and color are determined by the changing traits of character of the various peoples. He provides the mightiest building stones and plans for human progress and only the execution corresponds to the nature of the varying men and races. In a few decades, for example, the entire east of Asia will possess a culture whose ultimate foundation will be Hellenic spirit and Germanic technology, just as much as in Europe. Only the *outward* form — in part at least — will bear the features of Asiatic character. It is not true, as some people think, that Japan adds European technology to its culture; no, European science and technology are trimmed with Japanese characteristics. The foundation of actual life is no longer the special Japanese culture, although it determines the color of life — because outwardly, in consequence of its inner difference, it is more conspicuous to the European — but the gigantic scientific-technical achievements of Europe and America; that is, of Aryan peoples. Only on the basis of these achievements can the Orient follow general human progress. They furnish the basis of the struggle for daily bread, create weapons and implements for it, and only the outward form is gradually adapted to Japanese character.

If beginning today all further Aryan influence on Japan should stop, assuming that Europe and America should perish, Japan's present rise in science and technology might continue for a short time; but even in a few years the well would dry up, the Japanese special character would gain, but the present culture would freeze and sink back into the slumber from which it was awakened seven decades ago by the wave of Aryan culture. Therefore, just as the present Japanese development owes its life to Aryan origin, long ago in the gray past foreign influence and foreign spirit awakened the Japanese culture of that time. The best proof of this is furnished by the fact of its subsequent sclerosis and total petrifaction. This can occur in a people only when the original creative racial nucleus has been lost, or if the external influence which furnished the impetus and the material for the first development in the cultural field was later lacking. But if it is established that a people receives the most essential basic materials of its culture from foreign races, that it assimilates and adapts them, and that then, if further external influence is lacking, it rigidifies again and again, such a race may be designated as '*culture-bearing*,' but never as '*culture-creating*.' An examination of the various peoples from this standpoint points to the fact that practically none of them were originally *culture-founding*, but almost always *culture-bearing*. . . .

The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew. In hardly any people in the world is the instinct of self-preservation developed more strongly than in the so-called 'chosen.' Of this, the mere fact of the survival of this race may be considered the best proof. Where is the people which in the last two thousand years has been exposed to so slight changes of inner disposition, character, etc., as the Jewish people? What people, finally, has gone through greater upheavals than this one — and nevertheless issued from the mightiest catastrophes of mankind unchanged? What an infinitely tough will to live and preserve the species speaks from these facts!

. . . .

Since the Jew — for reasons which will at once become apparent — was never in possession of a culture of his own, the foundations of his intellectual work were always provided by others. His intellect at all times developed through the cultural world surrounding him.

The reverse process never took place.

For if the Jewish people's instinct of self-preservation is not smaller but larger than that of other peoples, if his intellectual faculties can easily arouse the impression that they are equal to the intellectual gifts of other races, he lacks completely the most essential requirement for a cultured people, the idealistic attitude.

In the Jewish people the will to self-sacrifice does not go beyond the individual's naked instinct of self-preservation. Their apparently great sense of solidarity is based on the very primitive herd instinct that is seen in many other living creatures in this world. It is a noteworthy fact that the herd instinct leads to mutual support only as long as a common danger makes this seem useful or inevitable.

Democracy is Jewish domination, for the people do not rule; public opinion is manufactured by the press, which is owned by Jews. At the same time democracy is not an end in itself, but the means to an end. The end is the achievement of Jewish domination through education for democracy—that is, through the creation of a lethargic mass of people who thinks that it rules through its elected representatives. The achievement of Jewish domination is facilitated by the determination of a minority and the cowardice of the majority in the ranks of the middle class, where, in addition, a great deal is accomplished by the threat of terror. . . .

Parliaments will not help the German people. We can hope for a change in our predicament only when we realize that the Jewish Revolution of 1918 was made by a small determined group, which, like shocktroops, swept the broad lethargic majority with it. That is the way great changes have always been accomplished. In realization of this Bismarck as a single individual once raised up the German people. We National Socialists want to adopt this "political" law of nature and want to be the shocktroops which will guide the destiny of the nation in order to lead it out of depression into a better future. It is our task to gather about us those dissatisfied with parliamentarianism in order to give our people the place it deserves. (Munich, Oct. ?, 1922; *Voelkischer Beobachter,* Nov. 1, 1922)

Internationalism is weakness in the life of nations. What is there that is born of internationalism? Nothing. The real values of human culture were not born of internationalism, but they were created by the whole heritage and tradition of the people (*das Volkstum*). When peoples no longer possess creative power they become international. Wherever there is weakness in regard to spiritual matters in the life of nations, internationalism makes its appearance. It is no coincidence that a people, namely, the Jews, which does not have any real creative ability is the carrier of this internationalism. It is the people with the least creative power and talent. It dominates only in the field of crooked and speculative economy.

The Jew, as a race, has a remarkable instinct of self-preservation, but as an individual he has no cultural abilities at all. He is the demon of the disintegration of nations—the symbol of continual destruction of peoples. If the first of May, therefore, is to have any meaning in the life of peoples, it can be only a glorification of the national, creative idea as against the international idea of decay. (Munich, May 1, 1923; *Voelkischer Beobachter,* May 3, 1923)

Wars supposedly are not necessary among civilized peoples. The supposition is that disputes among nations are no longer necessary, for they are represented to be merely the expression of the oppression of one class by the particular bourgeois group dominating at the time. In the case of actual differences of opinion between nations, a court of arbitration is supposed to decide. The question, however, whether the judges of this court would have the power to bring the respective parties before the bar remains unanswered. Would a state be able to bring an accused into court if it did not have the police behind it? It is the same in the life of nations, and in the final analysis it is

always a sort of divine ordeal that decides. The power which nations can bring to bear is the decisive factor. It is evident that the stronger has the right before God and the world to enforce his will. History shows that the right as such does not mean a thing, unless it is backed up by great power. If one does not have the power to enforce his right, that right alone will profit him absolutely nothing. The stronger have always been victorious. The whole of nature is a continuous struggle between strength and weakness, an eternal victory of the strong over the weak. All nature would be full of decay if it were otherwise. And the states which do not wish to recognize this law will decay. If you need an example of this kind of decay, look at the present German Reich. (Munich, April 13, 1923; *Voelkischer Beobachter,* April 15/16, 1923)

The *Weltanschauung* of pacifism and democracy which today directs the destiny of our people has brought us to the place where, instead of being the most powerful people on earth, we have become a colony of serfs and slaves, not only physically but also spiritually. Our people can earn the chance to acquire the means of another rejuvenation through a *Weltanschauung* completely contrary to the one mentioned above. The National Socialists have made this *Weltanschauung* their own, and they are determined to build the new Reich upon this basis.

We are enemies of cowardly pacifism because we recognize that according to the laws of nature struggle is the father of all things. We are enemies of democracy because we recognize that an individual genius represents at all times the best in his people and that he should be the leader. Numbers can never direct the destiny of a people. Only genius can do this. We are the deadly enemies of internationalism because nature teaches us that the purity of race and the authority of the leader alone are able to lead a nation to victory. (Kulmbach, Feb. 5, 1928; *Voelkischer Beobachter,* Feb. 9, 1928)

The fundamental motif through all the centuries has been the principle that force and power are the determining factors. All development is struggle. Only force rules. Force is the first law. A struggle has already taken place between original man and his primeval world. Only through struggle have states and the world become great. If one should ask whether this struggle is gruesome, then the only answer could be: For the weak, yes, for humanity as a whole, no.

World history proves that in the struggle between nations, that race has always won out whose drive for self-preservation was the more pronounced, the stronger. . . . Unfortunately, the contemporary world stresses internationalism instead of the innate values of race, democracy and the majority instead of the worth of the great leader. Instead of everlasting struggle the world preaches cowardly pacifism, and everlasting peace. These three things, considered in the light of their ultimate consequences, are the causes of the downfall of all humanity. The practical result of conciliation among nations is the renunciation of a people's own strength and their voluntary enslavement. (Essen, Nov. 22, 1926; *Voelkischer Beobachter,* Nov. 26, 1926)

Politics is history in the making. History is the story of a people's struggle for survival. There is no distinction between war and peace. Struggle is ever present. A latent peace is only possible when one is either a free lord or a slave. The final decision lies with the sword.

In the power of the sword lies the vital strength of a nation. There is, therefore, no difference between domestic policy and foreign policy. The one is the support of the other and in turn presupposes the existence of the other. Politics cannot be carried out without the recognition of certain fundamental principles: the principle of struggle, the purity of blood, and the ideal of the leader. (Munich, May 2, 1928; *Voelkischer Beobachter,* May 4, 1928)

The battlefield is the final test of the foreign policy of a people. Even in the Soviet State the ultimate consideration is the possibility of preserving the nation on the field of arms. If a nation is unable to do this, then its foreign policy is destined to destruction from the very beginning. The state which is unable to preserve itself in war can possess diplomatic leadership a thousand times over and still not be able to meet the final demands of battle. Whoever is unable to meet the power of his enemy with power of his own must sacrifice any active espousal of his own interests; he will be forced from one dictate to another instead of from one treaty to another. We must do away with the misleading idea that Germany has concluded treaties in the past few years. Instead, she has signed dictates as a consequence of a perfectly senseless foreign policy.

The goal of foreign policy is the preservation of a people's means of subsistence; it is nothing else than the preservation of the life of a nation. The path to this goal will, in the final analysis, always be war. The means will be the might of the nation as it is set up in its military organization, plus clever political leadership, which chooses the course of policy wisely and then employs the means ingeniously. Any foreign policy, therefore, is linked up with the power constituted in the nation, and a resourceful organization of this power, namely the military.

It is impossible in the long run to carry out our foreign policy without building up the army. If this is not done, the results will always be negative. It is the function of domestic policy to build up the army as a means by which foreign policy can attain its ultimate goals. Domestic policy must follow lines which make possible the creation of powerful armed forces. Only when foreign policy and domestic policy work hand in hand can the problem of the subsistence of a people be solved.

The fact is that today the German people as a nation no longer represents power, for it does not have an army of any significance beyond its relation to the German people. The problems of German policy cannot be solved if the instrument of their solution [a powerful army] is not established. (Munich, Sept. 22, 1928; *Voelkischer Beobachter,* Sept. 23/24, 1928)

If men wish to live, then they are forced to kill others. The entire struggle for survival is a conquest of the means of existence which in turn results in the elimination of others from these same sources of subsistence. As long as there are peoples on this earth, there will be nations against nations and they will be forced to protect their vital rights in the same way as the individual is forced to protect his rights.

There is in reality no distinction between peace and war. Life, no matter in what form, is a process which always leads to the same result. Self-preservation will always be the goal of every individual. Struggle is ever-present and will remain. This signifies a constant willingness on the part of man to sacrifice to the utmost. Weapons, methods, instruments, formations, these may change, but in the end the struggle for survival remains. . . .

. . . For ten years we have preached, and our deepest concern is: How can we again achieve power? We admit freely and openly that, if our Movement is victorious, we will be concerned day and night with the question of how to produce the armed forces which are forbidden us by the peace treaty. We solemnly confess that we consider everyone a scoundrel who does not try day and night to figure out a way to violate this treaty, for we have never recognized this treaty.

We admit, therefore, that as far as we are concerned the German army in its present form is not permanent. For us it will serve only as a great cadre army, that is, as a source of sergeants and officers. And in the meantime we will be continuously at work filling in the ranks. We will take every step which strengthens our arms, which augments the number of our forces, and which increases the strength of our people.

We confess further that we will dash anyone to pieces who should dare to hinder us in this undertaking. . . . Our rights will never be represented by others. Our rights will be protected only when the German Reich is again supported by the point of the German dagger. (Munich, March 15, 1929; *Voelkischer Beobachter,* March 17, 1929)

The Charter of the United Nations was drafted in San Francisco, as World War II was drawing to a close, by some fifty nations who were fighting the Axis powers led by German, Italy and Japan. During its deliberations, April 25 to June 26th 1945, the Germans surrendered unconditionally (May 7th) and in August, after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan surrendered. The General Assembly of the United Nations first met in January 1946 with 51 charter members. By 1978 it had over 150 members, including all the former enemies of the Allied Powers, and excluding only Nationalist China, Rhodesia, North and South Korea, Switzerland, and seven tiny city-states with populations of 750 to 92,000. Over 98% of the world's population were represented in the world body. Despite a mixed record of successes and failures, with diminishing influence on military conflicts due to both a lack of enforcement powers and the inclination of the big powers to act independently of the UN, the United Nations represents a significant forward step in the march towards world government. It is the current stage of an ever increasing proliferation of organizations devoted to international cooperation and order in a wide variety of fields.

The idea of a universal world government was envisaged, as we have seen, in Dante's De Monarchia. Penn's proposal of a European Parliament for the future peace of Europe (c. 1693) was followed by Abbé Saint-Pierre's Paix Perpetuelle (1713) Jean Jacques Rousseau's re-write of the latter in 1761, Kant's essay on Perpetual Peace (1795) as well as Bentham's unpublished plan (1786-9). But it was not until the 19th century that these ideas began to be taken up seriously by the nations. The first international peace congress was held in London in 1843, followed by other such meetings in Brussels, 1848, Paris, 1849, Frankfurt, 1850 and London, 1851. In 1864 twelve nations signed the first of the Geneva Conventions establishing the neutrality of medical personnel in war time and humane treatment of wounded. In 1874 a Universal Postal Union was established, followed in 1875 by the International Telegraph Union. The concept of International Law, based largely on Grotius' work in De Jure Belli et Pacis (1625) got a significant boost in the Declaration of Paris (1856) which tried to codify the international law of the sea, outlawing privateering (commissioning private ship owners to capture and take booty from enemy ships), protecting neutral shipping not engaged in helping the enemy militarily, and defining rules of blockades. A further step was taken in the Hague Conference of 1899 which set up the "Hague Tribunal" or Permanent Court of Arbitration; this was followed by the World Court (Permanent Court of International Justice) in 1921 which was transformed into the International Court of Justice, under the United Nations in 1945. The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 failed in their attempts to reduce armaments and solve the problems which led to World War I (1914-18). They ratified prohibitions of aerial bombardment, submarine mines and poison gas to no effect, but were more successful in establishing conventions on neutral shipping rights and the protection of non-combatants. Further they provided precedents for the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Conventions at Geneva in 1906, 1929 and 1949 added significantly to the body of formulated international law by the adoption of conventions on the conduct of war. The name, "United Nations" was used by President F.D.Roosevelt in 1941 to describe the nations opposing the Axis powers. Roosevelt, who had been an ardent supporter of Woodrow Wilson and Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Wilson, together with Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain, and various officials from Russia and China incorporated plans for an international organization devoted to peace in a succession of meetings and declarations including the Atlantic Charter (August 1941), the Declaration of the United Nations (Jan, 1942), the Moscow Declaration (October 1943), the Tehran Conference (December 1943), the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (October 1944) and the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Much of these meetings had to do with the prosecution of the war, division of conquered territories, etc., but the last two, in particular, included specifics for a world organization and led to the San Francisco conference several months later.

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, 1945 (Cont.)

Central, and novel, to the ideas governing the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris (August,1928), the unsuccessful Disarmament Conference at Geneva (1932-37) and the United Nations Charter, is the acknowledgement by increasing numbers of nations of the desirability of abolishwar as a means of settling international disputes and the necessity of disarming towards this end. Equally central is the failure of these efforts due to persistent nationalism and rejection of restrictions on military sovereignty, especially by the big powers. Although international cooperation, mutual interdependence and harmonious allocations of rights and duties among nations has taken place in many fields under the auspices of various international organizations, the forces of nationalistic militarism have so far been stronger than a commitment to achieve peace by subordinating national military forces to a world court or government. The very term "United Nations" suggests such a system by analogy with the United States of America, and such a concept was implicit in some of the language of the United Nations Charter. But once again the ideals of international order have been undermined by the distrust and ambition of nations acting independently.

Charter of the United Nations, Signed at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, June 26, 1945 [12]

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I. PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

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[12] Department of State, Pub. 2368, Conference Series 76.

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II. MEMBERSHIP

Article 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

Article 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III. ORGANS

Article 7

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

CHAPTER IV. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Composition

Article 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

a. promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;

b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions, and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (*b*) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

CHAPTER V. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Composition

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect

six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY - 2nd HALF: THE NUCLEAR AGE

The first atomic bomb exploded in a New Mexico (USA) desert at 5:30 a.m. on July 16, 1945, unknown to all but a highly select group of scientists and the very highest U.S.Government officials. It was an awesome sight; a multi-colored burst of light many times brighter than the mid-day sun, and far more powerful than the scientists had hoped, filling them with a sense of humility and some foreboding. The next day, President Truman, attending a conference with Prime Minister Churchill of England and Premier Stalin of the Soviet Union, decided to use the atomic bomb if Japan, who was still fighting (though Germany had surrendered), did not surrender. On July 26th a proclamation - the "Potsdam Declaration" - was sent to Japan and released to the press, calling for Japan's unconditional surrender under threat of "complete and utter destruction" (though with promises of withdrawal after Japan had established a democratic, "peacefully inclined and responsible" government). By the deadline, August 3rd, no positive response had been received from Japan, and on August 6th the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima leveling 90% of the city. With still no word from Japan, a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki August 9th, devastating one third of the city and bringing the total deaths from the two bombs to about 110,000. The next day, August 10, Japan announced its willingness to surrender, and in those few days the American people and the world learned, for the first time, that mankind had embarked on a new era: the Nuclear Age.

Actually, of course, the massive, secret American effort to design and construct an atomic bomb was suggested six years earlier when President Roosevelt received a paper from Albert Einstein informing him of the possibility and probability of atomic weapons. But our concern is with the ideas and attitudes which governed responses to this information and, later, to the reality of nuclear weaponry. What were Roosevelt's responses to Einstein's appeal, and what led him to massive support of the bomb project? What philosophical principles did Truman presuppose in deciding to use the bomb once it had become a reality? And what philosophical ideas and principles have governed the proposals and policies for dealing with the existence of nuclear weapons in subsequent decades?

Why would President Roosevelt, a champion of the "forgotten man" and of the Wilsonian ideals of peace and disarmament, commit his government to the development of a weapon devised to destroy cities indiscriminately with consequent massive slaughter of women, children and other non-combatants? To understanding his reasoning it is necessary to recall both the international situation and the state of physical science in 1932-42. In 1932 Sir James Chadwick had discovered the neutron. In 1933 Hitler became the dictator of Nazi Germany. Between 1933 and Einstein's letter in August of 1939 Hitler had withdrawn from the League of Nations, built up his armaments, marched into the Rhineland in violation of the Lucarno Pact, ordered the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss of Austria, signed a treaty guaranteeing the frontiers of Austria and then invaded it eight months later, took over Czechoslovakia less than six months after guaranteeing its reduced borders in the Munich Pact, and had formed alliances with Italy and Japan who were engaged in similarly aggressive adventures in Ethiopia and China. At the same time Hitler's racist theories were translated into measures which impacted the scientific community among many others. In the realm of physics, this same period saw some remarkable discoveries. Fermi in Italy had bombarded all known elements with neutrons, producing a whole new family of radioactive isotopes; Otto Hahn and his erstwhile Viennese colleague, Lise Meitner, had analysed the radioactive products of uranium bombardment, and three months before the Munich pact, Otto Frisch, a refugee from Germany, discovered, in a test of Meitner's theory, the enormous potential power of atomic fission. At this point scientists did not know - but as Einstein said, considered it probable - that nuclear fission, which had been found only in single atoms as it were, could yield enormous energies by chain reactions

in which atoms hit by a neutron would produce more neutrons to hit other atoms. Since much of the scientific work leading up to these results had been done in Italy, Austria and Germany, now under Nazi domination, the possibility and probability that Hitler would develop this weapon if he could seemed very strong. Within a month after Einstein's letter Germany had invaded Poland in violation of its promises, and England and France had declared war. World War II was under way. Einstein's letter was not actually presented to Roosevelt until six weeks after that, on October 11, 1939. Roosevelt was impressed but not convinced. He appointed an Advisory Committee which recommended government support. But it was not until one day before Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, after Germany had over-run most of Europe and destroyed a large part of the Soviet army in violations of its non-aggression pact with Russia, Italy had invaded Greece and North Africa, Japan had invaded Thailand and Indo-China, and the British had somehow survived the Battle of Britain, that Roosevelt finally approved an unqualified effort to develop the bomb within three or four years. The decision was based in part on scientific developments which convinced his scientific advisors that such a project would succeed, in part on word that the Germans were actively working on such a project, and in part by the greatly increased involvement of the United states on the side of the allied forces. In the context of the impending crisis with Japan, and the intense incompatibility of the Nazi and Fascist ideologies of militarism, dictatorship and racism vis-a-vis Roosevelt's commitment to British, French and American espousal of democracy, individual freedoms and international peace mechanisms, it is not difficult to see how Roosevelt would feel compelled to explore the possibility of a a weapon which could conceivably be essential to prevent world domination for many years by ideologies so violently opposed to those of the world he knew and believed in. He could have refused, perhaps on the grounds that such terrible weapons ought not, for the good of mankind, be even explored, But such a response would require a faith that either other men would not develop such a bomb, or that if they did they would not use it, or that if they used it, the outcome would nevertheless eventually benefit mankind. Such a faith was not part of Roosevelt's, nor of almost any American politician's, way of thinking.

Given that the Bomb had become a reality, what were the philosophical presuppositions on which Truman's decision to use it was based? Here the evidence is more clearly spelled out. It was based on a rather simple, utilitarian calculation. The cost in terms of lives, economic disruption, and time, both for Allied Forces and for Japan, would be much smaller, it was believed, if the atomic bomb was used, than otherwise. Given the goal of securing an unconditional surrender from Japan and the conviction that this was possible, it was estimated that that the conquest of Japan by invasion would have taken a year, at the cost of 250,000 American lives, a million American casualities, possibly two million Japanese lives, and untold suffering and misery in Japan and elsewhere. If with one or two atomic bombs, and 40,000 Japanese lives (40,000 was the scientists' initial estimate for the two bombs) the Japanese surrender would be secured, would not this be the best course for all concerned. In fact, there is pretty wide agreement that given the objective of unconditional Japanese surrender and the alternative military plans, the net result of dropping the bomb did result in less loss of lives, casualties and economic disruption than the alternative plans would have done. The subsequent history in Japan - the establishment of a an independent, prosperous, de-militarized, democratic Japan under a figurative emperor - reinforces the utilitarian argument for a longer-run period. Nevertheless, the decision to use the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been criticized on a variety of moral grounds. To believers in just-war theory, these acts grossly violated the principle, established in international law, of non-combatant immunity. Although Truman had asked that bombs be dropped on military targets, and the cities selected were said to be selected because they manufactured war materials, in fact the victims were

primarily women, children and non-combatants. The Allies, having already violated the principle of non-combatant immunity in the deliberate firebombing of Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo, did not devote serious attention to the principle in the cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thus to many church leaders and defenders of international agreements on the unjust nature of attacks on civilian populations, the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki violated moral and established international laws. The American military leaders had considered, briefly, dropping the bomb at some uninhabited place or on some purely military installation, but had rejected the idea on the grounds that such uses would not make the destructive powers of the bomb sufficiently clear and unambiguous to evoke the desired response. And the whole plan was, after all, a great gamble; the Japanese might not have given in (in fact, the Japanese war cabinet was split evenly and the decision to surrender rested solely on the will of the Emperor); there were only the two bombs available, a third bomb would have been months later coming. It worked, but the fact that it worked to bring the desired results does not answer the moral question. Ought the United States, for example, have insisted on unconditional surrender? There were some indications that Japan was ready to negotiate. On the other hand, would negotiations have resulted in the demilitarized, peaceful Japan which in fact emerged? Finally, even on utilitarian grounds, one may wonder whether refusal to use the bomb might not have been more beneficial for mankind than its use, if one assumes that by not using it the world might have avoided the vastly more threatening uncontroled nuclear arms race which now rages. In applying utilitarian principles to proposed courses of action, the soundness of our judgment depends on the correctness of predictions about the unknown future. Absolute principles like, "never deliberately attack non-combatants", free us from the possibility of errors of prediction; but the correctness of the moral principle involved comes into question when the reasonably predictable alternative seems to be significantly greater suffering and destruction with a less desirable outcome.

Finally, what philosophical ideas and principles have governed the proposals and policies for dealing with the existence of nuclear weapons in subsequent decades? There are, perhaps, three predominant responses. First, there are the responses of military and political leaders who have included nuclear weapons in their arsenal and are concerned with how they can most advantageously be distributed and deployed. Within this group there are differences; some think more narrowly of advantage to their own country, others think in terms of methods of avoiding nuclear warfare. For such individuals the presupposition is that different nations will continue to have arsenals of of nuclear weapons and the problem is essentially a question of cost-benefits or game theory, to ascertain best possible outcomes. Second, many thinkers, usually more removed from government responsibilities, view the existence of nuclear weapons as a very serious threat to civilization as we know it and argue for their elimination, and/or for a world government to control them. Such arguments are often based on long-run - as opposed to short or medium term - utilitarian considerations, and are motivated less by nationalistic loyalties and more by international and humanistic sympathies. A third influential group, largely from church leaders, tries to deal with the challenge of nuclear weapons in terms of traditional moral principles such as just war theory, or pacifist principles. There are of course, many ways in which these groups overlap, and there are other groups which do not fit into any of these crude characterizations - such as evangelical religionists who see nuclear weaponry as the precursor to Armageddon or a final judgment day or terrorists who view them as new devices for overthrowing established powers. However incomplete our sample, the readings which follow reflect major strains of thinking in current debates about nuclear weapons.

The first selection, by the philosopher Bertrand Russell, represents a secular position, urging abolition of nuclear weapons, unilateral disarmament, and international government, basically on the utilitarian grounds that

such plans would clearly yield much greater benefits to mankind than the alternatives currently under way. The second reading presents the views of Herman Kahn, a physicist and defense analyst, who has used game theory and cost-benefit analyses to develop (and espouse) a systematic range of policies and positions for utilizing resources and modern technology to achieve the best possible outcome for his nation in any international conflict in the nuclear age. Kahn is the quintessential exemplar of the first position above. The third selection is from three Soviet writers presenting what was presumably the Soviet government's view of war and the proper ways of dealing with problems of the nuclear age. In part they hark back to Marx and Lenin, including von Clausewitz (via Lenin) for their fundamental position which sanctions their "just" wars of liberation, opposes "imperialist" wars, and and predicts universal peace under socialism once class exploitation has been eliminated. With respect nuclear war, however, the position stressed is on a program for disarmament and peaceful coexistence as opposed to an arms race or a theory of deterrence. The third of these writers gives an interesting argument against the ways in which thinkers like Kahn have used game theory to support the arms race and the policy of deterrence. The fourth selection, by political scientist Michael Walzer, deals with some of the arguments based on just war theory, conerning the morality of a policy of nuclear deterrence. The final selection, from the American Catholic Bishops' pastoral letter of 1983, presents updated applications of the Catholic tradition to the problems of the nuclear age.

RUSSELL (1872-1970) from COMMON SENSE AND NUCLEAR WAR(1959)

In the first years following Japan's capitulation before the atomic bomb, many of the scientists who had been engaged in developing the bomb became seriously concerned that governments and the public act to contain the threat posed by the bomb. They warned that it could not be kept secret, that there could be no defense against it, argued that an arms race would lead inevitably to atomic war, and concluded that international control of atomic energy and atomic bombs was essential if nations were to live in a stable, peaceful world. They succeeded in getting atomic energy under government control in the United States, and in convincing the Truman administration to propose an International Atomic Development Authority at the United Nations in 1946. The Baruch Plan, as it was called, failed because it foundered on the question of national sovereignty, and as proposed would have left the United States with a nuclear know-how which was to be withheld from other nations, including the Soviet Union. As the cold war developed, (1948 Russian blockade of Berlin, 1949 the formation of NATO, 1955 the Warsaw Treaty Organization) and other disarmament plans fell before Russian rejections of American insistence on inspections, Russia developed the bomb in 1949, Great Britain became the third nuclear power (1952), and an arms race got under way between the USSR and the United States. The policy of developing nuclear arms sufficient for a "massive retaliation" in case of attack was put in place. It was at this point that Bertrand Russell, echoing points which had stressed by various groups earlier, wrote his small book, Common Sense and Nuclear War.

Bertrand Russell has frequently been described as one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Born in 1872, he was the grandson of Lord John Russell who was twice prime minister of England; his parents, prominent freethinkers, died when he was young and he was raised under the puritanical influence of his paternal grandmother. His informal godfather was John Stuart Mill, staunch utilitarian and defender of individual liberties, democracy and womens' rights. In 1890 he entered Cambridge University where he studied mathematics and philosophy, became a fellow of Trinity College (1895-1901) and later, a lecturer (1910-16). His best work in philosophy was done in this period, when he wrote, with Alfred North Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, in which the new symbolic or mathematical logic, with a very small number of primitive notions and axioms, was shown to be sufficient to derive all, or almost all, of classical mathematics. In metaphysics and epistemology, he was at first a convert to the British version of Hegel's absolute idealism, but reacted strongly against it before 1900 in favor of a Platonic sort of realism which ascribed independent reality to numbers, relations and properties as well as to physical objects as we perceive them. This position, in turn, was replaced by his philosophy of logical atomism, according to which: 1) reality consists of a great plurality of atomic facts (the sort which can be perceived in immediate sensory experience) and 2) ideas of the objects, physical or mental, which we ordinarily think of as being in the world, but are really logical constructions reflecting extremely complicated complexes of these atomic facts. Though this position underwent later revisions, Russell's prime interest was always that of searching for justifiable beliefs about reality on the basis of experience, while avoiding dogmatic claims about supernatural or speculative beings. He became an agnostic at 14, wrote books and articles arguing that supernaturalistic religion is intellectually indefensible, and that religion has done more harm than good in the world. At the same time, he showed remarkable courage in taking public stands, on moral grounds, for positions which he believed to be right. He did not claim that his moral positions were more than his own strong convictions; but his stands, whether one agrees with them or not, have all the marks of principle, concern for fairness, and devotion to mankind that are ordinarily taken as marks of high moral character. He lost an election to Parliament in 1907 campaigning for women's suffrage. He opposed, on pacifist grounds, England's

participation in World War I and was dismissed from Cambridge and put injail in 1918 for his pacifist activities. Though a socialist in his early years, upon visiting Russia under Lenin he was disillusioned by its hostility to freedom of science and art, its dogmatic, forced conformity, puritanism and harsh military government. He published his assessment in a book, thus alienating liberal friends. In the thirties his liberal views on education and sexual freedom led to legal battles involving academic freedom. In World War II he agreed with the need to fight Nazism, but after the war was a leading proponent of unilateral disarmament by Great Britain, was briefly imprisoned in 1961 for participation in mass demonstrations to ban nuclear weapons, and helped organize a "war crimes tribunal" in Stockholm, presided over by Jean-Paul Sartre, to protest the U.S. war in Vietnam. Russell's pacifism was never absolute; he did not reject all use of force. In his early years his moral views were close to the utilitarians, but later he felt that intellectual integrity and knowledge were more important morally than pleasure or pain. His pacifism was based on a deep compassion for the suffering of participants in war, but also by a strong revulsion against the dishonesty, unfairness, and lies which "statesmen" engage in prior to and during wartime. He summed up his life by saying, "Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind."

RUSSELL (1872-1970) from COMMON SENSE AND NUCLEAR WAR (1959)

I shall assume the following three propositions conceded:

(1) A large-scale nuclear war would be an utter disaster, not only to the belligerents, but to mankind, and would achieve no result that any sane man could desire.

(2) When a small war occurs, there is a considerable risk that it may turn into a great war; and in the course of many small wars the risk would ultimately become almost a certainty.

(3) If all existing nuclear weapons had been destroyed and there were an agreement that no new ones should be manufactured, any serious war would, nevertheless, become a nuclear war as soon as the belligerents had time to manufacture the forbidden weapons.

From these three theses, it follows that, if we are to escape unimaginable catastrophes, we must find a way of avoiding all wars, whether great or small and whether intentionally nuclear or not.

I think that, in a more or less undecided fashion, this conclusion is admitted by most of those who have studied the subject. But statesmen, both in the East and the West, have not arrived at any possible programme for implementing the prevention of war. Since the nuclear stalemate became apparent, the Governments of East and West have adopted the policy which Mr. Dulles calls 'brinkmanship'. This is a policy adapted from a sport which, I am told, is practised by some youthful degenerates. This sport is called 'Chicken!' It is played by choosing a long straight road with a white line down the middle and starting two very fast cars towards each other from opposite ends. Each car is expected to keep the wheels of one side on the white line. As they approach each other, mutual destruction becomes more and more imminent. If one of them swerves from the white line before the other, the other, as he passes, shouts 'Chicken!', and the one who has swerved becomes an object of contempt. As played by irresponsible boys, this game is considered decadent and immoral, though only the lives of the players are risked. But when the game is played by eminent statesmen, who risk not only their own lives but those of many hundreds of millions of human beings, it is thought on both sides that the statesmen on one side are displaying a high degree of wisdom and courage, and only the statesmen on the other side are reprehensible. This, of course, is absurd. Both are to blame for playing such an incredibly dangerous game. The game may be played without misfortune a few times, but sooner or later it will come to be felt that loss of face is more dreadful than nuclear annihilation. The moment will come when neither side can face the derisive cry of 'Chicken!' from the other side. When that moment is come, the statesmen of both sides will plunge the world into destruction.

Practical politicians may admit all this, but they argue that there is no alternative. If one side is unwilling to risk global war, while the other side is willing to risk it, the side which is willing to run the risk will be victorious in all negotiations and will ultimately reduce the other side to complete impotence. 'Perhaps'—so the practical politician will argue—'it might be ideally wise for the sane party to yield to the insane party in view of the dreadful nature of the alternative, but, whether wise or not, no proud nation will long acquiesce in such an ignominious rôle. We are, therefore, faced, quite inevitably, with the choice between brinkmanship and surrender.'

This view has governed policy on both sides in recent years. I cannot admit that brinkmanship and surrender are the only alternatives. What the situation requires is a quite different line of conduct, no longer governed by the motives of the contest for power, but by motives appealing to the common welfare and the common interests of the rival parties. What needs to be done is, first of all, psychological. There must be a change of mood and a change of aim, and this must occur on both sides if it is to achieve its purpose. . . .

The great majority of those who have considered the conditions for secure peace are persuaded that the most important of these conditions is the creation of an International Authority with power to enforce its decisions. This, however, remains for the present a merely academic opinion: while the East-West tension retains anything like its present acuteness, neither side would submit to any International Authority unless it could dominate it. The question at issue is, at bottom, one of great simplicity: would you rather have a world in which both friends and foes survive, or a world in which both are extinct? Put in these abstract terms, most people would prefer the survival of their friends to the extinction of their foes. But when it is pointed out to them that this choice, if made in earnest, requires some very distasteful measures, they will refuse to admit the necessity of such measures and will persist in the course leading to universal death. In this chapter, I wish to suggest comparatively painless steps by which an International Authority could gradually come into existence. . .

The League of Nations and the United Nations were both intended by their creators to be the germ of an International Authority capable of preventing war. Both failed, but the United Nations is perhaps still capable of being so reformed as to fulfil its intended function. The reforms required are, however, very drastic, and at present some, at least, are quite outside the domain of practical politics.

There is one very vital measure which may perhaps be adopted within a few years, and that is the admission to UNO of all States that desire membership. . .

There is a difficulty which faces all federal organizations, namely, that some members of the federation are more powerful or more populous than others and that it therefore does not seem just that all should carry equal weight. This problem faced the framers of the American Constitution, and, as everybody knows, they adopted a compromise solution: In the Senate, all States are equal, but, in the House of Representatives, their weight is proportional to their population. Some arrangement will be necessary in the Constitution of the reformed United Nations if small States are not to have undue weight. The present arrangement, according to which all States count equally in the Assembly, but, in the Security Council, certain powerful States have a veto, is open to various objections which I shall consider presently. One possible solution—which, I admit, has its own difficulties —would be to divide the world into a number of subordinate Federations, each of which should be a member of the one World-wide Federation. These subordinate Federations should be framed in accordance with two principles: first, they should all be approximately equal in population so that there would be no serious injustice in counting each as one in the federation of Federations which would be the reconstituted UNO; the second principle should be that, as far as possible, each Federation should have internal interests outweighing those concerning its external relations. It should be generally understood, though not formally decreed, that, in general, each subordinate Federation should have autonomy in regard to its internal affairs and that only disputes between Federations should come before UNO. In this way, the interference of the International Authority in local affairs could be reduced to a minimum.

The Veto, which was adopted in 1945 when the United Nations was created, was a practical necessity at that time. Both the United States and the USSR were agreed on this point. There is no likelihood that the Veto will be abolished until such time as East and West have become much more conscious of their common interests than they now are. But so long as the Veto exists, UNO lacks an essential characteristic of any Government. It is of the essence of a Government that it can enforce decisions upon recalcitrant members of the State which it represents. What should we think of a national State in which any burglar could veto laws against theft? There was once a national State constituted in this manner. It was the State of Poland. The *liberum veto* which existed in that country reduced it to impotence and rendered it incapable of resisting partition among its powerful neighbours. Nevertheless, it was this example which was followed when UNO was created. Already at that time the divergent interests of East and West made such a course inevitable. But if there is ever to be an International Authority capable of preventing large-scale war, it will have to be an Authority in which the Veto does not exist, since, otherwise, it will be unable to settle any dispute in which either side is prepared to use the Veto.

There will need to be, as in any Federation, a well-defined Constitution deciding which powers are to be federal. It should be understood that these powers must be only such as are involved in the prevention of war. There must be no interference by the Federal Authority with religion or economic structure or the political system. If some nations prefer parliamentary democracy, and others prefer some form of dictatorship, they must be free to persist in their choice. They must be similarly free if some prefer Communism and others prefer Capitalism. I think they must also be free to impose such limits upon individual liberty as they may consider desirable. I do not think that the Federal Authority ought to impose freedom of the Press or any other freedom upon any subordinate State. I say this in spite of realizing the importance of such freedoms. I say it because only the prevention of war gives outside States a justification for interference.

We have, I am afraid, already travelled a long way into Utopian regions, but there is a last step even more Utopian that must be taken if world peace is to be secure. There must be an International Armed Force sufficiently powerful to be certain of victory over the armed forces of any nation or likely alliance of nations. In the absence of this condition, the decrees of the International Authority may not be enforceable and may easily sink to the level of empty pronouncements like the Kellogg Pact. The International Authority will have to be free to create such armed forces as it thinks necessary and to impose such taxation as they may require. It will also need a legal right to limit the armed forces of national States so as to prevent any serious threat to its authority.

All this, however utopian it may appear, is only a close parallel to what happened in national States as a result of the invention of gunpowder. In the Middle Ages throughout Western Europe powerful barons in their castles could defy the central Government. It was only when artillery became able to destroy castles that the central Government was able to control feudal barons. What gunpowder did in the late Middle Ages, nuclear weapons have to do in our time. I do not mean that they have to be actually employed. Gunpowder does not often have to be employed to enforce the authority of national Governments against internal criminals. And similarly the actual employment of nuclear weapons will not be necessary if no national State possesses them and only the International Authority has the means of manufacturing them.

If an International Armed Force is to be both effective and safe, it will have to fulfil certain conditions. It must not be composed of large contingents contributed by national States, since such contingents would be likely to retain their national loyalties and could not be relied upon to obey a decree which they disliked. It will be necessary that each battalion, each squadron, and each submarine should contain men of various different nations so that mutiny in some national interest would be impossible. So long as the divergence between East and West persists, it would be desirable that the Supreme Command should belong to a member of an uncommitted nation.

Whenever an international armed force is suggested, many people at once raise objections which are equally applicable to municipal police forces. They suggest that such an armed force might make a military revolution and establish a tyranny over the civil authorities. In theory this is possible in the case of national armed forces, and in the less settled parts of the world it sometimes occurs. But there are well-established methods, both in Communist and in non-Communist countries, by which, not only in Russia and in the United States, but even in Nazi Germany, the civil authorities have maintained their supremacy. I see no reason to doubt that these methods would be equally effective in the international sphere.

In any case, governmental and legal control over the relations between national States has become necessary to survival. I do not mean that it is necessary from one day to the next. The world may go on for some time with brinkmanship and, with luck, it may not go over the brink. But luck cannot be counted upon to continue indefinitely. Sooner or later, present policies, if persisted in, must lead to disaster. Submission to a Central Authority may be as distasteful as submission to the king was to mediaeval barons, but it is in the long run equally necessary. Although an International Authority is not yet practical politics, it must be the ultimate goal of all those who wish to preserve the world from the disasters of nuclear war.

I have spoken of some of the above measures as Utopian, and I think in the present political climate they must be so regarded. I think that a long and serious work in the way of conciliation and lessening of mutual fanaticism will be a necessary preliminary to the creation of a powerful international force. . . .

Some Necessary Changes in Outlook

Some of the measures advocated in the preceding pages are such as will, in the present temper of the world, arouse vehement opposition both in the West and in the East. They are advocated as not improbable minimum conditions for a continued existence of *homo sapiens*. But certain widespread prejudices prevent clear thinking on the subject of international relations and make it difficult for intelligence to operate freely in this sphere. I wish in this chapter to deal with the most important of these obstacles and with the ways by which they can be overcome.

1. FANATICISM

There are many people in the West, and I suppose also in the East, who consider that the extermination of the human race would be preferable to the victory of the ideology that they dislike. They maintain that the evils inflicted by the Kremlin or by Wall Street, as the case may be, are so great that, in a world dominated by either, life would not be worth living and it would be a kindness to future generations to prevent them from being born. On this ground it is argued that, if nothing short of a nuclear war can prevent the victory of the other side, a nuclear war should be waged even should it involve a risk of universal death. I cannot but regard such a point of view as one exhibiting ferocious fanaticism. By a curious inconsistency, those in the West who take this point of view maintain that they are defending democracy, although they must be aware that a plebiscite of the world would give an overwhelming majority against them. And it is not only democracy, but also freedom that these fanatics consider themselves to be defending. . . . The great majority of mankind, even in politically educated countries, are occupied throughout the greater part of their time with quite unpolitical matters. They are concerned to eat and sleep; they are concerned with love and family; they are concerned with success or failure in their work, and with the joy or pain of living, according to the state of their health. If you were to say to any ordinary person, seriously and as a practical issue: 'Would you rather live under a political and economic system different from your own or have all mankind die an agonizing death?' he would think you mad—and not without justification. Only a man who has lost his sense of human values through preoccupation with controversy can hesitate to answer this question as every sane man must answer it. Those who have been occupied in combating Communism or in combating Capitalism are likely to become obsessed by a belief that nothing else matters in comparison. In a life of dusty argument, they have lost all sight of everyday joys and sorrows.

But when it comes to preferring the extermination of mankind to the victory of an ideology which we dislike, there are other less general arguments to be considered. There have been many bad Governments and bad systems in the past. Genghis Khan, for example, was quite as bad as fanatical anti-Communists believe Stalin to have been. But his tyranny did not last for ever, and if his enemies had had the power to extinguish human life rather than

submit to his brutalities, nobody in the present day would regret their not having exercised this power. Anybody who supposes that the tyranny of the Kremlin or the tyranny of Wall Street, as the case may be, would last for ever if for a moment it achieved world-victory, is being totally unhistorical and is showing himself an unbalanced victim of bugbears. . . .

So long as there are human beings, they will pursue their human purposes, partly good, partly bad. There will be systems of Government that inflict purposeless suffering, and there will be systems that make for human well-being. But if no human beings remain, the whole fabric of good and evil that men have gradually built up will be demolished. The pessimism of those who believe that under this or that system nothing good can ever emerge is to me incomprehensible.

Religious fanaticism has gradually decayed through experience of the futility of religious wars. Catholics and Protestants, Christians and Mohammedans have learnt to acquiesce in each other's existence, which was at one time thought quite impossible. But the newer controversies of our own time have caused many people to forget the tolerance which was slowly learned in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. When Locke wrote in favour of religious toleration, there were many who were outraged by his arguments; and there are many in the present day who are outraged when his arguments are applied to existing controversies. But the reasons which led to the success of his contentions had nothing to do with the particular nature of the controversies of his time. The reasons are valid now as they were valid then; and the arguments against toleration in our day are the same as the arguments of Loyola and Calvin at an earlier time.

II. NATIONALISM

In any approach towards the creation of a World Authority, certain disruptive forces raise difficulties which at times seem almost insuperable. The opposition between Communism and Capitalism is the most notable obstacle to world unity at the present day; but there is another, namely nationalism, which would remain if Communism and Capitalism had learnt to tolerate each other. Nationalism in each nation consists partly of beliefs as to one's own nation's excellence, and partly of ethical maxims supposed to follow from these beliefs.

I shall be speaking mainly of the bad aspects of nationalism, but I wish to say emphatically that it has also its good aspects. It would not be a good thing if people all over the world were alike. Culturally, the differences between different nations give a desirable variety and are a stimulus in literature and art. It is only when nationalism leads to armed strife that it becomes a danger. It is wholly a good thing when a nation has independence in everything except violent hostility to other nations. If an International Authority is ever created, it will have to limit its interferences with national States to matters likely to disturb international peace. If it does more than this, it becomes tyranny.

But, having said this, we must now turn our attention to the dangerous aspects of nationalism. Unlike Capitalism and Communism, nationalism is not a single, world-wide system, but is a different system in each nation. It consists essentially in collective self-glorification and in a conviction that it is right to pursue the interests of one's own nation however they may conflict with those of others. In the eighteenth century, the British proclaimed the slogan, 'Britons never shall be slaves', and proceeded to make slaves of as many non-Britons as they could. The French, shortly afterwards, proclaimed, 'Let impure blood water our furrows'—the impure blood being that of Austrians. I recently received a letter from a German explaining that 'Deutschland über alles' does not mean that Germany should rule the world, but that a German should think only of German interests. One could multiply examples indefinitely, but the phenomenon is too familiar to need further illustration.

It is rather odd that emphasis upon the merits of one's own nation should be considered a virtue. What should we think of an individual who proclaimed: 'I am morally and intellectually superior to all other individuals, and, because of this superiority, I have a right to ignore all interests except my own'? There are, no doubt, plenty of people who *feel* this way, but if they proclaim their feeling too openly, and act upon it too blatantly, they are thought ill of. When, however, a number of such individuals, constituting the population of some area, collectively make such a declaration about themselves, they are thought noble and splendid and spirited. They put up statues to each other and teach schoolchildren to admire the most blatant advocates of the national conceit.

We have become so accustomed to nationalism that it has come to seem an inherent part of human nature. History, however, does not bear out this view. In antiquity, there was hardly any nationalism except that of the Jews. In the Middle Ages, when ecclesiastics travelled freely throughout the Catholic world, their partisan feelings were centred upon their Church and not upon their nation. The nationalism of modern times has grown up, mainly, as a reaction against foreign imperialism. One may put its beginning at the time of Joan of Arc when the French were roused to collective resistance against English conquest. English nationalism began with the resistance to the Spanish Armada, and found its classic expression, a few years later, in Shakespeare. German and Russian nationalisms had their origin in resistance to Napoleon; American nationalism, in resistance to the Redcoats. Unfortunately, there is a psychologically natural dynamic which has almost invariably governed the development of nationalism. In the course of the struggle against foreign dominion, those who are fighting for freedom, not unnaturally, exaggerate their own merits and the demerits of the foreign oppressors. When they

ave won freedom, the beliefs formerly appropriate sur- ve and are thought to justify foreign conquest. The appeal to group self-esteem fits in so well with people's natural propensities that it is not easily combated except where there are dissident groups having a collective self-esteem at variance with that of their nation. Nelson, before the French Revolution, instructed midshipmen that they should hate a Frenchman as they would the Devil, and the young men to whom he commended this precept had no difficulty in accepting it and in continuing to believe it throughout twenty-two years of war.

Mankind survived the wars that have taken place hitherto, but it is doubtful whether survival will be possible in future wars. For this reason it has become imperative that sentiments promoting violent hostility between different groups must somehow be softened. I have spoken earlier of the need of tolerance as between Communist and Capitalist ideologies, and there is need of just the same kind of tolerance between nations. To bring this about will be no easy task, but it is one which will have to be undertaken before world peace can be secure and before any International Authority can win general acceptance. It is essentially an educational task.

III. EDUCATION

If the Great Powers can reach agreement that war is no ger to be an instrument of policy, one of the things that will have to be changed is education. Education in most countries is mainly in the hands of the national State and, therefore, tends to teach an outlook which is considered to be in the interests of the State concerned. It has not been thought, hitherto, that the interests of one State coincided with those of another. Nor, indeed, has this been true always, or even usually, in former times. It is the development of modern techniques, and, more especially, of nuclear weapons, that has made armed contests between States futile and has brought about an identity of interest between different countries far surpassing what was true at any earlier time. It follows that it is no longer to the interest of any country to emphasize its superiority to other countries or to cause its boys and girls to believe it invincible in war. Nor is it a good thing to present martial glory as what is, above all things, to be admired.

It is especially in the teaching of history that changes are called for. This applies not only in the lower grades, but just as much in the highest academic teaching.

But it is not only history that needs to be differently taught. Everything (except, perhaps, arithmetic) should be taught as part of the progress of Man, and as a series of steps in the conquest of obstacles with which he has n faced and is still faced. There is a danger that, in sing to emphasize wars, teaching will cease to be exciting, but this danger can be entirely avoided by emphasizing exciting contests with difficulties and dangers other than those of war.

There are, one may say, three great spheres of contest involved in the gradual approach of man towards wisdom.[1] There are the contests with nature, the contests between men, and the contests within a man's own self. Each of these has its own history and its own importance.

The contests with nature, which begin with the problem of securing food, lead on, step by step, to the scientific understanding of natural processes and the technical power of utilizing sources of energy. It is in this sphere that man's greatest triumphs have hitherto been won, and it is likely that many even greater triumphs will be achieved in the not very distant future. The story of man's increasing mastery over nature is inherently exciting, and is felt to be so by the young, except when it is taught in schools. It could be just as exciting in schools if teachers were adequate and the methods prescribed were appropriate. Love of adventure, which hitherto has been too often an incentive to war, can find abundant openings in the sphere of natural knowledge. . .

The second kind of conflict, namely, that of men with other men, when it consists of armed combat between groups, is the one with which we have been especially concerned in this book. It is one which, on any rational survey, must be ended if human progress is to continue. I am not contending, as a full-fledged pacifist might, that contests between different groups of men have never in the past served a useful purpose. I do not think that this would be true. . . [Bor,] It is not now barbarians who constitute the danger. On the contrary, it is those who are in the forefront of civilization. It should be one of the tasks of education to make vivid in the minds of the young both the merits of a civilized way of life and the needless dangers to which it is exposed by the survival of competitive ideals which have become archaic.

In the great majority of human beings, there is, in addition to outer conflicts, an inner conflict between different impulses and desires which are not mutually compatible. Systems of morality are intended to deal with such conflicts and, to a certain degree, they are often successful. But I think that the changing conditions of human life make changes of moral outlook necessary from time to time. One such change, which is especially necessary at the present time, is that each individual should learn to view groups of human beings other than his own as possible co-operators, rather than as probable competitors. But this whole subject is a very large one, and to pursue it would take us too far from our central theme.

What the world most needs, in education as in other departments of human life, is the substitution of hope for fear, and the realization of the splendid thing that life may be if the human family co-operatively will permit itself to realize its best potentialities.

Unilateral Disarmament

Some of my critics have laid stress upon the fact that in certain hypothetical circumstances I should think either the East or the West well advised if it disarmed unilaterally. My critics have omitted my provisos and have spoken as if I had advocated a disarmament policy for the West alone, and not equally for the East, in the circumstances supposed. My critics are not wholly to blame for this. I have been led into a purely academic issue as if it were one of practical politics. Everybody knows that neither the United States nor the USSR will disarm unilaterally. The question whether either would be wise to do so is therefore no more than an exercise in theoretical ethics. Speaking practically, and not theoretically, what I advocate is that methods should be sought of, first, lessening the East-West tension and then negotiating agreements on vexed questions on the basis of giving no net advantage to either side. Such negotiations, if they are to be satisfactory, must include the mutual renunciation of nuclear weapons with an adequate system of inspection.

It is true that I advocate practically, and not only theoretically, the abandonment of the H-bomb by Britain and the prevention of the spread of H-bombs to Powers other than the United States and the USSR. I do not consider that unilateral renunciation of British H-bombs would have any measurable effect upon the balance of power, and I do consider that the acquisition of H-bombs by many Powers will greatly increase the danger of a nuclear war. This makes the question of British renunciation of H-bombs quite distinct from that of general unilateral disarmament by one of the two camps.

The question at issue between my critics and myself arises only if all attempts at negotiation fail. My critics speak as though I wished the Government of the United States to announce that it is prepared to give way at all points, and suggest that I have no such wish as regards the Soviet Government. I think this question is quite unreal since, whatever might be the part of ideal wisdom, it is certain that neither side will surrender completely to the other. However, since the question is considered important, I will do my best to re-state my opinion more unmistakably.

To eliminate emotional factors, I shall speak of two Power Blocs, A and B, leaving it completely undetermined which of them is Communist and which anti-Communist. The argument proceeds on the hypothesis that, if there is a war between the two blocs, the human race will be exterminated. It further supposes a situation in which one of the two blocs is so fanatical that it prefers the ending of mankind to a rational compromise. In such a situation, I think that the less fanatical bloc, if it had the welfare of mankind in view, would prefer concession to warfare. I should say this equally to both sides.

There are those in both camps who think that the extermination of the human race would be a smaller evil than the victory of the 'enemy'. I regard this view, whether held by A or by B, as insane. My Western critics and some of Mr Krushchev's supporters agree when it is held by one side, but not when it is held by the other. The opinion which I have expressed, that it would be better to yield than to indulge in a nuclear war, is addressed to both parties equally, and I do not think it likely to have any more influence on the one side than on the other.

The argument that you cannot negotiate successfully if you announce in advance that, if pressed, you will yield, is entirely valid. If I were the Government of either A or B, I should make no such an announcement. But this has no bearing on the purely academic question of what it would be wise to do if the completely desperate situation arose. I must, however, once more insist that the view in favour of avoiding nuclear warfare even at great cost is one which applies to both sides equally and which, as far as I can judge, is no more unlikely to be adopted by one side than by the other. It is entirely unjust to regard the opinions that I have expressed as more useful to the one side than to the other. In fact, I have proclaimed my views to both sides equally, and my advocacy of them has been published as widely in Communist countries as in the United States.

. . . . I think that, with wise statesmanship on the part of the West and of the East, it will not be at all difficult to avoid both nuclear war and surrender. What I advocate in practice, and not as the outcome of an artificial logical dilemma, is a conclusion of agreements between East and West admitting the inevitability of co-existence and the disastrous futility of war. I wish both sides to realize that war cannot achieve anything that either side desires, and that, in consequence, points in dispute can only be settled by negotiation.

Many of my critics, though they are in the habit of proclaiming that they value freedom, on this point deceive themselves. They do not think that those who prefer life rather than death, even under Communism or under Capitalism, as the case may be, should be free to choose the alternative that they prefer. Not only the inhabitants of Communist nations—or of Capitalist nations—but the inhabitants of all the uncommitted nations are denied by them the most elementary freedom, which is freedom to choose survival. The view that No World is better than a Communist world, or that No World is better than a Capitalist World, is one that is difficult to refute by abstract arguments, but I think that those who hold it should question their right to impose their opinion upon those who do not hold it by the infliction of the death penalty upon all of them. This is an extreme form of religious persecution, going far beyond anything that has been advocated in previous human history.

HERMAN KAHN (1922-) ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR (1960)

Herman Kahn was born in Bayonne, New Jersey in 1922. After serving in the U.S. Army, 1943-45, he graduated from the University of California at Los Angeles and took a masters degree at the California Institute of Technology. From 1947 to 1960 he worked as a physicist and military analyst for the Rand Corporation, a government supported "think tank" which does research in the areas of national security and public welfare. In 1961 he founded and became director of the Hudson Institute which engages in analyses and professional forecasting about economic and foreign affairs. He worked at various times for the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S.Air Force, major aircraft manufacturers, the Atomic Energy Commission and others.Among his many books and articles, On Thermonuclear War (1960), Thinking About the Unthinkable (1962), and On Escalation (1965) have had an enormous influence on the debates which have raged over how to deal with the existence of nuclear weapons.

One of Kahn's major contributions was recognized by friend and foe alike. As one of his opponents wrote,

> The importance of ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR cannot be overestimated. Since the appearance of this book, proponents of armament and disarmament strategies have had to cope with Kahn's unassailable demonstration that policy-planners cannot simply choose between end-of-the-world nuclear annihilation and total nuclear "peace," but must be prepared to deal somehow with the possibility of a whole series of in-between states of nuclear war. All sides have benefited by this demonstration. Professional and academic military planners have been pushed to new levels of sophistication in their development of strategic alternatives, as have the opponents of nuclear armaments in their counterarguments.
>
> (Philip Green, Deadly Logic, Ohio State University Press,1966,p16)

Kahn has also been praised for his further examination of possible situations, strategies and outcomes, in Thinking About the Unthinkable and Escalation. However, he has been criticized severely in two ways. First, his opponents have criticized his estimates of probable outcomes, stressing both the uncertainty of future events, a purported lack of consideration of factors such as demoralizing psychological effects, and the assumption of rational decision-making in his projections. Such criticisms have limited force; surely an honest effort to foresee the future realistically is desirable, and oversights and uncertainties of the sort mentioned are either correctible or unavoidable. The second sort of criticism is aimed not so much at Kahn's analysis as at his arguments that we should take measures to cover all possible contingencies, and provide for limited conventional war, deterrence by multi-varied nuclear weapons systems, invulnerable retaliatory capacity, a national civil defense system, a credible first strike capacity, and vigorous research and development programs. In his stance as an honest analyst of possibilities, he has insisted on serious consideration of some proposals some people think are "unthinkable". But the distinction between analyst and advocate should be kept clear.

A third criticism pertains not so much to Kahn's analyses as to the ways they have been used. The U.S.Government and Kahn's clients have used Kahn's array of all the possible bad consequences (ranging from least bad to worst) to support enormous expenditures generating an arms race. No similar funds, or research, have been devoted to alternatives to the nationalistic, competitive, system within which the arms race takes place. It is as if, given a city ridden by a dozen street gangs, we devised ways to arm each so heavily that none would dare start a fight instead of planning some way to help them live peaceably together without each depending on their armed threats.

Kahn, and other "systems analysts", use game theory and decision theory, disciplines which involve utilitarian consideration of quantitative estimates of probable outcomes, costs and benefits. This methodology has been criticized on both moral and methodological grounds, as we shall see.

ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL STRATEGIES

Introduction

On July 16, 1960 the world entered the sixteenth year of the nuclear era. Yet we are increasingly aware that after living with nuclear bombs for fifteen years we still have a great deal to learn about the possible effects of a nuclear war. We have even more to learn about conducting international relations in a world in which force tends to be both increasingly more available and increasingly more dangerous to use, and therefore in practice increasingly unusable. As a result of this continuous secular change in the basic structure of the international situation, foreign and defense policies formulated early in the nuclear era badly need review and reformulation.

In considering these basic foreign and defense policies it is desirable to distinguish many different military postures and the corresponding possible strategies for both the United States and the Soviet Union. This treatment of thermonuclear warfare will mostly concern itself with four typical possible postures, which I will call Finite Deterrence, Counterforce as Insurance, Preattack Mobilization Base, and Credible First Strike Capability respectively. I will discuss the possibilities and implications of these postures from the point of view of the Soviet Union and the United States. While there is no reason why the two most powerful nations should have similar views, I will not initially dwell on possible asymmetries, deferring discussion of the separate national problems. A number of typical basic postures (important concepts italicized for emphasis) are listed in Table 1, roughly in order of increasing ability to wage general war.

TABLE 1

ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL POSTURES[a]

1. Internal Police Force plus "World Government"
2. *Minimum Deterrence* plus *Limited War* plus *Arms Control*
3. Add insurance to the *Minimum Deterrent:*
   - (a) for reliability (*Finite Deterrence*)
   - (b) against unreliability (*Counterforce as Insurance*)
   - (c) against a change in policy (*Preattack Mobilization Base*)
4. Add *Credible First Strike Capability*
5. "Splendid" First Strike and no Limited War Capability
6. Dreams

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1. Internal Police Force plus "World Government"

There seems to be little point in discussing the view that finds a solution in a totally disarmed world. Neither our own emotional desires nor the fact that there are many earnest proponents for this policy should sway us toward a position that ignores some of the basic realities. It has probably always been impractical to imagine a completely disarmed world, and the introduction of the thermonuclear bomb has added a special dimension to this impracticality. Given the large nuclear stockpiles in the Soviet Union, the United States, and the British Isles, it would be child's play for one of these nations to hide completely hundreds of these bombs. Even if some caches were found, one could not be sure that these were not decoys to allay suspicions, and yet there would be a great loathness to cancel the agreement just because "a few malcontents had conspired against the peace." The violator would then have an incredible advantage if the agreement ever broke down and the arms race started again. This surely means that even if all nations should one day agree to total nuclear disarmament, we must presume that there would be the hiding of some nuclear weapons or components as a hedge against the other side doing so. An international arrangement for banishing war through disarmament will not call for total disarmament but will almost undoubtedly include provisions for enforcement that cannot be successfully overturned by a small, hidden force. Otherwise, it would be hopelessly unstable. Even if the problem of what we may call the "clandestine cache" were solvable, the writer still is of the belief that one could not disarm the world totally and expect it to remain disarmed. But the problem of the clandestine nuclear cache in itself makes total disarmament especially infeasible.

While total disarmament can be ruled out as an immediate possibility, one can conceive of some sort of international authority which might have a monopoly of war-making capability. Such a postulated international authority would have to have enough power to be able to overwhelm any nation that had reserved hidden destructive potential. An international agency with a near-monopoly of force might come from any of the following possibilities (listed in order of apparent probability rather than desirability): (1) a Soviet or U.S. dominated world arising most likely out of war; (2) some other kind of postwar organization; (3) an S.U.–U.S. combination which is in effect a world government, though it may not openly be called that; (4) some of the NATO nations and China added to the above combination as influential, if not equal partners; (5) the Haves against the Have Nots, most likely without exploitation, but with stringent arms control in which authority and responsibility are roughly proportioned to military and economic development and, perhaps, with aid to underdeveloped nations; (6) a sort of World Federal state where power is proportioned to sovereignty and population as in the U.S. Congress. However, it is most doubtful in the absence of a crisis or war that a world government can be set up in the next decade. There are to date no serious proposals along such lines.[1] Certainly the official suggestions occasionally put out by the Soviet and U.S. governments are not to be taken seriously as possible solutions.

While it may seem high time to spell out practical proposals for world government, no such attempt will be made in this book. While I believe that even a poor world government might be preferable to an uncontrolled arms race, I also believe that the practical difficulties are so large that it is a digression to dwell on such possibilities as a possible solution for the problems of the sixties. And the problems of the sixties are important! About the only way "world government" and other long-run considerations affect the kind of analysis done here is the avoidance of otherwise desirable short-term measures that might seriously hinder or foreclose desirable long-term possibilities. Even this modest ambition toward shaping the seventies is difficult to realize because there are controversies over where we want to be, as well as how to get there. However, there seems to be some consensus on what we are trying to avoid even if we cannot agree on what we are for. This book will concentrate on the problem of avoiding disaster and buying time, without specifying the use of this time. This seeming unconcern for long-term objectives will distress some readers, but some of our immediate problems must be understood more clearly than in the past if we are to control the direction in which we are going. It is the hallmark of the amateur and dilettante that he has almost no interest in how to get to his particular utopia. Perhaps this is because the practical job of finding a path may be more difficult than the job of designing the goal. Let us consider, then, some of the practical military alternatives that we face in the 1960–1975 time period.

2. Minimum Deterrence plus Limited War plus Arms Control

This view, or the modest variant of it called Finite Deterrence, is probably the most widely held view in the West of what is a desir-

[1] The most serious recent attempt to describe a possible world government is given in the book, *World Peace Through World Law* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1958), by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn. One problem with proposals such as those in the Clark-Sohn book is the same problem that many of the white colonists in Africa have in trying to deal with African independence movements. If independence is granted, they are not sufficiently protected from the new government; if only limited sovereignty is granted the nonwhite population gets to be very unhappy at the attempt to maintain the unsatisfactory *status quo*. It is worth noting in this connection that it is easier to be a hero than a saint. It really would not be difficult to find thousands of Westerners willing to give up their lives for a world government of a satisfactory sort but one would find very few willing to accept Chinese or Indian standards of living, or any appreciable risk of this occurring, for either themselves or their families. Similarly, the underdeveloped nations are going to resent any real or fancied hindrances to their working out their salvation.

able and feasible strategic posture. Among the adherents to this position can be found most intellectuals interested in military affairs, staff people in the federal government, civilians who seek to qualify as "military experts" (including scientists and technicians), many military planners in the three services, and the vast majority of foreign and domestic lay analysts. What, then, is meant by Minimum Deterrence?

The notion is dramatic: It is that no nation whose decision makers are sane would attack another nation which was armed with a sufficiently large number of thermonuclear bombs. Thus all a nation that is so armed has to worry about is insanity, irresponsibility, accident, and miscalculation.

In general, the believers in Minimum Deterrence seem to view the deterrence of a rational enemy as almost a simple philosophical consequence of the *existence* of thermonuclear bombs. They argue that the decision to initiate thermonuclear war is such a momentous one—the risks are so great—that it is unlikely that such a decision will be affected by the relatively minor details of each side's military posture. One is tempted to call this "the layman's view," since people holding it show only the slightest interest in such matters as the status of the alert forces, holes in the warning networks, the range of the bombers, reliability of missiles, the degree of protection offered by current arrangements for hardening, dispersal, and concealment, and the multitude of other questions that bother sober students of the problem of retaliation. Nevertheless, the Minimum Deterrence view is held by such a surprisingly large number of experts that it may be gratuitously insulting to call it a layman's view.

An extreme form of the Minimum Deterrence theory is the view that the current strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, if used, will automatically result in world annihilation or at least mutual homicide. In 1955, fifty-two Nobel laureates signed a statement (the Mainau Declaration) which included the following: "*All* nations must come to the decision to renounce force as a final resort of policy. If they are not prepared to do this they will *cease to exist*." There is a beautiful simplicity about this statement. It does not differentiate between attacker and defender, belligerent and neutral, Northern and Southern Hemisphere, but simply says *all* nations. It does not talk about degree of damage but simply says *cease to exist*.

. . . .

Why do reasonably sober and knowledgeable people hold some version of this view of automatic mutual annihilation? In this first lecture, I will try to describe some of the data and calculations that have given rise to these cataclysmic expectations and explain why the situation is not, at least for the immediate future, as they describe it.

A thermonuclear war is quite likely to be an *unprecedented catastrophe* for the defender. Depending on the military course of events, it may or may not be an unprecedented catastrophe for the attacker, and for some neutrals as well. But an "unprecedented" catastrophe can be a far cry from an "unlimited" one. Most important of all, sober study shows that *the limits on the magnitude of the catastrophe seem to be closely dependent on what kinds of preparations have been made, and on how the war is started and fought.*

While the notions in the above paragraph may strike some readers as being obvious, I must repeat that they are by no means so. The very existence of the irreconcilable group predicting total catastrophe is proof. One can divide military thinkers into two classes: those who believe that any war would result in no less than mutual annihilation, and those who feel this is not necessarily so or even that it is in all likelihood wrong. The latter group is probably correct, at least for the military capabilities that are likely to be available in the next decade or so. Yet on the whole they have not done very much "homework" to prove their point. The total disaster group has done a great deal of homework. This could mean that the first group is likely for a time to win many an argument on this question.

This concept of mutual homicide, sure and certain, has in many ways been peculiarly comforting to those holding it. It makes plausible the conviction that when governments are informed of the terrible consequences of a nuclear war they will realize there could be no victors. There would be no sense to such a war. Would a sane leader ever start such a cataclysm? Of course not. The expected violence of war would deter him. Those who hold this comforting concept may even get angry at anyone who ventures to assay estimates of the precise degree of risk which a "successful" attacker might actually face.

The mutual homicide theory yields other comforts. If one grants that each side will utterly destroy the other, one must also grant that expensive preparations to reduce casualties, lessen damage, and facilitate postwar recuperation are useless. Can we not spare ourselves the financial burden of such preparations? The "logic" has sometimes been carried further, some arguing that modern weapons are so enormously destructive that only a few are needed to deter the enemy. Therefore, the argument goes, war can be deterred with much smaller forces than in the past; in any case we certainly do not need more.

The view from this plateau is attractive to many groups who are determined on disarmament and certain types of arms control. For them, the Minimum Deterrence notion implies a certain kind of automatic stability which makes it safe to be casual about both agreements and possible violations. One must concede that the very concept of Minimum Deterrence implies that the two nations involved have in effect signed a reliable nonaggression treaty with their populations as hostages to insure adherence to this treaty; the only strategic problem that seems to be left is an accidental or unauthorized violation of this nonaggression "treaty." It is such possibilities that are the subject of arms control negotiations.

The mutual annihilation view is also comforting to many idealistic individuals, particularly to those who have an intrinsic abhorrence of any use of force. The bizarreness of a war in which both sides expect to get annihilated confirms their intuition that this whole business of military preparations is silly: a stupid and dangerous game which we ought to discourage nations—our own country, at least—from playing. At the same time these idealists can afford to scoff at attempts to reduce casualties from, say, 100 million to 50 million Americans, reflecting that the situation is hopeless anyway and that the only Respectable Cause is the total elimination of war. They regard programs other than their own as foolish or sinister and designed to cause people discomfort by making it sound plausible that there really is a national security problem toward the relief of which considerable amounts of money, energy, and intelligence need to be allocated. . . .

3. *Three Kinds of Insurance*

The next view of what could result in a satisfactory strategic capability adds several kinds of "insurance" to the simple Minimum Deterrence position.[4] There are at least three kinds of insurance which a survival-conscious person might wish to add, the first being *Insurance for Reliability*. We will label the view that *worries about the details* of obtaining a "punishing" retaliation, but does not want any more strategic capability than this, the *Finite Deterrence* strategy.[5] In many ways, and with some inconsistencies, this is the official U.S. view. The believers in Finite Deterrence do not quite accept the idea that reliable deterrence can be obtained simply by stocking thermonuclear bombs and having a weapon system which could deliver these bombs in peacetime. They notice that when the problem of retaliation is studied, rather than asserted, it is difficult to retaliate effectively, since the enemy can do many things to prevent, hinder, or negate retaliation. . . .

The advocate of Finite Deterrence wants enough forces to cover *all* contingencies. He may even want mixed forces, considering that it may be possible for a clever enemy to discover an unexpected countermeasure against a single kind of force no matter how large. Thus he may well want different types of missiles, bombers, strategic submarines, aircraft carriers, and so forth. In addition, sober advocates of Finite Deterrence wish to have the various weapons systems so deployed and operated that they will have a guaranteed capability, even in a crisis in which the enemy has taken extraordinary measures to negate the capability. They want these forces dispersed, protected, and alert; the arrangements for command, control, and communications must be able to withstand degradation by both peacetime and wartime tactics of the enemy. These sober believers in Finite Deterrence tend to insist on an objective capability as opposed to one that is only "psychological." And even those believers in Finite Deterrence who would be satisfied with a façade yearn for an impressive-looking façade. One might characterize the Finite Deterrence position as an expert

version of the Minimum Deterrence position, held by an expert who wants to look good to other experts.

The notion of Finite Deterrence is therefore not as dramatic as the notion of Minimum Deterrence. The believer in Finite Deterrence is willing to concede that it takes some effort to guarantee Mutual Homicide, that it is not automatic. However, the notion of Finite Deterrence is still dramatic, since most followers of this doctrine believe that *the advent of thermonuclear bombs has changed the character of an all-out war in such a way that if both opponents are prepared the old-fashioned distinctions between victory, stalemate, and defeat no longer have much meaning.* It was once believed that if one country had forces twice as large as those of another country, the first country was the stronger. Those who believe in Finite Deterrence challenge this view. Sometimes they rest their case on this idea: the only purpose of strategic forces is to deter rather than to fight; once one has the ability to damage seriously, say, 10 or 20 enemy cities, this is enough force to deter, and therefore enough force. More often, backers of Finite Deterrence take a more extreme position. They argue that you can do no more than kill somebody once, to overkill by a factor of ten is no more desirable than overkilling by a factor of two—it is simply a waste of effort.

. . . . some believers in Finite Deterrence think it is important for us to disabuse ourselves of the idea that there can be any circumstance in which it makes sense to attack the Soviet Union, and they want us to adopt a posture which makes it clear to the Soviets that we are so disabused. As part of this posture we should make as few preparations as possible to alleviate the effects of the war or protect ourselves from a Soviet retaliatory strike. This will convince the Soviets that we do not intend to attack them except in retaliation; they will then be able to relax and not be trigger-happy. As one (partial) adherent to Finite Deterrence, Oskar Morgenstern, explained: "In order to preserve a nuclear stalemate under conditions of nuclear plenty it is necessary for *both* sides to possess invulnerable retaliatory forces. . . . it is in the interest of the United States for Russia to have an invulnerable retaliatory force and vice versa [i.e., one may wish to strengthen the enemy and weaken oneself]." [7]

Many who accept the Finite Deterrence view have another reason for not defending or protecting anything but the retaliatory capability; they see no need for programs to protect people and property, because they think it is not feasible to protect either people or property. These people often argue that it does not matter whether one dies immediately from blast, heat, or radiation, or dies later from the effects of radioactivity, disease, or starvation—as long as one is going to die. And they go on to assert that modern war is so horrible that everyone or almost everyone will be killed immediately—or will eventually be destroyed by one of the aftereffects.

Insurance Against Unreliability. Some of the proponents of Finite Deterrence do not have an antipathy toward all forms of counterforce. They are willing to insure against unreliability. That is, even though deterrence has been made as reliable as they think it can be made, they realize that it may still fail; for example, from accident, human irrationality, miscalculation, or unauthorized behavior. Given this nonzero probability of a war, they find it difficult not to go through the motions of doing "something" to mitigate its effects.

. . . . *Actually, when one examines the possible effects of thermonuclear war carefully, one notices that there are indeed many postwar states that should be distinguished.* If most people do not or cannot distinguish among these states it is because the gradations occur as a result of a totally bizarre circumstance—a thermonuclear war. The mind recoils from thinking hard about that; one prefers to believe it will never happen. If asked, "How does a country look on the day of the war?" the only answer a reasonable person can give is "awful." It takes an act of iron will or an unpleasant degree of detachment or callousness to go about the task of distinguishing among the possible degrees of awfulness.

But surely one can ask a more specific question. For example, *"How does a country look five or ten years after the close of war, as a function of three variables: (1) the preparations made before the war, (2) the way the war started, and (3) the course of military events?"* Both very sensitive and very callous individuals should be able to distinguish (and choose, perhaps) between a country which survives a war with, say, 150 million people and a gross national product (GNP) of $300 billion a year, and a nation which emerges with only 50 million people and a GNP of $10 billion. The former would be the richest and the fourth largest nation in the world, and one which would be able to restore a reasonable facsimile of the prewar society; the latter would be a pitiful remnant that would contain few traces of the prewar way of life. When one asks this kind of question and examines the circumstances and possible outcomes of a future war in some detail, it appears that it is useful and necessary to make many distinctions among the results of thermonuclear war. The figures in Table 3 illustrate some simple distinctions which one may wish to make at the outset of his deliberations in this field.

TABLE 3

TRAGIC BUT DISTINGUISHABLE POSTWAR STATES

Dead	*Economic Recuperation*
2,000,000	1 year
5,000,000	2 years
10,000,000	5 years
20,000,000	10 years
40,000,000	20 years
80,000,000	50 years
160,000,000	100 years

Will the survivors envy the dead?

Here I have tried to make the point that if we have a posture which might result in 40 million dead in a general war, and as a result of poor planning, apathy, or other causes, our posture deteriorates and a war occurs with 80 million dead, we have suffered an additional disaster, an *unnecessary* additional disaster that is almost as bad as the original disaster. If on the contrary, by spending a few billion dollars, or by being more competent or lucky, we can cut the number of dead from 40 to 20 million, we have done something vastly worth doing! The survivors will not dance in the streets or congratulate each other if there have been 20 million men, women, and children killed; yet it would have been a worthwhile achievement to limit casualties to this number. It is very difficult to get this point across to laymen or experts with enough intensity to move them to action. The average citizen has a dour attitude toward planners who say that if we do thus and so it will not be 40 million dead—it will be 20 million dead. Somehow the impression is left that the planner said that there will be *only* 20 million dead. To him is often attributed the idea that this will be a tolerable or even, astonishingly enough, a desirable state!

The rate of economic recuperation, like the number of lives saved, is also of extreme importance. Very few Americans can get interested in spending money or energy on preparations which, even if they worked, would result in preindustrial living standards for the survivors of a war. As will be explained later, our analysis indicates that if a country is moderately well prepared to use the assets which survive there is unlikely to be a critical level of damage to production. A properly prepared country is not "killed" by the destruction of even a major fraction of its wealth; it is more likely to be set back a given number of years in its economic growth. While recuperation times may range all the way from one to a hundred years, even the latter is far different from the "end of history."

Perhaps the most important item on the table of distinguishable states is not the numbers of dead or the number of years it takes for economic recuperation; rather, it is the question at the bottom: "Will the survivors envy the dead?" It is in some sense true that one may never recuperate from a thermonuclear war. The world may be permanently (i.e., for perhaps 10,000 years) more hostile to human life as a result of such a war. Therefore, if the question, "Can we restore the prewar conditions of life?" is asked, the answer must be "No!" But there are other relevant questions to be asked. For example: "How much more hostile will the environment be? Will it be so hostile that we or our descendants would prefer being dead than alive?" Perhaps even more pertinent is this question, "How happy or normal a life can the survivors and their descendants

hope to have?" *Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, objective studies indicate that even though the amount of human tragedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the increase would not preclude normal and happy lives for the majority of survivors and their descendants.*

My colleagues and I came to this conclusion reluctantly; not because we did not *want* to believe it, but because it is so *hard* to believe. Thermonuclear bombs are so destructive, and destructive in so many ways, that it is difficult to imagine that there would be anything left after their large-scale use. One of my tasks with The RAND Corporation was to serve as project leader for a study of the possibilities for alleviating the consequences of a thermonuclear war. That study was made as quantitatively and objectively as we could make it with the resources, information, and intellectual tools available to us. *We concluded that for at least the next decade or so, any picture of total world annihilation appears to be wrong, irrespective of the military course of events.*[8] Equally important, the picture of total disaster is likely to be wrong even for the two antagonists. Barring an extraordinary course for the war, or that most of the technical uncertainties turn out to lie at the disastrous end of the spectrum, one and maybe both of the antagonists should be able to restore a reasonable semblance of prewar conditions quite rapidly. Typical estimates run between one and ten years for a reasonably successful and well-prepared attacker and somewhat longer for the defender, depending mainly on the tactics of the attacker and the preparations of the defender. In the RAND study we tried to avoid using optimistic assumptions. With the exceptions to be noted, we used what were in our judgment the best values available, or we used slightly pessimistic ones. We believe that the situation is likely to be better than we indicate, rather than worse, though the latter possibility cannot be ruled out.

Exactly what is it that one must believe if he is to be convinced that it is worth while to buy Counterforce as Insurance? Listed below are eight phases of a thermonuclear war. If our decision makers are to justify the expense (and possible risk of strategic destabilization) that would be incurred in trying to acquire a capability for alleviating the consequences of a war, they must believe they can successfully negotiate each and every one of these phases, or that there is a reasonable chance that they can negotiate each of these phases.

TABLE 4

A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF A THERMONUCLEAR WAR

Includes the Analysis of:

1. Various time-phased programs for deterrence and defense and their possible impact on us, our allies, and others.
2. Wartime performance with different preattack and attack conditions.
3. Acute fallout problems.
4. Survival and patch-up.
5. Maintenance of economic momentum.
6. Long-term recuperation.
7. Postwar medical problems.
8. Genetic problems.

I repeat: To survive a war it is necessary to negotiate *all eight* stages. If there is a catastrophic failure in any one of them, there will be little value in being able to cope with the other seven. Differences among exponents of the different strategic views can often be traced to the different estimates they make on the difficulty of negotiating one or more of these eight stages. While all of them present difficulties, most civilian military experts seem to consider the *last six* the critical ones. Nevertheless, most discussions among "classical" military experts concentrate on the *first two*. To get a sober and balanced view of the problem, one must examine all *eight*.

[8] *Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense*, The RAND Corporation, Report R-322-RC, July 1, 1958.

Once one accepts the idea that deterrence is not absolutely reliable and that it would be possible to survive a war, then he may be willing to buy insurance—to spend money on preparations to decrease the number of fatalities and injuries, limit damage, facilitiate recuperation, and to get the best military result possible—at least "to prevail" in some meaningful sense if you cannot win.

Insurance Against a Change in Policy. One of the things which I will try to make clear in Lectures II and III is that *the military problem really is complicated and that it is impossible for fallible human beings to predict ahead of time exactly what capabilities they will wish or need.* This does not mean, of course, that one has to buy everything. Resources may not be as limited as some of the more budget-minded people think, but they are still quite limited. However, it does mean that whenever it is *cheap* to do so (and sometimes when it is moderately expensive), we should be willing to hedge against changes in our desires. The fact that it is expensive to buy and maintain a complete spectrum of military capabilities in being does not mean that we should not have what might be called "mobilization bases" for a complete spectrum of adequate military capabilities. The government, relying on current doctrine, current military capabilities, its estimates of the capabilities and intentions of potential enemies, or some aspects of the political situation, might be satisfied with current allocations for national defense. But it should still be willing to hedge against the possibility that circumstances may so change that the reluctance to spend money will also change, either increasing or decreasing. This hedging can be accomplished by spending a relatively small amount on advance planning and physical preparations. We will then be in a position where we can make the most rapid and effective use of larger funds if they become available, or we will be able to get the most value out of a smaller military budget if it seems desirable to cut back on expenditures.

There are many different kinds of programs that come under the heading "Hedging Against a Change in Policy." It is obvious that there is need for very broad research and development programs. While research is not cheap, it is far from true that research is so expensive that it can be afforded only on clearly needful items. The opposite is true. The penalty for not having researched on an item that turns out to be useful is so great that we must have an extremely broad program to be certain that all the things that could conceivably be useful will in fact be investigated. Development is somewhat more expensive than research. As a result, we cannot afford to have quite as broad a menu. But even here we should *develop* many more items than we actually *procure*. We may also procure some systems in part, even if we do not feel they are absolutely needful. Requirements can change.

. . . . while it might be our policy at a given moment to fight limited wars with atomic weapons, we may still be glad to have a large reserve force armed with conventional high-explosive equipment. After all, it is relatively cheap to keep up such reserves, and we recognize that we might change our minds—as we did in Korea. The existence of such a force could enable us to fight a war which otherwise we would have to lose by default, simply because we were unwilling to use nuclear weapons when the occasion actually arose.

There is a special type of mobilization base which I will call a "Preattack Mobilization Base." This can be extremely important. It is a capability for being able to improve rapidly our ability to fight or to threaten to fight either a limited or a general war. It includes preparations for putting in *adequate civil defense programs*. It also includes the procurement of very long *lead time* items for our strategic air defense and air offense, so that by just spending money rapidly we could bring all of these capabilities up to an adequate level. There is a very broad spectrum of preparations possible here. One kind of preparation would be useful only if a situation occurred in which substantial tactical warning (hours) was available; another set of preparations would be most useful in situations in which we had strategic warning—days, weeks, or even months. And still another set of preparations could be made to improve our ability to compensate for a possible deterioration in the international situation or an increase in our standards for an acceptable level of defense.

4. Credible First Strike Capability

The next position on Table 1, that there are circumstances in which a nation may wish to have a Credible First Strike Capability, may seem to many Americans like a possibility for the Soviets—but not for us. One sees many statements to the effect that "We will never strike first." In the context in which the remark is usually made (a "dastardly" surprise attack out of the blue against an unprepared enemy), this position is undoubtedly correct. Such a capability would not be worth much to the U.S. However, we have many treaties and other obligations. There is the obligation to come to the aid of NATO nations if they are attacked. It is generally supposed that this aid includes the use of our SAC against the Soviet heartland, even if the Soviets attack Europe *but not the United States*. From a technical point of view this means that in this instance *we* would strike *first!* The agonizing decision to start an all-out thermonuclear war would be ours. Surely there is a serious question whether we would live up to our treaty obligations under such circumstances. . . .

A thermonuclear balance of terror is equivalent to the signing of a nonaggression treaty which states that neither the Soviets nor the Americans will initiate an all-out attack, no matter how provoking the other side may become. Sometimes people do not understand the full implications of this figurative nonaggression treaty. Let me illustrate what it can mean if we accept absolutely the notion that there is no provocation that would cause us to strike the Soviets other than an immediately impending or an actual Soviet attack on the United States. Imagine that the Soviets have taken a very drastic action against our allies in Europe. Let the action be as extreme or shocking as the reader's imagination permits. Suppose, for example, that the Soviets have dropped bombs on London, Berlin, Rome, Paris, and Bonn *but have made no detectable preparations for attacking the United States, and our retaliatory force looks good enough to deter them from such an attack.* As far as we can tell they have done this horrible deed simply to demonstrate their strength and resolve. Suppose also that there is a device which restrains the President of the United States from acting for about twenty-four hours. It is probably true that if the President were not restrained he would order an attack on the S.U. (even if he had previously bought either the Minimum Deterrence or Finite Deterrence positions that no sane decision maker initiates a thermonuclear war against an enemy who can retaliate). However, we have assumed the existence of a 24-hour device which forces him to stop and think and make his decision in cold blood. The President would presumably call together his advisors during this time. Most of the advisors would probably urge strongly that the U.S. fulfill its obligations by striking the Soviet Union. Now let us further suppose that the President is also told by his advisors that even though we will kill almost every Russian *civilian*, we will not be able to destroy all of the Soviet strategic forces, and that these surviving Soviet forces will (by radiation or strontium-90 or something else) kill every American in their retaliatory blow—all 180 million of us.

Is it not difficult to believe that under these hypothetical circumstances any President of the United States would initiate a thermonuclear war by all-out retaliation against the Soviets with the Strategic Air Command? Few would contend that there is any plausible public policy which would justify ending life for everyone. . . . .

If 180 million dead is too high a price to pay for punishing the Soviets for their aggression, what price would we be willing to pay? This is a hard and unpleasant question. I have discussed this question with many Americans, and after about fifteen minutes of discussion their estimates of an acceptable price generally fall between 10 and 60 million, clustering toward the upper number. (Their first reaction, incidentally, is usually that the U.S. would *never* be deterred from living up to its obligations by fear of a Soviet counterblow—an attitude that invariably disappears after some minutes of reflection.) The way one seems to arrive at the upper limit of 60 million is rather interesting. He takes one-third of a country's population, in other words somewhat less than half. No American that I have spoken to who was at all serious about the matter believed that any U.S. action, limited or unlimited, would be justified—no matter what our commitments were—if more than half of our population would be killed in retaliation.

. . . .

It should now be clear what I mean by a Credible First Strike Capability. Credibility does not involve the question "Do we or the Soviets have the capability to hurt the other side on a first strike?" It is well known that this capability exists and in all likelihood will continue to exist. Credibility depends on being willing to accept the other side's retaliatory blow. It depends on the harm *he* can do, not on the harm *we* can do. It depends as much on *air defense* and *civil defense* as on *air offense*. It depends on *will* as well as *capability*. It depends on the *provocation* and on the *state of our mind* when the provocation occurs. One should also note that being able to use a Credible First Strike Capability to influence Soviet or European behavior depends not only on our will, but also on Soviet and European estimates of our will. Serious problems may be created for us if either of them does not believe in our willingness to attack under certain kinds of provocation.

. . . . No matter what our *declared policy* might be, our *actual policy* could be probed. Most important of all, it is difficult to believe, in the absence of adequate measure for air defense and civil defense, that the Europeans will have faith in our declared policy when it is strained. The Soviets may be able to make their gains more easily by working on the will and resolve of the Europeans than by working on ours. We must convince the Europeans as well as the Russians of our resolve if we are to prevent appeasement or an undue degree of accommodation.

Unclassified published estimates of the casualties that the United States would suffer in a nuclear war generally run around 50 to 80 million. If these estimates are relevant (which is doubtful since they generally assume a Soviet surprise attack on an unalert United States), we are already deterred from living up to our alliance obligations. If these casualty estimates are not relevant, then we ought to make relevant estimates for now and the future.

The critical point is whether the Soviets and the Europeans believe that we can keep our casualties to a level we would find acceptable, whatever that level may be. In such an eventuality the Soviets would be deterred from such provocative acts as a ground attack on Europe, Hitler-type blackmail threats, or evacuation of their cities and presentation to us of an ultimatum. But if they do not believe that we can keep casualties to a level we would find acceptable, the Soviets may feel safe in undertaking these extremely provocative adventures; or at least the Europeans may believe that the Soviets will feel safe, and this in itself creates an extremely dangerous negotiating situation—one in which the possibility of extreme pressure and blackmail will always be in the background, if not the foreground.

The situation is actually worse than the mere estimate of the casualties or economic damage is likely to indicate. The most crucial and difficult question is the one asked at the bottom of the table: "Will the survivors envy the dead?" Unless the President believes that the postwar world will be worth living in, he will in all likelihood be deterred from living up to our alliance obligations. We must give some attention to the conditions of postwar life, to the full impact of a thermonuclear war as indicated in Table 4 . . .

5. "Splendid" First Strike and no Limited War Capability

It is difficult for most people to believe that any nation would initiate a thermonuclear war against an opponent capable of retaliation no matter what capabilities it had and no matter how much it was provoked; nevertheless, there are many military planners who oppose having limited war capabilities to handle modest provocations. They say this is a diversion of our resources from more important and essential central war capabilities. They seem to feel that our strategic force can be so effective in Soviet eyes that they would not dare to provoke us in even a minor way. They also believe that if the Soviets did provoke us we should then hit them at "a time and place of our choosing," thereby punishing the Soviets for their provocation. This is, roughly speaking, the massive retaliation theory as enunciated by former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. While a Credible First Strike Capability to correct or avenge a limited but major aggression also involves massive retaliation, the distinction is that it is massive retaliation over *major* issues, not minor ones. It should also be clear that if the terror in the "balance

of terror" intensifies, the line between major and minor issues will shift so that the level of provocation we will accept without triggering SAC will increase.

Anyone who studies even superficially the likely effects of thermonuclear war will inevitably reach certain conclusions. Chief among these is the idea that *even if one could launch a very successful first strike, the net damage, if only from the backlash (i.e., the fallout on the U.S. and the world from the bombs dropped on Russia, not to speak of the Russian people who would be killed), would make it unreasonable to make such a strike on a minor issue.* Is it not true that if we were to launch such a war it would not be over the minor issue bothering us but really because we had decided to engage in a form of preventive war? In the real world we would have to worry about far more than just the backlash from our blow; we would have to worry about Soviet retaliatory action. For such *practical* reasons alone, not to speak of vitally important moral and political ones, the notion of having a "Splendid" First Strike Capability seems fanciful.

6. Dreams

If a "Splendid" First Strike Capability seems in the light of facts and reason to be fanciful, it is no less strange than many of the ideas which make the rounds in Washington or in European capitals. In such places one finds consideration given to very implausible notions. One of these is a conflict in which a thermonuclear blow is followed by a three-year war of production accompanied by the kind of mobilization we had in World War II. Another is the notion that the enemy can go ahead and strike us first, but that our defenses would keep us essentially untouched, and that we in turn can strike back and then survey the situation. There is the fervid belief in the possibility of a "leakproof" active defense system. There is the concept of a long-drawn-out conflict, a "broken backed war," waged with conventional weapons because both sides have simultaneously used up all their nuclear weapons. There is the claim that in a thermonuclear war it is important to keep the sea lanes open. And there is the quaint idea that the main purpose of civil defense is to support a thermonuclear war effort with men and materials. Or the equally quaint notion that after a massive interchange of thermonuclear bombs the major objective of the U.S. Army forces in the United States will not be civilian recuperation but to move to a (destroyed) port of embarkation for movement overseas. While all of these views are most implausible, they can be found in various types of official and semiofficial statements.

Where do such ideas come from? They generally result, it can be assumed, from doctrinal lags or from position papers which primarily reflect a very narrow departmental interest or which are the result of log-rolling compromises between several partisan departments of the government. We are fortunate that on the whole these views are no longer taken seriously even by many of the decision makers who sign the papers. Unfortunately, this does not prevent the papers themselves from influencing public opinion and policy to an important extent.

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In this book only the following strategic positions will be considered seriously: Finite Deterrence, Counterforce as Insurance, Preattack Mobilization Base, and Credible First Strike Capability—*all* with varying degrees of Arms Control and Limited War Capability. The burden of my discussion will be on the nature, feasibility, and problems associated with each of these strategies, with the purpose of suggesting which one should be the basis of national policy. Our national policy at this writing seems to be drifting (mostly as a result of decisions evaded or decided for relatively minor technical reasons) toward accepting a strategy between Finite Deterrence and Counterforce as Insurance. ***It is one of my main arguments that at least for the immediate future we should be somewhere between the Preattack Mobilization Base and the Credible First Strike Capability.*** This posture would have, at least, enough capability to launch a first strike in the kind of tense situation that would result from an outrageous Soviet provocation, so as to induce uncertainty in the enemy as to whether it would not be safer to attack us directly rather than provoke us. The posture should have enough of a retaliatory capability to make this direct attack unattractive. It should have enough of a Preattack Mobilization Base to enable us to increase our first strike and retaliatory capabilities rapidly enough so that, if international relations deteriorate seriously, we will be able to acquire sufficient power in time to control or influence events. There should be enough Counterforce as Insurance so that if a war occurs anyway—perhaps as a result of accident or miscalculation—the nation will continue and unnecessary death and destruction will not occur. And lastly, the posture should include enough Arms Control and Limited War Capability to deter and correct "minor" conflicts and to make the day-to-day course of international relations livable until more permanent and stable arrangements are set up.

SOVIET PHILOSOPHERS on PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE (1972)

The selections which follow are from a book entitled Problems of War and Peace; A Critical Analysis of Bourgeois Theories, published by the Progress Publishers in Moscow in 1972. It is an English translation of the original Russian, by Bryan Bean. The book was prepared by members of the staff of the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, with contributions from members of various other Moscow research institutes.

In general, the contributions in this volume repeat again and again the standard doctrines on war and peace enunciated by Lenin: in the past, and as long as capitalism lasts, war will be caused by the conflicts between the exploiting and the exploited classes; only when communism covers the world will the causes of war disappear. In the meantime the socialist and communist countries must defend themselves against the capitalist nations, and should support the "just" wars of liberation fought by exploited classes against their exploiters.

But we also find some interesting comments in the first of these selections which shows the connection, as perceived by T.R.Kondratkov, between the communist positions on war and peace, and Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and, above all, von Clausewitz. That "war is the continuation of politics by other means" is accepted as a basic truth; but it is supplemented by insistence that "politics" ultimately is always an expression of the class struggle; thus war is a continuation of the class struggle by other means. The big question then becomes whether a given war is simply a struggle between competing capitalist nations for commercial dominance (as in World War I), or a war in which one side is an exploited class trying to avoid or shake off exploitation.

More interesting in the present context, is the question of how communists relate the concept of nuclear war to Marxist-Leninist theory. Not unexpectedly, the first writer emphasizes the fact that the first nation to develop and use an atomic weapon was the capitalist nation, the United States, and that it was used against civilians. The initiation and continuation of the nuclear arms race is laid at the doorstep of this nation together with its allies in NATO. Among the "bourgeois" or "imperialist" (i.e., American) "ideologists" (i.e., theorists) the author distinguishes H.Kahn as one who as "the Clausewitz of the nuclear age" admits nuclear war as an instrument of America's "imperialistic" policy. But he also recognizes that some other "imperialist" thinkers argue for limited war only, while some reject nuclear war as an acceptable instrument of national policy. Marxist-Leninists, he says, oppose nuclear war (though not all wars) and he blames the nuclear arms race on the imperialist powers. The second selection, by A.N.Kalyadin, presents the more or less official Soviet position on nuclear arms; they seek the elimination of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, and proposes a conference of the (then) five nuclear powers to consider disarmament questions. Disarmament (though without mention of methods of verification) is their alternative to deterrence theory, which they strongly reject. Once again, Kahn and and some of the later strategies he explored are the focal point of objections, though more moderate American approaches (ascribed to Soviet development of nuclear arms) are recognized. The writer rejects American charges of insincerity on the part of the Russians. The final selection, by G.I.Gerasimov, on the theory of games and international affairs, is a rather thoughtful and penetrating critique of the kind of thinking which governs the military and foreign policy researches of "think tanks" like the Rand Corporation. Without rejecting such research out of hand, he raises interesting questions concerning its appropriateness with respect to foreign affairs and the possibility that deterrence policies, for example, may be a result of employing methods of analysis which are inappropriate to the subject matter.

I have given little information on the individual contributors mentioned, but perhaps this is not so important when conformity to a Party line governs. The question can be raised, of course, whether the views here expressed are merely presented for propaganda purposes, as anti-communists assert; but even if this is so, they represent serious challenges to our alternative policies.

T.R.Kondratkov,

"Politics and War in Our Time"

Today mankind is deeply concerned as to whether war can be eliminated from the life of society and permanent peace established, or whether the terrible threat of war is destined to continue to hang over us, a threat to our future, and indeed, in present conditions, to the very existence of life on our planet.

Two ideologies—the Marxist-Leninist and the bourgeois—are locked in a fierce struggle over this question, and represent opposite world outlooks, methods of enquiry and class-political standpoints.

Every war in the past represented a method of solving certain social and international conflicts, an extreme means of overcoming antagonisms between classes, peoples and states. Times changed, one social order was superseded by another, and the forms and means of armed struggle were developed and improved, but war remained what it had always been—an instrument of politics. The ruling exploiter classes always resorted to war with the object of strengthening and extending their own power, in order to implement their policy of subjugating the working masses and in order to oppress and enslave other peoples. Lenin noted that it was the reactionary classes who were usually the first to resort to force, and "placed the bayonet on the agenda".[1]

At the same time, the progressive, revolutionary classes and peoples were, and still are compelled to resort to war as an extreme measure in their struggle against their oppressors. Lenin stressed that no revolutionary class can renounce revolutionary war.[2] But to the progressive forces in society war is abhorrent and they only resort to it with the object of defending themselves from the forces of counter-revolution. As Engels put it, "... when there is no reactionary force that must be overthrown, there can be no question of revolutionary force...".[3]

Many philosophers, sociologists and political and military figures of the past pointed out the close relationship that exists between war and politics. At the stage of slave-owning society, Plato and Aristotle regarded war as one of the means of achieving political objects, and the art of war as a part of the art of politics, "the art of statecraft".[4] Hegel considered the object of the policy of the state to be "the Universal Spirit", and held that the power of the state and its policy lay "in Reason". He demonstrated on the basis of numerous examples from history that "the armies were used for particular expeditions, suggested by policy".[5] The famous Russian general Kutuzov also emphasised the relationship between war and politics. In 1811 he remarked that "political circumstances will indicate the kind of war".[6]

But, as we have already seen, it was the German military theorist Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) who gave the fullest picture of the relationship between war and politics prior to Marx. In his book *On War* he employed the Hegelian dialectic and generalised on the experience of the Napoleonic wars to establish the essential connection between war and politics. War, he wrote, is not an independent act, but depends on political relations, on politics. It always arises from the political situation and is invariably caused by political motives. It represents the continuation of politics by other means, and is in fact an instrument of politics. War is politics substituting "the sword for the pen". Since war is a part of politics, it naturally assumes the features and character of politics and should be measured by the political yardstick. "When politics become more mighty and puissant then so does war."[7]

War is an act of violence. In war everything is subordinated to the law of settlement by military force. The scale on which force is employed and the intensity of the armed conflict depend on the political aim pursued. The political aim is the measure of both the end being pursued by means of military action and the necessary military efforts. It is thus "senseless to subordinate the political standpoint to the military".[8]

These propositions represented the high water mark of bourgeois thought on the problem of war. They were duly praised by the classics of Marxism-Leninism. Engels referred to Clausewitz as a "star of the first magnitude" in German military literature, and Lenin called him one of the very great writers on questions of military history.

Clausewitz employed Hegel's idealist dialectic to reveal the relationship between war and politics and it left its mark on his views too. Clausewitz treated politics from the idealist standpoint, without reference to economic factors, the class struggle, or the character of the social order. He thus regarded politics as the "Reason of the state personified", and "representative of the interests of the whole of society". Moreover, by politics he intended only foreign policy, and completely ignored the home policy of the ruling class. Since he did not understand the class nature of politics and their material roots, Clausewitz failed to perceive the true essence of war, its content and character, the economic and socio-political class factors that underlie it. He held that all wars were historically necessary and lawful. In short, his views were circumscribed within the narrow framework of the bourgeois idealist outlook of his age.

Some modern bourgeois ideologists studying the problem of war and peace lavish excessive praise on Clausewitz, crediting him with more than he really deserves. Thus, the French sociologist and historian C. Rougeron writes in his preface to a French edition of Clausewitz's *On War* that he was "the greatest military classic of all times". The West German military historian W. R. Schramm describes him as "the only military philosopher of lasting importance that Europe has produced".

Such exaggeration of the role of Clausewitz is not only a distortion of historical truth, but an instrument used to belittle the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the relationship between war and politics.

In fact, however, Marxism-Leninism brought about a complete revolution in views of war and politics, providing the first scientific interpretation of them, banishing idealism, metaphysics and sophistry. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of war and politics naturally did not appear out of the blue, and it absorbed all that was best and progressive in earlier military theory. Nevertheless it is by no means a restatement of Clausewitz's views but represents a qualitatively new, higher stage, a highly original system of views.

The fact that Marxism-Leninism accepts the words of the formula that war is the continuation of politics by violent means should not be allowed to mask the totally different content with which materialists and idealists imbue it. The Marxist-Leninist theory of war and politics is based on the principles of dialectical materialism, on elucidation of the material, economic factors that underlie and determine politics, and on analysis of their class nature. Military theorists of the NATO countries prefer to ignore this aspect, thereby revealing their biased, hostile attitude to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

War is a part of the whole, a part of politics. The dialectic of the part and the whole, of war and politics, is of a contradictory nature. Thus, Lenin wrote: "With reference to wars, the main thesis of dialectics, which has been so shamelessly distorted by Plekhanov to please the bourgeoisie, is that *'war is simply the continuation of politics by other* [i.e., violent] *means'*.

"And it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded *any* war as the continuation of the politics of the powers concerned—and the *various classes* within these countries—in a definite period."

Politics occupy the dominant position in relation to war. The content of a war, its essence, character and causes cannot be understood without reference to the politics of the respective

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[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 346.
[2] Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 39.
[3] Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Band 38, S. 489-90.
[4] Aristotle, *Politics*, Saint-Petersburg, 1911, p. 22 (in Russian).
[5] Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, New York, 1900, p. 308.
[6] M. Kutuzov, *Documents*, Voyenizdat, 1952, Vol. III, p. 754 (in Russian).
[7] Karl von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 729.
[8] Ibid., p. 731.

classes and states, without studying the whole system of political relations that developed some time before the war, brought the war about and continued during it. Lenin was scornful of those who held that with the outbreak of war the historically prepared political relations between classes and nations were interrupted. He considered it gross ignorance, a philistine prejudice to imagine that war could be viewed separately from the politics of the respective governments and classes, simply as an enemy attack. "...The most important thing that is usually overlooked in the question of the war, a key issue to which insufficient attention is paid and over which there is so much dispute—useless, hopeless, idle dispute, I should say—is the question of the class character of the war: what caused that war, what classes are waging it, and what historical and historico-economic conditions gave rise to it." Lenin maintained that in order to judge a war and determine what attitude to take to it, it was necessary to investigate the historical circumstances from which it arose, what political system it was connected with, what politics had given rise to it, and what classes were waging it and with what aims. The ruling class determines politics in war as well as in peace.

Lenin insisted that each war must be approached from a concrete historical viewpoint, that in order to understand the character of a particular war one must first have an understanding of the character of the particular age. Lenin was not satisfied to define war in general terms but made a thorough analysis of the nature and specific features of wars in the age of monopoly capitalism. He divided these into different types, expounded a doctrine of two kinds of wars—just and unjust—and explained the nature of wars in defence of the socialist state.

Marxism-Leninism rejects the idealist concept of politics in investigating the essence, character and content of war, and its dependence on politics. Lenin described politics as the concentrated expression of economics, their generalisation and consequence. The material roots of policies giving rise to war were to be sought in the exploiting method of production based on private ownership. At the same time, Lenin warned against oversimplifying the relationship between economics and politics, the automatic deduction of politics from economics, and pointed out the relatively independent nature of politics and the fact that they, in turn, influence economics.

Politics comprise the relations between classes and peoples within a state (home policy), and also the relations between states and nations (foreign policy). The two are closely interrelated, the former playing the dominant role and determining the content and character of the latter. Lenin stressed that "no idea could be more erroneous or harmful than to separate foreign from home policy". This thesis should not be taken as suggesting that foreign policy can be reduced simply to a function of home policy. Indeed, at times foreign policy can exert a decisive influence on home policy. Nevertheless the major role goes to home policy. War is the result not of home or foreign policy taken separately, but of the two together, the two interrelated sides combined.

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The profound relationship between war and politics expounded scientifically by the founders of Marxism-Leninism is not a static, permanent relationship. Like all other relationships in nature and society it develops and changes, growing more complicated. Certain changes take place in the relationship between war and politics and in their very essence which must be taken note of in theory and practical activity. . . .

Nuclear missiles have completely transformed the material and technical base of the armed forces, have led to fundamental changes in their structure and organisation, in the roles and relative importance of the various arms, and in their training methods.

With respect to an earlier age, Marx wrote: "With the invention of a new instrument of warfare, firearms, the whole internal organisation of the army necessarily changed; the relationships within which individuals can constitute an army and act as an army were transformed and the relations of different armies to one another also changed." In the same way, only more so, this process can be seen to have taken place in connection with the creation of nuclear weapons.

New military doctrines and new concepts of strategy have been developed on the basis of the latest weapons and military equipment. Qualitatively new methods and forms of armed struggle have arisen. Unlike conventional weapons, designed for striking armed forces engaged on the battlefield, the new weapons are primarily directed against major economic and political centres, against large cities and the civilian population. The first samples of these weapons, which are already out of date, were used by the American imperialists not to strike military targets but against the civilian population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The fact that the NATO leadership has adopted nuclear missiles for the furtherance of its aggressive policy has caused its ideologists to step up their activities in military theory, falsify the problem of war and peace and engage in open and covert apologetics of the use of military force.

Some imperialist ideologists, while holding as valid Clausewitz's formula that war is the continuation of politics by forceful means, refuse to take into account new features of the relationship between war and politics, arguing in favour of the policy of nuclear blackmail and the arms race in nuclear and conventional weapons, and shutting their eyes to the danger of a world war.

In his books *On Thermonuclear War*, *Thinking About the Unthinkable* and *On Escalation*, H. Kahn, who has been called "the Clausewitz of the nuclear age", expounds his doctrine of the "admissibility" of nuclear war as an instrument of the aggressive policy of American imperialism. He has developed a theory of escalation, conceived as an escalator rising in 44 stages, across the nuclear threshold to the cherished dream of the nuclear warmongers—an all-out thermonuclear war. Kahn's gloomy, inhuman writings have, he is proud to admit, become indispensable textbooks on military planning for the Pentagon.

At the same time the ideologists of imperialism try to discredit the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the relationship between war and politics, by propagating the idea that the new weapons have fundamentally altered this relationship as it stood for centuries.

Some imperialist ideologists, fully aware of the dangers of a nuclear war, while not rejecting it in principle, would like the use of nuclear weapons in the interests of politics to be limited and localised. They want nuclear war on a limited scale, to have it limited to certain spheres that suit their purposes, to make it easier to handle and less dangerous as a means of achieving their aggressive political objects. This kind of thinking has found expression in the theory of local wars and in the creation of nuclear weapons with a limited capacity for use in such wars.

A third group of bourgeois ideologists, aware that a nuclear war would be fatal to capitalism, declares the old conception, i.e., Clausewitz's formula that war is the continuation of politics by violent means, to be no longer valid in view of the fact that nuclear weapons have fundamentally altered the traditional relationship between war and politics. . . .

There is, of course, a certain amount of truth in assertions of this sort made by Western sociologists and military writers with various philosophical views and political credos—their unanimous recognition of the exceptional danger of nuclear war used as an instrument of the aggressive policy of imperialism. At the same time, it is necessary to expose these arguments as being highly fallacious, one-sided, and showing a strong class bias.

Firstly, in rejecting Clausewitz's formula these bourgeois sociologists and military writers are in fact attacking the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of war and politics and trying to prove that it is no longer valid in the nuclear age. This is a new method of attacking the Marxist-Leninist theories in a covert manner, often behind a pacifist mask.

Secondly, these arguments represent an attempt to mask the role of the aggressive policy of American imperialism in the creation of the new weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weap-

ons are not simply a product of the development of science and technology, they are above all the monstrous offspring of the militarist policies of monopoly capitalism striving for world domination. Nuclear weapons are the material embodiment of aggressive power politics. Scientific and technological progress made possible the invention of nuclear weapons, but the decisive role in turning this possibility into a reality was played by imperialist politics. It was the aggressive, anti-Soviet and anti-socialist policy of American imperialism and its one-sided, selfish use of the achievements of scientific and technological progress that actually produced weapons of mass destruction, led to the nuclear arms race, determined the direction of changes in the structure of the US armed forces and the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc and their equipment with nuclear weapons, and determined the NATO strategy based on the massive use of nuclear weapons against the socialist countries.

While being strongly opposed to nuclear war, the Marxists-Leninists do not oppose all kinds of war. They support just, revolutionary wars, in which the masses take up arms to fight for their freedom and independence and for socialism—such as the wars of national liberation resulting from contradictions between the imperialist powers and the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, and civil wars provoked by antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. These are wholly just, emancipatory wars, the continuation and instrument of the revolutionary policies of national, social and class emancipation.

The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union states that the CPSU and the whole Soviet people will continue to oppose all kinds of annexationist wars, including those between capitalist countries, and also local wars whose object is to crush national liberation movements, and that they consider it their duty to support the sacred struggle of oppressed peoples, their just wars of liberation against imperialism.

In this the Marxists-Leninists differ fundamentally from the pacifists, who are opposed to all wars including just and lawful ones. The pacifists are out to find "models" for eternal peace. Professor Galtung, Director of the Oslo International Institute of Peace Studies, has counted thirty-five such model projects—peace based on "nuclear deterrence", the creation of a world state, man's development towards spiritual and moral perfection, the religious path to peace and so on. To this motley collection of pacifist peace plans, Galtung added his own, which he calls the theory of enthropy. The essence of this theory is that as political, economic, technological, cultural, scientific and other ties and relations grow more complicated, the sharp contrasts between the two separate social systems will gradually become softened and blurred, leading eventually to universal peace.[1]

Pacifist ideology is unscientific. It fails to reveal the true sources of war, their class essence, and misleads the masses as to how universal peace can be achieved, disorienting people and disarming them in the face of the threat of war presented by imperialism. Marxists-Leninists reject pacifism and support those who are striving for peace by opposing imperialist wars.

The Soviet Union's relations with the countries of the capitalist world are based on Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence between states irrespective of their social system. This principle means that international disputes should be resolved by peaceful means, without resorting to armed force. Soon after the First World War, Lenin pointed out that the prevention of a new, even more destructive world war had become "the keystone of all policy in all the countries of the globe".

Today, the question of preventing a thermonuclear war has assumed even greater importance and has become the pivot of world politics. The need to uphold the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, resolutely oppose the aggressive forces of imperialism and save mankind from a new world war was expressed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at its 24th Congress. The creation of a reliable system of collective security in Europe and other parts of the world would represent a tremendous contribution to the cause of peace.

A.N.Kalyadin, "The Soviet Disarmament Program and its Critics"

Is there a real possibility of achieving general disarmament? Marxists-Leninists have no hesitation in answering in the affirmative. The theory of scientific socialism from the outset connected the possibility of preventing wars and reducing armaments with action on the part of the masses and all progressive social forces. The founders of scientific socialism rejected the fatalistic approach to the assessment of the concrete processes of social development, and pointed to the need to conduct anti-militarist activities in the conditions of capitalism and the possibility of solving the practical questions of struggle against the burden of arms.

Efforts to halt the race in all types of weapons and achieve disarmament occupied a prominent place among the basic tasks set forth in the programme for peace and international security passed by the 24th Congress of the CPSU.

The Congress advanced the following concrete proposals for the accomplishment of these tasks: the conclusion of treaties putting a ban on nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons; an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, including underground tests; the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world; the dismantling of foreign military bases; the reduction of armed forces, especially in Central Europe; the working out of measures reducing the probability of accidental outbreak or deliberate fabrication of armed incidents and their development into international crises, into war; the reduction of military spending, above all by the major powers; the convocation of a conference of the five nuclear powers—the USSR, the USA, the People's Republic of China, France and Britain—with a view to achieving the nuclear disarmament of all states in possession of nuclear weapons, and the convocation of a world conference to consider disarmament questions to their full extent.

The super-armament champions reject the principle of coexistence with the socialist countries as "incompatible with genuine peace". They declare obsolete the traditional view on aggression, and regard the very existence of the socialist countries and the international communist movement as an act of aggression and a challenge to US interests. The ultra-Right ideologists insist on a policy aimed at securing a "victory over communism" by intensifying military pressure up to and including the delivery of a preventive nuclear strike.

The above theories regard relations between states with different social systems as phases of a military conflict; they reject the prospect of easing tensions, of a normalisation of international relations; they are ready to resolve controversial issues between the socialist and capitalist countries by armed force.

Herman Kahn, the Director of the Hudson Institute, who has joined the polemics on the building up of missile defence and other strategic arms systems, continues to hold a special place among the extremist theoreticians.

His present arguments are but a continuation of his former views, though, at the end of the sixties, he made a somewhat more cautious appraisal of the possibility of making a big thermonuclear war a political instrument. He admits that the pros and cons for a thin BMD System have "really changed dramatically" over the last couple of years, which has led to the loss by the USA of its "strategic advantage" and the emergence of a "strategic parity".[2] This is tantamount to an admission that the main postulate in Kahn's schemes for escalating threats and military conflicts, based on US military superiority, has been shaken. Admitting that a global nuclear conflict would be dangerous for the USA, Kahn does not however draw the logical conclusion that his policy of securing strategic and political advantages through the arms race should, therefore, be discarded. He rejects the only logical alternative to his bankrupt policy—the signing of an agreement to halt the arms race. No, he argues that the way out lies in the launching of a new armament cycle.

Kahn insists that the United States should adopt "competitive mobilisation" for its strategy in the seventies. Its aim is to compel the opponent steeply and steadily to raise the military budget and correspondingly to bring the war machine into a

state of complete combat readiness in peacetime conditions. To attain this he proposes that the US war expenditure should be 200,000 million dollars in the first year of the "competitive mobilisation" and reach 500,000 million at the end of the third year. In the course of three years the entire population, industry, and all institutions are to be hidden away in underground shelters, fundamentally new systems of strategic arms are to be developed and a superiority is to be achieved that will make possible an agreement with the USSR (meaning a capitulation of the USSR) or, in the event of war, ensure a better result for the USA. The idea is that the "competitive mobilisation" and the resulting greater combat readiness will make it possible to change the rules of the game, that is, to remove all restraints and enable the USA to resort to tactics of advancing ultimatums.

Note should be taken of the provocative implications of the "competitive mobilisation" conception, which proceeds from the premise that a sharp international crisis is inevitable. Essentially, Kahn implies that US interests would be furthered best of all by the fabrication of such crises, since that would trigger off the "competitive mobilisation" mechanism.

Kahn advertises his conception as a substitute for a war and promises the USA victory if it acts in accordance with his recipes. His plan, Kahn believes, is particularly advantageous because it creates an excellent mechanism for the improvement of military research and development, for exhausting the opponent's economy, and also for getting a "ransom", should the opponent decide to accept the challenge. Kahn's attempt to obtain through a "substitute war" the results which the many years of the cold war were unable to furnish, demonstrates that he has fully lost all sense of reality.

This aspect of Kahn's speculations must not be overlooked because some other military strategists, too, presume that the stepping up of the arms race is able to give the United States an advantage over the Soviet Union. They believe that the West can "bleed" the Soviet economy "by forcing it to keep up with high levels of US arms programmes".[1] The futility of these designs is self-evident. Now that the economic, scientific and technological potentials of the two world systems are more in favour of the Soviet Union than they were twenty or even ten years ago, now that the Soviet economy and science are developing at steady high rates, the defence capacity of the USSR has grown immensely, as has also its ability to defend the international positions of socialism.

The balance of forces in the world changed in the sixties and the unleashing of a nuclear war by an aggressor will inevitably doom him to extinction. The dynamic strategic equilibrium established between the USSR and the USA has nipped in the bud all attempts at reinstating the traditional policy of using nuclear arms for diplomatic pressure and blackmail.

For this reason a process of regroupment has begun within the ruling classes of the imperialist countries over the question of disarmament. The most sober-minded representatives of the bourgeoisie, realising the disastrous results a thermonuclear war would entail for the ruling classes in imperialist countries, have begun to search for new ways of attaining their class aims. While not excluding military methods altogether, they are gradually becoming convinced of the futility of making nuclear war their main trump in opposing the socialist countries.

The new attitude to the problem of war and peace is reflected in bourgeois literature in the appearance of numerous monographs and collections of articles presenting the conception of "peace based on mutual fear or deterrence", and various doctrines of arms control.

As distinct from the postulates of deterrence, forming the theoretical basis of US foreign policy, the Soviet conception of international relations proceeds from the need for a renunciation of the use or threat of force for the solution of controversial issues between states. This policy has been supplemented by all the measures proposed by the Soviet Union to halt the arms race and to bring about disarmament, to resolve international conflicts by political methods, to develop peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous co-operation between states in all fields. This has been stressed with special force at the 24th Congress of the CPSU.

As far as the Soviet conception of the arms limitation is concerned, it holds that the agreement should be based on the principle of equal security for the parties to the agreement, that it should not provide unilateral advantages, that it should consider in full measure the aim of reducing war danger in general and that it should fall in with the vital interests of all the peoples of the world.

The principle of identical or mutual security opposes the idea of continuing the arms race which, as historical experience has shown, ultimately has a malignant effect on universal security.

The USSR raises not only the question of limiting strategic arms, but also that of their subsequent reduction, giving preference to a plan that would provide for the reduction of all strategic stockpiles to an absolute minimum, leaving, and only for the time being, a strictly limited number of them.

Hence, in the Soviet view, the principle of equal security should presuppose not a stabilisation of the status quo, but implies the attainment of a higher degree of mutual security as a result of arms reduction. In other words, the Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that the maintenance, let alone perpetuation of vast strategic forces, or of the "assured destruction" level, is not a suitable basis for securing reliable mutual security but, on the contrary, is a factor threatening the security of all states. Decisively rejecting the postulates of the nuclear deterrence theory as a basis of international peace, the Soviet conception shows the way to the achievement of a genuinely higher level of security for the participants in the talks and for all other countries. That the Soviet position is a principled one and not just a concession to the present situation can be seen from the Soviet Union's increasing efforts, ever since the war, to ban all means of mass annihilation—nuclear, chemical and bacteriological—and the fact that it does not make this dependent on the solution of other questions. Until the great powers take up nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union considers it essential to make steps in order consecutively to decrease the role of nuclear arms in international relations.

The USSR believes that the ban on nuclear aggression, on the use and the threat of force, must become universal. That is why the Soviet Union offers to sign corresponding bilateral and regional agreements with countries sharing its views. The signing of such agreements would weaken the positions of the political forces still hoping that they will be able to intimidate other countries.

The development of more and more dangerous kinds of weapon can only be stopped by disarmament, the destruction of the military machine of states and the cessation of military-technological research. This is the course proposed in the Soviet disarmament programme.

Bourgeois ideologists propagating the idea of peace based on "mutual deterrence" try to weaken the great appeal of the Soviet proposals and cast doubt on the possibility of stopping the arms race. They criticise the Soviet programme on several counts.

Ultra-reactionary bourgeois sociologists claim that the Soviet programme contradicts communist ideology to which they attribute the totally alien features of justification of the use of force in international relations, of the arms race and wars between states.

It is on this wholly false interpretation of Marxism-Leninism that the myth about the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union is based, a myth exploited by imperialist politicians to justify militarisation, the creation of military blocs and their own refusal to conclude disarmament agreements.

The champions of militarism insist that the Soviet disarmament programme is merely a propaganda move, a shrewd diplomatic manoeuvre. They even go as far as to claim that the arms race is beneficial to the Soviet Union.

Accusations of Soviet "insincerity" and "unwillingness" to disarm are smokescreens to hide the fear and doubts of the ideologists of capitalism of the ability of the capitalist system to compete with socialism on a peaceful basis in a disarmed world.

G.I. Gerasimov, "The Theory of Games in International Affairs"

The publication in 1944 of a book entitled *The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern is generally taken as marking the birth of the "theory of games". It quickly found practical application in warfare, economics, the construction of electronic computers and cybernetics, and little over a decade later a UNESCO publication announced: "There is in the process of developing at the present time a radically different kind of mathematical model.... It is called the theory of games of strategy". Since then the theory has taken its first independent steps. Two eminent specialists described it as "one of the first examples of an elaborate mathematical development centered solely in the social sciences".[1]

The term itself is not entirely satisfactory since it might suggest to the layman such specific pastimes as cards, chess and so on, depending on his own particular associations. In point of fact, however, this theory treats all conflicts of interests as games of strategy, and games as we usually understand them are only one kind of many as far as this theory is concerned. The theory of games is used for the purpose of analysing all kinds of conflict, including politics in general and problems of war and peace in particular.

One may or may not agree with the usefulness of the theory, but it would be wrong to reject it out of hand, without examining the evidence carefully. Especially where so much is at stake —nothing more nor less than the future of mankind. No path which might lead to peace must be left unexplored, no stone left unturned that might lead to a solution of this vital issue.

Unfortunately, it was the militarists who were the first to turn their attention to the possibility of using the new theory in their own interests. This was largely due to the efforts of Morgenstern himself, though many others have contributed to it, including H. Kahn, T. Schelling, M. Halperin, H. Kissinger, B. Brodie, A. Wollstetter, K. Knorr, R. Osgood and D. Brennan. The great danger lies in the fact that neither the generals nor the public at large are in a position to test the validity of the deductions made by Kahn and his colleagues, who have been dubbed "the new civilian militarists" in the United States. Their deductions are being taken at their face value, on trust, because everyone is prepared to accept the theory itself, and these self-styled experts are thus left to draw the conclusions they wish to from it.

The "civilian militarists" naturally arouse the antipathy and condemnation of world public opinion.

Such indignation is fully justified and understandable, but is not enough in itself. The authors of these bloodthirsty works are quite indifferent to the moral indignation the unprejudiced reader is bound to feel. Thus, in *Thinking About the Unthinkable*, Kahn tries to shrug off the blame, and rejects the accusation that he is a warmonger. It is not a surgeon's fault, he argues, that he has to bloody his hands. One cannot, like the rulers of old, punish a messenger who brings bad news. All he is doing is to study some aspects of the tragedy of mankind from the quantitative angle.

The supporters of peace do not always find it easy to expose the militarist who has donned the mantle of omniscience, and dared to think of the unthinkable. The latter insists that science is impartial, that he is merely offering strategical advice for achieving a pre-set aim, and that it is not his job to draw ethical conclusions. The advocates of peace are made to look like poor fools who are hopelessly out of step with the times, and the strategists like heroes who have the courage to look the Medusa of war straight in the face without being turned to stone. As H. S. Hughes, Harvard University professor, put it, "the advocates of peace and disarmament will never be taken seriously until they can meet and answer the authority of a Herman Kahn" The only way to fight the strategist scholars is to put the ball squarely in their court.

[1] R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions*, New York, 1957, p. 11.

The following is a brief outline of the theory of games, just enough to enable the reader to gain a general idea. No attempt is made to go into the mathematical side of the theory.

According to the theory of games, all conflicts and disputes are divided into two categories: games that are strictly competitive and games that are not strictly competitive. In the former case, the interests of the two sides are diametrically opposed and irreconcilable, and victory for one side means defeat for the other. The principle is much the same as in cards or wrestling. A victory means that a side is one point up, a defeat that it is one point down. A victory followed by a defeat for a side brings its score to nil, hence the term "zero-sum games" often applies to this category.

In the case of games that are not strictly competitive, the interests of the two sides conflict without being diametrically opposed. There is plenty of leeway for compromise, mutual concessions and even co-operation. This kind of situation is to be observed in family life or international relations. The score is not so easily determined as in games of the first category, hence the term "non-zero-sum games".

The two sides are able to choose their own course of action, it being assumed that they will choose the course most likely to lead to victory. In deciding upon a course of action it is necessary to take into account the intentions of the adversary, who is assumed to be no less intelligent than yourself. All the possible courses of action represent a set of strategies. The combination of strategies—for example, strategy No. 1 for blue, and strategy No. 4 for red—produce a possible result. These possible results can be represented by a chart called the payments matrix, the gains of one side and the losses of the other being entered in the squares and termed payments. Thus, in the square where blue's strategy 1 intersects red's strategy 4 plus one is entered, representing a win for blue and a loss for red. It is important to have a clear idea of exactly what payments are involved in a given conflict. In politics the lives of thousands and millions of people may depend on it.

The theory of games does not represent a purely utilitarian discovery of the means of solving a conflict in favour of the side that knows the theory better. Indeed, practice has often shown the opposite to be the case—that there are no easy ways to victory. Just as spectacles correct bad sight, the theory of games helps see a situation and the ways of resolving it better. But if glasses are to be of any use at all, they have to be the correct strength, corresponding to the defect. Similarly, game theory can only be effective if the "model of the game" is appropriate to the nature of the conflict. Often the best moves for a zero-sum game are not only different from but quite the opposite of what would be best in a non-zero-sum game. An increase in the number of players above two also fundamentally alters the situation, since it then becomes possible to form alliances, two against one, and so on.

The theory of games has only been well elaborated for one class of games, two-person zero-sum games. But that is not a very common situation in international relations. If we approach international affairs from the point of view of the first class of games, and not the other more complex ones, there is the danger of producing false recommendations, all the more dangerous for the fact that the process by which they were reached has the appearance of being scientific. Since these recommendations generally correspond to the deductions of the most reactionary and militarist circles, it is extremely important that they be exposed as invalid.

.... in a zero-sum game the sides usually have to make an "all or nothing" choice, so that they tend to act according to the principle of "win or bust". Undoubtedly, this kind of thinking in terms of victory or defeat has a strong appeal for the reactionary military in the service of monopoly capital. The conclusions of the game theory specialists suit them perfectly and they welcome them with open arms. This kind of thinking also fits in with the widespread attitude in the United States which N. Wiener, the father of cybernetics, described as "the tendency ... to regard a war in the light of a glorified football game, at which at some period the final score is in, and which we have to count as either a definite victory or a definite defeat".

There is certainly a danger of game theory infused with the cold war spirit blocking all paths to resolution of the conflict between the two socio-economic systems apart from a direct military clash. This dangerous combination is to be found in the attitude of the American "ultras", including the republican candidate defeated in the 1964 presidential elections, Barry Goldwater. "For him," Walter Lippmann wrote, "all conflicts and disputes must end either in victory or defeat."[3] In the language of game theory, the ultras regard international relations as a zero-sum game. It is hardly surprising that they should widely advertise the conclusions of Kahn and other "strategists", for "a two-person zero-sum game is a game between two players in which their interests are diametrically opposed: one player gains only at the expense of the other. Consequently, there is no motive for collusion between the players."[4]

It is easy to see how treating international relations, or at least relations between the capitalist and socialist countries, as a zero-sum game entails rejection of the principles of international law and excludes the possibility of peaceful coexistence, by removing all bases for agreement.

What we have here is a shameless distortion of scientific principles, the attempt to apply the logic of zero-sum games to non-zero-sum conflicts, which require a completely different, often completely opposite, set of rules.

As Professor Fisher of Harvard University so aptly put it, "the world is not a zero-sum game".[1] The same view is expressed in another major work on game theory: "The strict conflict of interests is a realistic assumption for parlor games and military operations, and for a few special situations in business.... Outside of this rather limited domain, one is hard pressed to come up with a truly realistic game problem."[2]

Meanwhile, the strategists of the Rand Corporation, not to mention the Pentagon strategists, persist in regarding US-Soviet relations as a zero-sum game. Thus, Morgenstern for one, adopts the basic premise that "the opponent's interests are clearly opposed to our own", and makes this an excuse for the most aggressive recommendations.

Generally speaking, imperialist policies can be regarded as being based on the concept of deterrence, which the French general Beaufre described as the "hidden mainspring of our age". The theory of deterrence rests on the same assumptions as a zero-sum game. Rapoport has the following to say in this connection: "The theory of deterrence rests squarely on the assumption that the all-consuming passion of the Enemy is to destroy us and that only the realisation of his own vulnerability prevents him from doing so.... The zero-sum-game assumption is most pronounced in the fact that we attribute to the *other* preferences for those courses of action which are most devastating to ourselves. The fact that the other does not as a rule carry those actions out is attributed almost exclusively to the effectiveness of deterrence".[1] The absence of a control experiment permits this line of reasoning to turn in a vicious circle of self-justification.

Professor Schelling of Harvard launched a "counter-attack" on critics of the theory in his book *The Strategy of Conflict*, in which he attempts to link game theory with psychology. He declares that the theory can also be called "a theory of interdependent decisions", and recommends the use of bluff, intimidation, blackmail and double-cross. Unfortunately, when he comes to international politics he devotes his intellectual powers to developing the theory of "power politics" rather than to the quest for ways of ensuring peace.

His dubious contribution in this field includes the idea of "coercive deficiency", and the theory that the strength of a threat does not depend on the damage it would cause to the one who carries it out. Schelling terms this the theory of skilful non-use of the armed forces. The threat is effective, he writes, in as far as the one who makes it shows that he will not be able to refrain from carrying it out should the threat itself fail to work.

Schelling writes: "Game theory adds more insight into the strategy of bargaining by emphasising the striking truth that the threat does *not* depend on the threatener's having less to suffer than the threatened party.... Threats of war... threats to make a 'scene' ... cannot be understood except by denying the utility-comparison criterion."[1] Thus, a threat does not depend on the idea "You'll come off worse than me!" but rather on the thought: "I may come off worst, but you won't come off so well yourself." In this way it is possible to use the threat of nuclear war to blackmail one's opponent. The thing is to do so skilfully, making it quite plain that you are really quite prepared to cross the "nuclear threshold".

One of the ways of doing so is the "coercive deficiency" we have already mentioned. In simple terms, this involves breaking off all contacts with the opponent once the ultimatum has been delivered. Another way is reckless behaviour. Kahn has gone into this theory in great detail. He describes the game of "chicken" as an example. Two people drive their cars at top speed toward each other, straddling the white line down the centre of the road. The first to lose his nerve and swerve aside is "chicken", an object of contempt and scorn. Kahn goes on to say that "the game is a useful analogy because it brings out *some* aspects of international relations that are important.... The skilful player gets into the car quite drunk, throwing whiskey bottles out of the window to make it clear to everybody just how drunk he is. He wears very dark glasses so that it is obvious that he cannot see anything. As soon as the car reaches high speed, he takes the steering wheel and throws it out of the window."[2] The other driver sees there is nothing for it but to swerve.

This kind of theory of international blackmail is very much to the liking of the West German revanchists. They hope to achieve their aims by playing "chicken" with nuclear weapons.

But surely the stakes are really too high? This brings us back to the question of "pay-offs", going beyond the limits of game theory.

Bertrand Russell considers: "The game may be played without misfortune a few times, but sooner or later it will come to be felt that loss of face is more dreadful than nuclear annihilation."[1] After which the world will be plunged into a disaster that possibly nobody wanted. The game of "chicken" is alright for playboys but it is criminal to recommend it as a principle of behaviour in international affairs.

Yet dangerous advice urging the use of international blackmail is to be heard more and more frequently. It is no exaggeration to speak of a flood of literature of this kind, "theoretical" material reflecting the growing role of the Pentagon in American foreign policy. Thus Horelick and Rush of the Rand Corporation accuse the White House of "excessive restraint" in the "political employment of strategic nuclear threats",[2] while Bernard Brodie objects to the "timidity" of the American Government.[3] Schelling rebukes several of his colleagues for paying too much attention to "deterrence" and not enough to "constraint", and suggests the US Defence Department ought to be renamed the Department of Attack.[4]

* * *

However, the present shortcomings of game theory should not be used as grounds for out-of-hand rejection or sweeping criticism of the whole theory—however great the temptation might be in view of the use made of it to justify aggressive policies. In other words, the deliberate abstraction from major political, social and class factors that imperialist ideologists find necessary for pseudo-scientific justification of their aggressive policies should not provoke the supporters of peace to ignore game theory as just another reactionary device. Game theory itself, as a mathematical method of analysis, is perfectly neutral. Some of the ideas it suggests could prove useful in practice. We are bound to agree with A. Rapoport, one of the most virulent critics of militarist use being made of game theory, when he says that reference to this theory in itself may be useful since it "stimulates us to think about conflict in a novel way".[2] However, it is always necessary to bear in mind the dangers of getting carried away with this theory and the possibility of its being deliberately distorted.

MICHAEL WALZER (1935-) NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (1977)

Michael Walzer was born in New York City in 1935. He received his B.A. degree from Brandeis University and a Ph.D. from Harvard. He was a Fulbright fellow at Cambridge University, England, taught at Princeton University from 1962 to 1966, at Harvard University in the Department of Government from 1966 to 1980, and was appointed Professor in the School of Social Sciences at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Princeton, N.J. in 1980. His books include Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship (1970), Regicide and Revolution (1974), and Just and Unjust Wars (1977), from which the following selection was taken. As will be apparent, Walzer is a strong defender of the moral approach which is based on human rights, as distinct from utilitarian ethics, and views violations of such rights as unjust conduct in war or peace.

The previous readings in this section - Russell, Kahn and the Marxists - have used value judgments which were based on axiological, i.e., consequentialist, ethical theories. No act, or mode of action, was absolutely wrong in and of itself. Bad activities could be justified if they served good ends. They differed primarily in 1) what they considered to be good ends, and 2) how bad they considered the means. Thus Russell viewed as the ultimate good end a world society which would allow diverse forms of government and economic systems with progress towards a peaceful, rational, civilized world society and he viewed war as a great evil to be eliminated. Yet, in the face of extreme fanaticism and aggression such as Hitler's, he was willing to approve World War II. On the other hand, he considered nuclear war as so bad it must never occur. For Kahn, the good to be achieved or maintained was much narrower and more immediate; he presupposed that his nation's survival and maintenance of its position of dominance in international affairs was the good which would justify the various strategies and policies which he advocated. To be sure, he wished to avoid nuclear war; but he proposed to do this only provided his nation's relative standing among other nations would not be impaired. For Russian philosophers the good to be obtained is a classless communistic world society, and only wars contributing to that end - "wars of liberation" - are justified. The communists see nuclear war as an unmitigated evil which should be eliminated, but not by actions which would ammount to capitulation to capitalism.

In contrast to these views, Walzer insists that the ends do not justify the means when those means violate certain individual rights - particularly the rights of innocent non-combatants to life. He condemns the first use of atomic weapons, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States Air Force, by attacking the utilitarian ethics which was used to justify it. In discussing recent arguments by other non-catholic theologians - in particular, Paul Ramsey of the (Presbyterian) Princeton Theological Seminary - Walzer brings out the subtelties of arguments among just war theorists on whether nuclear weapons can be justified at all within the context of their theory.

The moral revulsion in America against the dropping of the atomic bomb to end World War II, was confined to a relatively small group of religious thinkers. The scientists who had participated in making the bomb and were horrified by the possibilities of its future use, had few regrets except in terms of their fears that future uses would not be adequately controlled. To those church leaders who responded negatively, the reaction was very different; at least an uneasy conscience, at most an overwhelming feeling of guilt and condemnation of the bomb as "morally indefensible". For pacifists, the bomb was simply the worst yet of all the indefensible engines of war. But for the more orthodox churchmen who believed in just wars, it was indefensible because it did not recognize the principle of the absolute worth and sanctity ofinnocent women, children and non-combatants. Walzer explores, in more depth than most, some of the internal controversies which took place among just war theorists on whether nuclear weapons can be justified.

WALZER (1935-) from JUST AND UNJUST WAR(1977)

The only possible defense of the Hiroshima attack is a utilitarian calculation made without the sliding scale, a calculation made, then, where there was no room for it, a claim to override the rules of war and the rights of Japanese civilians. I want to state this argument as strongly as I can. In 1945, American policy was fixed on the demand for the unconditional surrender of Japan. The Japanese had by that time lost the war, but they were by no means ready to accept this demand. The leaders of their armed forces expected an invasion of the Japanese main islands and were preparing for a last-ditch resistance. They had over two million soldiers available for the fighting, and they believed that they could make the invasion so costly that the Americans would agree to a negotiated peace. Truman's military advisors also believed that the costs would be high, though the public record does not show that they ever recommended negotiations. They thought that the war might continue late into 1946 and that there would be as many as a million additional American casualties. Japanese losses would be much higher. The capture of Okinawa in a battle lasting from April to June of 1945 had cost almost 80,000 American casualties, while virtually the entire Japanese garrison of 120,000 men had been killed (only 10,600 prisoners were taken).[29] If the main islands were defended with a similar ferocity, hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Japanese soldiers would die. Meanwhile, the fighting would continue in China and in Manchuria, where a Russian attack was soon due. And the bombing of Japan would also continue, and perhaps intensify, with casualty rates no different from those anticipated from the atomic attack. For the Americans had adopted in Japan the British policy of terrorism: a massive incendiary raid on Tokyo early in March 1945 had set off a firestorm and killed an estimated 100,000 people. Against all this was set, in the minds of American decision-makers, the impact of the atomic bomb—not materially more damaging but psychologically more frightening, and holding out the promise, perhaps, of a quick end to the war. "To avert a vast, indefinite butchery . . . at the cost of a few explosions," wrote Churchill in support of Truman's decision, "seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance."[30]

"A vast indefinite butchery" involving quite probably the deaths of several million people: surely this is a great evil, and if it was imminent, one could reasonably argue that extreme measures might be warranted to avert it. Secretary of War Stimson thought it was the sort of case I have already described, where one had to wager; there was no option. "No man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hand a weapon of such possibilities for . . . saving those lives, could have failed to use it."[31] This is by no means an incomprehensible or, on the surface at least, an outrageous argument. But it is not the same as the argument I suggested in the case of Britain in 1940. It does not have the form: if we don't do *x* (bomb cities), they will do *y* (win the war, establish tyrannical rule, slaughter their opponents). What Stimson argued is very different. Given the actual policy of the U.S. government, it amounts to this: if we don't do *x*, *we* will do *y*. The two atomic bombs caused "many casualties," James Byrnes admitted, "but not nearly so many as there would have been had our air force continued to drop incendiary bombs on Japan's cities."[44] Our purpose, then, was not to avert a "butchery" that someone else was threatening, but one that we were threatening, and had already begun to carry out. Now, what great evil, what supreme emergency, justified the incendiary attacks on Japanese cities?

Even if we had been fighting in strict accordance with the war convention, the continuation of the struggle was not something forced upon us. It had to do with our war aims. The military estimate of casualties was based not only on the belief that the Japanese would fight almost to the last man, but also on the assumption that the Americans would accept nothing less than unconditional surrender. The war aims of the American government required either an invasion of the main islands, with enormous losses of American and Japanese soldiers and of Japanese civilians trapped in the war zones, or the use of the atomic bomb. Given that choice, one might well reconsider those aims. Even if we assume that unconditional surrender was morally desirable because of the character of Japanese militarism, it might still be morally undesirable because of the human costs it entailed. But I would suggest a stronger argument than this. The Japanese case is sufficiently different from the German so that unconditional surrender should never have been asked. Japan's rulers were engaged in a more ordinary sort of military expansion, and all that was morally required was that they be defeated, not that they be conquered and totally overthrown. Some restraint upon their war-making power might be justified, but their domestic authority was a matter of concern only to the Japanese people. In any case, if killing millions (or many thousands) of men and women was militarily necessary for their conquest and overthrow, then it was morally necessary—in order not to kill those people—to settle for something less. I have made this argument before (in chapter 7); here is a further example of its practical application. If people have a right not to be forced to fight, they also have a right not to be forced to continue fighting beyond the point when the war might justly be concluded. Beyond that point, there can be no supreme emergencies, no arguments about military necessity, no cost-accounting in human lives. To press the war further than that is to re-commit the crime of aggression. In the summer of 1945, the victorious Americans owed the Japanese people an experiment in negotiation. To use the atomic bomb, to kill and terrorize civilians, without even attempting such an experiment, was a double crime.[83]

These, then are the limits of the realm of necessity. Utilitarian calculation can force us to violate the rules of war only when we are face-to-face not merely with defeat but with a defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community. But these calculations have no similar effects when what is at stake is only the speed or the scope of victory. They are relevant only to the conflict between winning and fighting well, not to the internal problems of combat itself. Whenever that conflict is absent, calculation is stopped short by the rules of war and the rights they are designed to protect. Confronted by those rights, we are not to calculate consequences, or figure relative risks, or compute probable casualties, but simply to stop short and turn aside.

WALZER (1935-) from JUST AND UNJUST WAR (1977)

Nuclear Deterrence

The Problem of Immoral Threats

Truman used the atomic bomb to end a war that seemed to him limitless in its horrors. And then, for a few minutes or hours in August 1945, the people of Hiroshima endured a war that actually was limitless in its horrors. "In this last great action of the Second World War," wrote Stimson, "we were given final proof that war is death."[1] *Final proof* is exactly the wrong phrase, for war had never been like that before. A new kind of war was born at Hiroshima, and what we were given was a first glimpse of its deadliness. Though fewer people were killed than in the fire-bombing of Tokyo, they were killed with monstrous ease. One plane, one bomb: with such a weapon the 350 planes that raided Tokyo would virtually have wiped out human life on the Japanese islands. Atomic war was death indeed, indiscriminate and total, and after Hiroshima, the first task of political leaders everywhere was to prevent its recurrence.

The means they adopted is the promise of reprisal in kind. Against the threat of an immoral attack, they have put the threat of an immoral response. This is the basic form of nuclear deterrence. In international as in domestic society, deterrence works by calling up dramatic images of human pain. "In the groves of *their* academy," wrote Edmund Burke of the liberal theorists of crime and punishment, "at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the gallows."[2] The description is uncomplimentary, for Burke believed that domestic peace must rest upon some other foundation. But there is this much to be said for the gallows: in principle, at least, only guilty men need fear the death it brings. About the theorists of deterrence, however, it must be said, "In the groves of *their* academy, at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the mushroom cloud"—and the cloud symbolizes indiscriminate slaughter, the killing of the innocent (as in Hiroshima) on a massive scale. No doubt, the threat of such slaughter, if it is believed, makes nuclear attack a radically undesirable policy. Doubled by a potential enemy, the threat produces a "balance of terror." Both sides are so terrified that no further terrorism is necessary. But is the threat itself morally permissible?

The question is a difficult one. It has generated in the years since Hiroshima a significant body of literature exploring the relation between nuclear deterrence and just war.[3] This has been the work mostly of theologians and philosophers, but some of the strategists of deterrence have also been involved; they worry about the act of terrorizing much as conventional soldiers worry about the act of killing. I cannot review this literature here, though I shall draw upon it freely. The argument against deterrence is familiar enough. Anyone committed to the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is bound to be appalled by the specter of destruction evoked, and purposely evoked, in deterrence theory. "How can a nation live with its conscience," John Bennett has asked, "and know that it is preparing to kill twenty million children in another nation if the worst should come to the worst?"[4] And yet, we have lived with that knowledge, and with our consciences too, for several decades now. How have we managed? The reason for our acceptance of deterrent strategy, most people would say, is that preparing to kill, even threatening to kill, is not at all the same thing as killing. Indeed it is not, but it is frighteningly close—else deterrence wouldn't "work"—and it is in the nature of that closeness that the moral problem lies.

The problem is often misdescribed—as in the following analogy for nuclear deterrence first suggested by Paul Ramsey and frequently repeated since:[5]

> Suppose that one Labor Day weekend no one was killed or maimed on the highways; and that the reason for the remarkable restraint placed on the recklessness of automobile drivers was that suddenly everyone of them discovered he was driving with a baby tied to his front bumper! That would be no way to regulate traffic *even if it succeeds* in regulating it perfectly, since such a system makes innocent human lives the *direct object* of attack and uses them as a mere means for restraining the drivers of automobiles.

No one, of course, has ever proposed regulating traffic in this ingenious way, while the strategy of deterrence was adopted with virtually no opposition at all. That contrast should alert us to what is wrong with Ramsey's analogy. Though deterrence turns American and Russian civilians into mere means for the prevention of war, it does so without restraining any of us in any way. Ramsey reproduces the strategy of the German officers during the Franco-Prussian War who forced civilians to ride on military trains in order to deter saboteurs. By contrast with those civilians, however, we are hostages who lead normal lives. It is in the nature of the new technology that we can be threatened without being held captive. That is why deterrence, while in principle so frightening, is so easy to live with. It cannot be condemned for anything it does to its hostages. It is so far from killing them that it does not even injure or confine them; it involves no direct or physical violation of their rights. Those critics of deterrence who are also committed consequentialists have had to imagine psychic injuries. Thus Erich Fromm, writing in 1960: "To live for any length of time under the constant threat of destruction creates certain psychological effects in most human beings—fright, hostility, callousness . . . and a resulting indifference to all the values we cherish. Such conditions will transform us into barbarians . . ."[6] But I don't know of any evidence that bears out either the assertion or the prediction; surely we are no more barbarians now than we were in 1945. In fact, for most people, the threat of destruction, though constant, is invisible and unnoticed. We have come to live with it casually—as Ramsey's babies, traumatized for life in all probability, could never do, and as hostages in conventional wars have never done.

If deterrence were more painful, we might have found other means of avoiding nuclear war—or we might not have avoided it. If we had to keep millions of people under restraint in order to maintain the balance of terror, or if we had to kill millions of people (periodically) in order to convince our adversaries of our credibility, deterrence would not be accepted for long.[7] The strategy works because it is easy. Indeed, it is easy in a double sense: not only don't we do anything to other people, we also don't believe that we will ever have to do anything. The secret of nuclear deterrence is that it is a kind of bluff. Perhaps we are only bluffing ourselves, refusing to acknowledge the real terrors of a precarious and temporary balance. But no account of our experience is accurate which fails to recognize that, for all its ghastly potential, deterrence has so far been a bloodless strategy.

So far as consequences go, then, deterrence and mass murder are very far apart. Their closeness is a matter of moral posture and intention. Once again, Ramsey's analogy misses the point. His babies are not really the "direct object of attack," for whatever happens on that Labor Day weekend, no one will deliberately set out to kill them. But deterrence depends upon a readiness to do exactly that. It is as if the state should seek to prevent murder by threatening to kill the family and friends of every murderer—a domestic version of the policy of "massive retaliation." Surely that would be a repugnant policy. We would not admire the police officials who designed it or those pledged to carry it out, even if they never actually killed anybody. I don't want to say that such people would necessarily be transformed into barbarians; they might well have a heightened sense of how awful murder is and a heightened desire to avoid it; they might loathe the work they were pledged to do and fervently hope that they never had to do it. Nevertheless, the enterprise is immoral. The immorality lies in the threat itself, not in its present or even its likely consequences. Similarly with nuclear deterrence: it is our own intentions that we have to worry about and the potential (since there are no actual) victims of those intentions. Here Ramsey has put the case very well: "Whatever is wrong to do is wrong to threaten, if the latter means 'mean to do' . . . If counter-population warfare is murder, then counter-population deterrent threats are murderous."[6] No doubt, killing millions of innocent people is worse than threatening to kill them. It is also true that no one wants to kill them, and it may well be true that no one expects to do so. Nevertheless, we intend the killings under certain circumstances. That is the stated policy of our government; and thousands of men, trained in the techniques of mass destruction and drilled in instant obedience, stand ready to carry it out. And from the perspective of morality, the readiness is all. We can translate it into degrees of danger, high and low, and worry about the risks we are imposing on innocent people, but the risks depend on the readiness. What we condemn in our own government, as in the police in my domestic analogy, is the commitment to murder.*

But this analogy, too, can be questioned. We don't prevent murder any more than we control traffic in these bizarre and inhuman ways. But we do deter or seek to deter our nuclear adversaries. Perhaps deterrence is different because of the danger its advocates claim to avoid. Traffic deaths and occasional murders, however much we deplore them, do not threaten our common liberties or our collective survival. Deterrence, so we have been told, guards us against a double danger: first, of atomic blackmail and foreign domination; and second, of nuclear destruction. The two go together, since if we did not fear the blackmail, we might adopt a policy of appeasement or surrender and so avoid the destruction. Deterrence theory was worked out at the height of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and those who worked it out were concerned above all with the political uses of violence—which are not relevant in either the traffic or police analogies. Underlying the American doctrine, there seemed to lurk some version of the slogan "Better dead than Red" (I don't know the Russian parallel). Now that is not really a believable slogan; it is hard to imagine that a nuclear holocaust was really thought preferable to the expansion of Soviet power. What made deterrence attractive was that it seemed capable of avoiding both.

We need not dwell on the nature of the Soviet regime in order to understand the virtues of this argument. Deterrence theory doesn't depend upon a view of Stalinism as a great evil (though that is a highly plausible view) in the same way that my argument about terror bombing depended upon an assertion about the evils of Nazism. It requires only that we see appeasement or surrender to involve a loss of values central to our existence as an independent nation-state. For it is not tolerable that advances in technology should put our nation, or any nation, at the mercy of a great power willing to menace the world or to press its authority outwards in the shadow of an implicit threat. The case here is very different from that which arises commonly in war, where *our* adherence to the war convention puts us, or would put us, at a disadvantage vis-à-vis *them*. For disadvantages of that sort are partial and relative; various counter-measures and compensating steps are always available. But in the nuclear case, the disadvantage is absolute. Against an enemy actually willing to use the bomb, self defense is impossible, and it makes sense to say that the only compensating step is the (immoral) threat to respond in kind. No country capable of making such a threat is likely to refuse to make it. What is not tolerable won't be tolerated. Hence any state confronted by a nuclear adversary (it makes little difference what the adversary relationship is like or what ideological forms it assumes), and capable of developing its own bomb, is likely to do so, seeking safety in a balance of terror.* Mutual disarmament would clearly be a preferable alternative, but it is an alternative available only to the two countries working closely together, whereas deterrence is the likely choice of either one of them alone. They will worry about one another's readiness to attack; they will each assume their own commitment to resist; and they will realize that the greatest danger of such a confrontation would not be the defeat of one side or the other but the total destruction of both—and possibly of everyone else too. This in fact is the danger that has faced mankind since 1945, and our understanding of nuclear deterrence must be worked out with reference to its scope and imminence. Supreme emergency has become a permanent condition. Deterrence is a way of coping with that condition, and though it is a bad way, there may well be no other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states. We threaten evil in order not to do it, and the doing of it would be so terrible that the threat seems in comparison to be morally defensible.

Limited Nuclear War

If the bomb were ever used, deterrence would have failed. It is a feature of massive retaliation that while there is or may be some rational purpose in threatening it, there could be none in carrying it out. Were our "bluff" ever to be called and our population centers suddenly attacked, the resulting war could not (in any usual

* Would it make any difference if this commitment were mechanically fixed? Suppose we set up a computer which would automatically respond to any enemy attack by releasing our missiles. Then we informed our potential enemies that if they attacked our cities, theirs would be attacked. And they would be responsible for both attacks, we might say, since in the interval between the two, no political decision, no act of the will, would be possible on our side. I don't want to comment on the possible effectiveness (or the dangers) of such an arrangement. But it is worth insisting that it would not solve the moral problem. The men and women who designed the computer program or the political leaders who ordered them to do so would be responsible for the second attack, for they would have planned it and organized it and intended that it should occur (under certain conditions).

sense of the word) be *won*. We could only drag our enemies after us into the abyss. The use of our deterrent capacity would be an act of pure destructiveness. For this reason, massive retaliation, if not literally unthinkable, has always seemed undo-able, and this is a source of considerable anxiety for military strategists. Deterrence only works, they argue, if each side believes that the other might actually carry out its threat. But would we carry it out? George Kennan has recently given what must be the moral response:[9]

> Let us suppose there were to be a nuclear attack of some sort on this country and millions of people were killed and injured. Let us further suppose that we had the ability to retaliate against the urban centers of the country that had attacked us. Would you want to do that? I wouldn't . . . I have no sympathy with the man who demands an eye for an eye in a nuclear attack.

A humane position—though one that should probably be whispered, rather than published, if the balance of terror is to be sustained. But the argument might look very different if the original attack or the planned response avoided cities and people. If a limited nuclear war were possible, wouldn't it also be do-able? And might not the balance of terror then be re-established on the basis of threats that were neither immoral nor unconvincing?

Over a brief timespan, in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, these questions were answered with an extraordinary outpouring of strategic arguments and speculations, overlapping in important ways with the moralizing literature I described earlier.[10] For the debate among the strategists focused on the attempt (though this was rarely made explicit) to fit nuclear war into the structure of the war convention, to apply the argument for justice as if this sort of conflict were like any other sort. The attempt involved, first, a defense of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in deterring and, if that failed, in resisting conventional or small-scale nuclear attacks; and it involved, secondly, the development of a "counter-force" strategy directed at the enemy's military installations and also at major economic targets (but not at entire cities). These two had a similar purpose. By holding out the promise of a limited war, they made it possible to imagine actually fighting such a war —they made it possible to imagine *winning* it—and so they strengthened the intention that lay behind the deterrent threat. They transformed the "bluff" into a plausible option.

Until the late 1950s, the tendency of most people was to regard the atomic bomb and its thermonuclear successors as forbidden weapons. They were treated on analogy with poison gas, though the prohibition on their use was never legally established. "Ban the bomb" was everyone's policy, and deterrence was simply a practical way of enforcing the ban. But now the strategists suggested (rightly) that the crucial distinction in the theory and practice of war was not between prohibited and acceptable weapons but between prohibited and acceptable targets. Massive retaliation was painful and difficult to contemplate because it was modeled on Hiroshima; the people we were planning to kill were innocent, militarily uninvolved, as removed from and ignorant of the weapons with which their leaders threatened us as we were of the weapons with which our leaders threatened them. But this objection would disappear if we could deter our adversaries by threatening a limited and morally acceptable destruction. Indeed, it might disappear so entirely that we would be tempted to give up deterrence and initiate the destruction ourselves whenever it seemed to our advantage to do so. This was certainly the tendency of much strategic argument, and several writers painted rather attractive pictures of limited nuclear war. Henry Kissinger likened it to war at sea—the very best kind of war, since no one lives in the sea. "The proper analogy . . . is not traditional land warfare, but naval strategy, in which self-contained, [highly mobile] units with great fire power gradually gain the upper hand by destroying their enemy counterparts without physically occupying territory or establishing a front line."[11] The only difficulty is that Kissinger imagined fighting a war like that in Europe.*

Tactical and counter-force warfare meets the formal requirements of *jus in bello*, and it was seized upon eagerly by certain moral theorists. That is not to say, however, that it makes moral sense. There remains the possibility that the new technology of war simply doesn't fit and cannot be made to fit within the old limits. This proposition can be defended in two different ways. The first is to argue that the collateral damage likely to be caused even by a "legitimate" use of nuclear weapons is so great that it would violate both of the proportionality limits fixed by the theory of war: the number of people killed in the war as a whole would not be warranted by the goals of the war—particularly since the dead would include many if not most of the people for whose defense the war was being fought; and the number of people killed in individual actions would be disproportionate (under the doctrine of double effect) to the value of the military targets directly attacked. "The disproportion between the cost of such hostilities and the results they could achieve," wrote Raymond Aron, thinking of a limited nuclear war in Europe, "would be colossal."[12] It would be colossal even if the formal limits on targeting were in fact observed. But the second argument against limited nuclear war is that these limits would almost certainly not be observed.

At this point, of course, one can only guess at the possible shape and course of the battles; there is no history to study. Neither moralists nor strategists can refer to cases; instead they design scenarios. The scene is empty; one can fill it in very different ways, and it is not impossible to imagine that limits might be maintained even after nuclear weapons had been used in battle. The prospect that they would be maintained and the war extended over time is so frightening to those countries on whose soil such wars are likely to be fought that they have generally opposed the new strategies and insisted upon the threat of massive retaliation. Thus, as André Beaufre has written, "Europeans would prefer to risk general war in an attempt to avoid war altogether rather than have Europe become the theater of operations for limited war."[13] In fact, however, the risks of escalation will be great whatever limits are adopted, simply because of the immense destructive power of the weapons involved. Or rather, there are two possibilities: either nuclear weapons will be held at such low levels that they won't be significantly different from or of greater military utility than conventional explosives, in which case there is no reason to use them at all; or their very use will obliterate the distinction between targets. Once a bomb has been aimed at a military target but has, as a side effect, destroyed a city, the logic of deterrence will require the other side to aim at a city (for the sake of its seriousness and credibility). It is not necessarily the case that every war would become a total war, but the danger of escalation is so great as to preclude the first use of nuclear weapons—except by someone willing to face their final use. "Who would even launch such hostilities,"

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* Kissinger later moved away from these views, and they have pretty much dropped out of the strategic debates. But this picture of limited nuclear war is worked out in graphic detail in a novel by Joe Haldeman (*The Forever War*, New York, 1974), where the fighting goes on not at sea but in outer space. Many of the strategic speculations of the 1950s and 1960s have ended up as science fiction. Does this mean that the strategists had too much imagination or that the authors of science fiction have too little?

Aron has asked, "unless he was determined to persist to the bitter end?"[14] But such a determination is not imaginable in a sane human being, let alone in a political leader responsible for the safety of his own people; it would involve nothing less than national suicide.

These two factors, the extent even of limited destruction and the dangers of escalation, seem to rule out any sort of nuclear war between the great powers. They probably rule out large-scale conventional war, too, including the particular conventional war about which the strategists of the 1950's and 1960's were most concerned: a Russian invasion of western Europe. "The spectacle of a large Soviet field army crashing across the line into western Europe in the hope *and expectation* that nuclear weapons would not be used against it—thereby putting itself and the USSR totally at risk while leaving the choice of weapons to us—would seem to be hardly worth a second thought . . ."[15] It is important to stress that the bar lies in the totality of the risk: not in the possibility of what the strategists called a "flexible response," finely adjusted to the scope of the attack, but in the stark reality of ultimate horror should the adjustments fail. It may well be that "flexible response" enhanced the value of a counter-population deterrent by making it possible to reach that final point in "easy" stages, but it is also and more importantly true that we have never begun the staged escalation and are never likely to begin it, because of what lies at the end. Hence the persistence of counter-population deterrence, and hence also the virtual end of the strategic debate, which petered out in the middle 1960s. At that point, I think, it became clear that given the existence of large numbers of nuclear weapons and their relative invulnerability, and barring major technological breakthroughs, *any imaginable strategy* is likely to deter a "central war" between the great powers. The strategists helped us to understand this, but once it was understood it became unnecessary to adopt any of their strategies—or at least, any particular one of them. We continue to live, then, with the paradox that pre-existed the debate: nuclear weapons are politically and militarily unusable only because and insofar as we can plausibly threaten to use them in some ultimate way. And it is immoral to make threats of that kind.

The Argument of Paul Ramsey

Before deciding (or refusing) to live with this paradox, I want to consider in some detail the work of the Protestant theologian Paul Ramsey, who has over a period of years argued that there exists a justifiable deterrent strategy. From the beginning of the moral and strategic debates, Ramsey has been a sharp opponent of the advocates of counter-city deterrence and also of those of its critics who think that it is the only form of deterrence and therefore opt for nuclear disarmament. He has condemned both these groups for the all-or-nothing character of their thinking: either total and immoral destruction or a kind of "pacifistic" inertia. He argues that these twin perspectives conform to the traditional American view of war as an all-out conflict, which must therefore be avoided whenever possible. Ramsey himself, I think, is a Protestant soldier in a different tradition; he would have Americans gird themselves for a long, continuous struggle with the forces of evil.[16]

Now if there is to be a justified deterrent strategy, there must be a justified form of nuclear war, and Ramsey has conscientiously argued "the case for making just war possible" in the modern age. He takes a lively and well-informed interest in the strategic debates and has at various times defended the use of tactical nuclear weapons against invading armies and of strategic weapons against nuclear installations, conventional military bases, and isolated economic objectives. Even these targets are only "conditionally" permissible, since the proportionality rule would have to be applied in each case, and Ramsey does not believe that its standards will always be met. Like everyone (or almost everyone) who writes about these matters, he has no zest for nuclear combat; his main interest is in deterrence. But he needs at least the possibility of legitimate warfare if he is to maintain a deterrent posture without making immoral threats. That is his central purpose, and the effort to achieve it involves him in a highly sophisticated application of just war theory to the problems of nuclear strategy. In the best sense of the word, Ramsey is engaged with the realities of his world. But the realities in this case are intractable, and his way around them is finally too complex and too devious to provide a plausible account of our moral judgments. He multiplies distinctions like a Ptolemaic astronomer with his epicycles and comes very close at the end to what G. E. M. Anscombe has called "double-think about double effect."[17] But his work is important; it suggests the outer limits of the just war and the dangers of trying to extend those limits.

Ramsey's central claim is that it is possible to prevent nuclear attack without threatening to bomb cities in response. He believes that "the collateral civilian damage that would result from counter-force warfare in its maximum form" would be sufficient to deter potential aggressors.[18] Since the civilians likely to die in such a war would be the incidental victims of legitimate military strikes, the threat of counter-force warfare plus collateral damage is also morally superior to deterrence in its present form. These are not hostages whom we intend to murder (under certain circumstances). Nor are we planning their deaths; we are only pointing out to our possible enemies the unavoidable consequences even of a war justly fought—which is, we could honestly say were we to adopt Ramsey's proposal, the only sort of war we were preparing to fight. Collateral damage is simply a fortunate feature of nuclear warfare; it serves no military purpose, and we would avoid it if we could, though it is clearly a good thing that we cannot. And since the damage is justifiable in prospect, it is also justifiable here and now to call that prospect to mind for the sake of its deterrent effects.

But there are two problems with this argument. First, the danger of collateral damage is unlikely to work as a deterrent unless the damage expected is radically disproportionate to the ends of the war or the value of this or that military target. Hence Ramsey is driven to argue that "the threat of something disproportionate is not always a disproportionate threat."[19] What that means is this: proportionality in combat is measured, let's say, against the value of a particular missile base, while proportionality in deterrence is measured against the value of world peace. So the damage may not be justifiable in prospect (under the doctrine of double effect), and yet the threat of such damage may still be morally permitted. Perhaps that argument is right, but I should stress that its result is to void the proportionality rule. Now there is no limit on the number of people whose deaths we can threaten, so long as those deaths are to be caused "collaterally" and not by taking direct aim. As we have seen before, the idea of proportionality, once it is worked on a bit, tends to fade away. And then the entire burden

of Ramsey's argument falls on the idea of death by indirection. That is indeed an important idea, central to the permissions and restraints of conventional war. But its standing is undermined here by the fact that Ramsey relies so heavily on the deaths he supposedly doesn't intend. He wants, like other deterrent theorists, to prevent nuclear attack by threatening to kill very large numbers of innocent civilians, but unlike other deterrent theorists, he expects to kill these people without aiming at them. That may be a matter of some moral significance, but it does not seem significant enough to serve as the cornerstone of a justified deterrent. If counter-force warfare had no collateral effects, or had minor and controllable effects, then it could play no part in Ramsey's strategy. Given the effects it does have and the central part it is assigned, the word "collateral" seems to have lost much of its meaning. Surely anyone designing such a strategy must accept moral responsibility for the effects on which he is so radically dependent.

But we have not yet seen the whole of Ramsey's design, for he doesn't pull back from the hardest questions. What if the likely collateral damage of a just nuclear war isn't great enough to deter a would-be aggressor? What if the aggressor threatens a counter-city strike? Surrender would be intolerable, and yet we cannot ourselves threaten mass murder in response. Fortunately (again), we don't have to. "We do not need . . . to threaten that we will use [nuclear weapons] in case of attack," Bernard Brodie has written. "We do not need to threaten anything. Their being there is quite enough."[20] So it is, too, according to Ramsey, with counter-city strikes: the mere possession of nuclear weapons constitutes an implicit threat which no one actually has to make. If the immorality lies in uttering the threat, then it may in practice be avoided—though one may wonder at the ease of this solution. Nuclear weapons, Ramsey writes, have a certain inherent ambiguity: "they may be used either against strategic forces or against centers of population," and that means that "*apart from intention*, their capacity to deter cannot be removed from them . . . No matter how often we declare, and quite sincerely declare, that our targets are an enemy's forces, he can never be quite *certain* that in the fury or the fog of war his cities may not be destroyed."[21] Now, the possession of conventional weapons is both innocent and ambiguous in exactly the way Ramsey suggests. The fact that I am holding a sword or a rifle doesn't mean that I am going to use it against innocent people, though it is quite effective against them; it has the same "dual use" that Ramsey has discovered in nuclear weapons. But the bomb is different. In a sense, as Beaufre has said, it isn't designed for war at all.[22] It is designed to kill whole populations, and its deterrent value depends upon that fact (whether the killing is direct or indirect). It serves the purpose of preventing war only by virtue of the implicit threat it poses, and we possess it for the sake of that purpose. And men and women are responsible for the threats they live by, even if they don't speak them out loud.

Ramsey presses on. Perhaps the mere possession of nuclear weapons won't be enough to deter some reckless aggressor. Then, he suggests, we must distinguish "between the appearance and the actuality of being . . . committed to go to city exchanges . . . In that case, only the appearance should be cultivated."[23] I am not sure exactly what that means, and Ramsey (for once) seems reluctant to say, but presumably it would allow us to hint at the possibility of massive retaliation without actually planning for it or intending to carry it out. Thus we are offered a continuum of increasing moral danger along which four points are marked out: the articulated prospect of collateral (and disproportionate) civilian deaths; the implicit threat of counter-city strikes; the "cultivated" appearance of a commitment to counter-city strikes; and the actual commitment. These may well be distinct points, in the sense that one can imagine policies focused around each of them, and these would be different policies. But I am inclined to doubt that the differences make a difference. To rule out the last for moral reasons, while permitting the first three, can only make people cynical about one's moral reasons. Ramsey aims to clear our intentions without prohibiting those policies that he believes necessary (and that probably are necessary under present conditions) for the dual prevention of war and conquest. But the unavoidable truth is that all these policies rest ultimately on immoral threats. Unless we give up nuclear deterrence, we cannot give up such threats, and it is best if we straightforwardly acknowledge what it is we are doing.

The real ambiguity of nuclear deterrence lies in the fact that no one, including ourselves, can be sure that we will ever carry out the threats we make. In a sense, all we ever do is to "cultivate the appearance." We strain for credibility, but what we are putatively planning and intending remains incredible. As I have already suggested, that helps make deterrence psychologically bearable, and perhaps also it makes a deterrent posture marginally better from a moral standpoint. But at the same time, the reason for our hesitancy and self-doubt is the monstrous immorality that our policy contemplates, an immorality we can never hope to square with our understanding of justice in war. Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war. They are the first of mankind's technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world. Or rather, our familiar notions about *jus in bello* require us to condemn even the threat to use them. And yet there are other notions, also familiar, having to do with aggression and the right of self defense, that seem to require exactly that threat. So we move uneasily beyond the limits of justice for the sake of justice (and of peace).

According to Ramsey, this is a dangerous move. For if we "become convinced," he writes, "that in the matter of deterrence a number of things are wicked which are not," then, seeing no way of avoiding wickedness, we will "set no limits on it."[24] Once again, this argument is precisely right with reference to conventional warfare; it catches the central error of what I have called the "war is hell" doctrine. But it is persuasive in the case of nuclear warfare only if one can describe plausible and morally significant limits, and that Ramsey has not done; nor have the strategists of "flexible response" been able to do it. All their arguments depend upon the ultimate wickedness of counter-city strikes. The pretense that this is not so carries with it dangers of its own. To draw insignificant lines, to maintain the formal categories of double effect, collateral damage, noncombatant immunity, and so on, when so little moral content remains is to corrupt the argument for justice as a whole and to render it suspect even in those areas of military life to which it properly pertains. And those areas are wide. Nuclear deterrence marks their outer limits, forcing us to contemplate wars that can never be fought. Within those limits there are wars that can and will and perhaps even should be fought, and to which the old rules apply with all their force. The specter of a nuclear holocaust does not invite us to act wickedly in conventional wars. Indeed, it probably is a deterrent there, too; it is hard to imagine a repetition of Dresden or Tokyo in a conventional war between nuclear powers. For destruction on such a scale would invite a nuclear response and a drastic and unacceptable escalation of the struggle.

UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS (1983) Pastoral Letter: The Challenge of Peace

At their November 1980 meeting the Catholic Bishops of the United States decided to address themselves to the moral and religious aspects of war, particularly nuclear war, and peace in the present world. A committee of five bishops and five consultants was set. It held many meetings and consulted with theologians, scholars, military men and past and present government officials, as well as some representatives of the Vatican and European Catholicism. Three drafts were submitted successively to all of the bishops for review. The revised third draft, from which the following excerpts were taken, was adopted by a vote of 238 to 9 by the United States Bishops in May 1983 at Chicago. The resulting document is remarkable for the forcefulness with which it interprets and applies traditional Catholic Just War theory to the new problems of nuclear war, often pitting the moral implications of this position against political and military postures of the United States and other governments. It is also notable for a renewed emphasis on the type of Christian pacifism embraced in the first three centuries A.D., as an appropriate option, instead of just war theory, for individuals.

The official title of the bishops' pastoral letter, as it is commonly called, is"The Challenge of Peace; God's Promise and Our Response". It is about 50,000 words long (125 normal pages) and contains a summary and four major parts. In the first two sub-sections of Part I, Peace in the Modern World: Religious Perspectives and Principles, it discusses the concepts of peace and war in the Old and New Testaments, and Christian understanding and hopes for peace in actual human history. The third sub-section, which is reproduced below, is entitled "Moral Choices for the Kingdom", and contains a Catholic view of the nature of peace, the presumption against war, the legitimacy of self-defense, and the Just War Theory both ad bellum (just reasons for going to war) and in bello(what is just in the conduct of war). These sections up-date the positions of Augustine and Aquinas. And finally the pacifist option is up-dated and placed alongside just war theory as an option for individual Catholics.

The other three parts of the pastoral letter deal with applications of these principles to nuclear war and to building peace, as well as well as suggestions to insure disemmination of ideas in the letter among Catholic clergy and laity. We include below the sections which are particularly relevant to goals and policies involving nuclear weapons. The letter also contains, though they are not reproduced here, a variety of positive suggestions to reduce the danger of war through arms control and reduction, disarmament, the development of non-violent means of conflict-resolution, recognition of conscientious objection (even selective objection based on just war theory), and the development of global systems of government based on the vision of the world as one interdependent planet with diverse national communities within the larger world community. In the latter connection stronger support of the United Nations, and avoidance of kinds of anti-Sovietism which ignore common interests and fogets that " the Soviet people and their leaders are human beings created in the image and likeness of God".

The mode of reasoning of the U.S.Bishops is, as is common in the Roman Catholic Church, a mixture of appeal to the authority of the Scriptures, the Pope - particularly Vatican II "The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World" 1965 - and theologians such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas, with much knowledge of history and realistic assessment of current affairs and international tensions. Underlying the letter is not only an assumption that appeals to conscience and religious commitments ought to made by this group, but that such appeals are not without affect in the affairs of men, and that their is grounds to hope that such appeals might indeed reverse the present course of history.

C. Moral Choices for the Kingdom

In one of its most frequently quoted passages, the pastoral constitution declares that it is necessary "to undertake a completely fresh reappraisal of war." (20) The council's teaching situates this call for a "fresh reappraisal" within the context of a broad analysis of the dignity of the human person and the state of the world today. If we lose sight of this broader discussion we cannot grasp the council's wisdom. For the issue of war and peace confronts everyone with a basic question: What contributes to, and what impedes a more genuinely human world? If we are to evaluate war with an entirely new attitude, we must be serious about approaching the human person with an entirely new attitude. The obligation for all of humanity to work toward universal respect for human rights and human dignity is a fundamental imperative of the social, economic and political order.

It is clear, then, that to evaluate war with a new attitude, we must go far beyond an examination of weapons systems or military strategies. We must probe the meaning of the moral choices which are ours as Christians. In accord with the vision of Vatican II, we need to be sensitive to both the danger of war and the conditions of true freedom within which moral choices can be made. (21) Peace is the setting in which moral choice can be most effectively exercised. How can we move toward that peace which is indispensable for true human freedom? How do we define such peace?

1. The Nature of Peace

The Catholic tradition has always understood the meaning of peace in positive terms. Peace is both a gift of God and a human work. It must be constructed on the basis of central human values: truth, justice, freedom and love. The pastoral constitution states the traditional conception of peace:

"Peace is not merely the absence of war. Nor can it be reduced solely to the maintenance of a balance of power between enemies. Nor is it brought about by dictatorship. Instead, it is rightly and appropriately called 'an enterprise of justice' (Is. 32:7). Peace results from that harmony built into human society by its divine founder and actualized by men as they thirst after ever greater justice." (22)

Pope John Paul II has enhanced this positive conception of peace by relating it with new philosophical depth to the church's teaching on human dignity and human rights. The relationship was articulated in his 1979 Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations and also in his World Day of Peace Message of 1982:

"Unconditional and effective respect for each one's unprescriptable and inalienable rights is the necessary condition in order that peace may reign in a society. Vis-a-vis these basic rights, all others are in a way derivatory and secondary. In a society in which these rights are not protected, the very idea of universality is dead as soon as a small group of individuals set up for their own exclusive advantage a principle of discrimination whereby the rights and even the lives of others are made dependent on the whim of the stronger." (23)

As we have already noted, however, the protection of human rights and the preservation of peace are tasks to be accomplished in a world marked by sin and conflict of various kinds. The church's teaching on war and peace establishes a strong presumption against war which is binding on all; it then examines when this presumption may be overriden, precisely in the name of preserving the kind of peace which protects human dignity and human rights.

2. The Presumption Against War and the Principle of Legitimate Self-Defense

Under the rubric, "curbing the savagery of war," the council contemplates the "melancholy state of humanity." It looks at this world as it is, not simply as we would want it to be. The view is stark: ferocious new means of warfare threatening savagery surpassing that of the past, deceit, subversion, terrorism, genocide. This last crime in particular is vehemently condemned as horrendous, but all activities which deliberately conflict with the all-embracing principles of universal natural law, which is permanently binding, are criminal, as are all orders commanding such action. Supreme commendation is due the courage of those who openly and fearlessly resist those who issue such commands. All individuals, especially government officials and experts, are bound to honor and improve upon agreements which are "aimed at making military activity and its consequences less inhuman" and which "better and more workably lead to restraining the frightfulness of war." (24)

This remains a realistic appraisal of the world today. Later in this section the council calls for us "to strain every muscle as we work for the time when all war can be completely outlawed by international consent." We are told, however, that this goal requires the establishment of some universally recognized public authority with effective power "to safeguard, on the behalf of all, security, regard for justice and respect for rights." (25) *But what of the present?* The council is exceedingly clear, as are the popes:

"Certainly war has not been rooted out of human affairs. As long as the danger of war remains and there is no competent and sufficiently powerful authority at the international level, governments cannot be denied the right to legitimate defense once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted. Therefore, government authorities and others who share public responsibility have the duty to protect the welfare of the people entrusted to their care and to conduct such grave matters soberly.

"But it is one thing to undertake military action for the just defense of the people, and something else again to seek the subjugation of other nations. Nor does the possession of war potential make every military or political use of it lawful. Neither does the mere fact that war has unhappily begun mean that all is fair between the warring parties." (26)

The Christian has no choice but to defend peace, properly understood, against aggression. This is an inalienable obligation. It is the *how* of defending peace which offers moral options. We stress this principle again because we observe so much misunderstanding about both those who resist bearing arms and those who bear them. Great numbers from both traditions provide examples of exceptional courage, examples the world continues to need.

Of the millions of men and women who have served with integrity in the armed forces, many have laid down their lives. Many others serve today throughout the world in the difficult and demanding task of helping to preserve that "peace of a sort" of which the council speaks.

We see many deeply sincere individuals who, far from being indifferent or apathetic to world evils, believe strongly in conscience that they are best defending true peace by refusing to bear arms. In some cases they are motivated by their understanding of the Gospel and the life and death of Jesus as forbidding all violence. In others, their motivation is simply to give personal example of Christian forbearance as a positive, constructive approach toward loving reconciliation with enemies.

In still other cases, they propose or engage in "active non-violence" as programmed resistance to thwart aggression or to render ineffective any oppression attempted by force of arms. No government, and certainly no Christian, may simply assume that such individuals are merely pawns of conspiratorial forces or guilty of cowardice.

Catholic teaching sees these two distinct moral responses as having a complementary relationship, in the sense that both seek to serve the common good. They differ in their perception of how the common good is to be defended most effectively, but both responses testify to the Christian conviction that peace must be pursued and rights defended within moral restraints and in the context of defining other basic human values.

In all of this discussion of distinct choices, of course, we are referring to options open to individuals. The council and the popes have stated clearly that governments threatened by armed, unjust aggression *must* defend their people. This includes defense by armed force if necessary as a last resort. We shall discuss below the conditions and limits imposed on such defense. Even when speaking of individuals, however, the council is careful to preserve the fundamental *right* of defense. Some choose not to vindicate their rights by armed force and adopt other methods of defense, but they do not lose the right of defense nor may they renounce their obligations to others. They are praised by the council, as long as the rights and duties of others, or of the community itself, are not injured.

Pope Pius XII is especially strong in his conviction about the responsibility of the Christian to resist unjust aggression:

"A people threatened with an unjust aggression, or already its victim, may not remain passively indifferent, if it would think and act as befits a Christian. All the more does the solidarity of the family of nations forbid others to behave as mere spectators, in any attitude of apathetic neutrality. Who will ever measure the harm already caused in the past by such indifference to war of aggression, which is quite alien to the Christian instinct? How much more keenly has it brought any advantage in recompense? On the contrary, it has only reassured and encouraged the authors and fomentors of aggression, while it obliges the several peoples, left to themselves, to increase their armaments indefinitely ...

"Among (the) goods (of humanity) some are of such importance for society, that it is perfectly lawful to defend them against unjust aggression. *Their defense is even an obligation for the nations as a whole, who have a duty not to abandon a nation that is attacked." (27)*

None of the above is to suggest, however, that armed force is the only defense against unjust aggression, regardless of circumstances. Well does the council require that grave matters concerning the protection of peoples be conducted *soberly*. The council fathers were well aware that in today's world, the "horror and perversity of war are immensely magnified by the multiplication of scientific weapons. For acts of war involving these weapons can inflict massive and indiscriminate destruction far exceeding the bounds of legitimate defense." (28) Hence, we are warned: "Men of our time must realize that they will have to give a somber reckoning for their deeds of war. For the course of the future will depend largely on the decisions they make today." (29). There must be serious and continuing study and efforts to develop programmed methods for both individuals and nations to defend against unjust aggression without using violence.

We believe work to develop non-violent means of fending off aggression and resolving conflict best reflects the call of Jesus both to love and to justice. Indeed, each increase in the potential destructiveness of weapons and therefore of war serves to underline the rightness of the way that Jesus mandated to his followers. But, on the other hand, the fact of aggression, oppression and injustice in our world also serves to legitimate the resort to weapons and armed force in defense of justice. We must recognize the reality of the paradox we face as Christians living in the context of the world as it presently exists; we must continue to articulate our belief that love is possible and the only real hope for all human relations, and yet accept that force, even deadly force, is sometimes justified and that nations must provide for their defense. It is the mandate of Christians in the face of this paradox to strive to resolve it through an even greater commitment to Christ and his message. As Pope John Paul II has said:

"Christians are aware that plans based on aggression, domination and the manipulation of others lurk in human hearts, and sometimes even secretly nourish human intentions in spite of certain declarations or manifestations of a pacifist nature. For Christians know that in this world a totally and permanently peaceful human society is unfortunately a utopia and that ideologies that hold up that prospect as easily attainable are based on hopes that cannot be realized, whatever the reason behind them.

"It is a question of a mistaken view of the human condition, a lack of application in considering the question as a whole; or it may be a case of evasion in order to calm fear, or in still other cases a matter of calculated self-interest. Christians are convinced, if only because they have learned from personal experience, that these deceptive hopes lead straight to the false peace of totalitarian regimes. But this realistic view in no way prevents Christians from working for peace; instead, it stirs up their ardor, for they also know that Christ's victory over deception, hate and death gives those in love with peace a more decisive motive for action than what the most generous theories about man have to offer; Christ's victory likewise gives a hope more surely based than any hope held out by the most audacious dreams.

"This is why Christians, even as they strive to resist and prevent every form of warfare, have no hesitation in recalling that, in the name of an elementary requirement of justice, peoples have a right and even a duty to protect their existence and freedom by proportionate means against an unjust aggressor." (30)

In light of the framework of Catholic teaching on the nature of peace, the avoidance of war, and the state's right of legitimate defense, we can now spell out certain moral principles within the Catholic tradition which provide guidance for public policy and individual choice.

3. The Just-War Criteria

The moral theory of the "just-war" or "limited-war" doctrine begins with the presumption which binds all Christians: We should do no harm to our neighbors; how we treat our enemy is the key test of whether we love our neighbor; and the possibility of taking even one human life is a prospect we should consider in fear and trembling. How is it possible to move from these presumptions to the idea of a justifiable use of lethal force?

Historically and theoretically the clearest answer to the question is found in St. Augustine. Augustine was impressed by the fact and the consequences of sin in history — the "not yet" dimension of the kingdom. In his view war was both the result of sin and a tragic remedy for sin in the life of political societies. War arose from disordered ambitions, but it could also be used in some cases at least to restrain evil and protect the innocent. The classic case which illustrated his view was the use of lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims. Faced with the fact of attack on the innocent, the presumption that we do no harm even to our enemy yielded to the command of love understood as the need to restrain an enemy who would injure the innocent.

The just-war argument has taken several forms in the history of Catholic theology, but this Augustinian insight is its central premise (31). In the 20th century, papal teaching has used the logic of Augustine and Aquinas (32) to articulate a right of self-defense for states in a decentralized international order and to state the criteria for exercising that right. The essential position was stated by Vatican II: "As long as the danger of war persists and there is no international authority with the necessary competence and power, governments cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed." (33) We have already indicated the centrality of this principle for understanding Catholic teaching about the state and its duties.

Just-war teaching has evolved, however as an effort to prevent war; only if war cannot be rationally avoided does the teaching then seek to restrict and reduce its horrors. It does this by establishing a set of rigorous conditions which must be met if the decision to go to war is to be morally permissible. Such a decision, especially today, requires extraordinarily strong reasons for overriding the presumption *in favor of peace* and *against* war. This is one significant reason why valid just-war teaching makes provision for conscientious dissent. It is presumed that all sane people prefer peace, never *want* to initiate war and accept even the most justifiable defensive war only as a sad necessity. Only the most powerful reasons may be permitted to override such objection. In the words of Pope Pius XII:

"The Christian will for peace ... is very careful to avoid recourse to the force of arms in the defense of rights which, however legitimate, do not offset the risk of kindling a blaze with all its spiritual and material consequences." (34)

The determination of *when* conditions exist which allow the resort to force in spite of the strong presumption against it is made in light of *jus ad bellum* criteria. The determination of *how* even a justified resort to force must be conducted is made in light of the *jus in bello* criteria. We shall briefly explore the meaning of both (35).

Jus Ad Bellum: Why and when recourse to war is permissible.

Just Cause

War is permissible only to confront "a real and certain danger," i.e., to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence and to secure basic human rights. As both Pope Pius XII and Pope John XXIII made clear, if war of retribution was ever justifiable, the risks of modern war negate such a claim today.

b. Competent Authority

In the Catholic tradition the right to use force has always been joined to the common good; war must be declared by those with responsibility for public order, not by private groups or individuals.

The requirement that a decision to go to war must be made by competent authority is particularly important in a democratic society. It needs detailed treatment here since it involves a broad spectrum of related issues. Some of the bitterest divisions of society in our own nation's history, for example, have been provoked over the question of whether or not a president of the United States has acted constitutionally and legally in involving our country in a *de facto* war, even if — indeed, especially if — war was never formally declared. Equally perplexing problems of conscience can be raised for individuals expected or legally required to go to war even though our duly elected representatives in Congress have in fact voted for war.

The criterion of competent authority is of further importance in a day when revolutionary war has become commonplace. Historically, the just-war tradition has been open to a "just revolution" position, recognizing that an oppressive government may lose its claim to legitimacy. Insufficient analytical attention has been given to the moral issues of revolutionary warfare. The mere possession of sufficient weaponry, for example, does not legitimize the initiation of war by "insurgents" against an established government, any more than the government's systematic oppression of its people can be carried out under the doctrine of "national security."

While the legitimacy of revolution in some circumstances cannot be denied, just-war teachings must be applied as rigorously to revolutionary-counterrevolutionary conflicts as to others. The issue of who constitutes competent authority and how much authority is exercised is essential.

When we consider in this letter the issues of conscientious objection and selective conscientious objection, the issue of competent authority will arise again.

c. Comparative Justice

Questions concerning the *means* of waging war today, particularly in view of the destructive potential of weapons, have tended to override questions concerning the comparative justice of the positions of respective adversaries or enemies. In essence: Which side is sufficiently "right" in a dispute, and are the values at stake critical enough to override the presumption against war? The question in its most basic form is this: Do the rights and values involved justify killing? For whatever the means used, war by definition involves violence, destruction, suffering and death.

The category of comparative justice is designed to emphasize the presumption against war which stands at the beginning of just-war teaching. In a world of sovereign states recognizing neither a common moral authority nor a central political authority comparative justice stresses that no state should act on the basis that it has "absolute justice" on its side. Every party to a conflict should acknowledge the limits of its "just cause" and the consequent requirement to use *only* limited means in pursuit of its objectives. Far from legitimizing a crusade mentality, comparative justice is designed to relativize absolute claims and to restrain the use of force even in a "justified" conflict. (36)

Given techniques of propaganda and the ease with which nations and individuals either assume or delude themselves into believing that God or right is clearly on their side, the test of comparative justice may be extremely difficult to apply. Clearly, however, this is not the case in every instance of war. Blatant aggression from without and subversion from within are often enough readily identifiable by all reasonably fair-minded people.

d. Right Intention

Right intention is related to just cause — war can be legitimately intended only for the reasons set forth above as a just cause. During the conflict, right intention means pursuit of peace and reconciliation, including avoiding unnecessarily destructive acts or imposing unreasonable conditions (e.g., unconditional surrender).

e. Last Resort

For resort to war to be justified, all peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted. There are formidable problems in this requirement. No international organization currently in existence has exercised sufficient internationally recognized authority to be able to either to mediate effectively in most cases or to prevent conflict by intervention of U.N. or other peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, there is a tendency for nations or peoples which perceive conflict between or among other nations as advantageous to themselves to attempt to prevent a peaceful settlement rather than advance it.

We regret apparent unwillingness of some to see in the United Nations organization the potential for world order which exists and to encourage its development. Pope Paul VI called the United Nations the last hope for peace. The loss of this hope cannot be allowed to happen. Pope John Paul II is again instructive on this point:

"I wish above all to repeat my confidence in you, the leaders and members of the international organizations, and in you, the international officials! In the course of the last 10 years your organizations have too often been the object of attempts at manipulation on the part of nations wishing to exploit such bodies. However it remains true that the present multiplicity of violent clashes, divisions and blocks on which bilateral relations founder, offer the great international organizations the opportunity to engage upon the qualitative change in their activities, even to reform on certain points their own structures in order to take into account new realities and to enjoy effective power." (37)

f. Probability of Success

This is a difficult criterion to apply, but its purpose is to prevent irrational resort to force or hopeless resistance when the outcome of either will clearly be disproportionate or futile. The determination includes a recognition that at times defense of key values, even against great odds, may be a "proportionate" witness.

g. Proportionality

In terms of the *jus ad bellum* criteria, proportionality means that the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms. Nor should judgments concerning proportionality be limited to the temporal order without regard to a spiritual dimension in terms of "damage," "cost" and "the good expected." In today's interdependent world even a local conflict can affect people everywhere; this is particularly the case when the nuclear powers are involved. Hence a nation cannot justly go to war today without considering the effect of its action on others and on the international community.

This principle of proportionality applies throughout the conduct of the war as well as to the decision to begin warfare. During the Vietnam War our bishops' conference ultimately concluded that the conflict had reached such a level of devastation to the adversary and damage to our own society that continuing it could not be justified. (38)

Jus In Bello

Even when the stringent conditions which justify resort to war are met, the conduct of war (i.e., strategy, tactics and individual actions) remains subject to continuous scrutiny in light of two principles which have special significance today precisely because of the destructive capability of modern technological warfare. These principles are proportionality and discrimination. In discussing them here, we shall apply them to the question of *jus ad bellum* as well as *jus in bello;* for today it becomes increasingly difficult to make a decision to use any kind of armed force, however limited initially in intention and in the destructive power of the weapons employed, without facing at least the possibility of escalation to broader, or even total, war and to the use of weapons of horrendous destructive potential. This is especially the case when adversaries are "superpowers," as the council clearly envisioned:

"Indeed, if the kind of weapons now stocked in the arsenals of the great powers were to be employed to the fullest, the result would be the almost complete reciprocal slaughter of one side by the other, not to speak of the widespread devastation that would follow in the world and the deadly aftereffects resulting from the use of such weapons." (39)

It should not be thought, of course, that massive slaughter and destruction would result only from the extensive use of nuclear weapons. We recall with horror the carpet and incendiary bombings of World War II, the deaths of hundreds of thousands in various regions of the world through "conventional" arms, the unspeakable use of gas and other forms of chemical warfare, the destruction of homes and of crops, the utter suffering war has wrought during the centuries before and the decades since the use of the "atom bomb." Nevertheless, every honest person must recognize that, especially given the proliferation of modern scientific weapons, we now face possibilities which are appalling to contemplate. Today, as never before, we must ask not merely *what* will happen but what *may* happen, especially if major powers embark on war. Pope John Paul II has repeatedly pleaded that world leaders confront this reality:

"(I)n view of the difference between classical warfare and nuclear or bacteriological war—a difference so to speak of nature—and in view of the scandal of the arms race seen against the background of the needs of the Third World, this right (of defense), which is very real in principle, only underlines the urgency of world society to equip itself with effective means of negotiation. In this way the nuclear terror that haunts our time can encourage us to enrich our common heritage with a very simple discovery that is within our reach, namely that war is the most barbarous and least effective way of resolving conflicts." (40)

The Pontifical Academy of Sciences reaffirmed the Holy Father's theme in its November 1981 "Statement on the Consequences of Nuclear War." Then, in a meeting convoked by the Pontifical Academy, representatives of the National Academies of Science from throughout the world issued a "Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear War" which specified the meaning of Pope John Paul II's statement that modern warfare differs by nature from previous forms of war. The scientists said:

"Throughout its history humanity has been confronted with war, but since 1945 the nature of warfare has changed so profoundly that the future of the human race, of generations yet unborn, is imperiled.... For the first time it is possible to cause damage on such a catastrophic scale as to wipe out a large part of civilization and to endanger its very survival. The large-scale use of such weapons could trigger major and irreversible ecological and genetic changes whose limits cannot be predicted."

And earlier, with such thoughts plainly in mind, the council had made its own "the condemnation of total war already pronounced by recent popes." (42) This condemnation is demanded by the principles of proportionality and discrimination. Response to aggression must not exceed the nature of the aggression. To destroy civilization as we know it by waging a "total war" as today it *could* be waged would be a monstrously disproportionate response to aggression on the part of any nation.

Moreover, the lives of innocent persons may never be taken directly, regardless of the purpose alleged for doing so. To wage truly "total" war is by definition to take huge numbers of innocent lives. Just response to aggression must be discriminate; it must be directed against unjust aggressors, not against innocent people caught up in a war not of their making. The council therefore issued its memorable declaration:

"Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation." (43)

When confronting choices among specific military options, the question asked by proportionality is: once we take into account not only the military advantages that will be achieved by using this means, but also all the harms reasonably expected to follow from using it, can its use still be justified? We know, of course, that no end can justify means evil in themselves, such as the executing of hostages or the targeting of non-combatants. Nonetheless, even if the means adopted is not evil in itself, it is necessary to take into account the probable harms that will result from using it and the justice of accepting those harms. It is of the utmost importance in assessing harms and the justice of accepting them to think about the poor and the helpless, for they are usually the ones who have the least to gain and the most to lose when war's violence touches their lives.

In terms of the arms race, if the *real* end in view is legitimate defense against unjust aggression and the means to this end are not evil in themselves, we must still examine the question of proportionality concerning attendant evils. Do the exorbitant costs, the general climate of insecurity generated, the possibility of accidental detonation of highly destructive weapons, the danger of error and miscalculation that could provoke retaliation and war—do such evils or others attendant upon and indirectly deriving from the arms race make the arms race itself a disproportionate response to aggression? Pope John Paul II is very clear in his insistence that the exercise of the right and duty of a people to protect their existence and freedom is contingent on the use of proportionate means. (44)

Finally, another set of questions concerns the interpretation of the principle of discrimination. The principle prohibits directly intended attacks on non-combatants and non-military targets. It raises a series of questions about the term "intentional," the category of "non-combatant" and the meaning of "military."

These questions merit the debate occurring with increasing frequency today. We encourage such debate, for concise and definitive answers still appear to be wanting. Mobilization of forces in modern war includes not only the military, but to a significant degree the political, economic and social sectors. It is not always easy to determine who is directly involved in a "war effort" or to what degree. Plainly, though, not even by the broadest definition can one rationally consider combatants entire classes of human beings such as schoolchildren, hospital patients, the elderly, the ill, the average industrial worker producting goods not directly related to military purposes, farmers, and many others. They may never be directly attacked.

Direct attacks on military targets involve similar complexities. Which targets are "military" ones and which are not? To what degree, for instance, does the use (by either revolutionaries or regular military forces) of a village or housing in a civilian populated area invite attack? What of a munitions factory in the heart of a city? Who is directly responsible for the deaths of non-combatants should the attack be carried out? To revert to the question raised earlier, how many deaths of non-combatants are "tolerable" as a result of indirect attacks—attacks directed against combat forces and military targets, which nevertheless kill non-combatants at the same time?

These two principles in all their complexity must be applied to the range of weapons—conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical—with which nations are armed today.

4. The Value of Non-violence

Moved by the example of Jesus' life and by his teaching, some Christians have from the earliest days of the church committed themselves to a non-violent lifestyle. (45) Some understood the Gospel of Jesus to prohibit all killing. Some affirmed the use of prayer and other spiritual methods as means of responding to enmity and hostility.

In the middle of the second century St. Justin proclaimed to his pagan readers that Isaiah's prophecy about turning swords into ploughshares and spears into sickles had been fulfilled as a consequence of Christ's coming:

"And we who delighted in war, in the slaughter of one another, and in every other kind of inequity have in every part of the world converted our weapons into implements of peace—our swords into ploughshares, our spears into farmer's tools—and we cultivate piety, justice, brotherly charity, faith and hope, which we derive from the Father through the crucified Savior." (46)

Writing in the third century, St. Cyprian of Carthage struck a similar note when he indicated that the Christians of his day did not fight against their enemies. He himself regarded their conduct as proper:

"They do not even fight against those who are attacking since it is not granted to the innocent to kill even the agressor, but promptly to deliver up their souls and blood that since so much malice and cruelty are rampant in the world they may more quickly withdraw from the malicious and the cruel. (47)

Some of the early Christian opposition to military service was a response to the idolatrous practices which prevailed in the Roman army. Another powerful motive was the fact that army service involved preparation for fighting and killing. We see this in the case of St. Martin of Tours during the fourth century, who renounced his soldierly profession with the explanation: "Hitherto I have served you as a soldier. Allow me now to become a soldier of God...I am a soldier of Christ. It is not lawful for me to fight." (48)

In the centuries between the fourth century and our own day, the theme of Christian non-violence and Christian pacifism has echoed and re-echoed, sometimes more strongly, sometimes more faintly. One of the great non-violent figures in those centuries was St. Francis of Assisi. Besides making personal efforts on behalf of reconciliation and peace, Francis stipulated that laypersons who became members of his Third Order were not "to take up lethal weapons, or bear them about, against anybody."

The vision of Christian non-violence is not passive about injustice and the defense of the rights of others; it rather affirms and exemplifies what it means to resist unjustice through non-violent methods.

In the 20th century, prescinding from the non-Christian witness of a Mahatma Gandhi and its worldwide impact, the non-violent witness of such figures as Dorothy Day and Martin Luther King has had a profound impact upon the life of the church in the United States. The witness of numerous Christians who had preceded them over the centuries was affirmed in a remarkable way at the Second Vatican Council.

Two of the passages which were included in the final version of the pastoral constitution gave particular encouragement for Catholics in all walks of life to assess their attitudes toward war and military service in the light of Christian pacifism. In Paragraph 79 the council fathers called upon governments to enact laws protecting the rights of those who adopted the position of conscientious objection to all war: "Moreover, it seems right that laws make humane provisions for the case of those who for reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms, provided, however, that they accept some other form of service to the human community." (49) This was the first time a call for legal protection of conscientious objectors had appeared in a document of such prominence. In addition to its own profound meaning this statement took on even more significance in light of the praise that the council fathers had given in the preceding section "to those who renounce the use of violence in the vindication of their rights." (50) In "Human Life in Our Day" (1968) we called for legislative provision to recognize selective conscientious objectors as well. (51)

As Catholic bishops it is incumbent upon us to stress to our own community and to the wider society the significance of this support for a pacifist option for individuals in the teaching of Vatican II and the reaffirmation that the popes have given to non-violent witness since the time of the council.

In the development of a theology of peace and the growth of the Christian pacifist position among Catholics, these words of the pastoral constitution have special significance: "All these factors force us to undertake a completely fresh reappraisal of war." (52) The council fathers had reference to "the development of armaments by modern science (which) has immeasurably magnified the horrors and wickedness of war." (53) While the just-war teaching has clearly been in possession for the past 1,500 years of Catholic thought, the "new moment" in which we find ourselves sees the just-war teaching and non-violence as distinct but interdependent methods of evaluating warfare. They diverge on some specific conclusions, but they share a common presumption against the use of force as a means of settling disputes.

Both find their roots in the Christian theological tradition; each contributes to the full moral vision we need in pursuit of a human peace. We believe the two perspectives support and complement one another, each preserving the other from distortion. Finally, in an age of technological warfare, analysis from the viewpoint of non-violence and analysis from the viewpoint of the just-war teaching often converge and agree in their opposition to methods of warfare which are in fact indistinguishable from total warfare.

II. War and Peace in the Modern World: Problems and Principles

Both the just-war teaching and non-violence are confronted with a unique challenge by nuclear warfare. This must be the starting point of any further moral reflection: Nuclear weapons particularly and nuclear warfare as it is planned today raise new moral questions. No previously conceived moral position escapes the fundamental confrontation posed by contemporary nuclear strategy. Many have noted the similarity of the statements made by eminent scientists and Vatican II's observation that we are forced today "to undertake a completely fresh reappraisal of war." The task before us is not simply to repeat what we have said before; it is first to consider anew whether and how our religious-moral tradition can assess, direct, contain and, we hope, help to eliminate the threat posed to the human family by the nuclear arsenals of the world. Pope John Paul II captured the essence of the problem during his pilgrimage to Hiroshima: "In the past it was possible to destroy a village, a town, a region, even a country. Now it is the world planet that has come under threat." (54)

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In light of these perspectives we address three questions more explicitly: 1) counter-population warfare 2) initiation of nuclear war 3) limited nuclear war

1. Counter-Population Warfare

Under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass slaughter be used for the purpose of destroying population centers or other predominantly civilian targets. Popes have repeatedly condemned "total war," which implies such use. For example, as early as 1954 Pope Pius XII condemned nuclear warfare "when it entirely escapes the control of man" and results in "the pure and simple annihilation of all human life within the radius of action." (64) The condemnation was repeated by the Second Vatican Council:

"Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation." (65)

Retaliatory action, whether nuclear or conventional, which would indiscriminately take many wholly innocent lives, lives of people who are in no way responsible for reckless actions of their government, must also be condemned. This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck. No Christian can rightfully carry out orders or policies deliberately aimed at killing non-combatants. (66)

We make this judgment at the beginning of our treament of nuclear strategy precisely because the defense of the principle of non-combatant immunity is so important for an ethic of war and because the nuclear age has posed such extreme problems for the principle. Later in this letter we shall discuss specific aspects of U.S. policy in light of this principle and in light of recent U.S. policy statements stressing the determination not to target directly or strike directly against civilian population. Our concern about protecting the moral value of non-combatant munity, however, requires that we make a clear reassertion of e principle our first word on this matter.

2. Initiation of Nuclear Warfare

We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare on however restricted a scale can be morally justified. Non-nuclear attacks by another state must be resisted by other than nuclear means. Therefore, a serious moral obligation exists to develop non-nuclear defensive strategies as rapidly as possible.

A serious debate is under way on this issue. (67) It is cast in political terms, but it has a significant moral dimension. Some have argued that at the very beginning of a war nuclear weapons might be used, only against military tergets, perhaps in limited numbers. Indeed it has long been American and NATO policy that nuclear weapons, especially so-called tactical nuclear weapons, would likely be used if NATO forces in Europe seemed in danger of losing a conflict that until then had been restricted to conventional weapons. Large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons are now deployed in Europe by the NATO forces and about as many by the Soviet Union. Some are substantially smaller than the bomb used on Hiroshima, some are larger. Such weapons, if employed in great numbers, would totally devastate the densely populated countries of Western and Central Europe.

Whether under conditions of war in Europe, parts of Asia or the Middle East, or the exchange of strategic weapons directly between the United States and the Soviet Union, the difficulties of limiting the use of nuclear weapons are immense. A number of expert witnesses advise us that commanders operating under conditions of battle probably would not be able to exercise strict control; the number of weapons used would rapidly increase, the targets would be expanded beyond the military and the level of civilian casualties would rise enormously. (68) No one can be certain that this escalation would not occur, even in the face of political efforts to keep such an exchange 'limited." The chances of keeping use limited seem remote, and the consequences of escalation to mass destruction would be appalling. Former public officials have testified that it is improbable that any nuclear war could actually be kept limited. Their testimony and the consequences involved in this problem lead us to conclude that the danger of escalation is so great that it would be morally unjustifiable to initiate nuclear war in any form. The danger is rooted not only in the technology of our weapons systems, but in the weakness and sinfulness of human communities. We find the moral responsibility of beginning nuclear war not justified by rational political objectives.

This judgment affirms that the willingness to initiate nuclear war entails a distinct, weighty moral responsibility; it involves transgressing a fragile barrier — political, psychological, and moral — which has been constructed since 1945. We express repeatedly in this letter our extreme skepticism about the prospects for controlling a nuclear exchange, however limited the first use might be. Precisely because of this skepticism, we judge resort to nuclear weapons to counter a conventional attack to be morally unjustifiable. (69) Consequently we seek to reinforce the barrier against any use of nuclear weapons. Our support of a "no first use" policy must be seen in this light.

At the same time we recognize the responsibility the United States has had and continues to have in assisting allied nations in their defense against either a conventional or a nuclear attack. Especially in the European theater, the deterrence of a *nuclear* attack may require nuclear weapons for a time, even though their possession and deployment must be subject to rigid restrictions.

3. Limited Nuclear War

It would be possible to agree with our first two conclusions and still not be sure about retaliatory use of nuclear weapons in what is called a "limited exchange." The issue at stake is the *real as opposed to the* theoretical possibility of a "limited nuclear exchange."

We recognize that the policy debate on this question is inconclusive and that all participants are left with hypothetical projections about probable reactions in a nuclear exchange. While not trying to adjudicate the technical debate, we are aware of it and wish to raise a series of questions which challenge the actual meaning of "limited" in this discussion.

— Would leaders have sufficient information to know what is happening in a nuclear exchange?

— Would they be able under the conditions of stress, time pressures, and fragmentary information to make the extraordinarily precise decision needed to keep the exchange limited if this were technically possible?

— Would military commanders be able in the midst of the destruction and confusion of a nuclear exchange to maintain a policy of "discriminate targeting?" Can this be done in modern warfare waged across great distances by aircraft and missiles?

— Given the accidents we know about in peacetime conditions, what assurances are there that computer errors could be avoided in the midst of a nuclear exchange?

— Would not the casualties, even in a war defined as limited by strategists, still run in the millions?

— How "limited" would be the long-term effects of radiation, famine, social fragmentation and economic dislocation?

Unless these questions can be answered satisfactorily, we will continue to be highly skeptical about the real meaning of "limited." One of the criteria of the just-war tradition is a reasonable hope of success in bringing about justice and peace. We must ask whether such a reasonable hope can exist once nuclear weapons have been exchanged. The burden of proof remains on those who assert that meaningful limitation is possible.

A nuclear response to either conventional or nuclear attack can cause destruction which goes far beyond "legitimate defense." Such use of nuclear weapons would not be justified.

In the face of this frightening and highly speculative debate on a matter involving millions of human lives, we believe the most effective contribution or moral judgment is to introduce perspectives by which we can assess the empirical debate. Moral perspective should be sensitive not only to the quantitative dimensions of a question, but to its psychological, human and religious characteristics as well. The issues of limited war is not simply the size of weapons contemplated or the strategies projected. The debate should include the psychological and political significance of crossing the boundary from the conventional to the nuclear arena in any form. To cross this divide is to enter a world where we have no experience of control, much testimony against its possibility and therefore no moral justification for submitting the human community to this risk. (70) We therefore express our view that the first imperative is to prevent any use of nuclear weapons and our hope that leaders will resist the notion that nuclear conflict can be limited, contained or won in any traditional sense.

D. Deterrence in Principle and Practice

The moral challenge posed by nuclear weapons is not exhausted by an analysis of their possible uses. Much of the political and moral debate of the nuclear age has concerned the strategy of deterrence. Deterrence is at the heart of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, currently the most dangerous dimension of the nuclear arms race.

1. The Concept and Development of Deterrence Policy

The concept of deterrence existed in military strategy long before the nuclear age, but it has taken on a new meaning and significance since 1945. Essentially deterrence means "dissuasion of a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict, often by the threat of unacceptable, retaliatory damage." (71) In the nuclear age deterrence has become the centerpiece of both U.S. and Soviet policy. Both superpowers have for many years now been able to promise a retaliatory response which can inflict "unacceptable damage." A situation of stable deterrence depends on the ability of each side to deploy its retaliatory forces in ways that are not vulnerable to an attack (i.e., protected against a "first-strike"); preserving stability requires a willingness by both sides to refrain from deploying weapons which appear to have a first strike capability.

This general definition of deterrence does not explain either the elements of a deterrence strategy or the evolution of deterrence policy since 1945. A detailed description of either of these subjects would require an extensive essay using materials which can be found in abundance in the technical literature on the subject of deterrence. (72) Particularly significant is the relationship between "declaratory policy" (the public explanation of our strategic intentions and capabilities) and "action policy" (the actual planning and targeting policies to be followed in a nuclear attack).

The evolution of deterrence strategy has passed through several stages of declaratory policy. Using the U.S. case as an example, there is a significant difference between "massive retaliation" and "flexible response," and between "mutual assured destruction" and "countervailing strategy." It is also possible to distinguish between "counterforce" and "countervalue" targeting policies; and to contrast a posture of "minimum deterrence" with "extended deterrence." These terms are well known in the technical debate on nuclear policy; they are less well known and sometimes loosely used in the wider public debate. It is important to recognize that there has been substantial continuity in U.S. action policy in spite of real changes in declaratory policy. (73)

The recognition of these different elements in the deterrent and the evolution of policy means that moral assessment of deterrence requires a series of distinct judgments. They include: an analysis of the *factual character* of the deterrent (e.g., what is involved in targeting doctrine); analysis of the *historical development* of the policy (e.g., whether changes have occurred which are significant for moral analysis of the policy); the relationship of deterrence policy and other aspects of *U.S.-Soviet affairs;* and determination of the key *moral questions* involved in deterrence policy.

2. The Moral Assessment Deterrence

The distinctively new dimensions of nuclear deterrence were recognized by policymakers and strategists only after much reflection. Similarly, the moral challenge posed by nuclear deterrence was grasped only after careful deliberation. The moral and political paradox posed by deterrence was concisely stated by Vatican II:

"Undoubtedly, armaments are not amassed merely for use in wartime. Since the defensive strength of any nation is thought to depend on its capacity for immediate retaliation, the stockpiling of arms which grows from year to year serves, in a way

hitherto unthought of, as a deterrent to potential attackers. Many people look upon this as the most effective way known at the present time for maintaining some sort of peace among nations. Whatever one may think of this form of deterrent, people are convinced that the arms race, which quite a few countries have entered, is no infallible way of maintaining real peace and that the resulting so-called balance of power is no sure genuine path to achieving it. Rather than eliminate the causes of war, the arms race serves only to aggravate the position. As long as extravagant sums of money are poured into the development of new weapons, it is impossible to devote adequate aid in tackling the misery which prevails at the present day in the world. Instead of eradicating international conflict once and for all, the contagion is spreading to other parts of the world. New approaches, based on reformed attitudes, will have to be chosen in order to remove this stumbling block, to free the earth from its pressing anxieties, and give back to the world a genuine peace." (74)

Without making a specific moral judgment on deterrence, the council clearly designated the elements of the arms race: the tension between "peace of a sort" preserved by deterrence and "genuine peace" required for a stable international life; the contradiction between what is spent for destructive capacity and what is needed for constructive development.

In the post-conciliar assessment of war and peace and specifically of deterrence, different parties to the political-moral debate within the church and in civil society have focused on one or another aspect of the problem. For some, the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 means that deterrence has worked, and this fact satisfies the demands of both the political and the moral order. Others contest this assessment by highlighting the risk of failure involved in continued reliance on deterrence and pointing out how politically and morally catastrophic even a single failure would be. Still others note that the absence of nuclear war is not necessarily proof that the policy of deterrence has prevented it. Indeed, some would find in the policy of deterrence the driving force in the superpower arms race. Still other observers, many of them Catholic moralists, have stressed that deterrence may not morally include the intention of deliberately attacking civilian populations or non-combatants.

The statements of the NCCB-USCC over the past several years have both reflected and contributed to the wider moral debate on deterrence. In the NCCB pastoral letter "To Live In Christ Jesus" (1976), we focused on the moral limits of declaratory policy while calling for stronger measures of arms control. (75) In 1979 Cardinal John Krol speaking for the USCC in support of SALT II ratification brought into focus the other element of the deterrence problem: The actual use of nuclear weapons may have been prevented (a moral good), but the risk of failure and the physical harm and moral evil resulting from possible nuclear war remained.

"This explains," Cardinal Krol stated, "the Catholic dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence and the urgency of the Catholic demand that the nuclear arms race be reversed. It is of the utmost importance that negotiations proceed to meaningful and continuing reductions in nuclear stockpiles and eventually to the phasing out altogether of nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutual-assured destruction." (76)

These two texts, along with the conciliar statement, have influenced much of Catholic opinion expressed recently on the nuclear question.

In June 1982, Pope John Paul II provided new impetus and insight to the moral analysis with his statement to the U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament. The pope first situated the problem of deterrence within the context of world politics. No power, he observes, will admit to wishing to start a war, but each distrusts others and considers it necessary to mount a strong defense against attack. He then discusses the notion of deterrence:

"Many even think that such preparations constitute the way — even the only way — to safeguard peace in some fashion or at least to impede to the utmost in an efficacious way the outbreak of wars, especially major conflicts which might lead to the ultimate holocaust of humanity and the destruction of the civilization that man has constructed so laboriously over the centuries.

"In this approach one can see the 'philosophy of peace' which was proclaimed in the ancient Roman principle: *Si vis pacem, para bellum.* Put in modern terms, this 'philosophy' has the label of 'deterrence' and one can find it in various guises of the search for a 'balance of forces' which sometimes has been called, and not without reason, the 'balance of terror.' " (77)

Having offered this analysis of the general concept of deterrence, the Holy Father introduces his considerations of disarmament, especially, but not only, nuclear disarmament. Pope John Paul II makes this statement about the morality of deterrence:

"In current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion." (78)

In Pope John Paul II's assessment we perceive two dimensions of the contemporary dilemma of deterrence. One dimension is the danger of nuclear war with its human and moral costs. The possession of nuclear weapons, the continuing quantitative growth of the arms race and the danger of nuclear proliferation all point to the grave danger of basing "peace of a sort" on deterrence. The other dimension is the independence and freedom of nations and entire peoples, including the need to protect smaller nations from threats to their independence and integrity. Deterrence reflects the radical distrust which marks international politics, a condition identified as a major problem by Pope John XXIII in "Peace on Earth" and reaffirmed by Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II. Thus a balance of forces, preventing either side from achieving superiority, can be seen as a means of safeguarding both dimensions.

The moral duty today is to prevent nuclear war from ever occurring *and* to protect and preserve those key values of justice, freedom and independence which are necessary for personal dignity and national integrity. In reference to these issues, Pope John Paul II judges that deterrence may still be judged morally acceptable, "certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament."

On more than one occasion the Holy Father has demonstrated his awareness of the fragility and complexity of the deterrence relationship among nations. Speaking to UNESCO in June 1980, he said:

"Up to the present, we are told that nuclear arms are a force of dissuasion which have prevented the eruption of a major war. And that is probably true. Still, we must ask if it will always be this way." (79)

In a more recent and more specific assessment Pope John Paul II told an international meeting of scientists on Aug. 23, 1982: "You can more easily ascertain that the logic of nuclear deterrence cannot be considered a final goal or an appropriate and secure means for safeguarding international peace." (80)

Relating Pope John Paul's general statements to the specific policies of the U.S. deterrent requires both judgments of fact and an application of moral principles. In preparing this letter we have tried through a number of sources to determine as precisely as possible the factual character of U.S. deterrence strategy. Two questions have particularly concerned us: 1) the targeting doctrine and strategic plans for the use of the deterrent, particularly their impact on civilian casualties; and 2) the relationship of deterrence strategy and nuclear war-fighting capability to the likelihood that war will in fact be prevented.

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Targeting doctrine raises significant moral questions because it is a significant determinant of what would occur if nuclear weapons were ever to be used. Although we acknowledge the need for deterrent, not all forms of deterrence are morally acceptable. There are moral limits to deterrence policy as well as to policy regarding use. Specifically, it is not morally acceptable to intend to kill the innocent as part of a strategy of deterring nuclear war. The question of whether U.S. policy involves an intention to strike civilian centers (directly targeting civilian populations) has been one of our factual concerns.

This complex question has always produced a variety of responses, official and unofficial in character. The NCCB committee has received a series of statements of clarification of policy from U.S. government officials. (81) Essentially these statements declare that it is not U.S. strategic policy to target the Soviet civilian population as such or to use nuclear weapons deliberately for the purpose of destroying population centers. These statements respond, in principle at least, to one moral criterion for assessing deterrence policy: the immunity of noncombatants from direct attack either by conventional or nuclear weapons.

These statements do not address or resolve another very troublesome moral problem, namely, that an attack on military targets or militarily significant industrial targets could involve "indirect" (i.e., unintended) but massive civilian casualties. We are advised, for example, that the United States strategic nuclear targeting (SIOP — Single Integrated Operational Plan) has identified 60 "military" targets within the city of Moscow alone, and that 40,000 "military" targets for nuclear weapons have been identified in the whole of the Soviet Union. (82) It is important to recognize that Soviet policy is subject to the same moral judgment; attacks on several "industrial targets" or politically significant targets in the United States could produce massive civilian casualties. The number of civilians who would necessarily be killed by such strikes is horrendous. (83) This problem is unavoidable because of the way modern military facilities and production centers are so thoroughly interspersed with civilian living and working areas. It is aggravated if one side deliberately positions military targets in the midst of a civilian population.

In our consultations, administration officials readily admitted that, while they hoped any nuclear exchange could be kept limited, they were prepared to retaliate in a massive way if necessary. They also agreed that once any substantial numbers of weapons were used, the civilian casualty levels would quickly become truly catastrophic and that even with attacks limited to "military" targets the number of deaths in a substantial exchange would be almost indistinguishable from what might occur if civilian centers had been deliberately and directly struck. These possibilities pose a different moral question and are to be judged by a different moral criterion: the principle of proportionality.

While any judgment of proportionality is always open to differing evaluations, there are actions which can be decisively judged to be disproportionate. A narrow adherence exclusively to the principle of non-combatant immunity as a criterion for policy is an inadequate moral posture for it ignores some evil and unacceptable consequences. Hence, we cannot be satisfied that the assertion of an intention not to strike civilians directly or even the most honest effort to implement that intention by itself constitutes a "moral policy" for the use of nuclear weapons.

The location of industrial or militarily significant economic targets within heavily populated areas or in those areas affected by radioactive fallout could well involve such massive civilian casualties that in our judgment such a strike would be deemed morally disproportionate, even though not intentionally indiscriminate.

The problem is not simply one of producing highly accurate weapons that might minimize civilian casualities in any single explosion, but one of increasing the likelihood of escalation at a level where many, even "discriminating," weapons would cumulatively kill very large numbers of civilians. Those civilian deaths would occur both immediately and from the long-term effects of social and economic devastation.

A second issue of concern to us is the relationship of deterrence doctrine to war-fighting strategies. We are aware of the argument that war-fighting capabilities enhance the credibility of the deterrent, particularly the strategy of extended deterrence. But the development of such capabilities raises other strategic and moral questions. The relationship of war-fighting capabilities and targeting doctrine exemplifies the difficult choices in this area of policy. Targeting civilian populations would violate the principle of discrimination — one of the central moral principles of a Christian ethic of war. But "counterforce targeting," while preferable from the perspective of protecting civilians, is often joined with a declaratory policy which conveys the notion that nuclear war is subject to precise rational and moral limits. We already have expressed our severe doubts about such a concept. Furthermore, a purely counterforce strategy may seem to threaten the viability of other nations' retaliatory forces, making deterrence unstable in a crisis and war more likely.

While we welcome any effort to protect civilian populations, we do not want to legitimize or encourage moves which extend deterrence beyond the specific objective of preventing the use of nuclear weapons or other actions which could lead directly to a nuclear exchange.

These considerations of concrete elements of nuclear deterrence policy, made in light of John Paul II's evaluation, but applying it through our own prudential judgments, lead us to a strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence. We cannot consider it adequate as a long-term basis for peace.

This strictly conditioned judgment yields *criteria* for morally assessing the elements of deterrence strategy. Clearly, these criteria demonstrate that we cannot approve of every weapons system, strategic doctrine, or policy initiative advanced in the name of strengthening deterrence. On the contrary, these criteria require continual public scrutiny of what our government proposes to do with the deterrent.

On the basis of these criteria we wish now to make some specific evaluations:

1. If nuclear deterrence exists only to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others, then proposals to go beyond this to planning for prolonged periods of repeated nuclear strikes and counterstrikes, or "prevailing" in nuclear war, are not acceptable. They encourage notions that nuclear war can be engaged

in with tolerable human and moral consequences. Rather, we must continually say no to the idea of nuclear war.

2. If nuclear deterrence is our goal, "sufficiency" to deter is an adequate strategy; the quest for nuclear superiority must be rejected.

3. Nuclear deterrence should be used as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament. Each proposed addition to our strategic system or change in strategic doctrine must be assessed precisely in light of whether it will render steps toward "progressive disarmament" more or less likely.

Moreover, these criteria provide us with the means to make some judgments and recommendations about the present direction of U.S. strategic policy. Progress toward a world freed of dependence on nuclear deterrence must be carefully carried out. But it must not be delayed. There is an urgent moral and political responsibility to use the "peace of a sort" we have as a framework to move toward authentic peace through nuclear arms control, reductions and disarmament. Of primary importance in this process is the need to prevent the development and deployment of destabilizing weapons systems on either side; a second requirement is to ensure that the more sophisticated command and control systems do not become mere hair triggers for automatic launch on warning; a third is the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international system.

In light of these general judgments *we oppose* some specific proposals in respect to our present deterrence posture:

1. The addition of weapons which are likely to be vulnerable to attack, yet also possess a "prompt hard target kill" capability that threatens to make the other side's retaliatory forces vulnerable. Such weapons may seem to be useful primarily in a first strike; (84) we resist such weapons for this reason and we oppose Soviet deployment of such weapons which generate fear of a first strike against U.S. forces.

2. The willingness to foster strategic planning which seeks a nuclear war-fighting capability that goes beyond the limited function of deterrence outlined in this letter.

3. Proposals which have the effect of lowering the nuclear threshold and blurring the difference between nuclear and conventional weapons.

In support of the concept of "sufficiency" as an adequate deterrent, and in light of the present size and composition of both the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals, *we recommend:*

1. Support for immediate, bilateral, verifiable agreements to halt the testing, production, and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems. (85)

2. Support for negotiated bilateral deep cuts in the arsenals both superpowers, particularly those weapons systems which e destabilizing characteristics; U.S. proposals like those for RT (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) and INF (Intermeange Nuclear Forces) negotiations in Geneva are said to signed to achieve deep cuts; (86) our hope is that they will sued in a manner which will realize these goals.

pport for early and successful conclusion of negotiations prehensive test ban treaty.

oval by all parties of short-range nuclear weapons tiply dangers disproportionate to their deterrent val-

al by all parties of nuclear weapons from areas re likely to be overrun in the early stages of war, pid and uncontrollable decisions on their use.

ning of command and control over nuclear weapadvertent and unauthorized use.

nts are meant to exemplify how a lack of unenation of deterrence is meant only to be an vledge the role attributed to deterrence, but extension beyond the limited purpose dishave urged us to condemn all aspects of his urging has been based on a variety of hasized particularly the high and terrible erate use or accidental detonation of nuclear weapons could quickly escalate to something utterly disproportionate to any acceptable moral purpose. That determination requires highly technical judgments about hypothetical events. Although reasons exist which move some to condemn reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence, we have not reached this conclusion for the reasons outlined in this letter.

Nevertheless, there must be no misunderstanding of our profound skepticism about the moral acceptability of any use of nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the use of any weapons which violate the principle of discrimination merits unequivocal condemnation. We are told that some weapons are designed for purely "counterforce" use against military forces and targets. The moral issue, however, is not resolved by the design of weapons or the planned intention for use; there are also consequences which must be assessed. It would be a perverted political policy or moral casuistry which tried to justify using a weapon which "indirectly" or "unintentionally" killed a million innocent people because they happened to live near a "militarily significant target."

Even the "indirect effects" of initiating nuclear war are sufficient to make it an unjustifiable moral risk in any form. It is not sufficient, for example, to contend that "our" side has plans for "limited" or "discriminate" use. Modern warfare is not readily contained by good intentions or technological designs. The psychological climate of the world is such that mention of the term "nuclear" generates uneasiness. Many contend that the use of one tactical nuclear weapon could produce panic, with completely unpredictable consequences. It is precisely this mix of political, psychological and technological uncertainty which has moved us in this letter to reinforce with moral prohibitions and prescriptions the prevailing political barrier against resort to nuclear weapons. Our support for enhanced command and control facilities, for major reductions in strategic and tactical nuclear forces, and for a "no first use" policy (as set forth in this letter) is meant to be seen as a complement to our desire to draw a moral line against nuclear war.

Any claim by any government that it is pursuing a morally acceptable policy of deterrence must be scrutinized with the greatest care. We are prepared and eager to participate in our country in the ongoing public debate on moral grounds.

The need to rethink the deterrence policy of our nation, to make the revisions necessary to reduce the possibility of nuclear war and to move toward a more stable system of national and international security will demand a substantial intellectual, political and moral effort. It also will require, we believe, the willingness to open ourselves to the providential care, power and word of God, which call us to recognize our common humanity and the bonds of mutual responsibility which exist in the international community in spite of political differences and nuclear arsenals.

Indeed, we do acknowledge that there are many strong voices within our own episcopal ranks and within the wider Catholic community in the United States which challenge the strategy of deterrence as an adequate response to the arms race today. They highlight the historical evidence that deterrence has not in fact set in motion substantial processes of disarmament.

Moreover, these voices rightly raise the concern that even the conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence as laid out in a letter such as this might be inappropriately used by some to reinforce the policy of arms buildup. In its stead they call us to raise a prophetic challenge to the community of faith — a challenge which goes beyond nuclear deterrence, toward more resolute steps to actual bilateral disarmament and peacemaking. We recognize the intellectual ground on which the argument is built and the religious sensibility which gives it its strong force.

The dangers of the nuclear age and the enormous difficulties we face in moving toward a more adequate system of global security, stability, and justice require steps beyond our present conceptions of security and defense policy. In the following section we propose a series of steps aimed at a more adequate policy for preserving peace in a nuclear world.